Com. v. Bloomfield, C. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTOPHER BLOOMFIELD,
Appellant No. 653 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered February 2, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0000378-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 02, 2017
Appellant, Christopher Bloomfield, filed the instant interlocutory appeal
from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (CCPPC)
denying his motion to dismiss the prosecution of two charges filed pursuant
to the Uniform Firearms Act. Appellant’s motion to dismiss asserted that the
prosecution of his firearms offenses is barred by 18 Pa.C.S. § 110, because
he had previously been convicted of a traffic offense, arising out of the same
criminal episode, in the Traffic Division of the Municipal Court of Philadelphia
(TDMCP). In view of this Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v.
Perfetto, ___ A.3d ___, 2017 WL 3776631 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc), we
are compelled to affirm.
____________________________________________
*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Philadelphia police arrested Appellant on July 28, 2014, and charged
him with carrying a firearm without a license, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106, carrying a
firearm in public in Philadelphia, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108, and failing to properly
employ a turn signal, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3334(b). The facts leading to Appellant’s
arrest, although summarized by the trial court in its opinion, are not
pertinent to this appeal. See Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 3/2/16, at 2-3. On
August 22, 2014, Appellant appeared before the TDMCP and entered a guilty
plea to the traffic offense. Appellant was scheduled to appear for a jury trial
before the CCPPC for the firearms offenses on February 2, 2016. On the eve
of trial, he motioned, inter alia, to dismiss the firearms charges premised on
the compulsory joinder rule set forth in 18 Pa.C.S. § 110. “After [a] full
hearing on February 2, 2016, th[e trial c]ourt formally denied [Appellant]’s
Motion To Dismiss Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.[] § 110(1)(ii), and granted [him]
leave to file an [i]nterlocutory [a]ppeal over the objection of the
Commonwealth.” TCO at 6.
Appellant timely filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement,
and the trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 2, 2016.
Appellant now presents the following question for our review: “Did not the
lower court err in denying [A]ppellant's motion to dismiss pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S. § 110 where [A]ppellant had previously been convicted of an offense
which arose from the same criminal episode as the offense[s] in the instant
case?” Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Section 110 of Title 18 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
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Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision
of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different
facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following
circumstances:
(1) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a
conviction as defined in section 109 of this title (relating to
when prosecution barred by former prosecution for the
same offense) and the subsequent prosecution is for:
(i) any offense of which the defendant could have
been convicted on the first prosecution;
(ii) any offense based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, if such offense was
known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the
time of the commencement of the first trial and
occurred within the same judicial district as the
former prosecution unless the court ordered a
separate trial of the charge of such offense; …
18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1).
Consequently, our Supreme Court has held that
Section 110, known as the compulsory joinder rule, bars a
subsequent prosecution if each prong of the following test is
met:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or
conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based on the
same criminal conduct or arose from the same criminal
episode; (3) the prosecutor in the subsequent trial was
aware of the charges before the first trial; and (4) all
charges [are] within the same judicial district as the
former prosecution.
Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
It is not disputed that the first three prongs of the compulsory joinder
rule were met in the instant case. At issue is Appellant’s contention that
“the two prosecutions occurred within the same judicial district.” Appellant’s
Brief at 9. Appellant provides very little analysis of this aspect of his claim,
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other than to baldly (but not incorrectly) state that the TDMCP and CCPPC
“share the First Judicial District.” Id.Recently, this Court addressed an identical issue in Perfetto. In that
case, as here, there was no dispute with regard to the first 3 prongs of the
compulsory joinder rule. Perfetto, 2017 WL 3776631 at 8. The procedural
history at issue in Perfetto is also virtually identical to the instant matter.
Perfetto was charged with three driving under the influence (“DUI”) offenses
and a related summary traffic offense. Id. at 2. Following a trial held in
absentia, Perfetto was found guilty of the traffic offense in the TDMCP. Id.
Subsequently, he motioned to dismiss his subsequent prosecution for the
DUI offenses premised on the compulsory joinder rule, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110.
Id. In Perfetto, however, the trial court granted the appellant’s motion,
and the Commonwealth appealed.
The Perfetto Court ultimately held that the compulsory joinder rule
did not bar the appellant’s subsequent prosecution, despite the fact that the
TDMCP and CCPPC fall within the same judicial district, thereby reversing the
lower court. Id. at 9. The Perfetto Court reasoned that 42 Pa.C.S. §
1302(a.1)(1)(i) provides a division of labor within the Philadelphia judicial
district where “the exclusive jurisdiction of the court of common pleas is
superseded by the exclusive jurisdiction of a minor court[,]” and, “[i]n
judicial districts with a designated and open traffic court such as
Philadelphia, 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302 expressly defines the jurisdiction of a traffic
court and effectively carves out an exception to the normal operation of the
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compulsory joinder rule.” Id. at 5. Moreover, the Perfetto Court found
that jurisdiction for traffic-related summary offenses rested “solely” in the
TDMCP. Id. at 8.
Therefore, in the context of compulsory joinder, where a
defendant is charged with a summary traffic violation and a
misdemeanor, the Title 75 summary offense must be disposed of
in a proceeding in the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic
Division, which has jurisdiction exclusive of the Court of
Common Pleas, and a separate proceeding must be held for the
remaining, higher offenses.
Id.
As that is precisely what occurred in the instant case, Appellant is not
entitled to relief based on the compulsory joinder rule set forth in 18 Pa.C.S.
§ 110. As such, we conclude that the trial court did not err or otherwise
abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/2/2017
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