Com. v. Bright, T. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
TENETHIA TONI BRIGHT, : No. 2067 MDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, September 16, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No. CP-14-CR-0001089-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 06, 2017
Tenethia Toni Bright appeals from the judgment of sentence of
September 16, 2016, following her convictions of firearms not to be carried
without a license, possession of a small amount of marijuana, possession of
drug paraphernalia, and obscured plates.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court has aptly summarized the relevant facts of this matter
as follows:
On June 23, 2015, Trooper Trevor Danko
(“Trooper Danko”) observed a red Chevrolet Cavalier
traveling east on Interstate 80 without a license
plate. Trooper Danko effectuated a traffic stop of
the vehicle. Upon approach, Trooper Danko saw a
piece of white paper taped to the back windshield of
the vehicle. The paper was not taped flat against
the glass, so it was only legible upon approach.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(31)(i), 35 P.S.
§ 780-113(a)(32), and 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1332(b)(3), respectively.
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Trooper Danko spoke to the driver through the
passenger window. The driver was [appellant].
[Appellant]’s minor son occupied the front passenger
seat. Trooper Danko identified the odor of fresh
marijuana emanating from the passenger side of the
vehicle. After speaking with [appellant],
Trooper Danko returned to his cruiser to run
[appellant]’s license and registration and to call for
backup.
When Trooper Danko had trouble accessing
[appellant]’s information through his computer, he
re-approached the vehicle to explain the delay.
Trooper Danko then asked [appellant] to exit her
vehicle. At that time, Trooper Danko told [appellant]
he smelled marijuana and asked [appellant] if there
was “any marijuana in the vehicle, or anything [I]
need to know about in the vehicle.” [Appellant]
admitted she had given her son marijuana to hold.
[Appellant]’s son handed a bag of marijuana to
Trooper Danko. When Trooper Danko inquired if
there was anything else in the vehicle he should be
aware of, [appellant] told him she had a firearm in
the back seat.
Trooper Danko asked [appellant] for
permission to search the vehicle. [Appellant] did not
give consent. Trooper Danko explained he was
going to search anyway, because he had probable
cause. Several other Troopers arrived at the scene
and assisted in searching [appellant]’s vehicle. The
Troopers discovered a loaded firearm in the back
seat of the vehicle. During the search, [appellant]
was not restrained.
Opinion and Order, 4/1/16 at 1-2.
Appellant’s omnibus pre-trial motion was denied. On June 27, 2016,
following a stipulated non-jury trial, appellant was found guilty of the
above-mentioned offenses. Appellant was sentenced on September 16,
2016, to an aggregate term of 11½ to 23½ months’ incarceration. Appellant
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filed a timely post-sentence motion on September 23, 2016, which was
denied on December 14, 2016.2 This timely appeal followed on
December 19, 2016. On December 20, 2016, appellant was ordered to file a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal within 21 days pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant complied on January 5, 2017, and the trial
court has filed an opinion. (Docket #48, 50.)
Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:
I. Did the lower court err in denying [appellant]’s
motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a
result of the illegal traffic stop?
II. Did the lower court err in denying [appellant]’s
motion to suppress all evidence obtained as a
result of the violation of the Miranda[3] Rule?
Appellant’s brief at 4 (emphasis added).
Our standard of review where an
appellant appeals the denial of a
suppression motion is well-established:
we are limited to determining whether
the factual findings are supported by the
record and whether the legal conclusions
drawn from those facts are correct. We
may consider the evidence of the
witnesses offered by the prosecution, as
verdict winner, and only so much of the
defense evidence that remains
uncontradicted when read in the context
of the record as a whole. We are bound
by facts supported by the record and
2
The Commonwealth also filed a post-sentence motion requesting an
upward modification of appellant’s sentence which was denied on the same
date. (Docket #44.) The Commonwealth has not filed an appeal.
3
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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may reverse only if the legal conclusions
reached by the court below were
erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Scott, 878 A.2d 874, 877
(Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 749, 892
A.2d 823 (2005) (citations omitted).
Commonwealth v. Smith, 904 A.2d 30, 35 (Pa.Super. 2006).
Here, Trooper Danko stopped appellant for a suspected violation of
Section 1332 of the Vehicle Code, “display of registration plate,” which
provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(a) General rule.--Every registration plate shall,
at all times, be securely fastened to the vehicle
to which it is assigned or on which its use is
authorized in accordance with regulations
promulgated by the department.
(b) Obscuring plate.--It is unlawful to display on
any vehicle a registration plate which:
(3) is otherwise illegible at a
reasonable distance or is obscured
in any manner[.]
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1332(a), (b)(3). Stopping a vehicle on the basis of a
violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1332 requires the police officer to possess
probable cause, as that is a violation that does not require further
investigation. See Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993
(Pa.Super. 2015) (explaining when a traffic stop requires probable cause or
reasonable suspicion).
To determine whether probable cause exists, we
must consider “whether the facts and circumstances
which are within the knowledge of the officer at the
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time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably
trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”
Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 824 (Pa.Super. 2015), appeal
denied, 138 A.3d 3 (Pa. 2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Rodriguez,
585 A.2d 988, 990 (Pa. 1991).
Trooper Danko testified that on June 23, 2015, he was sitting in the
median of I-80 watching eastbound traffic when he observed appellant’s
vehicle. (Notes of testimony, 1/26/16 at 22.) Trooper Danko testified that
appellant’s vehicle did not appear to have a license plate: “It traveled in
front of me and I looked for a registration plate, and I double looked. And I
noticed where a registration plate is supposed to be on a bumper, there’s no
registration plate.” (Id. at 23.) At that time, Trooper Danko initiated a
traffic stop. (Id.) Trooper Danko called in the traffic stop as a vehicle with
unknown registration. (Id. at 24.) It was not until Trooper Danko got out
and approached the vehicle that he noticed a temporary registration taped
to the back windshield. (Id. at 24-25, 42.)
Clearly, Trooper Danko had probable cause to stop appellant based on
the fact that he reasonably believed she was in violation of Section 1332 of
the Vehicle Code. Appellant complains that he was mistaken because she
did have a temporary registration taped to her rear windshield. (Appellant’s
brief at 12.) However, it is well established that a mistake of fact, if
reasonable, can support a finding of probable cause to stop a motor vehicle.
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See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Rachau, 670 A.2d 731, 735 (Pa.Cmwlth.
1996) (distinguishing between a mistake of fact and a mistake of law).
Here, Trooper Danko testified that due to the glare off the rear windshield,
he could not see the white paper temporary registration until he had already
stopped appellant’s vehicle. (Notes of testimony, 1/26/16 at 42-43.) The
trial court determined that Trooper Danko’s mistake was reasonable under
the circumstances. (Opinion and Order, 4/1/16 at 4.) We agree. Trooper
Danko had probable cause to stop appellant’s vehicle, and the trial court did
not err in denying appellant’s suppression motion on this basis.
Next, appellant argues that her statements to Trooper Danko were
made during a custodial interrogation and that she did not receive Miranda
warnings. Therefore, appellant contends that her inculpatory statements as
well as the gun and marijuana recovered during the ensuing search of her
vehicle should have been suppressed. We disagree.
In this Commonwealth, the test for custodial
interrogation is whether the suspect is physically
deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is
placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes
that his freedom of action or movement is restricted
by said interrogation. Once it is established that a
defendant is in custody (or his freedom of movement
is curtailed in any significant way), Miranda
warnings are necessary as a condition precedent to
the admission of the accused’s inculpatory
statements.
Commonwealth v. Proctor, 657 A.2d 8, 10 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal
denied, 666 A.2d 1054 (Pa. 1995) (citations omitted). It is well settled that
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the dictates of Miranda do not attach during an investigatory detention such
as a Terry stop. Commonwealth v. Kondash, 808 A.2d 943, 948
(Pa.Super. 2002), citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-478
(1966); Proctor, supra; Commonwealth v. Kloch, 327 A.2d 375,
380-381 (Pa.Super. 1975).
The usual traffic stop constitutes an investigative
rather than a custodial detention, unless, under the
totality of the circumstances, the conditions and
duration of the detention become the functional
equivalent of arrest. Since an ordinary traffic stop is
typically brief in duration and occurs in public view,
such a stop is not custodial for Miranda purposes.
Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 202 (Pa.Super. 1999)
(en banc) (citations omitted). “A motorist has a statutory duty to bring his
vehicle to a stop when a police officer so directs.” Id., citing 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3733(a).
An ordinary traffic stop becomes “custodial” when
the stop involves coercive conditions, including, but
not limited to, the suspect being forced into a patrol
car and transported from the scene or being
physically restrained. Such coercive conditions
constitute “restraints comparable to arrest” so as to
transform the investigative nature of an ordinary
traffic stop into custodial interrogation.
Id. See also Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 581 A.2d 956 (Pa.Super. 1990)
(defendant-motorist not in custody for Miranda purposes when subject to
an ordinary traffic stop, and not placed under arrest, forced to enter a police
patrol car, subjected to coercion, or subject to prolonged questioning).
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Instantly, Trooper Danko testified that he asked appellant to step out
of the vehicle. (Notes of testimony, 1/26/16 at 29.) The conversation took
place on the side of the highway, in between the two vehicles. (Id. at
30-31.) Appellant was not in handcuffs or restrained in any way. (Id. at
32.) Trooper Danko testified that he did not raise his voice or unholster his
weapon. (Id. at 30, 33.) Trooper Danko told appellant that he smelled
marijuana and asked if there was marijuana in the vehicle; appellant stated
that she had given the marijuana to her 17-year-old son to hold. (Id. at
30.) Trooper Danko then asked appellant if there was anything else in the
vehicle that he needed to know about, and appellant related that there was
a weapon in the vehicle. (Id. at 33.) At that point, Trooper Danko called
for backup and they performed a search of the vehicle. (Id. at 31.) Even
during the search, appellant and her son were not handcuffed or restrained
in any way. (Id. at 32.) Trooper Danko estimated that approximately
10-12 minutes elapsed between the time he initiated the traffic stop and the
search of appellant’s vehicle. (Id. at 34.)
Clearly, this was an ordinary traffic stop, and appellant was not in
custody for Miranda purposes. Appellant was not placed under arrest,
handcuffed, forced to enter a patrol car, subjected to coercion, or subjected
to prolonged questioning. Therefore, Miranda warnings were not required.
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For these reasons, the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s
pre-trial suppression motion.4
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/6/2017
4
A third issue raised in appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement, that the trial
court erred in denying her motion to dismiss on the basis that the
Commonwealth failed to preserve exculpatory evidence, has been
abandoned on appeal.
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