Com. v. Wolfe, J. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S52042-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                 :
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    JOHN PHILIP WOLFE                          :
    :
    Appellant                :      No. 1236 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 28, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-67-CR-0001009-2015
    BEFORE:      GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 15, 2017
    Appellant, John Philip Wolfe, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered in the York County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench trial
    convictions of persons not to possess firearms and hunting without securing
    a license.1 We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    In the late 1990s, Appellant was convicted of involuntary deviate sexual
    intercourse (“IDSI”) and burglary. Due to his convictions, Appellant cannot
    possess firearms pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105. On December 2, 2014,
    Officer Kyle Jury encountered Appellant in a hunting tree stand located
    within close proximity to two residences. Appellant was in possession of a
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1) and 34 Pa.C.S.A. § 2711(a)(1), respectively.
    J-S52042-17
    firearm at the time.   Officer Jury recognized Appellant from an incident in
    2013, where Officer Jury had informed Appellant he could not possess
    firearms due to his prior record.         Officer Jury asked Appellant for
    identification and his hunting license, which Appellant did not have on his
    person. As a result, Officer Jury confiscated Appellant’s firearm, confirmed
    Appellant’s criminal history, and placed Appellant under arrest. A search of
    Appellant’s person at the police station revealed a marijuana pipe and a
    small amount of marijuana.
    On March 2, 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with persons
    not to possess firearms, possession of a small amount of marijuana,
    possession of drug paraphernalia, unlawful hunting in a safety zone, and
    hunting without securing a license. Appellant proceeded to a bench trial on
    April 8, 2016.   At the conclusion of testimony, the court took the matter
    under advisement pending the parties’ briefs on the effect of federal case
    law on the constitutionality of Section 6105 of the Crimes Code. The court
    ultimately convicted Appellant on May 13, 2016, of persons not to possess
    firearms and hunting without securing a license.        The court deferred
    sentencing pending the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”)
    report.
    On June 28, 2016, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term
    of two and one-half (2½) to five (5) years’ imprisonment. Appellant timely
    filed a notice of appeal on July 27, 2016. On September 7, 2016, the court
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    ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
    appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).            Appellant filed his Rule 1925(b)
    statement on October 6, 2016.2
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
    WHETHER THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO
    SUPPORT THE CONVICTION OF PERSONS NOT TO
    POSSESS    [FIREARMS]—18  PA.C.S.A. [§] 6105—
    WHERE…APPELLANT PROVIDED CREDIBLE TESTIMONY
    THAT HE RECEIVED NOTICE THAT HIS FIREARMS
    DISQUALIFICATION WOULD EXPIRE?
    WHETHER EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A
    CONVICTION WHEREIN RECENT FEDERAL [CASE LAW]
    RECOGNIZED THAT APPELLANT COULD POSSESS A
    FIREARM?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 4).
    With respect to his first issue on appeal, a challenge to the sufficiency
    of the evidence implicates the following legal principles:
    The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
    evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
    trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
    ____________________________________________
    2
    To preserve claims for appellate review, an appellant must comply
    whenever the trial court orders the appellant to file a concise statement of
    errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    Commonwealth v. Castillo, 
    585 Pa. 395
    , 403, 
    888 A.2d 775
    , 780 (2005).
    This Court, however, may address the merits of a criminal appeal where a
    defendant files an untimely Rule 1925(b) statement, if the trial court had
    adequate opportunity and chose to prepare an opinion addressing the issues
    raised on appeal.       Commonwealth v. Burton, 
    973 A.2d 428
    , 434
    (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc). Here, Appellant did not timely file his Rule
    1925(b) statement. Nevertheless, the trial court received the statement and
    prepared an opinion addressing the issues raised on appeal. Therefore, we
    decline to find waiver on this basis. See 
    id.
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    is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
    applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
    and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.            In
    addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
    established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
    possibility of innocence.        Any doubts regarding a
    defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless
    the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter
    of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
    combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain
    its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a
    reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
    evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire
    record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
    received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact
    while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
    or none of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    874 A.2d 108
    , 120-21 (Pa.Super. 2005)
    (quoting Commonwealth v. Bullick, 
    830 A.2d 998
    , 1000 (Pa.Super.
    2003)).
    After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
    applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Michael E.
    Bortner, we conclude Appellant’s first issue on appeal merits no relief. The
    trial court opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the
    question presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed December 9, 2016, at 5-
    7 (finding: at trial, Appellant stipulated to his prior convictions of IDSI and
    burglary, which are disqualifying offenses pursuant to Section 6105(b);
    additionally, Officer Jury testified he found Appellant with firearm on
    December 2, 2014; while Appellant admitted possession of firearm on that
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    date, Appellant claims evidence was insufficient to sustain conviction
    because he believed his period of firearm disqualification had expired; this
    mistake of law defense does not entitle Appellant to any relief; further,
    Appellant failed to present any evidence to demonstrate his probation officer
    misled him about his firearm disqualification; in fact, probation forms
    Appellant relies on to support claim explicitly explain terms of Appellant’s
    firearm disqualification; moreover, Officer Jury credibly testified to previous
    encounter with Appellant in 2013, where Officer Jury informed Appellant he
    could not possess firearms due to his prior convictions of IDSI and burglary;
    under these circumstances, evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant’s
    conviction of persons not to possess firearms, and Appellant’s challenge to
    sufficiency of evidence fails). Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s first issue on
    the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
    With respect to Appellant’s second issue on appeal, Pennsylvania Rule
    of Appellate Procedure 2119 states in relevant part:
    Rule 2119. Argument
    (a) General Rule. The argument shall be divided into
    as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and
    shall have at the head of each part—in distinctive type or
    type distinctively displayed—the particular point treated
    therein, followed by such discussion and citation of
    authorities as are deemed pertinent.
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a).      Significantly, “[a]n appellate brief must provide a
    discussion of the issue raised along with citations to pertinent legal
    authorities.”   Commonwealth v. Vega, 
    754 A.2d 714
    , 719 (Pa.Super.
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    2000). “This [C]ourt will not assume the role of advocate for an appellant
    when the issues in his brief are improperly raised and undeveloped or
    abandoned, lack support in the record, and are presented without reference
    to legal authority.” 
    Id.
     This Court will consider an issue abandoned where
    an appellant has identified the claim on appeal, but failed to develop it in his
    appellate brief.   Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 
    605 A.2d 1228
    , 1239
    (Pa.Super. 1992), appeal denied, 
    532 Pa. 655
    , 
    615 A.2d 1311
     (1992).
    Abandonment of an issue on appeal results in waiver for purposes of our
    review. 
    Id.
    Instantly, Appellant does not offer any pertinent discussion or citation
    to relevant authority in support of his constitutional challenge to Section
    6105 of the Crimes Code.      Instead, Appellant concedes the issue has no
    merit and states the trial court properly disposed of the issue in its Rule
    1925(a) opinion. Thus, Appellant has abandoned the issue on appeal, and it
    is waived for purposes of our review. See 
    id.
    Nevertheless, even if Appellant had properly preserved this issue, a
    challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a pure question of law.
    Commonwealth v. Proctor, 
    156 A.3d 261
    , 268 (Pa.Super. 2017).                 As
    such, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.
    
    Id.
       This Court presumes “statutes are constitutional and require[s] those
    challenging the constitutionality of a statute to demonstrate that it clearly,
    plainly, and palpably violates the constitution.” Commonwealth v. Felder,
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    75 A.3d 513
    , 516 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 
    624 Pa. 671
    , 
    85 A.3d 482
     (2014).
    “When attacking the constitutionality of a statute, an appellant can
    raise two types of challenges: facial and as-applied.”   Commonwealth v.
    Thompson, 
    106 A.3d 742
    , 763 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal denied, 
    635 Pa. 743
    , 
    134 A.3d 56
     (2016), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 
    137 S.Ct. 106
    , 
    196 L.Ed.2d 87
     (2016). Significantly,
    A facial attack tests a law’s constitutionality based on its
    text alone and does not consider the facts or
    circumstances of a particular case. An as-applied attack,
    in contrast, does not contend that a law is unconstitutional
    as written but that its application to a particular person
    under particular circumstances deprived that person of a
    constitutional right. A criminal defendant may seek to
    vacate his conviction by demonstrating a law’s facial or as-
    applied unconstitutionality.
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    26 A.3d 485
    , 493 (Pa.Super. 2011).
    Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s challenge to 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
    6105 as follows:
    [Appellant] has provided little, if anything, to support a
    constitutional challenge to the statute at issue. This is
    especially true where he has three prior felony convictions,
    all of which are quite serious. And at least two of [those]
    convictions, IDSI and burglary, suggest the sort of future
    dangerousness that warrants barring felons from
    possessing guns. There is thus nothing to distinguish
    [Appellant] from other felons so as to make his conviction
    unconstitutional.
    Moreover, even if [Appellant] had established that he was
    unlikely to commit serious crimes in the future—he did not
    even attempt to make any such showing—this would do
    him no good. Although [Appellant] relies on [U.S. v.
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    Barton, 
    633 F.3d 168
    , 174 (3d Cir. 2011)], which found
    that such a showing could restore a felon’s Second
    Amendment rights, [Binderup v. Attorney General
    United States of America, 
    836 F.3d 336
    , 349 (3d Cir.
    2016)] overruled Barton and foreclosed this possibility….
    [Appellant’s]   as-applied constitutional challenge    is
    therefore meritless.
    To the extent [Appellant] is asserting a facial challenge—
    again, he does not say—this fails [because a] facial
    challenge to a legislative [a]ct is…the most difficult
    challenge to mount successfully…. [E]ven Barton, cited
    by [Appellant], rejected a facial challenge to a similar
    statute [because the] felon dispossession statutes regulate
    conduct which is unprotected by the Second Amendment….
    In light of [applicable] precedent…, [Appellant’s] facial
    challenge is meritless. And again, his as-applied challenge
    is equally meritless where he has failed to articulate any
    reason—convincing or otherwise—why he should be
    allowed to possess guns despite his felony convictions.
    [Appellant’s] second asserted ground for appeal should
    therefore also be rejected.
    (See Trial Court Opinion, filed December 9, 2016, at 9-11) (some citations
    omitted). We see no error in the court’s analysis. Thus, even if Appellant
    had properly preserved his second issue on appeal, it would warrant no
    relief. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/15/2017
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