Com. v. Davis, E. ( 2017 )

J-E03011-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
EUGENE LAMONT DAVIS
Appellant No. 1440 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order April 13, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009685-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., PANELLA, J., LAZARUS, J., OTT, J.,
STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., MOULTON, J., and RANSOM, J.
MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
Appellant, Eugene Lamont Davis, appeals from the order entered April
13, 2015, denying his motion to dismiss which asserted a violation of
Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder rule. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. We affirm.
We derive the following statement of facts and procedural background
of this case from the trial court’s opinion and the record. See Trial Ct. Op.
8/19/2015, at 1-2.
[In March 2014], Philadelphia[1] Police Officers [], in a
marked patrol vehicle, observed [Appellant] driving a vehicle
with tinted windows at a high rate of speed and disregarding a
stop sign. The officers attempted to stop [Appellant’s] vehicle
by operating their lights and sirens. [Appellant] allegedly failed
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1
Philadelphia is the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania. 42 Pa.C.S. §
901(a).
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to pull over for several blocks. During the pursuit, [Appellant]
allegedly sped through two steady red lights and two additional
stop signs, causing another vehicle to swerve out of the way.
[Appellant] was arrested and was charged with driving under the
influence [(“DUI”)] (75 Pa.C.S. § 3802) fleeing and eluding
police (18 Pa.C.S. § 3733), and recklessly endangering another
person [(“REAP”)] (18 Pa.C.S. § 2705). Appellant was also
issued traffic citations under the [] Vehicle Code.2
[In May 2014], [Appellant] was found guilty in absentia on
all four traffic offenses [] [in] the [Philadelphia] Municipal Court -
Traffic Division. The DUI charge was listed in the [General]
Division of the Municipal Court for disposition. A preliminary
hearing was held[], and [Appellant] was bound over for trial [in
the Court of Common Pleas] on all charges. [] [In February
2015, Appellant argued a motion to dismiss the remaining
charges before the court, asserting that subsection (1)(ii) of 18
Pa.C.S. § 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule, barred his
subsequent prosecution. See Notes of Testimony (N.T.),
2/19/2015, at 4. Appellant argued that dismissal was
appropriate because the multiple charges filed against him arose
from the same criminal episode, occurred within the same
judicial district, and the Commonwealth was aware of the
charges when it prosecuted him for the summary offenses. Id.
at 4-11.] [In April 2015], this court denied [Appellant’s] motion
to dismiss. [Appellant] filed a notice of appeal[3] [in May 2015.
No 1925(b) statement was ordered.]
Id. at 1-2 (unnecessary capitalization and some footnotes omitted).
The trial court filed an opinion in August 2015. In June 2016, this
Court issued a memorandum opinion affirming the trial court. Appellant
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2
[Appellant] received [] citations for driving without a license [], reckless
driving [], disregarding a red signal [], and illegal sunscreen []. [75 Pa.C.S.
§§ 1501(a), 3736(a), 311(a)(3)(i), and 4524(e)(1), respectively.]
3
As Section 110 “embodies the same basic purposes as those underlying the
double jeopardy clauses, the interlocutory appealability of double jeopardy
claims has been applied to claims based on Section 110.” Commonwealth
v. Bracaielly, 658 A.2d 755, 759-760 (Pa. 1995).
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petitioned this Court for en banc reconsideration, which was granted in
August 2016.
Appellant raises the following claim for our review:
1. Did not the lower court err in denying [A]ppellant’s motion to
dismiss pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 in that: (i) [Appellant]
was found guilty in Philadelphia Municipal Court’s Traffic
Division on four traffic citations; (ii) the Traffic Division
prosecutions were based upon the same criminal conduct
and/or [a]rose from the same criminal episode as the instant
criminal charges; (iii) the Commonwealth was aware of the
instant charges before the commencement of the trial on the
former charges; and, (iv) these instant charges occurred
within the same judicial district as the former prosecutions in
the Philadelphia Municipal Court’s Traffic Division?
Substituted Brief for Appellant, at 3.
This Court addressed the compulsory joinder rule in our recent
decision, Commonwealth v. Perfetto, --- A.3d --- (Pa. Super. 2017) (en
banc).4 The Perfetto Court held that jurisdiction is no longer an express
element of the four-prong compulsory joinder test; rather, a court must
consider whether all charges occurred within the same judicial district.
Perfetto, --- A.3d ---, *21 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). The Perfetto
Court also held that jurisdiction is implicit in any compulsory joinder
analysis, and in judicial districts with an open traffic court, summary traffic
offenses may be disposed of in a single proceeding in the traffic court, which
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4
A claim regarding compulsory joinder pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 110 raises a
question of law reviewed under a de novo standard of review and a plenary
scope of review. See Commonwealth v. Fithian, 961 A.2d 66, 71 n.4 (Pa.
2008).
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has exclusive jurisdiction to hear it, without violating the compulsory joinder
rule. Id. at *12-14. Further, the Court observed that in the unique context
of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has allocated disposition
of summary traffic offenses solely to the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic
Division. Id. at *16-21. As such, the court concluded that Title 75
summary offense must be disposed of in a proceeding in the Philadelphia
Municipal Court Traffic Division and that a separate proceeding must be held
for the remaining, higher offenses. Id. at *18.
Applying the Perfetto holding to the case sub judice, Appellant’s
subsequent prosecution is not subject to dismissal under compulsory joinder,
as Appellant’s prior summary traffic offenses were adjudicated in the
Municipal Court Traffic Division. The trial court’s denial was proper.
Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
P.J.E. Bender, and Judges Bowes, Panella, Ott, and Stabile
join the memorandum.
Judges Lazarus, Dubow, and Moulton concur in the result.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/19/2017
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