Com. v. Peal, L. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 2464 EDA 2015
:
LIONEL PEAL :
Appeal from the Order, July 30, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. MC-51-CR-0041060-2012
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., RANSOM, J. AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 12, 2017
The Commonwealth appeals from the July 30, 2015 order entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that granted appellee
Lionel Peal’s motion to dismiss based on a violation of Pennsylvania’s
compulsory joinder statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 110. In light of this court’s
recent en banc decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto, A.3d ,
2017 WL 3776631 (Pa.Super. 2017) (en banc), we reverse and remand.
The trial court set forth the following:
[O]n October 6, 2012, [appellee] was arrested in
Philadelphia after officers observed him in the area
of an auto accident near 2201 Tremont Street, and
cited him for being involved in an automobile
accident, leaving the scene, striking a tree, etc. He
was arrested and subsequently charged with the
misdemeanor offense of Driving Under
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Intoxication [sic] (DUI) pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 3802, and summary offenses for traffic violations,
including: Failure to Give Info [sic] or Aid, Failure to
Carry a License, Failure to Provide Proof of
Insurance, and Failure to Carry Valid Registration.
On April 23, 2013, [appellee] was found guilty of
Failing to Give Information or Aid in the Philadelphia
Traffic Court; the DUI charge was not adjudicated on
that date. On June 26, 2015, [appellee] moved to
dismiss the DUI charge in Municipal Court before the
Honorable Martin Coleman, arguing that the
Commonwealth was barred from prosecuting him
under the compulsory joinder provisions of
18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 110(ii) because he was previously
prosecuted for and convicted of Failing to Give
Information or Aid. On June 26, 2015,
Judge Coleman denied [appellee’s] motion.
[Appellee] then petitioned for an interlocutory appeal
to the Court of Common Pleas. On July 30, 2015,
the Honorable Michael E. Erdos granted [appellee’s]
petition and dismissed [appellee’s] charges pursuant
to Rule 110.[Footnote 1]
[Footnote 1] On June 19, 2013, the
Philadelphia Traffic Court merged with
the Municipal Court, a sea change
necessitated because of widespread and
rampant corruption throughout Traffic
Court that resulted in numerous federal
indictments. It is therefore unlikely that
the compulsory joinder issue will rear its
head in the future with respect to
summary traffic offenses.
Trial court opinion, 1/28/16 at 1-2 (citation to summary trial exhibit
omitted).
The record reflects that the Commonwealth filed a timely notice of
appeal to this court and, simultaneously and without being ordered to
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pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal. Subsequently, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.
The Commonwealth raises the following issue for our review: “Did the
lower court err when, in contravention of Supreme Court precedent, it
dismissed the charge of driving under the influence pursuant to [the
compulsory joinder statute,] 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 110[,] based on the prior
adjudication of summary traffic offenses?” (Commonwealth’s brief at 4.)
Here, in analyzing whether the compulsory joinder rule barred the
subsequent felony prosecution, the trial court correctly applied the
four-prong test set forth in Commonwealth v. Reid, 77 A.3d 579, 582 (Pa.
2013). Under that test, the compulsory joinder rule bars a subsequent
prosecution if each of the following is met:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or
conviction; (2) the current prosecution was based on
the same criminal conduct or arose from the same
criminal episode; (3) the prosecutor in the
subsequent trial was aware of the charges before the
first trial; and (4) all charges [are] within the same
judicial district as the former prosecution.
Id. (citation omitted; bracket in original).
In applying this test, the trial court found that the compulsory joinder
rule barred appellee’s subsequent DUI prosecution because all four prongs
were satisfied. Preliminary, we note that no dispute exists that appellee’s
prosecution on the summary traffic offense resulted in a conviction, that the
DUI prosecution would be based on the same criminal conduct or arose from
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the same criminal episode, and that the Commonwealth knew of the DUI
charges before the summary trial. In light of Perfetto, 2017 WL 3776631,
however, appellee fails to satisfy the fourth Reid test prong.
In Perfetto, 2017 WL 3776631 at *11, this court held that where a
defendant’s summary traffic offense was to be heard solely in the
Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division pursuant to its jurisdiction in
accordance with Pa.C.S.A. § 1302(a.1)(1)(i), a prior disposition of that
summary traffic offense in traffic court does not bar a later prosecution of
other criminal charges that arose in the same judicial district and at the
same time as the summary traffic offense because Section 1302 carves out
an exception to compulsory joinder and directs that the summary traffic
offense is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the traffic court. Consequently,
appellee’s subsequent prosecution on the misdemeanor DUI charge was not
barred by compulsory joinder.
Order reversed. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/12/2017
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