Com. v. Anderson, D. ( 2015 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DESTANY ROBINSON ANDERSON
Appellant No. 1148 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 10, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0012049-2013
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED JULY 08, 2015
Appellant, Destany Robinson Anderson, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered March 10, 2014, by the Honorable David R. Cashman,
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Anderson contends that the
trial court erred in denying her motion for a new trial based upon the weight
of the evidence. We affirm.
Ebonie Marshal was the owner of a 1999 Ford Explorer. Marshal,
before July 2013, sold the vehicle to Anderson. Due to an issue with
Anderson’s license, Marshall kept the car in her name. Sometime after the
sale Marshall filed an insurance claim, stating that she had been a passenger
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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in the vehicle during a collision. Although she was not injured, the insurance
company issued a three thousand dollar check for the damages. Upon
learning this, Marshall decided to make an agreement to split the money
with Anderson. As a term of the agreement, Anderson believed she deserved
more money since it was her car. An argument ensued, which concluded
with Marshall agreeing to only take $1,000.00 of the $3,000.00. On July 16,
2013, Anderson and Marshall went to a Money Mart to cash the check.
Anderson received two thousand dollars on a debit card and Marshall, after
paying a $20.00 checking fee, received $980.00, which she timely placed in
a sealed envelope, then secured it inside her zipped purse.
After leaving the Money Mart, Marshall, mistakenly believing Anderson
was walking the opposite way, overheard Anderson on the phone saying,
“We are walking to the busway now.” Before Marshall could get to the bus,
Anderson sprayed mace directly into Marshall’s face. Following this, a
physical altercation between the two began, and both ended up wrestling on
the ground. At one point, while Marshall was on top of Anderson, Anderson
maced Marshall in the mouth, causing her to drop her purse. Anderson,
noticing the dropped purse, yelled for someone to grab it. A third party
walked over, picked up the purse, but immediately dropped it. Marshall was
able to identify the third party as Orlando Grandison. Using this opportunity,
Anderson grabbed the purse, dumped the belongings, took the envelope,
and ran off in the same direction as Grandison. Marshall, still stunned from
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the events, ran over to a store to wash the mace off her face and called 911.
Paramedics and Police Officers showed up to the scene, at which point
Marshall filed a Police report.
Anderson was later charged with one count each of robbery1, criminal
conspiracy (to commit robbery)2, and simple assault3. Co-defendant
Orlando Grandison was also charged with robbery and conspiracy. A joint
bench trial took place before the Honorable David R. Cashman. At the end of
the trial, the court found Anderson guilty of all charges and sentenced her to
a 1-year probationary term and an order to pay $980.00 in restitution.
Anderson filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of the
evidence. The trial court denied the motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Anderson challenges the weight of the evidence to support
the convictions. Our standard when reviewing a weight of the evidence claim
is well settled. We must “review[] the [trial court’s] exercise of discretion,
not the underlying question whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 985 A.2d 886, 897 (Pa. 2009)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Diggs, 949 A.2d 873, 879 (Pa. 2008)). The
jury is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence, and an appellate
court will not make its own assessment of the credibility of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, 33 A.3d 602, 609 (pa. 2011). “The trial
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(a)(1)(vi).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a)(1).
3
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1).
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court will award a new trial only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the
evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.” Id. (quoting Diggs, 949 A.2d
at 879-80). In turn, we only reverse a trial court’s refusal to do so when we
find that it reflected an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to conclude
that the verdict was so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice. In effect, the trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on
a weight of the evidence claim is “the least assailable of its rulings.” Id.
Anderson’s argument simply rests on the fact that she believes that
her testimony should have been viewed as more credible than Marshall’s.
The argument is meritless. With respect to each argument Anderson raises,
the trial court provides the following reasoning supporting its decision.
[§ 3701. Robbery.]
The Commonwealth established that Anderson initially attacked
Marshall when she sprayed mace in her face, grabbed her and
pulled her to the ground, wrestled with her in an attempt to get
her purse and then maced her a second time which caused
Marshall to lose control of her purse and ultimately the money
that was contained in that purse. Marshall testified that she
experienced pain and a burning sensation as a result of being
sprayed with mace by Anderson not once, but twice. Anderson
did not attempt to obtain the money from Marshall lawfully but
rather planned an attack on her so she carried mace with her
and was the aggressor in spraying mace into Marshall’s face on
two separate occasions and wrestling her to the ground.
...
[§ 903. Criminal Conspiracy]
While she was spraying Marshall’s face for the second time, she
yelled across the street to the two men standing there, one of
whom was Grandison, to grab her purse. Grandison came across
the street, picked up the purse and was looking for the money
and when he could not find it, Anderson grabbed the purse,
dumbed its contents onto the ground and picked up the envelope
and the two of them ran off together in the same direction. The
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logical and reasonable inference to be drawn from this testimony
[was] that there is a common plan and design agreed to
between Anderson and Grandison to steal the money from
Marshall and act of spraying Marshall was an overt act in
furtherance of that conspiracy which enabled them to accomplish
the underlying object of the crime of conspiracy, that being, the
robbery.
...
[§ 2701. Simple Assault]
Finally, with respect to the charge of simple assault all that is
necessary is that somebody knowingly, recklessly or intentionally
caused bodily injury to the victim. Bodily injury means
substantial pain and Marshall testified that she experienced
significant pain and a burning sensation as a result of being
sprayed by Anderson twice with mace, the pain being such that
she had to go to a restaurant to use the bathroom to wash her
face before she could call police.
...
[T]he standard with respect to this claim is to determine whether
or not the verdicts rendered in this case shock one’s sense of
justice. A review of the evidence in light of that standard, it is
clear that one’s sense of justice would be shocked only if
Anderson were not convicted of these particular crimes. The
Commonwealth proved that she was the individual who
committed these crimes, she was the individual who encouraged
her co-conspirator to act to get the money and she was the
individual who took the necessary overt action to commit all of
the crimes charged. The verdicts rendered in this case did not
shock one’s sense of justice and, accordingly, they were properly
entered.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/12/14, at 7-9.
After reviewing the record independently, we have not found any
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s reasoning. Therefore, we reach the
conclusion that Anderson’s issue on appeal holds no merit.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/8/2015
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