K.M.G. v. H.M.W. ( 2017 )

J. A16045/17
2017 PA Super 311K.M.G. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
H.M.W., : No. 116 WDA 2017
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order, December 14, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County
Civil Division at No. 2011-1215-CD
BEFORE: STABILE, J., FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., AND STRASSBURGER, J.*
DISSENTING OPINION BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2017
I must respectfully dissent. I conclude that the trial court’s
December 14, 2016 order is not a final, appealable order. Consequently, I
would quash this appeal.
The Majority recognizes that this “Court has often stated that ‘an order
of contempt is not appealable if sanctions were not imposed.’” N.A.M. v.
M.P.W., A.3d , 2017 WL 3378878, at *3 (Pa.Super. January 3,
2017), citing Takosky v. Henning, 906 A.2d 1255, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2006);
Genovese v. Genovese, 550 A.2d 1021, 1022-1023 (Pa.Super. 1988).
Nevertheless, while citing cases that list the long-existing precedent that
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J. A16045/17
support this principle, the Majority finds the facts of this case
distinguishable. I cannot agree.
The Majority first reasons that the trial court’s December 14, 2016
contempt order is a final, appealable order pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 341(a) as
disposing of all claims and all parties because the contempt matter was the
only matter pending on the docket at the time the trial court entered that
order. Specifically, the trial court conducted a hearing on the contempt
matter prior to entering the December 14, 2016 contempt order; the trial
court entered the December 14, 2016 contempt order with a direct finding
that Mother was in contempt; and the text of the December 14, 2016
contempt order indicates that the court contemplated no further proceedings
or orders regarding the matter.
Under the long-established case law in this Commonwealth, however,
these reasons are insufficient to sustain the finality and appealability of the
December 14, 2016 contempt order. Moreover, because contempt
proceedings are usually stand-alone enforcement proceedings of previously
entered orders, such reasoning would render most, if not all, contempt
orders final and appealable without any need for a determination of
sanctions. This is clearly in conflict with numerous other cases that hold
otherwise.
In Rhoades v. Pryce, 874 A.2d 148 (Pa.Super. 2005) (en banc), this
court reaffirmed long-standing precedent that:
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“[a]n appeal may be taken only from a final order,
unless otherwise permitted by rule or statute.”
Hoffman v. Knight, 823 A.2d 202, 205
(Pa.Super.2003); Pa.R.A.P. 341(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A.
Generally, an order finding a party in contempt is
interlocutory and not appealable unless it imposes
sanctions. Wolanin v. Hashagen, 829 A.2d 331,
332 (Pa.Super.2003).
Id. at 151.
In Rhoades, following a finding of contempt for Wife’s failure to sign
necessary insurance forms when ordered to do so, the trial court directed
Wife to sign the forms and imposed attorney’s fees. The question before us
was whether the imposition of counsel fees was a sufficient sanction to make
the contempt order final and appealable. We decided that the award of
attorney’s fees was sufficient in that it was both coercive and compensatory.
Id. at 152-153, citing, among other cases, Mrozek v. James, 780 A.2d
670, 674 (Pa.Super. 2001) (reiterating that “[s]anctions for civil contempt
can be imposed for one or both of two purposes: to compel or coerce
obedience to a court order and/or to compensate the contemnor’s adversary
for injuries resulting from the contemnor’s noncompliance with a court
order.”).
As addressed in another en banc decision of this court, Sonder v.
Sonder, 549 A.2d 155 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc), the sanction must
represent a penalty for the contemptuous behavior, and not merely a
direction to do that which was ordered. In Sonder, we concluded that our
only course was to quash the appeal because “while a finding of contempt
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was entered and an Order of specific performance imposed, no sanctions
were imposed, therefore, this Court is powerless to grant appellant relief on
that Order since he has yet to suffer harm or penalty.” Id. at 160.
Instantly, the trial court specifically stated that it was not imposing sanctions
for Mother’s contemptuous conduct, and therefore, I cannot find that the
present order constitutes a final, appealable determination.
In addressing an alternate basis for appealability, the Majority
determines that notwithstanding the trial court’s statement that it did not
order sanctions, it clearly did just that because it ordered family counseling
and any attendant costs associated therewith.
As noted above, the purpose of civil contempt proceedings is remedial.
See Lachat v. Hinchliffe, 769 A.2d 481, 488 (Pa.Super. 2001). Civil
contempt sanctions are employed to coerce the contemnor into compliance
with the court’s order and, in some cases, to compensate the complainant
for losses sustained. See id.Here, Mother was found in contempt of the trial court’s orders of
January 22, 2016 and April 29, 2016. The latter order rescinded the trial
court’s March 24, 20151 order regarding Father’s partial custody and
reinstated the trial court’s January 22, 2016 order. The January 22, 2016
order directed Mother and Father to utilize the Child Access Center located in
1 I note that a typographical error appears in the first paragraph of the
order, which indicates that the order was entered on March 24, 2015, as
opposed to March 24, 2016.
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Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, to facilitate Father’s periods of custody and
Father’s transition to unsupervised periods of partial custody. (Trial court
order, 1/22/16.) In addition to the trial court specifically stating in the order
before us that “no sanctions shall be imposed at this time,” the trial court
directed Mother, Father, and the minor child to attend family counseling.
(Trial court contempt order, 12/14/16.) The Majority fails to explain how an
order directing Mother, Father, and the minor child to attend family
counseling equates to a sanction imposed upon Mother to punish her for her
failure to comply with the prior order or to coerce her to utilize the Child
Access Center to facilitate Father’s periods of custody. Clearly, the trial
court imposed no sanction on Mother, but rather sought to facilitate a better
relationship between Mother and Father in order to facilitate the custody
order and serve the best interest of the minor child.
Consequently, I would find that the contempt order at issue is neither
final nor appealable. Therefore, I would quash this appeal.
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