Citizens Bank of PA. v. Rim, D. ( 2017 )


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  • J-A04028-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    CITIZENS BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA                    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    DONG M. RIM, AS ADMINISTRATOR
    OF THE ESTATE OF YOUNG WOON RIM,
    DECEASED
    Appellant                 No. 760 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Order Dated January 20, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2015-03289
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.:                       FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2017
    Appellant Dong M. Rim, as administrator of the estate of Young Woon
    Rim, appeals from the order denying his petition to open the default
    judgment entered in the mortgage foreclosure action initiated by Appellee
    Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania. We affirm.
    In 2011, Young Woon Rim mortgaged a residential property located in
    Ambler, Pennsylvania (“Ambler property”), for a principal amount of
    $228,500. Trial Ct. Op., 8/19/16, at 1. The Ambler property was later
    encumbered by a second mortgage owned by Nationstar Mortgage, LLC.
    Young Woon Rim died in June 2014, and in July 2014, Dong M. Rim
    (“Rim”), was qualified as the administrator of the estate. Id. at 2. In his
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A04028-17
    petition for probate and grant of letters testamentary, Rim verified his
    address as 2200 Arch Street, #907-08, Philadelphia, PA 19103 (“2200 Arch
    Street”). Id.
    On January 6, 2015, as the Ambler property loan had fallen into
    default,1 Citizens sent an Act 91 notice to Rim.2 The notice was sent to 2200
    Arch Street via certified mail. Trial Ct. Op. at 2.3 Citizens received no
    response to the Act 91 notice.
    On February 20, 2015, Citizens initiated a mortgage foreclosure action.
    Trial Ct. Op. at 2. On March 19, 2015, Citizens filed an affidavit stating that
    the complaint and notice to defend4 were served upon Rim on March 17,
    2015, at 2200 Arch Street. Aff. of Service, 3/19/15. Attached to the affidavit
    was a copy of the notarized return of service.5 The return states that Rim
    was served at 2200 Arch Street on March 17, 2015, at 9:25 AM. It specifies
    that the process documents were given to the “Manager/Clerk of place of
    ____________________________________________
    1
    According to the complaint, the mortgage fell past due in August 2014.
    Compl., 2/20/15, at ¶ 12.
    2
    The Homeowner’s Emergency Mortgage Act, “Act 91,” provides, among
    other things, that a homeowner must be notified that his or her mortgage is
    in default and how to contact the lender prior to the commencement of a
    foreclosure action. See generally 35 P.S. §§ 1680.402c to 1680.403c.
    3
    Citizens also sent the Act 91 notice to two other known heirs of Young
    Woon Rim at their addresses, and a fourth notice to the Ambler property
    addressed to “[a]ny and all unknown heirs.” Trial Ct. Op. at 2.
    4
    A notice to defend advises a defendant that he or she has twenty days to
    respond to the complaint. See Pa.R.C.P. 1018.1.
    5
    A “return of service” or “return of no service” specifies whether service of
    process was successfully made upon a defendant. See Pa.R.C.P. 405.
    -2-
    J-A04028-17
    lodging in which Defendant resides.” It does not state the name of the
    person to whom the documents were given. The return also states that on
    March 12, 2015, the server had attempted to serve Rim at the same
    location, but that “As per the Concierge the Defendant was not home.”
    Citizens received no response to the complaint and notice to defend.
    On April 8, 2015, Citizens sent Rim a notice of its intent to seek entry
    of a default judgment based on Rim’s failure to plead to the complaint. Trial
    Ct. Op. at 3.6 The notice was sent to 2200 Arch Street via first class regular
    mail. See Praecipe to Enter Default J., 4/23/15, at ¶ 4. Citizens received no
    response to the notice of its intent to seek a default judgment.
    On April 23, 2015, Citizens filed a praecipe to enter a default
    judgment. Trial Ct. Op. at 3. Judgment was entered against Rim in the
    amount of $239,453.34, plus interest and the costs of suit. Id.
    On June 3, 2015, Citizens filed a praecipe for a writ of execution,
    requesting a sheriff’s sale of the Ambler property, which was granted. On
    June 16, 2015, Citizens attempted to serve a notice of sale upon Rim at
    2200 Arch Street, and was informed by security personnel that Rim was no
    longer living there. Citizens also mailed a copy of the notice of sale to the
    2200 Arch Street address.
    ____________________________________________
    6
    Notice must be given to the defendant and his or her attorney at least ten
    days before the plaintiff files a praecipe for entry of a default judgment. See
    Pa.R.C.P. 237.1.
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    Meanwhile, on June 5, 2015, Nationstar filed a complaint in mortgage
    foreclosure against Rim for the same Ambler property.
    On September 10, 2015, Rim’s counsel entered an appearance on the
    record. Trial Ct. Op. at 3. On October 13, 2015, Rim filed a petition 7 to open
    the default judgment. Id. The petition stated, in pertinent part:
    2. Service of the Complaint was made by the sheriff’s
    department on March 17, 2015[,] on a “manager/clerk or place
    of lodging in which Defendant resides” at the location of 2200
    Arch Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103. A true and correct copy of
    the [Return of Service] is attached hereto as Exhibit “B.”
    3. [Rim] no longer resides at 2200 Arch Street, Philadelphia, PA
    19103 nor was he personally served with a copy of the
    Complaint at that address.
    4. Further, [Rim] does not know who was actually served and
    referenced in the [Return of Service] as the [Return of Service]
    does not contain a name of the individual served.
    5. Consequently, [Rim] has never been properly served with the
    Complaint, Praecipe, or default filings.
    6. Had [Rim] been properly served, [Rim] would have filed a
    response disputing [Citizens’] claims and asserting that the
    amounts claimed to be due were incorrect.
    7. [Rim] first became aware of this suit upon the subsequent
    [foreclosure] action in Montgomery County [filed by Nationstar].
    ...
    9. [Rim] has acted expeditiously in attempting to open the
    default in this matter, as [Rim] was improperly served and as a
    result was not aware of the litigation until after the Judgment
    had been entered.
    ____________________________________________
    7
    Rim’s petition was styled as a motion rather than a petition. As the relief
    sought is typically by petition, see Pa.R.C.P. 237.3, we will refer to Rim’s
    motion as a petition.
    -4-
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    10. [Rim]’s conduct was not intended to cause unnecessary
    delay. Rather, he did not respond to the Complaint because it
    was not properly served with any of the necessary paperwork.
    Mot., 10/13/15, at ¶ 2-10.
    The court issued a Rule to Show Cause on October 21, 2015. Trial Ct.
    Op. at 3-4. The order provided Citizens with twenty days to respond to the
    petition to open, declared that the petition to open would be decided
    according to Pa.R.C.P. 206.7,8 and instructed that discovery be completed
    within sixty days of Citizens’ answer. Id.
    Citizens filed a timely response and memorandum of law to the
    petition to open on November 10, 2015. Trial Ct. Op. at 4. Citizens denied
    that the service of the complaint and notice to defend had been improper
    and denied that Rim was unaware of the instant foreclosure action until the
    filing of the Nationstar foreclosure action. Resp., 11/10/15, at ¶ 2-7. Citizens
    pointed out that in Rim’s petition to open, Rim did not technically claim that
    he was not a resident of 2200 Arch Street on March 17, 2015, the time
    that service was made there. See Mem. of Law, 11/10/15, at 6-7
    ____________________________________________
    8
    This rule governs the procedure after the issuance of a rule to show cause:
    If an answer is filed raising disputed issues of material fact, the
    petitioner may take depositions on those issues, or such other
    discovery as the court allows, within the time set forth in the
    order of the court. If the petitioner does not do so, the petition
    shall be decided on petition and answer and all averments of fact
    responsive to the petition and properly pleaded in the answer
    shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of this subdivision.
    Pa.R.C.P. 206.7(c).
    -5-
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    (unpaginated).   Citizens   attached   multiple   exhibits   in   support   of   its
    contention that Rim was in fact a resident of 2200 Arch Street on March 17,
    2015, including the estate dockets listing 2200 Arch Street as Rim’s address
    on December 2014 and November 2015; the certified mail receipt, dated
    January 6, 2015, for the Act 91 Notice, which displays Rim’s signature; the
    Philadelphia Office of Property Assessment listing Rim as residing there as of
    February 19, 2015; the return of service from March 17, 2015, which
    indicated that on March 12, 2015, personnel at 2200 Arch Street informed
    that Rim was not “home” on that date; and a certification from the
    Postmaster of Philadelphia dated July 15, 2015, stating that there was no
    change of Rim’s address from 2200 Arch Street.
    Citizens also denied that Rim promptly filed his petition to open. Resp.,
    11/10/15, at ¶ 6-10. Citizens argued that even if Rim did not receive actual
    notice of the suit until the Nationstar action, the Nationstar action was filed
    on June 5, 2015, well before Rim filed the petition to open. See Mem. of
    Law, 11/10/15, at 6 (unpaginated). Citizens’ counsel also averred that Rim
    had contacted her office by telephone on July 16, 2015, after someone from
    2200 Arch Street had hand-delivered to him the June 16, 2015 notice of the
    impending sheriff’s sale of the Ambler property. Id. at 3. According to
    Citizens’ counsel, Rim indicated that he had recently moved out of the
    building. Counsel sent Rim a copy of the notice of sale via e-mail and Rim
    acknowledged receipt; a copy of the e-mail exchange was attached to
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    Citizens’ response to the petition to open. See Resp., Ex. B.9 Despite this
    July 2015 contact with Rim, Rim’s counsel did not enter an appearance until
    September 10, 2015, and the petition to open was not filed until October 13,
    2015. Citizens argued that under these facts, the filing of the petition to
    open should not be considered timely. Mem. of Law, 11/10/15, at 3, 6.
    Finally, Citizens denied Rim’s assertion that he had a meritorious
    defense to the mortgage foreclosure action, specifically a challenge to the
    amounts due on the mortgage. Resp., 11/10/15, at ¶ 6-7; Mem. of Law,
    11/10/15, at 8-9 (citing Landau v. Western Pennsylvania National
    Bank, 
    282 A.2d 335
    , 340 (Pa. 1971), for the proposition that “[t]he entry of
    summary judgment is appropriate even if the mortgagor has not admitted in
    his answer that the total amount of the indebtedness as pled in the
    foreclosure complaint is correct”). Citizens also complained that Rim had not
    attached to his petition to open a verified copy of his prospective answer to
    the mortgage foreclosure action setting forth his defenses, in contravention
    ____________________________________________
    9
    Counsel also requested a new mailing address from Rim, which Rim
    provided; however, when Citizens attempted to send the notice of sale
    there, it was returned. Citizens attempted service at the new address on
    August 29, 2015, but the return of no service stated that service was not
    possible because the building at that address was “vacant and in the process
    of being rehabilitated.” Citizens attempted to verify this new address with
    the postmaster on August 27, 2015, but the postmaster responded on
    September 3, 2015, that no such address existed.
    -7-
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    of Pa.R.C.P. 237.3.10 Mem. of Law, 11/10/15, at 8. According to Citizens,
    this flaw was fatal to Rim’s petition.
    Neither party conducted discovery regarding the allegations in the
    petition to open. Subsequently, on January 20, 2016, following argument,
    the court denied the petition. Trial Ct. Op. at 4. Rim filed a timely notice of
    appeal and has raised the following issues:
    1. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Rim]’s Petition to
    Open the Default Judgment because the Complaint was not
    properly served on [Rim] pursuant to the Pennsylvania Rules of
    Civil Procedure[.]
    2. Whether the trial court erred in [] determining that [Citizens]
    properly made service upon [Rim] in the manner proscribed by
    Pa.R.C.P. 402, by handing a copy of the complaint at the former
    residence of [Rim] to the clerk or manager of the apartment
    house.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Rim]’s Petition to
    Open because [Rim] had a reasonable excuse for its delay in
    filing the petition, as he did not become aware of the underlying
    ____________________________________________
    10
    The relevant portion of the rule states:
    (a) A petition for relief from a judgment . . . of default entered
    pursuant to Rule 237.1 shall have attached thereto a copy of the
    complaint, preliminary objections, or answer which the petitioner
    seeks leave to file.
    (b) . . .
    (2) If the petition is filed within ten days after the entry of
    a default judgment on the docket, the court shall open the
    judgment if one or more of the proposed preliminary
    objections has merit or the proposed answer states a
    meritorious defense.
    Pa.R.C.P. No. 237.3.
    -8-
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    matter until [he] was put on notice of a second mortgage
    foreclosure action[,] since he was not served.
    4. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Rim]’s Petition to
    Open because [Rim] had a meritorious defense to the allegations
    in the underlying complaint.
    Rim’s Brief at 3 (suggested answers omitted).
    Our standard of review follows:
    When reviewing a trial court’s disposition of a petition to open
    a default judgment, the appellate court must examine the entire
    record for any abuse of discretion, reversing only where the trial
    court’s findings are inconsistent with the clear equities of the
    case. Moreover, this Court must determine whether there are
    equitable considerations which require that a defendant, against
    whom a default judgment has been entered, receive an
    opportunity to have the case decided on the merits. Where the
    trial court’s analysis was premised upon record evidence, where
    its findings of fact were deductions from other facts, a pure
    result of reasoning, and where the trial court made no credibility
    determinations, this Court may draw its own inferences and
    arrive at its own conclusions.
    Duckson v. Wee Wheelers, Inc., 
    620 A.2d 1206
    , 1208-09 (Pa. Super.
    1993) (citations omitted).
    Rim claims that the trial court should have granted his petition to open
    because service was defective and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to
    enter judgment against him. Rim’s Brief at 11. He claims that service was
    improper for two reasons: (1) the person to whom the process documents
    were given was unidentified by name in the return of service, and (2) Rim
    did not reside at 2200 Arch Street on March 17, 2015. 
    Id.
     Rim contends that
    although his petition did not facially state the latter assertion, it is the only
    logical interpretation of the petition, in which Rim verified that he has never
    -9-
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    received process and that he no longer resides at 2200 Arch Street. See 
    id.
    at 12 n.4; Rim’s Reply Brief at 4, 7-9. Rim states that he was unable to
    conduct discovery to support his contentions, “such as taking the deposition
    of the person allegedly served[,] because they were not identified [in the
    return of service].” Id. at 7. However, Rim argues that the verifications
    made in his petition to open should be considered conclusive evidence. Id.
    Rim also attaches to his brief to this Court the copy of a residential
    lease. The lease purports to rent the premises at issue, 2200 Arch Street,
    Unit 907-08, to another person from August 1, 2014, through July 31, 2016.
    Rim contends that this Court may consider the lease as evidence because,
    when deciding a petition to open, “a court can consider facts not before it at
    the time the judgment was entered.” Rim’s Reply Brief at 10 (citing
    Mother’s Rest., Inc. v. Krystkiewicz, 
    861 A.2d 327
    , 336 (Pa. Super.
    2004) (en banc)). Rim claims that the combination of the factual
    verifications made in his petition and the lease he now presents to this Court
    “undermine and contradict” Citizens’ allegation that he received proper
    service at 2200 Arch Street. Rim’s Brief at 12, 16.
    Furthermore, Rim claims that he did not delay in filing his petition to
    open. Rim contends that he was not aware of the instant foreclosure matter
    until the filing of the Nationstar action on June 5, 2015. Rim’s Brief at 21. 11
    ____________________________________________
    11
    Rim asserts that the earliest evidence that he had notice of the instant
    action is as of July 16, 2015, although he does not actually allege that he did
    not know of the action until that date. See Rim’s Brief at 21.
    - 10 -
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    Rim claims that the lapse between this date and the filing of his petition to
    open, a total of 4 months and 8 days, is excused by the time it took him to
    contact counsel for Citizens, acquire his own counsel, and file the petition.
    
    Id.
     He claims that “a period of just over three months[12] should be
    considered timely in a mortgage foreclosure action in align[ment] with past
    decisions and in equity considering the valuable property at stake.” Id. at
    23.
    Finally, Rim contends that he has meritorious defenses to the
    mortgage foreclosure action. He claims these defenses “include but are not
    limited to being properly served, challenging the averment of default,
    denying receiving the Act 91 notice, and denying whether [Citizens] hold[s]
    the original [mortgage] note.” Rims’ Brief at 25-26. Although he did not
    attach a copy of a proposed answer or proposed preliminary objection to his
    petition to open, Rim claims that this flaw is not fatal because this would be
    an “overly strict” interpretation of Rule 237.3. Id. at 26-27 (citing Stauffer
    v. Hevener, 
    881 A.2d 868
    , 869 (Pa. Super. 2005)).
    Our analysis of whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in
    denying the petition to open is guided by the following:
    Ordinarily, if a petition to open a judgment is to be successful, it
    must meet the following test: (1) the petition to open must be
    promptly filed; (2) the failure to appear or file a timely answer
    must be excused; and (3) the party seeking to open the
    ____________________________________________
    12
    As noted above, the petition to open was filed approximately three
    months after Rim contacted Citizens’ counsel via e-mail, which is the earliest
    “evidence” of notice of the instant petition.
    - 11 -
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    judgment must show a meritorious defense. However, where
    the party seeking to open a judgment asserts that service
    was improper, a court must address this issue first before
    considering any other factors. If valid service has not been
    made, then the judgment should be opened because the court
    has no jurisdiction over the defendant and is without power to
    enter a judgment against him or her. In making this
    determination, a court can consider facts not before it at the
    time the judgment was entered.
    Cintas Corp. v. Lee’s Cleaning Servs., Inc., 
    700 A.2d 915
    , 919 (Pa.
    1997) (citations omitted, emphasis added); accord Century Sur. Co. v.
    Essington Auto Ctr., LLC, 
    140 A.3d 46
    , 54 (Pa. Super. 2016). “If,
    however, the court concludes that proper service was made, it must then
    consider all three parts of the tripartite test in the light of all of the
    circumstances and equities of the case before deciding whether to open the
    judgment.” Am. Exp. Co. v. Burgis, 
    476 A.2d 944
    , 951 (Pa. Super. 1984).
    If a petition to open a default judgment fails to fulfill any one prong of this
    test, then the petition must be denied. Myers v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
    
    986 A.2d 171
    , 178 (Pa. Super. 2009); see also McFarland v. Witham, 
    544 A.2d 929
    , 930–31 (Pa. 1988) (failure to provide justifiable explanation for
    failing to respond to complaint in a timely manner was sufficient basis to
    deny petition); US Bank N.A. v. Mallory, 
    982 A.2d 986
    , 996–97 (Pa.
    Super. 2009) (affirming denial of petition to open without needing to analyze
    third prong of test).
    Rule 402 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
    original process may be served by handing a copy “at the residence of the
    defendant to the clerk or manager of the . . . apartment house . . . at which
    - 12 -
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    he resides.” Pa.R.C.P. 402(a)(2)(ii). Rule 405 mandates that the return of
    service “shall set forth the date, time, place and manner of service, the
    identity of the person served and any other facts necessary for the court to
    determine whether proper service has been made.” Pa.R.C.P. 405(b). But
    where a return of service fails to specifically identify by name the person
    served, that failure alone does not necessarily invalidate the service. See
    Pincus v. Mut. Assur. Co., 
    321 A.2d 906
    , 910 (Pa. 1974); accord
    Podolak v. Artisan’s Valve Repair, Inc., 
    470 A.2d 567
    , 568 (Pa. Super.
    1983); see also Miller v. Carr, 
    292 A.2d 423
    , 425 (Pa. Super. 1972).13
    Whether process was delivered to the appropriate person and place
    under Rule 402 is dispositive on the issue of whether service was sufficient
    to invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction. See Anzalone v. Vormack, 
    718 A.2d 1246
    , 1248 (Pa. Super. 1998). A defendant may attack service with an
    allegation that the person served was not the actual clerk or manager of the
    residence or that the residence served was not the actual residence of the
    defendant. 
    Id. at 1249
    . The defendant bears the burden to prove such
    allegations through depositions or extrinsic evidence. Id.; see also Burgis,
    476 A.2d at 950. (“[A]s to whether sufficient evidence was produced to
    establish that the ‘adult’ [indicated in the return of service] was actually in
    charge of [the defendant’s] residence, we note that it is [the defendant’s]
    ____________________________________________
    13
    Failure to identify an individual by name does not render a return of
    service defective, and an actual defect in a return of service would not
    ordinarily divest a court of jurisdiction if the fact of service could be
    established. See Cintas, 700 A.2d at 918.
    - 13 -
    J-A04028-17
    burden to prove otherwise. Here, [the defendant] has fallen short of
    establishing such a negative”); Am. Vending Co. v. Brewington, 
    432 A.2d 1032
    , 1035 (Pa. Super. 1981) (service deemed proper where the record was
    devoid of any extrinsic evidence to buttress the defendants’ testimony that
    the “adult female” indicated in the return of service was not in charge of
    defendants’ residence).
    As a prefatory matter, we address Rim’s request that this Court
    consider, for the first time on appeal, a lease that purportedly establishes he
    did not reside at 2200 Arch — evidence which was not presented to the trial
    court. Rim misunderstands the import of our decisions stating that “a court
    can consider facts not before it at the time the judgment was entered.” See
    Rim’s Reply Brief at 10 (quoting Mother’s Rest., Inc., 
    861 A.2d at 336
    );
    see also Cargitlada v. Binks Mfg. Co., 
    837 A.2d 547
     (Pa. Super. 2003) (in
    resolving a petition to open, the trial “court may consider matters dehors the
    record”). Those decisions do not authorize Rim to introduce, for the very first
    time on appeal, evidence that was never presented to and made part of the
    trial court’s record; rather, they confirm that the trial court’s scope of
    review over a petition to open a judgment is not limited to the record that
    existed at the time judgment was entered and that the trial court is
    permitted to consider extra-record evidence in support of a petition to open.
    See Cintas, 700 A.2d at 919 (a petition to open judgment is appropriate
    where a party “seeks to challenge the truth of factual averments in the
    record at the time judgment was entered”).
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    J-A04028-17
    In this case, the trial court would have been permitted to consider the
    lease as evidence if it had been provided to that court in support of Rim’s
    petition to open. But because the lease was not provided for consideration
    by the trial court, we lack the authority to review it on appeal. See Temple
    Univ. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Cheltenham Twp., 
    199 A.2d 415
    ,
    417 (Pa. 1964) (“appellant has violated the time-honored rule that evidence
    not introduced in the court below cannot now be submitted on appeal.”);
    see also Nevling v. Natoli, 
    434 A.2d 187
    , 188 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1981). We
    therefore will not consider the lease.
    Putting the lease aside, we turn to whether the trial court correctly
    considered the evidence of record. The trial court denied Rim’s petition to
    open after concluding that service of the mortgage foreclosure complaint
    was not defective. In doing so, it examined the allegations in the petition to
    open and the averments pleaded by Citizens in the response, pursuant to
    Rule 206.7. First, the court found that Rim’s petition admitted that “[s]ervice
    of the [c]omplaint was made . . . on March 17, 2015[,] on a ‘manager/clerk
    [of] place of lodging in which [Rim] resides,” see Mot., 10/13/15, at ¶ 1,
    and that this was a proper form of service under Pa.R.C.P. 402(a)(2)(ii). See
    Trial Ct. Op. at 9. Next, the court noted that the petition to open does not
    actually allege that Rim did not reside at 2200 Arch Street on March 17,
    2015, the date of service. Id. at 6. The trial court also found that —
    . . . despite being provided the opportunity to conduct discovery
    to support his claim, which was refuted by [Citizens’] Response,
    [Rim] did not. Absent creating such a record, [Citizens’
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    J-A04028-17
    r]esponse that service was made on [Rim] at his residence is
    deemed admitted. See Pa. R.C.P. 206.7(c).
    ...
    [O]nce [Citizens] timely filed an Answer to [Rim]’s Petition, the
    burden shifted to [Rim] to rebut [Citizens’] averments of fact
    with the requisite pleading and/or discovery necessary.
    ...
    [Rim] for his part inexplicably neglected to avail himself of the
    opportunity to take depositions on the issue of service and/or
    other such discovery to attempt to rebut any of [Citizens’]
    averments of fact. Thus, in accordance with Pa. R.C.P. 206.7,
    the [c]ourt properly deemed admitted [Citizens’] averments that
    it effectuated service of original process upon [Rim] under the
    applicable rules of civil procedure. Based on [Rim]’s failure to
    rebut [Citizens’] averments with the requisite evidence and
    guided by Pa. R.C.P. 206.7’s burden[-]shifting paradigm, the
    Court properly determined that [Rim] was properly served the
    Complaint on March 17, 2015, and lacked a reasonable
    explanation or excuse for his default.
    Id. at 8, 11, 12.14
    We agree with the foregoing and discern no abuse of discretion by the
    trial court. Citizens’ response made averments of material fact – namely that
    2200 Arch Street was Rim’s residence on the date of service (despite Rim’s
    ____________________________________________
    14
    The trial court also concluded that because Rim was attacking the validity
    of service, he should have filed a petition to strike the default judgment
    rather than a petition to open. See Trial Ct. Op. at 6. However, Rim attacks
    the factual averments in the return of service, rather than the validity of the
    return on its face. Where, as here, “a party seeks to challenge the truth of
    factual averments in the record at the time judgment was entered, then the
    party should pursue a petition to open the judgment, not a petition to strike
    the judgment.” Cintas, 700 A.2d at 919; see also Podolak, 470 A.2d at
    568 n.2 (the answer to the question of whether the person served was
    actually in charge of defendant’s place of business does not typically appear
    on the face of the record and therefore provides grounds for opening a
    default judgment rather than striking judgment).
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    effort to skirt around this issue in his petition to open by claiming only that
    he “no longer” lived there) and that the process documents were given to
    the manager of that residence. Following that response, Rim failed to
    conduct discovery or provide evidence to the trial court contradicting
    Citizens’ averments of fact. Rim did not adduce any evidence attesting to his
    actual residence on March 17, 2015.15 Nor did Rim attempt to depose the
    process server or anyone at 2200 Arch Street who could have potentially
    testified regarding whether the process documents were handed to the
    wrong individual. Based on the record before it and the evidentiary burden
    borne by Rim, see Anzalone, 
    718 A.2d at 1248
    , and Pa.R.C.P. 206.7(c),
    the trial court correctly concluded that 2200 Arch Street was Rim’s actual
    residence on March 17, 2015, that process was handed to the manager of
    that address, and that service was not defective. See Burgis, 476 A.2d at
    950; Brewington, 
    432 A.2d at 1035
    .
    As we find that the trial court did not err in concluding that service was
    proper and that it had jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against Rim,
    we consider the merits of Rim’s petition to open within the three-factor
    framework. See Burgis, 476 A.2d at 951. For ease of disposition, we begin
    with the second factor, which requires that Rim explain his failure to file a
    timely answer to the foreclosure complaint. See Cintas, 700 A.2d at 919.
    “Whether an excuse is legitimate is not easily answered and depends upon
    ____________________________________________
    15
    Rim has yet to definitively identify his purported address on that date.
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    J-A04028-17
    the specific circumstances of the case.” Castings Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v.
    Klein, 
    663 A.2d 220
    , 223-24 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted).
    Rim’s only explanation is that he did not receive actual notice of the
    instant foreclosure action until the Nationstar action was filed, which was
    after the default judgment was entered against him. The trial court
    concluded that Rim in fact received proper service in March 2015 and
    therefore lacked a reasonable explanation or excuse for his failure to
    respond. Trial Ct. Op. at 12. Because Rim has not supplied any record
    evidence to establish the date by which he received actual notice of the
    Citizens action, we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that Rim has not
    stated a reasonable explanation or excuse.
    As Rim has failed to establish that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or
    provide a legitimate excuse for his failure to answer, we affirm the order of
    the trial court denying Rim’s petition to open the default judgment. See
    Myers, 
    986 A.2d at 178
    .
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/8/2017
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