Com. v. Williams, S. ( 2017 )


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  • J. A10004/17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                      :
    :
    SHAWN CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS,              :
    :
    APPELLANT         :
    :     No. 2191 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 24, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0003673-2015
    BEFORE: DUBOW, J., SOLANO, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    JUDGMENT ORDER BY DUBOW, J.:                    FILED OCTOBER 04, 2017
    Appellant, Shawn Christopher Williams, appeals from the June 24,
    2016 Judgment of Sentence entered in the Northampton County Court of
    Common Pleas. A jury convicted Appellant of three offenses arising from his
    failure to comply with the registration and verification requirements of the
    Sexual Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”). On appeal, he
    challenges the retroactive application of the penalty provisions enacted to
    enforce SORNA averring that they violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the
    United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions.      In light of our Supreme
    Court’s recent decision in Commonwealth v. Muniz, __ A.3d __, No. 47
    MAP 2016 (Pa. filed July 19, 2017), we vacate Appellant’s convictions.
    J. A10004/17
    On December 4, 1998, a jury found Appellant guilty of sexual assault,
    graded as a felony of the second degree. The trial court sentenced Appellant
    to 4 to 10 years of imprisonment.
    Following Appellant’s sentencing, the General Assembly subsequently
    passed Megan’s Law II, under which Appellant was required to register as a
    sex offender for ten years. Our General Assembly passed two more versions
    of Megan’s Law, the most recent being SORNA which was enacted on
    December 20, 2011 and became effective of December 20, 2012.                    Under
    SORNA, Appellant is deemed a Tier III offender and subject to a lifetime
    registration requirement.
    Appellant has violated SORNA’s registration requirements twice: once
    in late 2013, and again in late 2015. The 2015 violation is the subject of the
    instant appeal.1
    On October 25, 2015, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with three
    counts    related   to   his   failure   to   complete   his   quarterly   registration
    requirement with the Pennsylvania State Police: Failure to Register, Failure
    to Verify Address, and Failure to File Accurate Registration Information.2
    Appellant elected to proceed by way of a jury trial, and on June 1, 2016, the
    jury convicted Appellant of all counts.         On June 24, 2016, the trial court
    1 On June 2, 2014, Appellant pled nolo contendere to charges that he failed
    to register as required in late 2013. The trial court sentenced Appellant to
    five years of probation.
    2   18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4915.1(A)(1), 4915.1(A)(2), and 4915.1(A)(3), respectively.
    -2-
    J. A10004/17
    sentenced Appellant to three consecutive terms of 33 to 120 months in
    prison.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, raising a single issue: “[i]s
    SORNA unconstitutional because the penalties imposed for failing to comply
    are punitive and therefore violate ex post facto laws?” Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    On July 18, 2017, this Court issued an Opinion stating that we were
    constrained by prior precedent to conclude that SORNA did not violate ex
    post facto laws.       The following day, our Supreme issued its Opinion in
    Commonwealth v. Muniz, __ A.3d __, No. 47 MAP 2016 (Pa. filed July 19,
    2017)     (OAJC),    wherein   the   Court   held   that   SORNA’s   registration
    requirements violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Pennsylvania
    Constitution.3
    In light of Muniz, this Court entered an Order withdrawing our July
    18th Opinion.       In subsequent Post-Submission Communications, Appellant
    and the Commonwealth both agree that Appellant is entitled to relief.
    3 Although a plurality Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court
    (“OAJC”) has no precedential value, “where a concurring opinion enumerates
    the portions of the plurality's opinion in which the author joins or disagrees,
    those portions of agreement gain precedential value.” Commonwealth v.
    Brown, 
    23 A.3d 544
    , 556 (Pa. Super. 2011). In Muniz, the OAJC found
    that SORNA violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses under both the Pennsylvania
    and United States Constitutions. Justice Wecht’s Concurring Opinion, joined
    by Justice Todd, found that SORNA violates the Pennsylvania Constitution
    and declined to consider whether SORNA violates the United States
    Constitution. Thus, the binding precedent arising out of Muniz is limited to
    the finding that SORNA’s registration requirements violate the Ex Post Facto
    Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution
    -3-
    J. A10004/17
    Because Appellant was convicted in 1998 of the offense triggering
    SORNA’s applicability—more than a decade before SORNA was passed into
    law—pursuant to Muniz, SORNA’s retroactive application violated the Ex
    Post Facto Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution. Accordingly, Appellant’s
    convictions for failing to comply with registration requirements which ought
    never have applied to him must be vacated.
    Convictions and Judgment of Sentence vacated. Case remanded.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/4/2017
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2191 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 10/4/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/4/2017