Com. v. Roberts, P. ( 2018 )

J-S47039-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
PRECIOUS C. ROBERTS, :
:
Appellant : No. 220 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 4, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0010343-2017
BEFORE: OLSON, MCLAUGHLIN, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 19, 2018
Precious C. Roberts (Appellant) appeals from the January 4, 2018
judgment of sentence of six months of non-reporting probation following his
negotiated guilty plea to resisting arrest, defiant trespass, and two counts of
simple assault. We affirm.
Appellant was charged with numerous offenses following an altercation
between Appellant and police officers after Appellant, who was ordered to
leave UPMC Mercy Hospital, refused to do so. Appellant appeared before the
plea court on January 4, 2018 and pled guilty to the aforementioned crimes.
Pursuant to the negotiated guilty plea, the Commonwealth agreed to amend
two counts of aggravated assault to simple assault and also agreed to a
sentence of non-reporting probation. Following the entry of his guilty plea,
Appellant opted to proceed immediately to sentencing. The plea court
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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accepted the parties’ sentencing agreement for six [] months of
non-reporting probation at the [s]imple [a]ssault counts, to be
served concurrently. No further penalty was imposed at the
remaining counts of conviction. Court costs were waived.
[Appellant] was ordered to have no contact with any UPMC
Hospitals, with the exception of UPMC St. Margaret so that
[Appellant] could consult his primary care physician in the case
of an emergency.
Plea Court Opinion, 3/16/2018, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
On January 11, 2018, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. In his post-sentence motion, Appellant alleged that
various physical and emotional ailments caused him to enter an unknowing
plea. Post-Sentence Motion, 1/11/2018. Based on Appellant’s averments,
the court set a hearing. As aptly summarized by the plea court:
At the post-sentence motion hearing held on January 31,
2018, [Appellant] testified that he began experiencing flu
symptoms the day after his plea and sentencing. He indicated
that he was concerned about his symptoms because he had been
sick with pneumonia twice in the last year and a half and
because he had a back injury which required him to be in a body
cast until November of 2017. [Appellant] testified that he
“wasn’t feeling that good” on the day of his plea and sentencing
and that his illness affected his ability to intelligently, knowingly
and voluntarily enter into his plea because he was “sick the
whole following week[. …” Appellant] claimed that his back
injury, which was sustained months before the plea hearing,
contributed to his inability to understand what was happening on
the day of his plea because he was “fairly weak,” and he was
“preoccupied” with trying to fight off his flu symptoms. As a
result of his physical injury and sickness, [Appellant] testified
that he felt “emotionally distraught” at the time of his plea.
[Appellant] also testified that he did not feel coerced into
pleading guilty.
On cross-examination, [Appellant] acknowledged that he
was asked on the day of his guilty plea whether there was
anything that could have hindered his ability to plead guilty, but
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he claimed that he answered “yes” to that question. He also
acknowledged that, on the day of the hearing, he was afforded
additional time to consider whether to plead guilty. [Appellant]
claimed that he “took a while” to make the decision since he
“wasn’t feeling good.”
When questioned by th[e plea] court as to whether he had
any medical documentation showing that he had sought
treatment for his sickness, [Appellant] testified that he had
called the paramedics because of his illness, but that the
documentation confirming that call and any subsequent
treatment was at his home. [Appellant] did not specify when he
called the paramedics. He also claimed that he called his doctor
for Theraflu, but he did not have any medical documentation to
support that claim, and he did not specify when he called his
doctor.
Plea Court Opinion, 3/16/2018, at 3-4 (citations omitted). At the conclusion
of the hearing, the plea court denied Appellant’s motion.
This timely-filed appeal followed.1 Appellant presents one issue for our
consideration: whether the plea court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea resulted “in manifest injustice where [Appellant’s]
diminished mental state prevented the plea from being entered into
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 5. We begin
our review mindful of the following.
The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
rests within the trial court’s discretion, and we will not disturb
the court’s decision on such motion unless the court abused that
discretion. An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in
judgment but, rather, involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice,
manifest unreasonableness, and/or misapplication of law. By
1 Both Appellant and the plea court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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contrast, a proper exercise of discretion conforms to the law and
is based on the facts of record.
Commonwealth v. Gordy, 73 A.3d 620, 624 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations
omitted).
The standard for withdrawal of a guilty plea after
imposition of sentence is much higher [than the standard for
withdrawal prior to sentencing]; a showing of prejudice on the
order of manifest injustice is required before withdrawal is
properly justified. A plea rises to the level of manifest injustice
when it was entered into involuntarily, unknowingly, or
unintelligently.
***
[T]o establish manifest injustice, Appellant must show that
his plea was entered in an involuntary, unknowing, or
unintelligent manner. To ascertain whether Appellant acted in
such manner, we must examine the guilty plea colloquy. The
colloquy must inquire into the following areas: (1) the nature of
the charges; (2) the factual basis of the plea; (3) the right to
trial by jury; (4) the presumption of innocence; (5) the
permissible range of sentences; and (6) the judge’s authority to
depart from any recommended sentence. This Court evaluates
the adequacy of the guilty plea colloquy and the voluntariness of
the resulting plea by examining the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the entry of that plea.
Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 382–84 (Pa. Super. 2002)
(quotation marks and citations omitted).
In his brief to this Court, Appellant reiterates that he “was suffering
from a combination of mental and physical health problems at the time of
his plea that diminished his ability to respond knowingly and intelligently.”
Appellant’s Brief at 13.
During the plea, [Appellant] was grieving the loss of his wife, for
which he was receiving counseling services before his arrest at
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UPMC Mercy Hospital. During his arrest, [Appellant], who was
67 at the time, was forced to the ground by multiple officers and
received a broken back and two broken ribs. [Appellant] was
still receiving physical therapy to address the pain from the back
injury he suffered nearly eight months earlier that had required
him to wear a back brace until November of 2017. [Appellant]
explained at the post-sentence motion hearing that he had the
flu and was ill the day of the plea. This illness continued for an
entire week following the hearing, leaving [Appellant] bedridden.
Id. at 13-14 (citations and unnecessary capitalizations omitted).
“Our law presumes that a defendant who enters a guilty plea was
aware of what he was doing. He bears the burden of proving otherwise.”
Commonwealth v. Rush, 909 A.2d 805, 808 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted). “The longstanding rule of Pennsylvania law is that a defendant
may not challenge his guilty plea by asserting that he lied while under
oath[.]” Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa. Super. 2003).
“Where the record clearly demonstrates that a guilty plea colloquy was
conducted, during which it became evident that the defendant understood
the nature of the charges against him, the voluntariness of the plea is
established.” Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 790 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the plea court found Appellant’s plea was entered
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Plea Court Opinion, 3/16/2018, at
10 (“Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea, and
the sworn statements that [Appellant] made under oath at the time of his
plea, [Appellant] failed to meet his burden of proving that his decision to
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plead guilty was not knowing, intelligent or voluntary.”). Our review of the
record as a whole supports the plea court’s findings.
At Appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing, the plea court conducted a
thorough on-the-record colloquy. N.T., 1/4/2018, at 3-8. Additionally,
Appellant was questioned about the comprehensive written colloquy, which
he stated he reviewed and signed. Id. at 11. See also Guilty Plea
Explanation of Defendant’s Rights, 1/4/2018. During the on-the-record
colloquy, Appellant answered “no” when asked, inter alia, if he had taken
any medication, drugs, alcohol or had any mental or physical illness or
infirmity that would impair his ability to understand the proceedings. N.T.,
1/4/2018, at 4-5. Furthermore, Appellant confirmed he: (1) spoke with his
attorney and understood the nature and elements of each charge and the
maximum penalties allowable by law; (2) was not forced, promised,
threatened, or coerced into pleading guilty; (3) reviewed the written guilty
plea form; (4) completed the form with the assistance, advice, and
supervision of his attorney; and (5) read and understood each question and
answered honestly. Id. at 6-7.
A defendant who enters a guilty plea “is bound by the statements he
makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds
for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his
plea colloquy.” Pollard, 832 A.2d at 523. Here, Appellant confirmed under
oath that he was not suffering from any mental or physical illness or
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infirmity “that would impair [his] ability to understand [the] proceedings or
participate fully in them[.]” N.T., 1/4/2018, at 5. Appellant cannot now
assert physical and mental/emotional ailments as the basis for withdrawing
his plea.
Furthermore, in its opinion to this Court, the plea court stated that it
“vividly” recalled Appellant’s guilty plea and sentencing, asserting Appellant
seemed alert and aware of the circumstances surrounding his
plea. He also appeared to fully comprehend the nature of the
proceedings and was able to directly participate in them. Had
[Appellant] been disoriented or had he in any way demonstrated
an inability to comprehend the proceedings at the time due to
his purported illness, th[e plea] court would have halted the
proceedings sua sponte and postponed the case until such time
that [Appellant] was mentally and physically able to proceed.
The court also notes that [Appellant] could not provide any
medical documentation to corroborate his claim that he was, in
fact, ill at the time of the plea.
Finally, […] in addition to lacking any medical
documentation regarding his illness, [Appellant] failed to
articulate how exactly his illness precluded him from being able
to understand his plea agreement and the attendant issues
surrounding his waiver of a jury trial other than claiming that he
was “concerned” about his symptoms. The court notes that this
general concern about being sick does not rise to the level of
emotional trauma which would have precluded him from being
able to comprehend the nature of the proceedings. [Appellant]
was afforded ample time at the plea hearing to consider the plea
offer and to discuss the pros and cons of the offer with his
attorney. There was no surprise as to the sentence because it
was a negotiated plea agreement, which included a sentencing
agreement that th[e plea] court accepted. Hence, the prospect
of sentencing certainly could not have added to [Appellant’s]
stress or concern.
Plea Court Opinion, 3/16/2018, at 8-9.
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We agree with the plea court’s conclusions. Appellant fails to cite any
pertinent case law2 to support his contention that his concern over flu-like
symptoms and his rehabilitation from health issues hindered his ability to
comprehend the plea proceedings. Thus, Appellant has failed to meet his
burden of showing that denial of relief would result in manifest injustice.
See Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124, 129 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(“A defendant must demonstrate that manifest injustice would result if the
court were to deny his post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.”).
Based on the foregoing, as Appellant has failed to convince this Court
that the plea court erred by denying his motion, we affirm Appellant’s
judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
2
Appellant’s citations to Commonwealth v. Manley, 380 A.2d 1290, 1294
(Pa. Super. 1977) and Commonwealth v. Davis, 110 A. 85, 86 (Pa. 1920),
which discuss the necessity of granting a mistrial when a trial judge or juror
becomes ill, is irrelevant to the issue in this case, and therefore is neither
applicable nor persuasive law.
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Date: 9/18/2018
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