Com. v. Barnes, T. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S30016-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                         IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    TYYA M. BARNES
    Appellant                     No. 1918 MDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 12, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0002483-2013
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., RANSOM, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY RANSOM, J.:                            FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2017
    Appellant, Tyya M. Barnes, appeals from the judgment of sentence of
    life imprisonment, imposed June 12, 2014, following a jury trial resulting in
    his conviction for second degree murder, robbery, conspiracy, and firearms
    not to be carried without a license.1 Additionally, Appellant’s counsel, Caleb
    K. Shreve, Esquire, seeks to withdraw his representation of Appellant
    pursuant     to   Anders     v.   California,   
    87 S. Ct. 1936
        (1967),   and
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009).                     We affirm and
    grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    On March 4, 2013, Iliana Luciano drove Courtney Jackson, her
    boyfriend, to meet with an acquaintance in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. See
    ____________________________________________
    1
    See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(b), 3701(a)(1), 903, 6106(a)(1), respectively.
    J-S30016-17
    Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 6/9/14 – 6/12/14, 25, 29-31. Unbeknownst to
    her, Mr. Jackson was meeting Layton Potter to sell him drugs. Id. at 29-31,
    235-39.     After approximately an hour and one-half of no contact, Ms.
    Luciano attempted to call Mr. Jackson approximately fifteen times.     Id. at
    33-35.
    Mr. Potter met Mr. Jackson twice that night, the last time around 8:00
    p.m.     Id. at 240-245.   At that time, he observed Appellant and Shane
    Holloway across the street.    Id. at 248-49.   Mr. Jackson indicated to Mr.
    Potter that he was going to conduct a drug transaction with Appellant and
    Mr. Holloway, but he first took Mr. Potter home. Id. at 250-51. Mr. Potter
    advised him not to make the sale, and the two men parted. Id. at 260-62.
    Between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., a bystander discovered Mr. Jackson
    lying face down in the alleyway near the corner store, covered in blood,
    without a pulse, and foaming from the mouth.          Id.   at 175-76.    Mr.
    Jackson’s hands were outstretched, as if he had been running away. Id. at
    176, 181-82. Near Mr. Jackson’s body, a cell phone rang repeatedly. Id. at
    181-82. He had been shot eight times in the chest, arm, and back. Id. at
    61-63, 81-91.
    Police recovered fired shell casings from a .40 caliber and .25 caliber
    gun. Id. at 448-49. Police officers also recovered Mr. Jackson’s cell phone;
    the last call received and answered by Mr. Jackson, at 7:52 p.m., was from a
    number belonging to Appellant. Id. at 372-74, 391. Security footage from
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    J-S30016-17
    the corner store showed Mr. Jackson meeting with Appellant and Mr.
    Holloway, and walking off together. Id. at 396-99.
    The day after the murder, Appellant told his godsister, Timothea
    Anders, that he and Mr. Holloway shot Mr. Jackson.           Id. at 435-36.
    Appellant claimed that it was an accident, specifically, that Mr. Jackson had
    grabbed Mr. Holloway and Mr. Holloway shot him. Id. at 436. On March 9,
    2013, Ms. Anders gave a statement to the police implicating Appellant and
    Mr. Holloway. Id. at 437-39..
    In June 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of the above charges.
    Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which the court denied.     Appellant
    timely appealed, but his appeal was dismissed for failure to file a brief. See
    Order, 5/27/15, at 1985 MDA 2014. Appellant filed a petition seeking relief
    under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, and
    his direct appeal rights were reinstated nunc pro tunc.
    Appellant timely appealed, and the court issued an order directing
    compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Counsel filed a statement of intent to
    file an Anders/McClendon brief. The court did not issue an opinion.
    On February 22, 2017, appellate counsel filed in this Court an Anders
    brief and application to withdraw as counsel. We rejected his brief as being
    inadequate pursuant to the requirements of Anders and Santiago. On July
    26, 2017, appellate counsel filed a revised Anders brief and petition to
    withdraw as counsel. The brief sets forth the sole issue Appellant seeks to
    raise on appeal:
    -3-
    J-S30016-17
    Did the [c]ourt err by allowing a magistrate judge initial in place
    of a signature on Appellant’s criminal complaint?
    Anders Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
    When faced with a purported Anders brief, this Court may not review
    the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining
    counsel’s request to withdraw.    Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 
    928 A.2d 287
    , 290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc). Prior to withdrawing as counsel on
    direct appeal under Anders, counsel must file a brief that meets the
    requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago,
    namely:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record;
    (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
    supports the appeal;
    (3) set forth counsel's conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
    and
    (4) state counsel's reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
    controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to
    the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
    Counsel also must provide a copy of the Anders brief to his
    client. Attending the brief must be a letter that advises the
    client of his right to: “(1) retain new counsel to pursue the
    appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any points
    that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s attention in
    addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”
    Commonwealth v. Nischan, 
    928 A.2d 349
    , 353 (Pa. Super.
    2007), appeal denied, 
    594 Pa. 704
    , 
    936 A.2d 40
     (2007).
    -4-
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    Commonwealth v. Orellana, 
    86 A.3d 877
    , 879-880 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    After determining that counsel has satisfied these technical requirements of
    Anders and Santiago, only then may this Court “conduct an independent
    review of the record to discern if there are any additional, non-frivolous
    issues overlooked by counsel.” Commonwealth v. Flowers, 
    113 A.3d 1246
    , 1250 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and footnote omitted).
    In the instant matter, Attorney Shreve’s Anders brief complies with
    the above-stated requirements.      Namely, he includes a summary of the
    relevant factual and procedural history; he refers to the portions of the
    record that could arguably support Appellant’s claims; and he sets forth his
    conclusion that Appellant’s appeal is frivolous.   He explains his reasoning
    and supports his rationale with citations to the record as well as pertinent
    legal authority.   Attorney Shreve avers he has supplied Appellant with a
    copy of his Anders brief and a letter explaining the rights enumerated in
    Nischan.      Accordingly,   counsel   has   complied    with   the   technical
    requirements for withdrawal. Thus, we may independently review the record
    to determine if the issues Appellant raises are frivolous and to ascertain if
    there are other non-frivolous issues he may pursue on appeal.
    The sole issue that Appellant has identified for appeal is that the court
    erred by allowing a magistrate judge’s initial in place of a signature on the
    criminal complaint. See Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant contends that the
    use of initials instead of a signature renders the complaint legally
    insufficient. 
    Id.
     Counsel notes that facsimile signatures are permissible on
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    J-S30016-17
    criminal complaints and Appellant’s defense was not prejudiced as a result of
    the use of initials. 
    Id.
     at 9 (citing in support Commonwealth v. Emanuel,
    
    462 A.2d 653
    , 657 (Pa. 1983) (holding that facsimile signatures are
    permissible in criminal complaints)).   We agree that Appellant’s claim is
    frivolous.   We have independently reviewed the record and find no other
    issues of arguable merit that he could pursue on appeal.     Accordingly, we
    affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to
    withdraw.
    Petition to withdraw granted. Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/8/2017
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1918 MDA 2016

Filed Date: 9/8/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/8/2017