In the Interest of: H.T. a/k/a H.D., a Minor ( 2017 )


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  • J. S58014/17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF:                     :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    H.T. A/K/A H.D., A MINOR                :           PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF:                              :          No. 753 MDA 2017
    C.D., BIOLOGICAL MOTHER                 :
    Appeal from the Order Dated April 4, 2017,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
    Juvenile Division at No. CP-35-DP-0000015-2017
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:            FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2017
    C.D. (“mother”) appeals from the April 4, 2017 order entered in the
    Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County that adjudicated her
    biological daughter H.T. a/k/a H.D. (“minor child”) dependent and, due to
    the presence of aggravated circumstances, ordered that no further efforts to
    preserve or reunify the minor child with mother were necessary. We affirm.
    The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:
    Minor child came into the [Lackawanna County
    Office of Youth and Family Services’ (“Agency”)]
    custody following her discharge from the hospital
    subsequent to her birth on February [], 2017.
    Initially, the Agency was seeking immediate custody
    due to [mother]’s history with the Agency in regards
    to domestic violence, drug and alcohol use,
    homelessness, mental health issues, psychiatric
    hospitalizations, and inability to understand how to
    care for a child. [Mother] has been involved with the
    Agency since 2010, at which time [mother] gave
    birth to a child. [Mother]’s rights were voluntarily
    terminated on that child on September 11, 2012.
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    [Mother] has an IQ score of 64. Case worker
    Jennifer Dunston (hereinafter “Ms. Dunston”)
    testified that [mother] has been diagnosed with PDD
    (pervasive developmental disorder), intellectual
    disability, depression, ODD (oppositional defiant
    disorder), and ADHD (attention-deficit/hyperactivity
    disorder). Since being involved with [mother], the
    Agency has had concerns about [mother]’s cognitive
    and emotional delays. For example, at one time
    [mother] reported to that Agency that she was living
    with two (2) friends but did not know their names or
    where she was living.       In 2010, [mother] met
    someone on the Internet, took a cab to Pittsburgh,
    and upon arrival in Pittsburgh did not have the
    $400.00 to pay the taxi driver.
    Subsequently, [mother] gave birth to another
    child on February [], 2014 and the Agency again
    became involved. It was reported that [mother] was
    not taking her required medications, and that minor
    child was placed into custody with the Agency
    following a domestic violence incident with her
    paramour with whom she resided, [V.S.]. When that
    child was in custody with the Agency, [mother] was
    inconsistent with services and scheduled visits with
    the child. Following the placement of the minor
    child, [mother] was again homeless and unable to
    maintain housing. Ms. Dunston testified that the
    record notes that [mother] did not have an
    understanding     of   the   child’s    development.
    [Mother]’s rights were involuntarily terminated with
    respect to that child on September 17, 2015.
    [Mother] was not present for that hearing, and her
    whereabouts were unknown.
    [Mother]’s rights were voluntarily terminated
    on a third child on June 2, 2016. [Mother] was again
    homeless, and inconsistent with services provided by
    the Agency and visits with that minor child.
    Subsequently, [mother] gave birth to a fourth child,
    J.T., who was placed in custody of the Agency on
    June 10, 2016. [Mother]’s fourth minor child is
    currently in kinship with his paternal aunt and uncle.
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    Regarding minor child J.T., the Agency was granted
    aggravated circumstances on September 19, 2016
    by the Honorable Judge Chester Harhut, with no
    attempts of reunification.      Stephanie Herne, the
    caseworker that worked specifically with [mother]
    and minor child J.T., testified that [mother] could
    have attended twenty-two (22) visits with J.T. but
    only showed to fourteen (14). Ms. Herne further
    testified that [mother] displayed low empathy,
    required prompts to care for the basic needs of the
    minor child during every visitation, and struggled
    with her own hygiene. Since September, [mother]
    made no progress in terms of her ability to care for
    the minor child.       [Mother] consistently missed
    parenting assessments, and is only at the beginning
    stages with the child at issue.
    The Agency has continued to offer [mother]
    with services. The Agency was aware of [mother]’s
    pregnancy with the child at issue in our case in
    September of 2016, and attempted to prepare
    [mother] for said child by offering parenting services
    and through working with Scranton Counseling
    Center. While [mother] did participate in a few
    visitations with minor child J.T., she was very
    inconsistent and unable to care for the child on her
    own. [Mother] was not compliant with any services
    until March of 2017. In March 2017, [mother] began
    attending parenting sessions through the Agency and
    Scranton Counseling Center, attended a medication
    management       appointment      and    a    therapy
    appointment, and completed an intake assessment
    at PATH for drug and alcohol.         While [mother]
    completed an intake for drug and alcohol, she was a
    no-call no-show for her first appointment at PATH.
    The minor child at issue is [mother]’s fifth
    child, and at the time the Agency took custody, the
    father was unknown.        Paternity has since been
    established to be [V.S.]. The Agency still must
    assess [V.S.’s] parenting to assure that he is capable
    to care for the minor child properly. [V.S.] also has
    a history of domestic violence against [mother], and
    was incarcerated for the same in 2014 for a period of
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    one (1) year. The Agency is seeking to reunify the
    minor child with [V.S.], and is not looking to find
    aggravated circumstances against [V.S.]. [V.S.] was
    to begin supervised visitation through the Agency in
    late April.
    Minor child is currently in placement in kinship
    foster care with [mother]’s cousins [T. and S.B.].
    The minor child is also residing with a biological
    sibling who will be adopted by the [kinship foster
    caretakers].    Minor child was born premature at
    thirty-four (34) weeks, was on a feeding tube and
    could not breathe on her own. Minor child was
    discharged from the hospital on February 28, 2017,
    and placed on vitamins and iron due to being born
    premature.     While in the NICU at the hospital,
    [mother] had unlimited access to the minor child but
    had not visited with the minor child since
    February 20, 2017. Currently, minor child does not
    have any medical issues.
    An adjudication hearing was held on April 4,
    2017, wherein this Court found minor child
    adjudicated     dependent,      custody    placement
    remaining with the Agency. This Court found clear
    and convincing evidence that the parental rights of
    [mother] have been involuntarily terminated with
    respect to another child of [mother], and voluntarily
    terminated with respect to two (2) other children of
    [mother].     This Court also found that this is
    [mother]’s fifth child, and that she has not followed
    recommendations of the Agency for the last
    seven (7)     years.         Therefore,   aggravated
    circumstances exist with minor child []. The Court
    held that [mother] is not obligated to accept, nor is
    the [A]gency obligated to provide, services to
    [mother].
    [Mother] filed the current appeal of our April 4,
    2017 Order on May 4, 2017.                   [Mother]
    simultaneously filed a concise statement of
    errors/matters complained of on appeal pursuant to
    [Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)] alleging that following a finding
    of aggravated circumstances, this Court erred as a
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    matter of law and manifestly abused its discretion in
    determining that the Agency is not required to make
    efforts to reunify [mother] and minor child.
    Trial court opinion, 6/1/17 at 1-5 (citations to notes of testimony omitted).
    Mother raises the following issue for our review: “Whether following a
    finding of aggravated circumstances, the trial court erred as a matter of law
    and/or manifestly abused its discretion in determining the Agency is not
    required to make efforts to reunify biological mother and the [minor] child?”
    (Mother’s brief at 6 (capitalization omitted).)
    Our standard of review in dependency cases is well
    established; the standard this Court employs is
    broad. We accept the trial court’s factual findings
    that are supported by the record, and defer to the
    court’s credibility determinations. We accord great
    weight to this function of the hearing judge because
    he is in the position to observe and rule upon the
    credibility of the witnesses and the parties who
    appear before him. Relying upon his unique posture,
    we will not overrule the trial court’s findings if they
    are supported by competent evidence.
    R.P. v. L.P., 
    957 A.2d 1205
    , 1211 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations,
    quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
    Our Supreme Court, in In re M.L., 
    562 Pa. 646
    , 
    757 A.2d 849
    , 850-51 (Pa. 2000), stated that a court:
    is   empowered     by   42   Pa.C.S.[A.]
    § 6341(a) and (c) to make a finding that
    a child is dependent if the child meets
    the statutory definition by clear and
    convincing evidence. If the court finds
    that the child is dependent, then the
    court    may   make     an  appropriate
    disposition of the child to protect the
    child’s physical, mental and moral
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    J. S58014/17
    welfare, including allowing the child to
    remain with the parents subject to
    supervision, transferring temporary legal
    custody to a relative or a private or
    public agency, or transferring custody to
    the juvenile court      of another state.
    42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6351 (a).
    
    Id. (citation omitted).
    A dependent child is one who:
    is without proper parental care or
    control,   subsistence,      education    as
    required by law, or other care or control
    necessary for his physical, mental or
    emotional health, or morals.               A
    determination that there is a lack of
    proper parental care or control may be
    based upon evidence of conduct by the
    parent, guardian or other custodian that
    places the health, safety or welfare of
    the child at risk, including evidence of
    the   parent’s,    guardian’s      or  other
    custodian’s use of alcohol or a controlled
    substance that places the health, safety
    or welfare of the child at risk[.]
    42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6302(1).
    
    Id. (brackets in
    original).
    The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] §§ 6301-65, which
    was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal
    Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”), 42 U.S.C.
    § 671 et seq., controls the adjudication and
    disposition of dependent children.         The policy
    underlying these statutes aims at the prevention of
    children languishing indefinitely in foster care, with
    its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy, and
    long-term parental commitment. Furthermore, the
    1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as required
    by ASFA, place the focus of dependency proceedings
    on the child.       Safety, permanency, and the
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    well-being of the child must take precedence over all
    other considerations, including the rights of the
    parents.
    
    Id. at 1217
    (internal citations to case law omitted).
    Under the definitions section of the Juvenile Act, an aggravated
    circumstance is defined, among other circumstances, as when “[t]he
    parental rights of the parent have been involuntarily terminated with respect
    to a child of the parent.”    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302 (definition of “aggravated
    circumstances,” Subsection (7)).
    Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, if a court finds that
    aggravated circumstances exist in a given case, the
    court must then “determine whether or not
    reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need
    for removing the child from the home or to preserve
    and reunify the family shall be made or continue to
    be made . . . .” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6341(c.1). A court
    may end reasonable efforts at its discretion.” See
    In re A.H., 
    2000 Pa. Super. 357
    , 
    763 A.2d 873
    , 878
    (Pa. Super. 2000).
    In the Interest of L.V., 
    127 A.3d 831
    , 839 (Pa.Super. 2015); accord 
    R.L., 957 A.2d at 1217
    (finding that the existence of an aggravated circumstance
    permits a trial court to suspend efforts at reunification).
    Here,    mother    neither   disputes   the   trial     court’s     dependency
    adjudication nor its aggravated circumstance finding.                   Mother’s sole
    contention is that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the
    Agency is not required to make reunification efforts. We disagree.
    Following a hearing on this matter, where two Agency caseworkers
    and mother testified, the trial court explained its findings of dependency and
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    aggravated circumstances and its decision to order that no further efforts to
    preserve or reunify the minor child with mother were necessary, as follows:
    Based upon my review of the testimony that was
    provided here today, there’s no question that the
    Agency has met by clear and convincing evidence
    that an aggravating circumstance does exist, that
    being [mother] had one other child wherein her
    parental rights were involuntarily terminated.
    The next step would be as to what we do subsequent
    to that. And the Court has made additional findings
    as part of the record here today, that being that
    there’s a seven year history that the Agency has with
    [mother].
    [Minor child] is her fifth child and made reference to
    the fact that one child, her rights were involuntarily
    terminated. There were two others where her rights
    were voluntarily terminated, and a 4th child, [J.T.]
    the third, who was born on May [], 2016, that
    aggravating circumstances existed in that particular
    case with no efforts to reunify child with mother.
    Also, that there is evidence that mother has a history
    of mental illness, which she admitted to on the stand
    today. That there is inconsistent stable housing,
    even though there were periods that there were, but
    there’s still over the seven year period that there’s
    [sic] inconsistencies with regards to stable living
    conditions.
    There’s also a history wherein [mother] did not or
    could not follow the recommendations of the Agency
    over the past seven years. Albeit that there has
    been some effort over the last month. I don’t think
    that’s enough with regards to this particular case
    involving [minor child].
    Notes of testimony, 4/4/17 at 79-80.
    -8-
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    We have carefully reviewed the record in this case.        As the record
    supports the trial court’s factual findings, we discern no abuse of discretion.
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/19/2017
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 753 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 9/19/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024