Com. v. Jones, I. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
ISAIAH JONES, : No. 431 WDA 2014
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, February 10, 2014,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County
Criminal Division at No. CP-65-CR-0003493-2011
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES AND ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 24, 2015
Isaiah Jones appeals from the judgment of sentence of February 10,
2014, following his conviction of robbery and related charges. After careful
review, we vacate and remand for resentencing, but affirm in all other
respects.
The trial court has summarized the history of this case as follows:
The Defendant was charged by Criminal
Information filed at No. 3493 C 2011 with numerous
violations of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, including
Robbery, Aggravated Assault, Simple Assault,
Recklessly Endangering Another Person and Theft by
Unlawful Taking. These charges arose from an
incident that occurred on June 4, 2011 in Monessen,
Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania. The testimony
at trial established that on June 4, 2011,
Jason McCullough was working as an employee of
Del Rosa’s Pizza Shop, and that part of his job
involved delivering pizzas to individuals who had
placed orders. McCullough testified that he knew
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Isaiah Jones before that date, but only knew him by
his nickname, “Oogie.” He testified that he had
delivered an order to “Oogie” at 464 Reed Avenue in
Monessen earlier that evening, and returned to
deliver another order at approximately 10:00 p.m.
McCullough related that as he approached the rear
entrance to the residence, he was struck from behind
and thrown to the ground. He further stated that the
person who had assaulted him then placed a gun to
the side of his head and demanded all of his money.
McCullough gave the person some of the money that
was in the pocket of his pants, and the person
demanded that he give him all of the money or he
would kill him. The person patted McCullough down,
felt more money in his pocket and “pistol whipped”
him before he removed the rest of the money from
his pants. McCullough could see parts of the gun,
and was able to describe the weapon.
When the person who assaulted and robbed
him ran off, McCullough immediately screamed for
help. The resident of the front apartment, Stephanie
Shanefelt, let him inside her apartment and called
9-1-1 for him. McCullough told her, “Oogie robbed
me, Oogie robbed me,” and also called his employer
at the pizza shop to tell him what had occurred.
Although he never saw his face, McCullough
recognized the voice of his attacker as that of the
person who he knew as “Oogie,” and identified
“Oogie” at trial as the defendant, Isaiah Jones.
Stephanie Shanefelt testified that she had
been inside her apartment on the evening of June 4,
2011 when McCullough rang her doorbell, thinking
that the delivery was for her. She suggested that he
try the rear apartment. Shortly thereafter, she
heard yelling, and when she looked outside her
window, she saw “the pizza man” running from
around the side of the house and also saw “Oogie”
running from behind the house and down the street.
She stated that McCullough (the [“]pizza man”)
repeatedly said that “Oogie” had robbed him. She
testified that she knew “Oogie” at the time of the
incident, and also positively identified him at trial.
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Some time after the incident, after Jones had
been charged with these crimes, McCullough testified
that he received an anonymous letter in the mail
offering him $1,000.00 if he would not testify against
Jones, and threatening him with “consequences” if
he chose to do so. Jones’ girlfriend, Pashun
Pettiford, testified that Jones had written to her,
instructed her to send a letter to McCullough, and
specified exactly what words should be contained in
that letter. She identified the letter that McCullough
had received as being the letter she wrote at Jones’
direction.
Keith Barber testified that on February 19,
2012, he h[e]ard sounds of a crash outside of his
North Belle Vernon home at approximately
10:20 p.m. He saw that a SUV had collided with a
tree across the street from hi[s] house. He heard
police shouting to “come out of the car.” He was on
his way to see if his neighbor was all right, and
noted that his back gate was open. He went to the
back yard to investigate, and when he opened the
door to his shed, a tall individual wearing a dark
hoodie and jeans came out of the shed and ran
away. Barber alerted the police that “they’re back
here,” and the police gave chase. Barber testified
that he immediately went into the shed and spotted
a red ball cap that did not belong to him or any
member of his family. Upon closer examination,
Barber saw a cell phone and a gun and traces of
blood inside of the shed. He stated that he had been
in the shed earlier [and] that none of the items he
discovered, nor the blood smears, had been there
prior to his observing the unknown individual running
out of the shed on that night. He promptly notified
police of his discoveries. Police took custody of the
gun that Barber found in his shed, and also
preserved samples of the blood smears that were
located in the interior of the shed. DNA analysis of
the blood found inside Barber’s shed matched the
sample of blood that was subsequently obtained
from Jones. DNA analysis of the gun found in the
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shed was inconclusive because it contained a DNA
mixture from at least four individuals.
Trial court opinion, 6/4/14 at 1-4 (footnote and citations omitted).
Following a jury trial held November 4, 6, and 7, 2013, appellant was
found guilty of three counts of robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault,
recklessly endangering another person, and theft by unlawful taking. On
February 10, 2014, appellant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum of
5 to 10 years’ incarceration at Count 1, robbery, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9712(a) (visible possession of a firearm during commission of the offense).
At Count 4, aggravated assault, appellant received a concurrent sentence of
1½ to 3 years; at Count 6, recklessly endangering, the trial court imposed
no further sentence. The remaining charges merged for sentencing
purposes. Therefore, appellant’s aggregate sentence was 5 to 10 years’
imprisonment. This timely appeal followed. Appellant has complied with
Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1925(b), 42 Pa.C.S.A., and the trial court has filed an
opinion.
Appellant has raised the following issues for this court’s review:
I. Did the Trial Court impose an illegal sentence
in relying upon the mandatory sentence in
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712, in light of the Superior
Court decision in Commonwealth v. Newman,
2014 PA Super 178 (2014), which declared the
mandatory sentencing statute to be
unconstitutional?
II. Did the Trial Court err in excluding from
evidence the proposed testimony of alibi
witnesses for Defendant?
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III. Did the Trial Court err in allowing the
Commonwealth to introduce evidence tending
to show that Defendant possessed a firearm on
an occasion approximately eight months after
the offenses for which he was tried?
IV. Did the Trial Court err in refusing to grant a
mistrial where the prosecuting attorney elicited
testimony from a witness about an alleged
conversation she had with Defendant’s
attorney, which testimony would have required
counsel to become a witness in the trial to
contradict the same?
Appellant’s brief at 4.
In his first issue on appeal, appellant argues that his sentence is
illegal. As stated above, the trial court imposed the 5 to 10-year mandatory
minimum sentence for crimes committed with firearms pursuant to
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9712. Following the United States Supreme Court’s decision
in Alleyne v. United States, U.S. , 133 S.Ct. 2151 (2013),
Section 9712 has been held unconstitutional in its entirety.
Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206, 213-216 (Pa.Super. 2015),
discussing Commonwealth v. Valentine, 101 A.3d 801 (Pa.Super. 2014);
and Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa.Super. 2014) (en banc).
Therefore, it is necessary to vacate appellant’s sentence and remand for
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resentencing without consideration of the mandatory minimum sentence
provided in Section 9712.1
The Commonwealth argues that any error is harmless because
appellant’s sentence was within the guidelines and the trial court could have
imposed the same sentence without applying the mandatory minimum
sentence pursuant to Section 9712. The Commonwealth’s argument is
misplaced. Regardless of whether the trial court could have imposed the
same sentence without relying on Section 9712 and remained within the
guidelines, the fact of the matter is that the trial court did impose the
mandatory 5 to 10-year sentence required by Section 9712, as requested by
the Commonwealth. (Notes of testimony, sentencing, 2/10/14 at 2, 4.) See
Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748, 750 (Pa.Super. 2014) (“It is
also well-established that [i]f no statutory authorization exists for a
particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to correction. An
illegal sentence must be vacated.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
In addition, the fact that the jury found appellant was in possession of a
firearm at the time of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt is of no moment.
(Notes of testimony, 11/4, 6-7/13 at 423.) The unconstitutional provisions
of Section 9712 are not severable, and the trial court cannot create a new
procedure in an effort to impose the mandatory minimum sentence in
1
Appellant did not raise this issue in the court below. However, it is well
settled that a challenge to the legality of a sentence is non-waivable.
Ferguson, 107 A.3d at 213 n.4.
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compliance with Alleyne by allowing the jury to determine the factual
predicate of Section 9712. Ferguson, 107 A.3d at 216.
In his second issue on appeal, appellant argues that the trial court
abused its discretion by excluding proposed alibi witnesses. According to
appellant, two alibi witnesses, Earl Pinkney and Ethan Pinkney, could testify
that he was not in the vicinity of his home at the time of the robbery. The
trial court ruled that appellant could not call these witnesses at trial because
he failed to comply with the notice requirements of Pa.R.Crim.P. 567.
Rule 567 provides, in relevant part:
Rule 567. Notice of Alibi Defense
(A) Notice by Defendant. A defendant who
intends to offer the defense of alibi at trial shall
file with the clerk of courts not later than the
time required for filing the omnibus pretrial
motion provided in Rule 579 a notice specifying
an intention to offer an alibi defense, and shall
serve a copy of the notice and a certificate of
service on the attorney for the Commonwealth.
(1) The notice and a certificate of
service shall be signed by the
attorney for the defendant, or the
defendant if unrepresented.
(2) The notice shall contain specific
information as to the place or
places where the defendant claims
to have been at the time of the
alleged offense and the names and
addresses of the witnesses whom
the defendant intends to call in
support of the claim.
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(B) Failure to File Notice.
(1) If the defendant fails to file and
serve the notice of alibi as required
by this rule, the court may exclude
entirely any evidence offered by
the defendant for the purpose of
proving the defense, except
testimony by the defendant, may
grant a continuance to enable the
Commonwealth to investigate such
evidence, or may make such other
order as the interests of justice
require.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 567.
Accordingly, Rule [567] enables the trial court, when
the notice requirement is not met, to take such
measures as preventing an alibi witness from
testifying and to deny a request for an alibi
instruction. Rule [567] is “designed to enhance the
search for truth in the criminal trial by insuring both
the defendant and the state ample opportunity to
investigate certain facts crucial to the determination
of guilt or innocence.”
Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 646 A.2d 1211, 1219 (Pa.Super. 1994),
appeal denied, 655 A.2d 512 (Pa. 1995), quoting Commonwealth v.
Fernandez, 482 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa.Super. 1984). “The imposition of
sanctions for violations of Pa.R.Crim.P. [567] rests in the sole discretion of
the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 571 A.2d 1062, 1067
(Pa.Super. 1990), appeal denied, 600 A.2d 953 (Pa. 1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 945 (1992) (citations omitted).
Instantly, appellant filed his alibi notice on July 5, 2012, well after the
time required for filing pre-trial motions. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 579(A) (“Except
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as otherwise provided in these rules, the omnibus pretrial motion for relief
shall be filed and served within 30 days after arraignment, unless
opportunity therefor did not exist, or the defendant or defense attorney, or
the attorney for the Commonwealth, was not aware of the grounds for the
motion, or unless the time for filing has been extended by the court for
cause shown.”). Appellant waived formal arraignment on October 6, 2011.
In his alibi notice, appellant provided the names, addresses, and
telephone numbers of the two witnesses. (Notes of testimony, 11/4/13 at
3.)2 However, appellant did not provide any specific information regarding
where he was at the time the crime was alleged to have been committed, as
required by Rule 567. Appellant stated only that he “was not in the vicinity”
as alleged in the information. A hearing was held on July 11, 2012, before
the Honorable Alfred B. Bell, who granted appellant 30 days to file an
amended alibi notice. (Notes of testimony, 7/11/12 at 13-14; Docket #30.)
A continuance was granted until the September trial term to give appellant
time to provide the Commonwealth with the requested information. (Id. at
14.)
2
In its original Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court states that, “No contact
information was provided by the defense other than the names of these
individuals.” (Trial court opinion, 6/4/14 at 5.) Subsequently, after the
record was transmitted to this court, it came to the trial court’s attention
that appellant had, in fact, provided the Commonwealth with the witnesses’
names, addresses, and telephone numbers. (Notes of testimony, 8/22/14 at
3.) Subsequently, the trial court filed a supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion
on August 26, 2014.
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On November 1, 2013, the Commonwealth filed a second motion to
exclude alibi defense, noting that appellant had failed to provide any of the
ordered alibi defense information. (Docket #56.) A hearing was held on the
motion on November 4, 2013, before the Honorable Rita Donovan
Hathaway. The Commonwealth argued that on July 11, 2012, Judge Bell
had given appellant 30 days to provide additional information and appellant
failed to comply. (Notes of testimony, 11/4/13 at 2.) Appellant conceded
that he failed to amend his alibi notice to include specific information
regarding where appellant claimed to be at the time the crime was
committed. (Id. at 3-4.) Appellant argued that he provided the
Commonwealth with the witnesses’ names, addresses, and telephone
numbers and it was up to the Commonwealth to investigate the witnesses.
(Id. at 3-6.) According to appellant, “I’m being blamed for not providing
information that she could have or Officer Gray could have gotten with a
phone call or a stop by.” (Id. at 5.) Judge Hathaway granted the
Commonwealth’s motion and ruled that while appellant could testify as to his
whereabouts at the time of the alleged crime, the proposed alibi witnesses
would be excluded. (Id. at 6.)
We determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the Commonwealth’s motion to exclude alibi defense. Appellant’s
initial alibi notice was manifestly untimely, having been filed approximately
eight months after arraignment. Then, despite having been given 30 days
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to file an amended alibi notice in compliance with Rule 567, appellant failed
to do so. Contrary to appellant’s argument, it is not the Commonwealth’s
responsibility to investigate his proposed alibi witnesses to ascertain what
they are likely to testify to at trial. Rule 567 is explicit that “The notice shall
contain specific information as to the place or places where the defendant
claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 567(A)(2). On the eve of trial, some 16 months after
Judge Bell’s order, appellant had still not filed an amended alibi notice.
There is no error here.
Next, appellant argues that the trial court erred in granting the
Commonwealth’s motion in limine to admit the firearm recovered from
Barber’s shed. Appellant maintains that there was no evidence linking the
gun to the robbery and any probative value the gun had was outweighed by
its prejudicial effect. (Appellant’s brief at 23.) We disagree.
“The admission of evidence is a matter vested within the sound
discretion of the trial court, and such a decision shall be reversed only upon
a showing that the trial court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v.
Broaster, 863 A.2d 588, 591-592 (Pa.Super. 2004), citing Commonwealth
v. Reid, 811 A.2d 530, 550 (Pa. 2002).
According to Pa.R.E. 401, “‘Relevant evidence’
means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence.”
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Relevant evidence may nevertheless be
excluded ‘if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.’[Footnote 4]
[Footnote 4] See Pa.R.E. 403;
Commonwealth v. Kitchen,
730 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super.1999).
Because all relevant Commonwealth
evidence is meant to prejudice a
defendant, exclusion is limited to
evidence so prejudicial that it would
inflame the jury to make a decision
based upon something other than the
legal propositions relevant to the case.
As this Court has noted, a trial court is
not required to sanitize the trial to
eliminate all unpleasant facts from the
jury’s consideration where those facts
form part of the history and natural
development of the events and offenses
with which [a] defendant is charged.
Commonwealth v. Serge, 837 A.2d 1255, 1260-61
(Pa.Super.2003).
In addressing the admissibility of a gun for
demonstrative purposes, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that:
[a] weapon shown to have been in a
defendant’s possession may properly be
admitted into evidence, even though it
cannot positively be identified as the
weapon used in the commission of a
particular crime, if it tends to prove that
the defendant had a weapon similar to
the one used in the perpetration of the
crime.
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Commonwealth v. Williams, 537 Pa. 1, 16, 640
A.2d 1251 (1994).
Id. at 592. “With regard to the admission of weapons evidence, such
evidence is clearly admissible where it can be shown that the evidence was
used in the crime charged.” Commonwealth v. Owens, 929 A.2d 1187,
1191 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 364 (Pa. 2007) (citation
omitted). “Uncertainty whether the weapons evidence was actually used in
the crime goes to the weight of such evidence, not its admissibility.” Id.(citation omitted).
At the hearing on the Commonwealth’s motion, the Commonwealth
argued that the appearance of the gun recovered from Barber’s shed was
consistent with the victim’s description of the gun used in the robbery. The
victim described the gun as a small, black and silver semi-automatic
handgun, not a revolver. (Notes of testimony, 11/4/13 at 7.) The gun
found in Barber’s shed was a small-caliber, black and silver semi-automatic
handgun. (Id. at 8, 12-13.) The gun was black and shiny with silver trim,
which matched the victim’s description to police. (Id.)
In fact, at trial, the victim identified it as the same gun. (Notes of
testimony, 11/4, 6-7/13 at 51; Commonwealth’s Exhibit 12.) Clearly, the
gun was admissible as evidence, whether it was actually the same gun used
in the robbery or not. At a minimum, it tended to prove that appellant had a
weapon similar to the one used in the perpetration of the crime. Although it
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was not recovered until eight months later, it was highly relevant.
Furthermore, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction. (Id. at 416-
417.) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
Commonwealth’s motion to introduce this evidence.
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court should have declared a
mistrial when the Commonwealth elicited testimony from Shanefelt
regarding a conversation she allegedly had with defense counsel
approximately 3-4 months after the crime occurred. On cross-examination,
Shanefelt admitted that she did not identify appellant as the victim’s
assailant the night of the incident, nor three months later, when she
provided police with a written statement. (Id. at 124-127.) On redirect, the
Commonwealth attempted to rehabilitate Shanefelt by questioning her about
a telephone conversation she allegedly had with defense counsel,
Alan J. Manderino, Esq., in September or October 2011. (Id. at 133.)
According to Shanefelt, she told Attorney Manderino that she saw appellant
running away from the house. (Id. at 134.) Shanefelt testified that she told
Attorney Manderino she could identify the perpetrator as appellant. (Id.)
At sidebar, Attorney Manderino made a request for mistrial. (Id. at
135.) Attorney Manderino remembered speaking with Shanefelt but denied
that she ever told him she could identify his client, appellant. (Id. at 136,
138-139.) Attorney Manderino indicated that he would have to call himself
as a witness to refute Shanefelt’s testimony. (Id. at 136-138.) According
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to the prosecuting attorney, Shanefelt had just informed her about the
conversation with Attorney Manderino the previous day. (Id. at 136, 139.)
The trial court denied the motion for mistrial but issued a curative instruction
to the jury as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your patience.
As I told you earlier this morning, sometimes the
attorneys and I have legal matters that we have to
discuss at sidebar outside of your hearing to make
sure that you receive the evidence in a fair and
impartial manner. I am now instructing you to
disregard the questions that Mrs. Patterson asked
the witness pertaining to any possible conversations
with Mr. Manderino. You’re to disregard her
questions, you’re to disregard any answers that the
witness gave, so it’s just like that part never
happened. I should not have allowed those
questions or answers to be given. They were legally
inappropriate so they never happened and I do trust
that you’ll be able to follow that instruction, so if you
have anything in your notes about it just cross it out.
Id. at 144-145.
With regard to the denial of mistrials, the following
standards govern our review:
In criminal trials, the declaration of a
mistrial serves to eliminate the negative
effect wrought upon a defendant when
prejudicial elements are injected into the
case or otherwise discovered at trial. By
nullifying the tainted process of the
former trial and allowing a new trial to
convene, declaration of a mistrial serves
not only the defendant’s interests but,
equally important, the public’s interest in
fair trials designed to end in just
judgments. Accordingly, the trial court is
vested with discretion to grant a mistrial
whenever the alleged prejudicial event
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may reasonably be said to deprive the
defendant of a fair and impartial trial. In
making its determination, the court must
discern whether misconduct or
prejudicial error actually occurred, and if
so, . . . assess the degree of any
resulting prejudice. Our review of the
resulting order is constrained to
determining whether the court abused its
discretion.
Commonwealth v. Hogentogler, 53 A.3d 866, 877-878 (Pa.Super. 2012),
appeal denied, 69 A.3d 600 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted). “The remedy
of a mistrial is an extreme remedy required ‘only when an incident is of such
a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the appellant of a fair and
impartial tribunal.’” Id. at 878 (citations omitted). When the trial court
provides cautionary instructions to the jury in the event the defense raises a
motion for mistrial, “[t]he law presumes that the jury will follow the
instructions of the court.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 786 A.2d 961, 971
(Pa. 2001) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1187 (2003).
Instantly, the trial court issued a prompt and thorough curative
instruction to the jury, instructing them to disregard Shanefelt’s testimony
regarding the alleged conversation with Attorney Manderino. The prejudice
to appellant was minimal. Appellant was able to establish, through
cross-examination, that Shanefelt never told police she could identify the
victim’s assailant. Shanefelt admitted that she never identified “Oogie” as
the individual she saw running from the house the night of the robbery
either in her statement to police that night or in a written statement three
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months later. The first time she identified appellant was at trial. At any
rate, the victim himself testified unequivocally that he is familiar with
appellant and that he was the robber. (Id. at 61.) The trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for mistrial.
Convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded
for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/24/2015
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