Straw, J. v. Fair, K. v. Pittsburgh Lubes ( 2018 )

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2018 Pa. Super. 103
JENNIFER M. STRAW AND THOMAS P. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
STRAW, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO- PENNSYLVANIA
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF
ELIJAH C. STRAW, DECEASED; AND
ROWAN J. STRAW, A MINOR, BY AND
THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND NATURAL
GUARDIANS, JENNIFER M. STRAW AND
THOMAS P. STRAW
v.
KIRK A. FAIR AND GOLON MASONRY
RESTORATION, INC.
v.
PITTSBURGH LUBES, INC. D/B/A JIFFY
LUBE, TOWER AUTO SALES & SERVICE,
NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE PARTS
ASSOCIATION-NAPA AUTO PARTS
T/D/B/A/ NAPA
v.
THOMAS P. STRAW
APPEAL OF: GOLON MASONRY
RESTORATION, INC.
No. 742 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): G.D. NO. 2013-003294
JENNIFER M. STRAW AND THOMAS P. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
STRAW, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO- PENNSYLVANIA
ADMINISTRATORS OF THE ESTATE OF
ELIJAH C. STRAW, DECEASED; AND
ROWAN J. STRAW, A MINOR, BY AND
THROUGH HIS PARENTS AND NATURAL
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GUARDIANS, JENNIFER M. STRAW AND
THOMAS P. STRAW
v.
KIRK A. FAIR AND GOLON MASONRY
RESTORATION, INC.
v.
PITTSBURGH LUBES, INC. D/B/A JIFFY
LUBE, TOWER AUTO SALES & SERVICE,
NATIONAL AUTOMOTIVE PARTS
ASSOCIATION-NAPA AUTO PARTS
T/D/B/A/ NAPA
v.
THOMAS P. STRAW
APPEAL OF: KIRK A. FAIR
No. 743 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 28, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Civil Division at No(s): G.D. NO. 13-003294
BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
OPINION BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 30, 2018
Appellants, Kirk A. Fair and Golon Masonry Restoration, Inc.
(hereinafter “Golon Masonry”), appeal from the judgment entered on April
28, 2016, in favor of Jennifer M. Straw and Thomas P. Straw, individually
and as co-administrators of the Estate of Elijah C. Straw, a deceased minor,
and Rowan J. Straw, a minor, by and through his parents and natural
____________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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guardians, Jennifer M. Straw and Thomas P. Straw (hereinafter, collectively,
“Plaintiffs”), and against Appellants, in the amount of $35,114,122.78. After
careful review of this tragic case, we are constrained to vacate the judgment
and remand.
I. Facts and Procedural History
On February 21, 2013, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Appellants.
The complaint sounded in negligence and, within the complaint, Plaintiffs
averred the following.
At approximately 7:30 p.m. on May 1, 2012, Thomas Straw was
driving his Pontiac Vibe automobile north on State Route 28 (hereinafter
“Route 28”), in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, near the RIDC Drive exit.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, 2/21/13, at ¶ 9. Jennifer Straw (Mr. Straw’s wife) and
the Straws’ two young sons, Elijah and Rowan, were passengers in the car.
Id. at ¶ 16. As the Straws were driving down the highway, their “vehicle
experienced a mechanical malfunction that caused Thomas Straw to reduce
his speed and . . . bring the vehicle to a controlled stop” in the middle lane
of the highway; Mr. Straw then turned on his hazard flashers. Id. at ¶¶ 11
and 14.
At around the same time, Kirk Fair was driving behind the Straws, in a
2010 Ford F-250 truck that his employer, Golon Masonry, provided him to
use in his job. Id. at ¶¶ 6-7 and 10. Plaintiffs averred:
At the time Thomas Straw was bringing his vehicle to a
controlled stop, [Mr.] Fair . . . observed folders and binders
that had been sitting on the front seat of the Ford truck
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slide onto the floor of the truck. Upon observing the
aforementioned items slide to the floor, [Mr.] Fair reached
for the items and “straightened” them up. As [Mr.] Fair was
“straightening” the items, he was looking down at the floor
of the vehicle, not at the highway in front of him. After
“straightening” the items, [Mr.] Fair looked up and observed
the Straw vehicle stopped in front of him with its hazard
flashers blinking.
Id. at ¶¶ 12-13.
Mr. Fair did not stop his truck in time and he crashed into the Straws’
stationary vehicle while traveling at a speed in excess of 60 miles per hour.
Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. The collision caused serious injuries to Thomas, Jennifer,
and Rowan Straw; horribly, the Straws’ six-year-old son, Elijah, died from
the injuries he received in the accident.1 Id. at ¶¶ 16-19.
Plaintiffs’ ten-count complaint sought compensatory and punitive
damages against Appellants. As Plaintiffs claimed: at the time of the
accident, Mr. Fair was recklessly driving under the influence of narcotics;
even if Mr. Fair were not under the influence of narcotics, Mr. Fair’s conduct
was negligent and reckless; Golon Masonry was vicariously liable for Mr.
Fair’s conduct; and, Golon Masonry was independently negligent for
improperly hiring, training, and supervising Mr. Fair. Id. at ¶¶ 30-86.
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1 As will be explained below, Mr. Fair later pleaded guilty to multiple crimes
arising out of the May 1, 2012 accident. On February 18, 2014, the trial
court sentenced Mr. Fair to serve an aggregate term of six to 23 months in
jail, followed by ten years of probation, for his convictions. N.T. Guilty Plea
and Sentencing Hearing, 2/18/14, at 1-14.
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On May 22, 2013, Appellants filed an answer, new matter, and
cross-claim. Amongst other things: the answer admitted that, “at the time
of the [] accident[, Mr. Fair] was an employee of [Golon Masonry], and Mr.
Fair was acting in the course and scope of his employment;” the new matter
alleged that Thomas Straw was comparatively negligent for his injuries; and,
the cross-claim, which Appellants asserted against Thomas Straw, alleged
that Mr. Straw was negligent in causing the accident and was, therefore,
directly liable to Jennifer Straw, Rowan Straw, and the Estate of Elijah
Straw, or liable over to Appellants for contribution or indemnity. Appellants’
Answer, New Matter, and Cross-Claim, 5/22/13, at ¶¶ 6 and 88 and Cross-
Claim ¶¶ 1-4. Specifically, Appellants alleged in the cross-claim that Mr.
Straw stopped his vehicle on Route 28 because the hood of his vehicle
popped open while he was driving, thus obstructing his vision. Further,
Appellants alleged, the hood opened because the hood latch failed.
According to Appellants, Mr. Straw was negligent because he knew that “the
hood and/or latching mechanism on the vehicle was not in good operating
condition” and, yet, “continu[ed] to travel and/or remain on the highway []
when it was hazardous and unsafe to do so.” Id. at Cross-Claim ¶ 2. In
addition, Appellants claimed, Mr. Straw was negligent in failing to remove
his vehicle from the highway and in “allow[ing the vehicle] to remain in the
lane of travel when it was unsafe and hazardous to do so.” Id.
Appellants also filed complaints to join three additional defendants:
Pittsburgh Lubes, Inc. d/b/a Jiffy Lube (hereinafter “Jiffy Lube”); Tower Auto
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Sales and Service (hereinafter “Tower Auto”); and, National Automotive
Parts Association – NAPA Auto Parts (hereinafter “NAPA Auto Parts”) 2
(hereinafter, collectively, “Additional Defendants”). Within their complaints
to join, Appellants repeated their allegation that, immediately before the
accident, the hood latch failed on the Straws’ vehicle. Appellants claimed
that, when the hood latch failed, the vehicle’s hood flew open and obstructed
Mr. Straw’s vision of the road, thus “result[ing] in him bringing his vehicle to
a complete stop in the middle of Route 28,” which caused the accident.
According to the complaints to join, the Additional Defendants negligently
performed work on the hood latch of the Straws’ vehicle or analyzed the
vehicle and assured the Straws that the hood latch was safe; therefore,
Appellants claimed that the Additional Defendants were all directly liable to
the Plaintiffs or liable over to Appellants for contribution and indemnity. See
Complaint to Join Additional Defendant Jiffy Lube, 6/26/13, at 1-7;
Complaint to Join Additional Defendants Tower Auto and NAPA Auto Parts,
9/11/13, at 1-10.
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2 Appellants incorrectly identified Fayette Parts Services, Inc. as “NAPA Auto
Parts” and, on January 22, 2014, the parties stipulated that the name NAPA
Auto Parts “shall be removed from the caption of the lawsuit in lieu of the
correct Additional Defendant Fayette Parts Services, Inc.” Stipulation,
1/22/14, at 1. Nevertheless, the caption still employs the name “NAPA Auto
Parts” to refer to “Fayette Parts Services, Inc.”; therefore, this Court will
refer to the party as “NAPA Auto Parts.”
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At the close of discovery, the Additional Defendants and Plaintiffs filed
motions for summary judgment. We summarize these motions below.
I.A. Tower Auto’s Motion for Summary Judgment
According to Tower Auto’s summary judgment motion, on September
27, 2011, Thomas Straw took his Pontiac Vibe automobile to Tower Auto for
its required annual state inspection. Tower Auto’s Brief in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, 8/10/15, at 6. “In the course of the state
inspection, Tower’s owner, [John] Fanto, noticed after he pulled the handle
inside the vehicle to release the hood latch that the primary hood latch had
not sprung back into place. . . . The secondary latch, which catches the
hood when the primary latch is released, functioned properly at all times
during the inspection, and did not require any service.” Id. at 6-7.
According to Tower Auto, “[Mr. Fanto] serviced the primary hood latch by
spraying it with a lubricant, which flushed the debris from the latch, and
mov[ed] it back and forth with a screwdriver, so that the primary latch
functioned normally and moved freely again.” Id. at 7. Mr. Fanto then
closed the hood completely, issued Mr. Straw a certificate of inspection, and
the Straws did not bring the vehicle back to Tower Auto at any point after
the September 2011 state inspection. Id. at 7-9.
Tower Auto claimed that it was entitled to summary judgment
because “there was no evidence that [it] breached any duty owed to the
Plaintiffs” and, relatedly, because, under the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle
Code, it was entitled to “limited immunity from suit [for work done during]
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the required state inspection.” Id. at 11-13; Tower Auto’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, 8/10/15, at ¶ 2; see also 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4702.1.
I.B. Jiffy Lube’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Jiffy Lube’s summary judgment motion declared:
In January 2012, [] Thomas Straw brought Plaintiffs’ car to
Jiffy Lube for an oil change. Approximately one week after
the January 2012 oil change, Plaintiffs began noticing that
the hood latch was not closing completely. Plaintiffs allege
that shortly thereafter, still in January of 2012, they went
back to the same Jiffy Lube location and advised an
employee of the hood not closing properly. Plaintiff[s]
further allege that an employee of Jiffy Lube, free of charge,
performed some sort of work on the hood and got it to close
properly. Subsequent to the alleged second visit to Jiffy
Lube in January [] 2012, Plaintiffs drove their car to Ohio on
a family trip and experienced no problem with the hood.
On March 16, 2012, Plaintiffs took their car to Additional
Defendant, NAPA Auto Parts. . . . While at NAPA [Auto
Parts,] Plaintiffs allege that they had the hood latch
inspected once again and asked if it should be fixed or was
safe to drive since they had an inspection upcoming and
they intended to take another family trip to Ohio. Plaintiffs
state that they were advised by NAPA [Auto Parts] that the
hood latch was working properly and was safe to drive.
Plaintiffs traveled to Ohio after the March 2012 visit to NAPA
[Auto Parts] and drove hundreds of miles with no problems
with the hood or hood latch until the accident on May 1,
2012.
Jiffy Lube’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/29/15, at ¶¶ 12-18 (internal
paragraphing omitted).
Jiffy Lube claimed that, under these facts: it owed no duty of care to
the Plaintiffs because it is not “in the business of fixing hoods or hood
latches of cars, particularly free of charge;” even if it owed Plaintiffs a duty
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of care, its negligence was not the proximate cause of the accident or
resulting injuries; Mr. Fair’s criminal conduct constituted a superseding
cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries, thus relieving Jiffy Lube of liability; the Straws’
“continued operation of the vehicle long after it was last at Jiffy Lube and
with actual knowledge that the hood was still not closing properly”
constituted a superseding cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries, thus relieving Jiffy
Lube of liability; “[t]he examination of the hood latch at NAPA [Auto Parts],
two months after it was last seen at Jiffy Lube, and the NAPA [Auto Parts’]
manager’s assurances that it was ‘absolutely’ safe to drive in its condition”
constituted a superseding cause of Plaintiffs’ injuries, thus relieving Jiffy
Lube of liability; Appellants “have no right of contribution and/or
indemnification [] since Jiffy Lube and [Appellants] are not joint tortfeasors;”
and, Appellants “are not entitled to contribution and/or indemnity from Jiffy
Lube” because Appellants’ “conduct was reckless while, at best, Jiffy Lube’s
conduct is alleged to be negligent.” Id. at ¶¶ 20-24; Jiffy Lube’s Brief in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/29/15, at 4-13.
I.C. NAPA Auto Parts’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Within NAPA Auto Parts’ motion for summary judgment, NAPA Auto
Parts claimed that it “is not an automotive repair facility and does not
perform repairs on automobiles for the public.” NAPA Auto Parts’ Motion for
Summary Judgment, 6/26/15, at ¶ 8. According to NAPA Auto Parts,
Appellants’ cross-claim against it is based upon the allegation that, on March
16, 2012, Thomas Straw visited a particular NAPA Auto Parts store and
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purchased a tail light bulb for his car. NAPA Auto Parts claimed that, during
his visit, Mr. Straw “asked the cashier whether he would mind looking at the
latch as Mr. and Mrs. Straw were intending to travel to Ohio.” Id. at ¶ 9.
The cashier then “looked at the vehicle and indicated that the vehicle should
be able to be taken to Ohio, but that Mr. and Mrs. Straw should have the
latch fixed.” Id. at ¶ 10. According to NAPA Auto Parts, the Straws drove
the vehicle “for approximately six [] weeks and [] for between 500 to 600
miles prior to the accident with no incidents.” Id. at ¶¶ 11-13.
According to NAPA Auto Parts, under this characterization of the facts,
it could not be held negligent because: it did not owe any duty of care to
any party; it did not breach any duty of care owed to any party; and, there
was no evidence that the latch was defective on March 16, 2012. Id. at
¶¶ 14-15. Further, NAPA Auto Parts claimed that it could not be a joint
tortfeasor with Appellants, as “[t]he conduct of [Appellants] was reckless
and the conduct of [NAPA Auto Parts] was [only] allegedly negligent.” Id. at
¶ 17; see also NAPA Auto Parts’ Brief in Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment, 6/26/15, at 4.
I.D. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment
Finally, Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, where they
requested that the trial court “dismiss the crossclaim [that Appellants] filed
against Plaintiff Thomas Straw.” Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment,
6/19/15, at “Wherefore” Clause (some internal capitalization omitted). In
support of their motion, Plaintiffs attached a transcript from Mr. Fair’s
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February 18, 2014 guilty plea and sentencing hearing, where Mr. Fair
pleaded guilty to the following crimes arising out of the May 1, 2012
accident: four counts of recklessly endangering another person (hereinafter
“REAP”) (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705); three counts of aggravated assault by
vehicle (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1(a)); one count of homicide by vehicle (75
Pa.C.S.A. § 3732(a)); and, one count each of exceeding the
55-miles-per-hour speed limit (by 16 miles per hour) (75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3362(a)(2)) and driving vehicle at safe speed (75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361).
During the guilty plea colloquy, the Commonwealth recited the factual
basis for Mr. Fair’s plea:
Had the Commonwealth proceeded to trial on this case . . . ,
the evidence would have shown that on May 1st of 2012 at
approximately 7:30 p.m., Thomas Straw was driving on []
Route 28 North, in a blue 2004 Pontiac Vibe. . . . The Vibe’s
hood latch malfunctioned causing the Vibe’s hood to be
released upwards. Mr. Straw could not see the road due to
this obstruction. He brought the vehicle to a stop in the
center lane of Route 28 northbound, just prior to Exit 10
and activated his hazard lights.
Thomas Straw would testify that as he brought the vehicle
to a stop, he looked in his rear view mirror and there were
no cars approaching. His wife, Jennifer Straw, was seated
in the front seat. His son, Rowan Straw was seated in the
back seat on the left side and his son Elijah Straw was
seated in the back seat on the right side.
The defendant Kirk Fair was driving North on [Route] 28 in
a white F250 Ford truck. . . . At an impact point just prior
to Exit 10 on northbound [] Route 28, Kirk Fair crashed into
the rear of the Pontiac Vibe while traveling at a speed
between 54 and 64 miles per hour as indicated by the Ford
truck’s Powertrain Control Module. The impact of the crash
resulted in the Pontiac Vibe being totaled. The crash also
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caused severe injuries to Thomas, Jennifer and Rowan
Straw, and caused the death of rear seated passenger Elijah
Straw who was six years old at the time.
Data obtained from the download of Fair’s Ford truck
indicated that Fair was driving at approximately 71 miles
per hour for 19 seconds prior to impact. Fair did not apply
the brakes until .6 seconds prior to the impact with the
Pontiac Vibe. The speed limit for this stretch of roadway is
55 miles per hour. The defendant did admit to taking his
eyes off the road while driving. He stated that when he
looked up he noticed the blue Pontiac Vibe with its flashing
lights on, but due to the weight of the truck he could not
control the truck and avoid the collision. The truck that Fair
was driving was weighted down with materials that he had
just loaded for work.
Based on a traffic crash reconstruction conducted by
Corporal Gregory Brandt of the Pennsylvania State Police,
who is an expert in the field of accident construction, Fair
would have been able to see the victim’s vehicle
approximately 2,058 feet prior to the impact if Fair was
looking at the road. At a constant speed of 71 miles per
hour, it would have taken Fair approximately 19 seconds for
the Ford truck to travel that 2,058 feet and reach the rear
end of the Vibe. At that speed, the defendant would have
needed approximately between 6 to 7 seconds to perceive
the victim’s vehicle, apply the brakes, and stop safely
before striking the vehicle. Therefore, Fair could have
safely stopped his truck prior to striking the vehicle if he
had observed the vehicle within the first 12 to 13 seconds of
possible perception. The result of his inattentiveness,
driving reckless and gross[] negligen[ce] caused his vehicle
to crash into the rear end of the Pontiac Vibe at a high rate
of speed resulting in serious injuries for all four passengers
and caus[ing] the death of Elijah Straw.
N.T. Guilty Plea and Sentencing Hearing, 2/18/14, at 6-9.
At the conclusion of the factual recitation, Mr. Fair’s attorney declared
that he did not have “any additions or corrections” to the recitation. Id. at
9. Mr. Fair then pleaded guilty to the above-mentioned crimes, the trial
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court accepted Mr. Fair’s plea, and the court sentenced Mr. Fair to serve an
aggregate term of six to 23 months in jail, followed by ten years of
probation. Id. at 9 and 12-13.
Within Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion, Plaintiffs noted that Mr.
Fair pleaded guilty to four counts of REAP, which requires a mens rea of
“recklessness.” Plaintiffs argued that Mr. Fair’s REAP convictions constitute
conclusive proof, in this civil proceeding, that Mr. Fair acted recklessly in
causing the May 1, 2012 accident and, thus, in causing all harm against
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment, 6/19/15, at ¶ 15.
Confusing Appellants’ cross-claim against Mr. Straw with Appellants’
affirmative defense pleaded in new matter that Mr. Straw was comparatively
negligent for his own injuries,3 Plaintiffs claimed that, since Appellants did
not allege reckless behavior on the part of Mr. Straw, Appellants’ cross-claim
against Mr. Straw must be dismissed. Specifically, Plaintiffs argued:
a plaintiff’s contributory negligence cannot serve as a viable
defense if the defendant is found to have acted in reckless
disregard of the plaintiff’s safety. . . . Accordingly where, as
here, [Mr.] Fair’s acts were reckless, while Mr. Straw’s acts
have been alleged to be only ordinary negligence,
comparative negligence principles are simply inapplicable
under Pennsylvania law. . . . In light of [this, Appellants]
cannot prove the elements of their crossclaim against
Plaintiff Thomas Straw and as such Plaintiffs respectfully
request that [the trial court] grant Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment and dismiss the crossclaim.
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3 See infra at **62-69.
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Id. at ¶¶ 15-17 (some internal capitalization omitted).
I.E. Appellants’ Responses to the Summary Judgment Motions
Appellants responded to the motions and argued that none of the
movants were entitled to summary judgment. Moreover, Appellants
attached deposition transcripts and documents to their responses that, they
argued, established genuine issues of material fact that precluded the entry
of summary judgment. These transcripts and documents included: the
deposition transcripts of Thomas Straw, Jennifer Straw, John Robert Fanto,
and Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Gregory Brant; answers to
interrogatories; a Pennsylvania State Police Crash Report Narrative; a
Pennsylvania State Police General Investigation Report; and, an expert
report authored by Edward M. Weber of Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Appellants as the non-moving parties,
the attached transcripts and documents presented the following evidence in
opposition to the summary judgment motions. See Washington v.
Baxter, 719 A.2d 733, 737 (Pa. 1998) (“as with all summary judgment
cases, we must view the record in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact must be resolved against the moving party”).
The owner of Tower Auto, John Robert Fanto, testified that he
performed the September 27, 2011 state inspection on the Straws’ Pontiac
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Vibe automobile. Deposition of John Robert Fanto, 6/29/15, at 11-12.4 Mr.
Fanto testified:
Immediately upon popping the hood . . . [I] determine[d]
that there was a hood latch assembly issue. . . . I didn’t
know what the problem was at that point, but when I
reached down and I pulled the lever to open the hood, the
little plastic lever did not return. That throws up, to me, a
red flag. . . . At that point, I carried on with the rest of
[the] inspection, finished all that, and as I was closing his
hood, that’s when I serviced that hood latch.
Id. at 19 and 20-21.
Mr. Fanto testified that he serviced the hood latch by “hos[ing] it down
with a penetrating oil and work[ing] the latch back and forth.” Id. at 21.
Specifically, Mr. Fanto testified, he hosed the latch down with a penetrating
oil that was manufactured by a company called Zep; Mr. Fanto then used a
screwdriver to “work the latch back and forth just to get it moving and
operating correctly.” Id. at 22 and 26. Mr. Fanto testified that, after he did
this, he was able to successfully close the hood. Id. at 26. Mr. Fanto then
issued Mr. Straw a certificate of inspection for the vehicle and wrote, in the
service invoice, that he was charging Mr. Straw $21.00 for: “repair hood
latch assembly, hood would not close, cable would not return.” Tower Auto
Service Invoice, 9/27/11, at 1.5 As Mr. Straw testified, it was at this time
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4 Appellants attached Mr. Fanto’s deposition transcript as “Exhibit G” to their
response in opposition to Tower Auto’s summary judgment motion.
5 Appellants attached the September 27, 2011 Tower Auto Service Invoice
as “Exhibit F” to all responses in opposition to summary judgment.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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that he first became aware that there was “an issue with the hood.”
Deposition of Thomas Straw, 5/13/15, at 29.6
Mr. Straw testified that he next observed a problem with the Pontiac
Vibe’s hood in January 2012, following an oil change at Jiffy Lube. According
to Mr. Straw, after the oil change, he returned to the Jiffy Lube and told the
employees “I got an oil change here, and the next thing I know my hood
doesn’t close all the way.” Id. at 33. Mr. Straw testified that a Jiffy Lube
employee “just kind of grunted and went and got some tools, you know,
worked with it for a little bit, grunted some more, went and got some other
tools, worked with it, got it down and that was that.” Id. Upon completion,
Mr. Straw asked the Jiffy Lube employee, “is [this] safe to drive? It’s not
going to pop up on me?” Id. at 34 and 71. The employee responded by
telling Mr. Straw that the vehicle was indeed safe to drive. Id.
The third time Mr. Straw addressed the problem with the Pontiac
Vibe’s hood was in March 2012, when he and his family were driving to Ohio.
In particular, Mr. Straw testified that he stopped his vehicle at a NAPA Auto
Parts store to purchase a tail light bulb for the vehicle. Id. at 35. While
there, Mr. Straw asked an employee to “take a look at [the hood] and . . .
let me know if it’s all right, if it’s safe.” Id. at 36. Mr. Straw testified: “I
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
6 Appellants attached Mr. Straw’s deposition transcript as “Exhibit B” to all
responses in opposition to summary judgment.
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said I have a state inspection coming up in a couple months, is this going to
make it to the state inspection, is it safe[?] He said absolutely. He said it’s
metal on metal. They don’t call it a safety latch for nothing.” Id. at 36.
Mr. Straw testified that he could not remember whether the NAPA Auto
Parts’ employee did “anything physically with the car,” but Mr. Straw
testified that he relied upon the employee’s assurances that the hood was
safe. Id. at 36-37. Mr. Straw also testified that he did not “recall opening
[the hood] up between the time [he] left NAPA [Auto Parts] and the [May 1,
2012] accident.” Id. at 39.
Regarding the accident, Mr. Straw testified that the accident occurred
at around 7:00 p.m. on May 1, 2012 and that, at the time of the accident,
he was driving his Pontiac Vibe automobile with Jennifer, Elijah, and Rowan
Straw as his passengers. Id. at 40 and 44. Mr. Straw testified that he was
driving down the middle lane of Route 28, in daylight, with a clear sky, in
light traffic, and in an area that had a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit. Id. at
40-41. As recounted in the Pennsylvania State Police Crash Report
Supplemental Narrative:7
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7 Appellants attached the Pennsylvania State Police Crash Report
Supplemental Narrative as Exhibits “E” and “G” to their responses in
opposition to the motions for summary judgment filed by Jiffy Lube, NAPA
Auto Parts, and Plaintiffs; Appellants attached the Pennsylvania State Police
Crash Report Supplemental Narrative as Exhibits “E” and “I” to their
response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment filed by Tower
Auto.
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[Mr. Straw] said he was driving north and for a second or so
before the hood popped he could hear some kind of noise
under the hood. Then he said the hood popped and the
hood blocked his view through the front so he [could not]
see. He said his immediate priority was to bring the vehicle
to a stop. He said he used his rearview and side mirrors to
bring the vehicle to a complete stop.
. . . He said that he activated his hazard lights once he was
stopped. He said he also recalled his wife placing her hand
on his lap and saying everything is going to be [OK]. He
said he looked in the rearview mirror and the first thing he
saw was the truck on the horizon line. He said for a brief
second he thought to himself [it’s] a good thing he is back
far enough to react. He said it seemed like an eternity at
the time but it was probably something like 5 to 8 seconds
minimum that the truck crashed into him. He said at no
time was there any cars between him and the truck. In fact
he said he didn’t recall any traffic in the area around him, or
even southbound really at the time of this crash.
Pennsylvania State Police Crash Report Supplemental Narrative, 4/24/13, at
1.
Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Gregory Brandt investigated the
accident for the Pennsylvania State Police. Following the investigation,
Corporal Brandt issued a General Investigation Report, where he concluded
that “[a] mechanical problem with [the] hood latch [on the Straws’ Pontiac
Vibe automobile] resulted [in] its hood opening while [the vehicle] was
traveling” on Route 28. Pennsylvania State Police General Investigation
Report, 1/22/13, at 21.8 Further, Corporal Brandt “concluded with [a] high
____________________________________________
8 Appellants attached the January 22, 2013 Pennsylvania State Police
General Investigation Report as “Exhibit K” to their responses in opposition
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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level of certainty” that, prior to the accident, the hood latch on the Pontiac
Vibe had been damaged “for a substantial amount of time.” Id. at 17.
Finally, Corporal Brandt wrote: “in a post-crash interview with investigators,
[Thomas Straw] related that he was aware of the faulty hood latch and
attempted to have the latch repaired one or two weeks prior.” Id. at 21.
Appellants also relied upon an expert report authored by Edward M.
Weber, of Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. (hereinafter “the Weber Report”),
to oppose Additional Defendants’ motions for summary judgment.9 The
Weber Report declared:
The 2004 Pontiac Vibe Owner’s Manual states . . . that the
hood latch should be lubricated with multi-purpose
lubricant, GM part no 12346241, yearly.
It is extremely rare that hood latches fail to lock. The most
vulnerable areas are the latch release lever (on latch itself)
and hood release cable. When the hood latch is not
lubricated at regular intervals, the original grease becomes
hard and dries out. It also becomes gritty with the
accumulation of dirt, which causes the lever and latch to
stick and bind. To properly repair the latch, a de-greasing
solvent should be used to remove all of the old grease and
dirt. The debris in the latch should be blown out using
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
to the motions for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs and NAPA Auto Parts
and as “Exhibit J” to their response in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment filed by Jiffy Lube.
9Appellants attached the Weber Report as “Exhibit I” to their responses in
opposition to the motions for summary judgment filed by Jiffy Lube and
NAPA Auto Parts and as “Exhibit H” to their response in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment filed by Tower Auto.
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compressed air. Penetrating oil does not last and is not the
proper lubricant for this application.
When Mr. Fanto of Tower Auto sprayed the penetrating oil
on the Pontiac’s hood latch, it was just a temporary fix. The
penetrating oil eventually dried out, which reverted the
latch back to its malfunctioning condition. After removing
the old grease with the proper solvent, lithium, or white,
grease should have been liberally applied. The thicker
grease serves two purposes: it keeps the latch lubricated
and prevents dirt and dust from entering the mechanism.
The secondary hood latch should have been degreased and
lubricated in the same manner. Because its return spring
was ineffective, vibrations and movement of the hood
allowed it to move away from the secondary striker plate,
causing the hood to disengage from the secondary latch,
which allowed the hood to swing open.
There was not enough information to determine Jiffy Lube’s
culpability other than it appears that the mechanic just
manually moved the release lever back so the hood would
latch. He should have advised Mr. Straw to have the hood
latch repaired.
[The NAPA Auto Parts] manager[] incorrectly advised Mr.
Straw that the Pontiac was safe to drive. Although he did
correctly advise Mr. Straw to have the vehicle fixed, he
should have advised Mr. Straw to have the hood latch
repaired as soon as possible.
Weber Report, 8/11/15, at 4.
I.F. Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Rulings, the Trial, and the
Current Appeal
On August 31, 2015, the trial court heard oral argument on the
summary judgment motions and, on November 10, 2015, the trial court
granted all four motions. As the trial court later explained, it granted
Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment because, first, it concluded that Mr.
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Straw’s conduct was not a proximate cause of the harm. Trial Court
Opinion, 9/8/16, at 5 n.3. Second, the trial court reasoned that Mr. Fair
pleaded guilty to REAP and Mr. Fair was, therefore, bound by his admission
that he acted recklessly in causing the accident. According to the trial court,
“[f]lowing from [the guilty plea] and the law that contributory negligence
cannot be weighed or applied to reckless conduct, the claims of contributory
negligence against Mr. Straw were improper and irrelevant to any contested
issue. As such, the [trial] court granted summary judgment on this issue.”10
Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/16, at 4-5. With respect to the summary judgment
motions filed by Tower Auto, Jiffy Lube, and NAPA Auto Parts, the trial court
declared that it granted the motions because: 1) the Additional Defendants
did not owe a duty to the Plaintiffs, and 2) “the conduct of [Appellants] was
not reasonably foreseeable . . . [and, therefore,] proximate cause could not
be established against the Additional Defendants.” Id. at 7-9. The trial
court thus dismissed the cross-claim Appellants filed against Mr. Straw and
the complaints to join that Appellants filed against Additional Defendants.
____________________________________________
10 On September 9, 2015, Appellants filed a motion for leave to file an
amended answer, new matter, and counterclaim, so that they could claim
that Thomas Straw acted recklessly at the time of the accident. Appellants’
Motion for Leave to Amend, 9/9/15, at ¶¶ 1-17. According to Golon
Masonry, when the trial court granted Mr. Straw’s summary judgment
motion, “[t]he motion to amend filed by Golon [Masonry] and Mr. Fair was
thereby mooted.” Appellant Golon Masonry’s Brief at 8.
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The case was called for trial and, on December 7, 2015, the trial court
issued a number of pre-trial rulings, including a ruling bifurcating the trial
into compensatory and punitive damages phases. With respect to the
compensatory damages phase of the trial, on December 15, 2015, after six
days of trial, the jury found in favor of Plaintiffs and against Appellants in an
aggregate amount of $32,000,000.00. N.T. Trial, 12/15/15, at 1175-1180.
Following the jury’s compensatory damages award, Plaintiffs withdrew
their punitive damages claim without prejudice to their right to reassert the
claim if the case were to be remanded after an appeal. Id. at 1201-1202.
The trial court denied Appellants’ timely post-trial motions and, on April 28,
2016, the prothonotary entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and against
Appellants in the amount of $35,114,122.78. Appellants filed timely notices
of appeal and now raise the following claims to this Court:
I. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to
Additional Defendants Tower [Auto], Jiffy Lube, and NAPA
[Auto Parts], and Plaintiff/Cross-Claim Defendant Thomas
Straw?
A. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment
to Tower [Auto] where there was ample evidence from
which the jury could have found that Tower [Auto] was
both negligent and reckless?
B. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment
to Jiffy Lube where there was ample evidence from
which the jury could have found that Jiffy Lube was both
negligent and reckless?
C. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment
to NAPA [Auto Parts] where there was ample evidence
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from which the jury could have found that NAPA [Auto
Parts] was both negligent and reckless?
D. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment
to Thomas Straw where there was ample evidence from
which the jury could have found that Thomas Straw was
both negligent and reckless?
Appellant Kirk Fair’s Brief at 5; see also Appellant Golon Masonry’s Brief at
5.
In this appeal, Appellants also raise claims regarding the trial court’s
pre-trial, trial, and post-trial rulings. As Appellants’ claims on these rulings
differ somewhat from one another, we will independently quote the parties’
claims. Mr. Fair claims:
II. Did the trial court err in refusing to award a new trial
based on numerous improper and unfairly prejudicial rulings
at trial?
A. Did the trial court err in admitting irrelevant,
inflammatory, and unfairly prejudicial evidence of prior
convictions and pre-accident and post-accident drug use
and treatment against Kirk Fair?
B. Did the trial court err in denying [Appellants’] motions
for a mistrial and permitting [Plaintiffs’] counsel to make
a number of improper and unfairly prejudicial
statements in his closing argument, which individually
and collectively inflamed the jury and tainted the
verdict?
C. Did the trial court err in submitting a verdict sheet
which shifted the burden to Appellants[] to disprove
Decedent Elijah Straw’s claim for conscious pain and
suffering and improperly directed a verdict against Kirk
Fair on the issue of recklessness?
D. Did the trial court err in precluding Kirk Fair from
contesting that he had 19 seconds and 2058 feet of
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distance in which to avoid the stopped Straw vehicle
based on Kirk Fair’s criminal plea?
E. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant judgment
N.O.V., a new trial, or a substantial remittitur because
the jury’s verdict was shocking, manifestly excessive,
and unsupported by the trial evidence?
Appellant Kirk Fair’s Brief at 5.
Golon Masonry claims:
II. Did the trial court err in refusing to award a new trial
based on numerous improper and prejudicial rulings at trial?
A. Did the trial court err in permitting [Plaintiffs] to
pursue a negligent entrustment claim against Golon
[Masonry] without the requisite expert testimony to
explain the applicable standard of care?
B. Did the trial court err in admitting irrelevant,
inflammatory, and highly prejudicial evidence regarding
co-defendant Kirk Fair’s drug problems?
C. Did the trial court err in permitting [Plaintiffs’]
counsel to make a number of improper and highly
prejudicial statements in his closing argument, which
individually and collectively inflamed the jury and
tainted the verdict?
D. Did the trial court err in shifting to [Appellants] the
burden to disprove decedent Elijah Straw’s claim for
conscious pain and suffering?
E. Did the trial court err in submitting a jury verdict
sheet that diluted [Plaintiffs’] burden of proof, directed a
verdict against Golon [Masonry] with respect to
causation on the direct claim against it, failed to
apportion liability between Golon [Masonry] and
co-defendant Kirk Fair on the direct claims against them,
and contained numerous other reversible errors?
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F. Did the trial court err in refusing to grant a new trial
or a substantial remittitur based on the excessiveness of
the verdict?
Appellant Golon Masonry’s Brief at 5-6 (some internal capitalization
omitted).
We conclude that the trial court erred when it granted summary
judgment to Additional Defendants and to Thomas Straw. Therefore, we
must vacate the judgment and remand. 11
____________________________________________
11 As noted, after the jury found Appellants liable and announced its
compensatory damage award, Plaintiffs declared that they were withdrawing
their punitive damages claim “without prejudice” to their right to assert the
claim if the case were to be remanded following an appeal. See N.T. Trial,
12/15/15, at 1201-1202. Further, after Plaintiffs declared that they would
withdraw the claim, counsel for Golon Masonry declared: “[w]e would agree
to waive [the punitive damages claim] now and allow the [P]laintiffs to bring
it back up if the case is remanded. That’s fine.” Id. The trial court then
dismissed the jury. Id.
As this Court has held, even though Plaintiffs withdrew their punitive
damages claim “without prejudice,” the withdrawal of the claim means that
“[t]here are no outstanding claims remaining” in this case. Levitt v.
Patrick, 976 A.2d 581, 588 (Pa. Super. 2009). Moreover, the subsequent
denial of Appellants’ post-trial motions and entry of judgment upon the
verdict give this Court jurisdiction to consider this appeal. As the Levitt
Court explained:
The key inquiry in any determination of finality is whether
there is an outstanding claim. Pa.R.A.P. 341. . . . If any
claim remains outstanding and has not been disposed of by
the trial court, then it does not matter whether the claim is
classified as a counterclaim or a bifurcated claim, for the
result is the same: this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain
the appeal unless the appeal is interlocutory or we grant
permission to appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 341.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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II. Analysis
II.A. Standard of Review
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
Similarly, if a claim was discontinued prior to trial, we do
not inquire whether the discontinuance was with or without
prejudice. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure permit
a party to “commence a second action upon the same cause
of action” after a discontinuance. Pa.R.C.P. 231. This
second action is considered a new action and not a
continuation of the initial action. Because a party may
initiate a new action upon a discontinued claim, it follows
that a discontinued claim is not before the trial court for
resolution.
Instantly, the parties jointly agreed to discontinue Patrick's
sole bifurcated counterclaim against Levitt. The parties
further agreed that all issues that were not the subject of
the trial of this matter have been disposed of. The
discontinuance constitutes a final judgment as a matter of
law. Because our finality inquiry has always focused on the
existence of an outstanding claim, we need not examine
whether Patrick's bifurcated counterclaim was discontinued
with or without prejudice. There are no outstanding claims
remaining and thus we have jurisdiction to consider this
matter.
Id. (some internal citations, quotations, and corrections omitted); see also
Bourne v. Temple Univ. Hosp., 932 A.2d 114, 115-116 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(the Bournes filed a medical malpractice complaint against Temple University
Hospital, Gail O. Berman, M.D., and three other defendants. However, the
Bournes failed to file a certificate of merit with their complaint and, thus,
Temple University Hospital and Dr. Berman filed a praecipe for entry of a
judgment of non pros. On February 6, 2006, the trial court denied the
Bournes’ petition to open the judgment of non pros and the Bournes
appealed. As this Court held: “[o]n April 24, 2006, the trial court approved
a stipulation withdrawing without prejudice the claims against [the three
other defendants], thereby rendering the trial court’s February 6, 2006 order
final for purposes of appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 341”).
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As this Court has stated:
Our scope of review of a trial court’s order granting or
denying summary judgment is plenary, and our standard of
review is clear: the trial court’s order will be reversed only
where it is established that the court committed an error of
law or abused its discretion.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the record
clearly shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. The reviewing court must view the record in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve
all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material
fact against the moving party. Only when the facts are so
clear that reasonable minds could not differ can a trial court
properly enter summary judgment.
Englert v. Fazio Mech. Serv.’s, Inc., 932 A.2d 122, 124 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(internal citations omitted); see also Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 997
A.2d 1152, 1159 (Pa. 2010) (“an appellate court may reverse a grant of
summary judgment if there has been an error of law or an abuse of
discretion. But the issue as to whether there are no genuine issues as to
any material fact presents a question of law, and therefore, on that question
our standard of review is de novo. This means we need not defer to the
determinations made by the lower tribunals”).
II.B. Analysis Regarding the Trial Court’s Grant of Summary
Judgment to Additional Defendants
We will first consider the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to
Additional Defendants.
As the trial court explained, it granted summary judgment to
Additional Defendants because, it determined, Additional Defendants did not
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owe Plaintiffs a duty and because “the conduct of [Appellants] was not
reasonably foreseeable . . . [and, therefore,] proximate cause could not be
established against the Additional Defendants.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/16,
at 7-9. Respectfully, we conclude that the trial court erred.
II.B.1. Additional Defendants’ Duties and Breaches of their Duties to
Plaintiffs
Our Supreme Court has explained:
In Pennsylvania, the elements of a cause of action based on
negligence are:
(1) a duty or obligation recognized by the law requiring the
defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct for
the protection of others against unreasonable risks;
(2) defendant’s failure to conform to the standard required;
(3) a causal connection between the conduct and the
resulting injury;
(4) actual loss or damage resulting to the plaintiff.
R.W. v. Manzek, 888 A.2d 740, 746 (Pa. 2005).
As to the element of duty, “[i]t is a fundamental principle of tort law
[that] there cannot be a valid claim sounding in negligence unless there is a
duty upon the defendant in favor of the plaintiff which has been breached.”
Alumni Ass’n v. Sullivan, 572 A.2d 1209, 1210-1211 (Pa. 1990). “The
existence of a duty is a question of law for the court to decide.” Manzek,
888 A.2d at 746; see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328B(a) and (b)
(“[i]n an action for negligence the court determines . . . (a) whether the
evidence as to the facts makes an issue upon which the jury may reasonably
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find the existence or non-existence of such facts; (b) whether such facts
give rise to any legal duty on the part of the defendant”). However, “[t]he
determination of whether an act or failure to act constitutes negligence . . .
in view of all the evidence has always been particularly committed to
determination by a jury.” Snead v. SPCA, 929 A.2d 1169, 1183 (Pa. Super.
2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that Sections 323 and 324A
of the Second Restatement of Torts correctly state the law of this
Commonwealth. Section 323 provides:
§ 323 Negligent Performance of Undertaking to Render
Services
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of the other's person or things,
is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting
from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his
undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of
such harm, or
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other's reliance
upon the undertaking.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323; Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 746
(Pa. 1984) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has “adopted [Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 323] as an accurate statement of the law in this
Commonwealth”).
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Section 323 imposes liability “where a party assumes a duty, whether
gratuitously or for consideration, and so negligently performs that duty that
another suffers damage.” Feld, 485 A.2d at 746. It applies:
to any undertaking to render services to another which the
defendant should recognize as necessary for the protection
of the other's person or things. It applies whether the harm
to another or his things results from the defendant's
negligent conduct in the manner of his performance of the
undertaking, or from his failure to exercise reasonable care
to complete it or to protect the other when he discontinues
it.
Id., quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 cmt. a.
The rule stated in Section 324A “parallels the one stated in § 323, as
to the liability of the actor to the one to whom he has undertaken to render
services. [Section 324A, however,] deals with the liability to third persons.”
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A cmt. a. Section 324A declares:
§ 324A Liability to Third Person for Negligent Performance
of Undertaking
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
render services to another which he should recognize as
necessary for the protection of a third person or his things,
is subject to liability to the third person for physical harm
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to
protect his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise reasonable care increases the
risk of such harm, or
(b) he has undertaken to perform a duty owed by the
other to the third person, or
(c) the harm is suffered because of reliance of the other
or the third person upon the undertaking.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A; Cantwell v. Allegheny County,
483 A.2d 1350, 1353 (Pa. 1984) (recognizing that “the essential provisions
of [Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A] have been the law in
Pennsylvania for many years”).
As the comments to the rule state:
[Section 324A] applies to any undertaking to render
services to another, where the actor's negligent conduct in
the manner of performance of his undertaking, or his failure
to exercise reasonable care to complete it, or to protect the
third person when he discontinues it, results in physical
harm to the third person or his things. It applies both to
undertakings for consideration, and to those which are
gratuitous.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A cmt. b.
Here, Appellants put forth evidence establishing a genuine issue of
material fact that Additional Defendants owed Plaintiffs duties under
Sections 323 and 324A of the Second Restatement – and that they breached
those duties.12
____________________________________________
12 In Althaus ex rel. Althaus v. Cohen, 756 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 2000), our
Supreme Court held that the issue of duty is “necessarily rooted in often
amorphous public policy considerations, which may include our perception of
history, morals, justice and society.” Id. at 1169. The Althaus Court held
that, to determine whether a duty exists in a particular case, a court must
weigh “several discrete factors,” including:
(1) the relationship between the parties; (2) the social
utility of the actor’s conduct; (3) the nature of the risk
imposed and foreseeability of the harm incurred; (4) the
consequences of imposing a duty upon the actor; and (5)
the overall public interest in the proposed solution.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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II.B.1.a. Tower Auto’s Duties and Breaches of Its Duties to Plaintiffs
First, with respect to Tower Auto, Appellants put forth evidence that,
viewed in the light most favorable to Appellants, tends to show the following.
On September 27, 2011, Thomas Straw took his vehicle to Tower Auto
for a state inspection. During the inspection, the owner of Tower Auto, John
Fanto, noticed a problem with the hood latch assembly. Mr. Fanto then
undertook to repair the hood latch assembly by “hos[ing] it down with a
penetrating oil and work[ing] the latch back and forth.” Deposition of John
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
Id.
However, as our Supreme Court later made clear, the weighing of the
Althaus factors is “more relevant to the creation of new duties than to the
vindication of existing ones.” Alderwoods (Pennsylvania), Inc. v.
Duquesne Light Co., 106 A.3d 27, 40 (Pa. 2014). Thus, the Supreme
Court held:
It is not necessary to conduct a full-blown public policy
assessment in every instance in which a longstanding duty
imposed on members of the public at large arises in a novel
factual scenario. Common-law duties stated in general
terms are framed in such fashion for the very reason that
they have broad-scale application.
Id. at 40-41; see also Scampone v. Highland Park Care Ctr., LLC, 57
A.3d 582, 586 (Pa. 2012) (holding that “reliance on the principle articulated
in Section 323 of the Restatement [(Second) of Torts] offered the functional
equivalent of an Althaus factor analysis”).
Here, we need not engage in an Althaus factor analysis because the instant
case concerns a straightforward application of Sections 323 and 324A of the
Second Restatement and the longstanding law of this Commonwealth.
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Robert Fanto, 6/29/15, at 21. Mr. Fanto issued Mr. Straw a state inspection
for the vehicle, billed Mr. Straw $21.00 for his work on the hood latch
assembly, and noted, on the service invoice, that he had “repair[ed the]
hood latch assembly.” Id. at 21-26; Tower Auto Service Invoice, 9/27/11,
at 1.
However, as stated in the Weber Report, Mr. Fanto should not have
used penetrating oil to lubricate the hood latch because “[p]enetrating oil
does not last . . . [and will] eventually dr[y] out.” Weber Report, 8/11/15,
at 4. Instead, the Weber Report declared, Mr. Fanto should have: used a
“de-greasing solvent . . . to remove all of the old grease and dirt;” blown out
the debris in the latch using compressed air; and, “[a]fter removing the old
grease with the proper solvent, lithium, or white, grease should have been
liberally applied.” Id. Moreover, as implied by the Weber Report, when Mr.
Fanto serviced the hood latch with the penetrating oil, Mr. Fanto actually
masked the problem with the hood latch by creating a “temporary fix” and
making the hood latch appear to be properly operational. Id. According to
the Weber Report, when the penetrating oil “eventually dried out” it
“reverted the latch back to its malfunctioning condition;” specifically, the
hood latch became “gritty with the accumulation of dirt” and this “cause[d]
the lever and latch to stick and bind.” Id.
Finally, Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Gregory Brandt concluded
that “[a] mechanical problem with [the] hood latch [on the Straws’ Pontiac
Vibe automobile] resulted [in] its hood opening while [the vehicle] was
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traveling” on Route 28. Pennsylvania State Police General Investigation
Report, 1/22/13, at 21. Corporal Brandt also “concluded with [a] high level
of certainty” that, prior to the accident, the hood latch on the Pontiac Vibe
had been damaged “for a substantial amount of time.” Id. at 17.
Viewing the above evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants
demonstrates that Tower Auto owed Mr. Straw a duty under Section 323 of
the Second Restatement and that Tower Auto owed Jennifer, Rowan, and
Elijah Straw duties under Section 324A of the Second Restatement. There is
also a genuine issue of material fact that Tower Auto breached its duties of
care to Plaintiffs. Specifically, there is a genuine issue of material fact that:
 Mr. Fanto “undert[ook], . . . for consideration, to render services
to [Mr. Straw] which he should [have] recognize[d] as necessary
for the protection of the other’s person” (Mr. Fanto undertook,
for consideration, to repair the hood latch on Mr. Straw’s vehicle
and then informed Mr. Straw that he had “repair[ed the] hood
latch assembly;” further, Mr. Fanto should have recognized that
his work and statements to Mr. Straw were necessary for the
protection of Mr. Straw and Mr. Straw’s passengers because he
should have recognized that, if the hood latch failed while Mr.
Straw was driving, the hood would open and obscure the vision
of Mr. Straw, thus risking harm to Mr. Straw and Mr. Straw’s
passengers);
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 Mr. Fanto failed to exercise reasonable care in performing his
work on the vehicle (according to the Weber Report, Mr. Fanto
utilized the wrong lubricant on the hood latch assembly, which,
in effect, concealed the problem with the hood latch and allowed
the problem to manifest when the improper lubricant dried out;
Mr. Fanto also informed Mr. Straw that he had “repair[ed the]
hood latch assembly;” further, the hood latch on the vehicle
failed on May 1, 2012 and, prior to that time, the hood latch had
been damaged “for a substantial amount of time”);
 Mr. Fanto’s failure to exercise reasonable care increased the risk
of physical harm to Mr. Straw and Mr. Straw’s passengers (the
Weber Report, in effect, declared that when Mr. Fanto serviced
the hood latch with penetrating oil, Mr. Fanto masked the
problem with the hood latch and allowed the problem to
manifest when the improper penetrating oil dried out,
conceivably depriving Mr. Straw of the possibility that Jiffy Lube
and NAPA Auto Parts would discover the problem); and,
 the Straws suffered harm because of Mr. Straw’s reliance upon
the undertaking (Mr. Fanto performed work on the hood latch
and informed Mr. Straw that he had “repair[ed the] hood latch
assembly;” Mr. Straw drove the vehicle in reliance upon Mr.
Fanto’s undertaking; the Straws were later rear-ended when
they were forced to stop, in the middle of Route 28, because the
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hood on their vehicle unexpectedly popped open; and, the
Straws all suffered grave harm as a result of the collision).
Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists that Tower Auto owed
Plaintiffs duties under Section 323(a) and (b) and Section 324A(a) and (c) of
the Second Restatement. There also exists a genuine issue of material fact
that Tower Auto breached its duties of care to Plaintiffs.
II.B.1.a.i. The Trial Court’s Rationale for Finding No Duty as to Tower
Auto was Mistaken
According to the trial court, Tower Auto owed Plaintiffs no duty of care
because: “Tower Auto serviced the vehicle more than [seven] months prior
to the accident; Plaintiffs experienced no problems with the hood for [three]
months until after Jiffy Lube changed the vehicle’s oil; and Plaintiffs never
returned to Tower Auto after experiencing trouble with the hood latch.” Trial
Court Opinion, 9/8/16, at 7.
The facts cited by the trial court do not negate the existence of the
duties Tower Auto owed to Plaintiffs. This is especially true in light of the
Weber Report. To be sure, according to the Weber Report, Mr. Fanto
incorrectly used penetrating oil to lubricate the hood latch. Weber Report,
8/11/15, at 4. According to the Weber Report, servicing the latch with
penetrating oil was merely a “temporary fix.” The Weber Report declared
that the oil “eventually dried out” and caused the latch to “revert[] . . . back
to its malfunctioning condition;” specifically, the hood latch became “gritty
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with the accumulation of dirt” and this “cause[d] the lever and latch to stick
and bind.” Id.
Viewing the Weber Report in the light most favorable to Appellants
demonstrates that Tower Auto breached the duties it owed to Plaintiffs under
Sections 323 and 324A of the Second Restatement at the time it serviced
the hood latch. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
II.B.1.a.ii. Tower Auto’s Arguments to this Court are Meritless
Within Tower Auto’s appellate brief, Tower Auto claims that “there is
no evidence that it breached a duty to the Plaintiffs” because: 1) it is
entitled to limited immunity from suit under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4702.1 and, 2)
the Weber Report, upon which Appellants rely, “is entirely based off of a
misreading of the owner’s manual for the Straw vehicle” and must be
disregarded. Appellant’s Brief at 22-23. These claims fail.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4702.1, entitled “limited liability of inspection station or
mechanic,” declares, in relevant part:
(a) General rule.--An inspection conducted pursuant to
section 4702(a) (relating to annual inspection) . . . shall not
be construed as a guaranty of the safety of any vehicle and
neither the official inspection station issuing the certificate
of inspection nor the official inspection mechanic performing
the inspection shall be liable to the owner or occupants of
any inspected vehicle for any damages caused by the failure
or malfunction of that vehicle or to the owner or occupants
of any vehicle involved in an accident with that inspected
vehicle or to any pedestrian injured in the accident unless
it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that the failure was caused by the negligence of the
inspection station or mechanic.
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75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4702.1 (emphasis added).
This Section does not entitle Tower Auto to summary judgment
because, as explained above, there exists a genuine issue of material fact
that “the failure [of the hood latch] was caused by the negligence of the
inspection station or mechanic.” Id.
Tower Auto also claims that this Court should “disregard” the Weber
Report because the Weber Report “is entirely based off of a misreading of
the owner’s manual for the Straw vehicle.” Appellant’s Brief at 22-23. This
argument plainly fails at the summary judgment stage, as it constitutes a
simple attack upon the credibility and weight of Appellants’ expert.
Summers, 997 A.2d at 1161 (“[i]t has long been Pennsylvania law that,
while conclusions recorded by experts may be disputed, the credibility and
weight attributed to those conclusions are not proper considerations at
summary judgment; rather, such determinations reside in the sole province
of the trier of fact”).
II.B.1.b. Jiffy Lube’s Duties and Breaches of Its Duties to Plaintiffs
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Appellants, Appellants
produced the following evidence that Jiffy Lube owed duties of care to
Plaintiffs and that Jiffy Lube breached those duties.
In January 2012, following an oil change at Jiffy Lube, Mr. Straw
returned to the Jiffy Lube and told the employees “I got an oil change here,
and the next thing I know my hood doesn’t close all the way.” Deposition of
Thomas Straw, 5/13/15, at 33. Mr. Straw testified that a Jiffy Lube
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employee “just kind of grunted and went and got some tools, you know,
worked with it for a little bit, grunted some more, went and got some other
tools, worked with it, got it down and that was that.” Id. Mr. Straw
testified that, when the employee finished, Mr. Straw asked the employee “is
[this] safe to drive? It’s not going to pop up on me?;” the employee
responded by declaring that the vehicle was safe to drive. Id. at 34 and 71.
Nevertheless, on May 1, 2012, the hood latch failed on the Straws’
vehicle, resulting in the “hood opening while [the vehicle] was traveling” on
Route 28. Pennsylvania State Police General Investigation Report, 1/22/13,
at 21. Further, as Corporal Brandt concluded, the hood latch on the Straws’
vehicle had been damaged “for a substantial amount of time” prior to the
accident. Id. at 17.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Appellants, Jiffy Lube
owed a duty to Mr. Straw under Section 323, and to Jennifer, Rowan, and
Elijah Straw under Section 324A, of the Second Restatement; there also
exists a genuine issue of material fact that Jiffy Lube breached its duties of
care to Plaintiffs. To be sure, the record demonstrates that:
 a Jiffy Lube employee “undert[ook], gratuitously . . . , to render
services to [Mr. Straw] which he should [have] recognize[d] as
necessary for the protection of [Mr. Straw’s] person” (the Jiffy
Lube employee undertook to repair the hood latch on the Straws’
vehicle and then assured Mr. Straw that the vehicle was “safe to
drive;” further, the employee should have recognized that his
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work and statements to Mr. Straw were necessary for the
protection of Mr. Straw and Mr. Straw’s passengers because he
should have recognized that, if the hood latch failed while Mr.
Straw was driving, the hood would fly up and obscure the vision
of Mr. Straw, thus risking harm to Mr. Straw and his
passengers);
 the Jiffy Lube employee failed to exercise reasonable care in
performing his work on the vehicle and in advising Mr. Straw as
to the car’s safety (approximately three or four months after
Jiffy Lube performed its work and assured Mr. Straw of the
latch’s safety, the hood latch on the vehicle failed and, at the
time of failure, the hood latch had been damaged “for a
substantial amount of time”);
 the Jiffy Lube employee’s failure to exercise reasonable care
increased the risk of physical harm to Mr. Straw and Mr. Straw’s
passengers (the employee’s failure to perform the undertaking in
a non-negligent manner and his assurances of safety to Mr.
Straw caused Mr. Straw to believe the latch was safe and to,
thus, not protect himself or his family against the risk of the
hood opening while he was driving); and,
 the Straws suffered harm because of Mr. Straw’s reliance upon
the undertaking (the Jiffy Lube employee purportedly repaired
the hood latch and then assured Mr. Straw that the latch was
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safe; Mr. Straw drove the vehicle; and, the Straws were later
rear-ended when they were forced to stop, in the middle of
Route 28, because the hood on their vehicle unexpectedly
popped open).
The record, as stated above, reveals a genuine issue of material fact
that Jiffy Lube owed Plaintiffs duties – and breached those duties – under
Section 323(a) and (b) and Section 324A(a) and (c) of the Second
Restatement.13
II.B.1.b.i. The Trial Court’s Rationale for Finding No Duty as to Jiffy
Lube was Mistaken
____________________________________________
13 Our Supreme Court has not adopted the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical Harm (Proposed Draft Number One), and although we
do not express any opinion as to the acceptance of this provision, we note
that comment f to Section 42 (“Duty Based on Undertaking”) explains:
f. Increasing the risk of harm. The requirement that the
actor increase the risk of harm means that the risk to the
other person is increased beyond that which existed in the
absence of the actor's undertaking.
This requirement is often met because the plaintiff or
another relied on the actor's performing the undertaking in
a nonnegligent manner and declined to pursue an
alternative means for protection. Although reliance is
merely a specific manner of increasing the risk of harm for
another, this Section retains reliance as a separate basis for
imposing a duty because historically it has been treated
separately.
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical Harm § 42 cmt. f (PFT
No. 1).
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The trial court reasoned that Jiffy Lube did not owe Plaintiffs any duty
because: “Jiffy Lube is in the business of changing oil not repairing hood
latches; Plaintiffs experienced no problems with the hood for a week after
the oil change; an employee attempted to aid Plaintiffs free of charge upon
their return; the employee never told Mr. Straw he fixed anything; Plaintiffs
did not experience any issues with the hood for several weeks later despite
driving to Ohio multiple times.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/16, at 8. We
conclude that the trial court’s reasoning is mistaken.
First, as to the fact that “Plaintiffs experienced no problems with the
hood for a week after the oil change,” we conclude that this fact does not
bear upon the existence of Jiffy Lube’s duty. This is because the employee
performed the work on the hood latch, and assured Mr. Straw of the hood
latch’s safety, after the oil change had occurred. Deposition of Thomas
Straw, 5/13/15, at 32-33 (Mr. Straw explained that he received an oil
change at Jiffy Lube and then, approximately one week later, he returned to
the Jiffy Lube because the hood of his car would not close all the way).
Second, the trial court held that “an employee attempted to aid [Mr.
Straw] free of charge upon [his] return” negated the existence of Jiffy Lube’s
duty. However, this fact does not negate the existence of a duty, as
Sections 323 and 324A impose a duty of reasonable care upon “[o]ne who
undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to
another. . . .” Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 323 and 324A (emphasis
added).
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Third, the trial court reasoned, Jiffy Lube did not have a duty to
Plaintiffs because “Jiffy Lube is in the business of changing oil not repairing
hood latches.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/16, at 8. This reasoning fails
because the Jiffy Lube employee actually performed work on the hood latch
and, thus, “undert[ook] . . . to render services to [Mr. Straw] which he
should [have] recognize[d] as necessary for the protection of [Mr. Straw’s]
person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 323 and 324A. Further,
although Jiffy Lube’s business specialty might create a factual issue
concerning whether Mr. Straw “relied” upon the employee’s safety
assurances, this factual issue cannot be resolved at the summary judgment
stage. See, e.g., Leach v. Phila. Sav. Fund Soc., 340 A.2d 491, 492 (Pa.
Super. 1975) (“[s]ummary judgment may be entered only in the clearest of
cases where there is not the slightest doubt as to the absence of an issue of
material fact. . . . The existence of [an] issue of material fact renders the
summary judgment procedure premature and inappropriate”). To be sure,
as explained in the comments to Section 323 of the Second Restatement:
One who gratuitously gives transportation to another, or
otherwise renders gratuitous services to him, is not subject
to liability to him for his failure to have the competence or
to exercise the skill normally required of persons doing such
acts, if the other who accepts the services is aware, through
information given by the actor or otherwise, of his
incompetence. However, a contract to render services, or a
gratuitous offer to render them, or even merely giving them
at the other's request, may carry with it a profession or
representation of some skill and competence; and if the
actor realizes or should realize that his competence and skill
are subnormal, he must exercise reasonable care to inform
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the other. If he does not do so, he is subject to liability for
physical harm resulting from his deficiencies.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 cmt. b.
In the case at bar, there is no evidence: that the Jiffy Lube employee
possessed a “subnormal” skill or competence in general car repair or,
specifically, in fixing hood latches; that the employee informed Mr. Straw
that he possessed any such subnormal skill or competence; or, that Mr.
Straw “realize[d] or should [have] realize[d] that [the employees’]
competence and skill [was] subnormal.” Id. Therefore, the mere fact that
“Jiffy Lube is in the business of changing oil not repairing hood latches” does
not entitle Jiffy Lube to summary judgment. See Trial Court Opinion,
9/8/16, at 8.
Finally, the trial court reasoned that Jiffy Lube did not have a duty to
Plaintiffs because “the employee never told Mr. Straw he fixed anything” and
“Plaintiffs did not experience any issues with the hood for several weeks
later despite driving to Ohio multiple times.” Id. These reasons do not
support the trial court’s grant of summary judgment.
Simply stated, the assertion that “the employee never told Mr. Straw
he fixed anything” fails to view the record in the light most favorable to
Appellants. Certainly, under the proper standard of review, the record
reflects that the employee worked on the hood latch, was able to fully close
the hood, and then assured Mr. Straw that the hood latch was safe.
Deposition of Thomas Straw, 5/13/15, at 29-33. Viewing these facts in the
light most favorable to Appellants demonstrates that the Jiffy Lube employee
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endeavored to repair the hood latch and then, through his actions and
words, represented to Mr. Straw that he had repaired the hood latch and
that the latch was “safe.”
Further, the fact that “Plaintiffs did not experience any issues with the
hood for several weeks [] despite driving to Ohio multiple times” does not
negate the existence of a duty upon Jiffy Lube because the hood latch failed
three to four months after its employee worked on the latch and assured Mr.
Straw that it was safe. Moreover, following the accident, Corporal Brandt
concluded that the hood latch on the Straws’ vehicle had been damaged “for
a substantial amount of time” prior to the accident. Thus, there is evidence
that, although the employee manipulated the latch, he did not repair it and
unreasonably assured Mr. Straw that the latch was safe. The trial court’s
conclusion to the contrary was in error.
II.B.1.b.ii. Jiffy Lube’s Arguments to this Court are Meritless
On appeal, Jiffy Lube primarily claims that it did not owe Plaintiffs any
duty because there was “[n]o evidence that [Jiffy Lube] was in the business
of fixing hoods or hood latches of cars, particularly free of charge.” Jiffy
Lube’s Brief at 12. As explained above, this claim does not entitle Jiffy Lube
to summary judgment.14
____________________________________________
14 Within Jiffy Lube’s appellate brief to this Court, Jiffy Lube also claims that
it did not owe Plaintiffs any duty because the accident was not foreseeable.
Jiffy Lube’s Brief at 12. We will analyze the foreseeability of the accident
below.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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II.B.1.c. NAPA Auto Parts’ Duties and Breaches of Its Duties to
Plaintiffs
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Appellants as the
non-moving parties, the evidence as to NAPA Auto Parts’ liability is as
follows.
In March 2012, Mr. Straw and his family drove to Ohio. During their
trip, they stopped their Pontiac Vibe automobile at a NAPA Auto Parts store
to purchase a tail light bulb. Deposition of Thomas Straw, 5/13/15, at 35.
While there, Mr. Straw asked an employee to “take a look at [the hood] and
. . . let me know if it’s all right, if it’s safe.” Id. at 36. Mr. Straw testified:
“I said I have a state inspection coming up in a couple months, is this going
to make it to the state inspection, is it safe[?] He said absolutely. He said
it’s metal on metal. They don’t call it a safety latch for nothing.” Id. at 36.
Mr. Straw testified that he could not remember whether the NAPA Auto
Parts’ employee did “anything physically with the car,” but Mr. Straw
testified that he relied upon the employee’s assurances that the hood was
safe. Id. at 36-37.
Approximately six weeks later, the hood latch on the Straws’ Pontiac
Vibe failed, thus leading to the accident. Further, Corporal Brandt
“concluded with [a] high level of certainty” that, prior to the accident, the
hood latch on the Pontiac Vibe had been damaged “for a substantial amount
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
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of time.” Pennsylvania State Police General Investigation Report, 1/22/13,
at 17.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants
establishes a prima facie case under Sections 323 and 324A of the Second
Restatement. It demonstrates that:
 a NAPA Auto Parts employee “undert[ook], gratuitously . . . , to
render services to [Mr. Straw] which he should [have]
recognize[d] as necessary for the protection of [Mr. Straw’s]
person” (the NAPA Auto Parts employee undertook to analyze
the hood latch on the Straws’ vehicle and then assured Mr.
Straw that the vehicle was “safe;” 15 further, the employee
should have recognized that his work and statements to Mr.
Straw were necessary for the protection of Mr. Straw and Mr.
Straw’s passengers because he should have recognized that, if
the hood latch failed while Mr. Straw was driving, the hood
would fly up and obscure the vision of Mr. Straw, thus risking
harm to Mr. Straw and Mr. Straw’s passengers);
____________________________________________
15 See Farabaugh v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 911 A.2d 1264, 1284 (Pa. 2006)
(“the plain language of Section 324A merely requires an undertaking to
‘render services to another,’ which we find to encompass the rendering of
inspection services”); Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828 (Pa. Super.
1998) (holding that, under Section 323, the plaintiffs established that the
defendant “render[ed] services” by issuing “telephonic advice”).
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 the NAPA Auto Parts employee failed to exercise reasonable care
in performing his analysis on the vehicle and in advising Mr.
Straw as to the car’s safety (approximately six weeks after the
NAPA Auto Parts employee looked at the vehicle and assured Mr.
Straw of the latch’s safety, the hood latch on the vehicle failed
and, at the time of failure, the hood latch had been damaged
“for a substantial amount of time”); and,
 the NAPA Auto Parts employee’s failure to exercise reasonable
care increased the risk of physical harm to Mr. Straw and Mr.
Straw’s passengers (the employee’s assurances of safety to Mr.
Straw caused Mr. Straw to believe the latch was safe and to,
thus, not protect himself or his family against the risk of the
hood opening while he was driving); and,
 the Straws suffered harm because of Mr. Straw’s reliance upon
the undertaking (the NAPA Auto Parts employee undertook to
assure Mr. Straw that the latch was safe; Mr. Straw relied upon
the advice and drove the vehicle; and, the Straws were later
rear-ended when they were forced to stop, in the middle of
Route 28, because the hood on their vehicle unexpectedly
popped open).
The record thus reveals a genuine issue of material fact that NAPA
Auto Parts owed Plaintiffs duties under Section 323(a) and (b) and Section
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324A(a) and (c) of the Second Restatement and that NAPA Auto Parts
breached its duties of care to Plaintiffs.
II.B.1.c.i. The Trial Court’s Rationale for Finding No Duty as to NAPA
Auto Parts was Mistaken
The trial court held that NAPA Auto Parts did not owe Plaintiffs any
duty because: “NAPA [Auto Parts] is an auto parts store not a repair shop;
the employee was asked to look at the hood latch and did so free of charge;
[six] weeks elapsed between the NAPA [Auto Parts] visit and the accident;
and between the NAPA [Auto Parts] visit and the accident, Plaintiffs drove
their car to Ohio and elsewhere putting hundreds of miles on the car.” Trial
Court Opinion, 9/8/16, at 8.
This Court has already explained why the trial court’s rationale fails.
Nevertheless, we note: there is no evidence that the NAPA Auto Parts’
employees’ skill and competence at car maintenance was subnormal or that
Mr. Straw “realize[d] or should [have] realize[d] that [the employees’]
competence and skill [was] subnormal” (thus, at the summary judgment
stage, it is immaterial that “NAPA [Auto Parts] is an auto parts store not a
repair shop”); Sections 323 and 324A impose a duty of reasonable care
upon “[o]ne who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render
services to another” (thus, at the summary judgment stage, it is irrelevant
that “the employee was asked to look at the hood latch and did so free of
charge”); and, six weeks after the NAPA Auto Parts’ employee declared the
Straws’ hood latch “safe,” “[a] mechanical problem with [the] hood latch [on
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the Straws’ automobile] resulted [in] its hood opening while [the vehicle]
was traveling” on Route 28 and, at the time of failure, the hood latch had
been damaged “for a substantial amount of time” (therefore, summary
judgment is not proper merely because “[six] weeks elapsed between the
NAPA [Auto Parts] visit and the accident and . . . Plaintiffs drove their car to
Ohio and elsewhere putting hundreds of miles on the car”).
II.B.1.c.ii. NAPA Auto Parts’ Arguments to this Court are Meritless
Within its brief, NAPA Auto Parts claims that it had no duty to Plaintiffs
and, in support, repeats many of the same arguments that the trial court
made. NAPA Auto Parts’ Brief at 15-18. For the reasons set forth above, we
reject those arguments.
NAPA Auto Parts also claims that its employee “could not possibly have
foreseen that his actions were necessary for the protection of Plaintiff[s]”
and that NAPA Auto Parts, thus, does not have any duty to Plaintiffs under
Sections 323 and 324A of the Second Restatement. Id. at 17. This claim
fails because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants,
the employee undertook to analyze the Straws’ vehicle and undertook to
give Mr. Straw advice that the hood latch on the vehicle was “safe.”
Deposition of Thomas Straw, 5/13/15, at 36. If the employee failed to
exercise reasonable care in this undertaking and improperly assured Mr.
Straw that the hood latch was safe, a direct and easily foreseeable result of
this improper advice would be that the hood would fly open while the vehicle
was in operation, thus endangering Mr. Straw and his passengers.
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Therefore, in this case, there exists a genuine issue of material fact that the
employee “should [have] recognized [that his services were] necessary for
the protection of” Mr. Straw and Mr. Straw’s passengers. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 323 and 324A. NAPA Auto Parts’ claim to the contrary
fails.
II.B.1.d. Conclusion as to Duties and Breaches of Duties
We have thus concluded that there are genuine issues of material fact
that Additional Defendants owed Plaintiffs duties under Sections 323 and
324A of the Second Restatement and that Additional Defendants breached
those duties. We will next address our conclusion that the trial court erred
in holding that “the conduct of [Appellants] was not reasonably foreseeable .
. . [and, therefore,] proximate cause could not be established against the
Additional Defendants.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/16, at 7-9.
II.B.2. Causation
II.B.2.a. Additional Defendants’ Negligence and Factual Cause
Analysis
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must produce
sufficient facts to show that the defendant’s negligence was both the
cause-in-fact and the legal, or proximate, cause of her injuries. In
Pennsylvania, a negligent act is a cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s injuries “if
the harmful result would not have come about but for the negligent
conduct.” First v. Zem Zem Temple, 686 A.2d 18, 21 n.2 (Pa. Super.
1996) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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In this case, Appellants put forth sufficient evidence to create a jury
question that, but for Additional Defendants’ alleged negligence, Plaintiffs
would not have suffered harm. Evidence exists that, if the Additional
Defendants had not been negligent, Plaintiffs would not have driven the car,
the hood on Plaintiffs’ car would never have opened, Plaintiffs would never
have stopped their vehicle on the highway, and Mr. Fair would never have
crashed into Plaintiffs’ vehicle. Hence, in this case, there is a genuine issue
of material fact that Additional Defendants’ negligence was a factual cause of
Plaintiffs’ harm.16
II.B.2.b. Proximate Causation and Intervening Causes
Regarding proximate cause, conduct is a proximate cause of the
plaintiff’s harm where the conduct “was a substantial factor in bringing about
the harm inflicted upon a plaintiff.” Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 431 A.2d
920, 923 (Pa. 1981). As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:
At its root, the concept of legal cause . . . is an articulation
of policy related to social and economic considerations.
Dean Prosser has described proximate or legal causation as
follows:
Once it is established that the defendant's conduct has
in fact been one of the causes of the plaintiff's injury,
there remains the question whether the defendant
should be legally responsible for what he has caused.
Unlike the fact of causation, with which it is often
____________________________________________
16Further, on appeal, the Additional Defendants do not claim that factual
causation is lacking.
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hopelessly confused, this is essentially a problem of law.
It is sometimes said to be a question of whether the
conduct has been so significant and important a cause
that the defendant should be legally responsible. But
both significance and importance turn upon conclusions
in terms of legal policy, so that this becomes essentially
a question of whether the policy of the law will extend
the responsibility for the conduct to the consequences
which have in fact occurred.
Prosser, Law of Torts § 42 (4th ed.). . . . [The Pennsylvania
Supreme] Court, in accord with Prosser, has stated: “the
concept [of proximate cause], like that of negligence itself,
was designed not only to permit recovery for a wrong but to
place such limits upon liability as are deemed socially or
economically desirable from time to time.” Grainy v.
Campbell, 425 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa. 1981). . . .
As a general rule, however, in the absence of policy
considerations which would limit liability, if an actor's
negligence is the legal cause of damages sustained by
another, the actor is liable for those damages. Under the
analysis of “legal cause” set forth in the Restatement of
Torts, Second and adopted by [the Pennsylvania Supreme]
Court . . . , the question is whether the defendant's conduct
was a “substantial factor” in producing the injury.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 431.
As [the Pennsylvania Supreme] Court observed in Ford v.
Jeffries, [379 A.2d 111 (Pa. 1977),] ordinarily the
determination of whether the defendant's conduct was a
substantial cause of the injuries complained of should not
be taken from the jury if the jury may reasonably differ as
to whether the conduct of the defendant has been a
substantial factor in causing the harm. See also
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434. If issues are raised
on which a jury may not reasonably differ, it is proper for
the trial court to decide them. If, on the other hand, a jury
may reasonably differ on whether the defendant's conduct
was a substantial factor in causing the injury, generally, the
case must go to the jury on those issues.
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Vattimo v. Lower Bucks Hosp., Inc., 465 A.2d 1231, 1233-1234 (Pa.
1983) (plurality) (emphasis omitted) (some internal citations omitted).
Section 433 of the Second Restatement of Torts sets forth three
“considerations [that are] important in determining whether negligent
conduct is [a] substantial factor in producing harm.” Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 433. The section declares:
The following considerations are in themselves or in
combination with one another important in determining
whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about harm to another:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in
producing the harm and the extent of the effect which
they have in producing it;
(b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or
series of forces which are in continuous and active
operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a
situation harmless unless acted upon by other forces for
which the actor is not responsible;
(c) lapse of time.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433; see also Betz v. Pneumo Abex,
LLC, 44 A.3d 27, 56 n.36 (Pa. 2012) (“th[e Pennsylvania Supreme] Court
has cited [Restatement (Second) of Torts §] 433 as consistent with
Pennsylvania law”).
“Two or more causes may contribute to and thus be the legal or
proximate cause of an injury.” Feeny v. Disston Manor Personal Care
Home, Inc., 849 A.2d 590, 595 (Pa. Super. 2004). Further, and relatedly,
where an act or force “actively operates in producing harm to [the plaintiff]
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after [the defendant’s] negligent act [] has been committed,” that
intervening force does not necessarily relieve the defendant of liability.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 441. Instead, for an act to break the
causal chain and relieve the defendant of liability, the act must be “so
extraordinary as not to have been reasonably foreseeable.” Von der Heide
v. Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp., 718 A.2d 286, (Pa. 1998); Trude v.
Martin, 660 A.2d 626, 632 (Pa. Super. 1995). In such a case, the act
constitutes a “superseding cause” and, “by its intervention, [the act]
prevents the [defendant] from being liable for harm to another which his
antecedent negligence is a substantial factor in bringing about.” Von der
Heide, 718 A.2d at 288 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440). “A
determination of whether an act is so extraordinary as to constitute a
superseding cause is normally one to be made by the jury.” Powell v.
Drumheller, 653 A.2d 619, 624 (Pa. 1995).
The Restatement lists a number of considerations that “are of
importance in determining whether an intervening force is a superseding
cause of harm to another.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442. The
listed considerations are:
(a) the fact that its intervention brings about harm different
in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from
the actor's negligence;
(b) the fact that its operation or the consequences thereof
appear after the event to be extraordinary rather than
normal in view of the circumstances existing at the time of
its operation;
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(c) the fact that the intervening force is operating
independently of any situation created by the actor's
negligence, or, on the other hand, is or is not a normal
result of such a situation;
(d) the fact that the operation of the intervening force is
due to a third person's act or to his failure to act;
(e) the fact that the intervening force is due to an act of a
third person which is wrongful toward the other and as such
subjects the third person to liability to him;
(f) the degree of culpability of a wrongful act of a third
person which sets the intervening force in motion.
Id.
The Restatement also declares:
Where the negligent conduct of the actor creates or
increases the risk of a particular harm and is a substantial
factor in causing that harm, the fact that the harm is
brought about through the intervention of another force
does not relieve the actor of liability, except where the harm
is intentionally caused by a third person and is not within
the scope of the risk created by the actor's conduct.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442B; see also Ford, 379 A.2d at 115
(quoting comment b to Section 442B). And:
If the likelihood that a third person may act in a particular
manner is the hazard or one of the hazards which makes
the actor negligent, such an act whether innocent,
negligent, intentionally tortious, or criminal does not
prevent the actor from being liable for harm caused
thereby.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 449.
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In the case at bar, the trial court essentially held that Mr. Fair’s
reckless17 actions on May 1, 2012 constituted a superseding cause of
Plaintiffs’ harm as a matter of law – and that, as a result of Mr. Fair’s
criminal actions, the Additional Defendants were relieved of liability for their
alleged negligence. Respectfully, we conclude that this holding is incorrect.
II.B.2.b.i. Appellants’ Conduct and Intervening Cause Analysis
As summarized above, Appellants put forth evidence that the
Additional Defendants negligently: performed work on the hood latch of the
Straws’ vehicle and/or analyzed the vehicle and assured the Straws that the
hood latch was safe. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
____________________________________________
17As was previously noted, Mr. Fair pleaded guilty to four counts of REAP.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705 defines REAP in the following manner:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if
he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place
another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705.
REAP is a non-summary criminal offense and, as is evident in the crime’s
definition, a necessary element of REAP is the mens rea of “recklessness.”
Therefore, at least with respect to Mr. Fair and the vicarious liability of Golon
Masonry, Mr. Fair’s guilty plea to REAP constitutes “conclusive evidence,” in
this civil proceeding, that Mr. Fair acted recklessly on May 1, 2012. See
Folino v. Young, 568 A.2d 171, 172-173 (Pa. 1990) (“operative facts
necessary for non-summary criminal convictions [may] be admitted as
conclusive facts in civil suits arising from the same event”); Hurtt v.
Stirone, 206 A.2d 624, 625-627 (Pa. 1965) (holding that the civil
defendant’s prior conviction for extortion constituted “conclusive evidence of
the fact of the alleged extortion” in the later, civil trial).
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Appellants, at the time each Additional Defendant performed its services for
the Straws, the Additional Defendant knew or should have known that a
foreseeable consequence of any negligence with respect to the hood latch
would be that: the Straws would drive their vehicle; the air speed at the
front of the Straws’ vehicle would increase as the Straws increased the
speed of their vehicle; the increasing air speed at the front of the vehicle
would increase the drag upon a partially raised, unsecured hood; and, as a
result of the increased drag upon the hood, the unsecured hood on the
vehicle would fly open while the Straws were driving. Further, the Additional
Defendants should have known that a foreseeable risk of their negligence
would be that the suddenly-raised hood would obscure Mr. Straw’s vision of
the road, leading to the foreseeable risk that Mr. Straw would hit an object
in front of him, lose control of his vehicle, or unexpectedly stop his vehicle
on the roadway and be hit, from behind, by another vehicle – all of which
could foreseeably cause grave injuries or death to Mr. Straw and his
passengers. To be sure, these are the precise risks that made the Additional
Defendants’ actions negligent in the first place.
Moreover, Appellants put forth evidence that, as a result of Additional
Defendants’ negligence, Mr. Straw was driving the vehicle and the hood on
the Straws’ vehicle popped open while Mr. Straw was driving on a highway.
This led to Mr. Straw unexpectedly stopping his vehicle on the highway,
which led to Mr. Fair striking the Straws’ stationary vehicle from behind,
which led to the death of Elijah Straw and injuries to Thomas, Jennifer, and
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Rowan Straw. In other words, Appellants have put forth evidence that
Additional Defendants’ conduct created the foreseeable risk of serious injury
or death to Mr. Straw and his passengers, because Mr. Straw would be
forced to unexpectedly stop his vehicle on the highway and be hit from
behind by another vehicle – and Plaintiffs were, in fact, harmed when Mr.
Straw was forced to unexpectedly stop his vehicle on the highway and was
hit from behind by Mr. Fair’s vehicle. As such, there is sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that Plaintiffs’ harm was within the scope of the original risk
that Additional Defendants’ negligence created.
Undoubtedly, Mr. Fair’s conduct was criminal. However, Plaintiffs
never claimed that Mr. Fair intentionally struck their vehicle and Mr. Fair’s
pleas of guilt only establish that he acted recklessly. Moreover, as our
Supreme Court has held, “criminal conduct does not act as a per se
superseding force.” Powell, 653 A.2d at 624. Instead, the Supreme Court
held, the focus in every case is not upon the criminal nature of the act, but
upon “whether the act was so extraordinary as not to be reasonably
foreseeable” – and that question “is normally one to be made by the jury.”
Id. at 624-625 (holding: “[i]t is for the jury . . . to determine whether [one
defendant’s] actions in attempting to pass a car while under the influence of
alcohol thus crossing into [the plaintiff’s] lane were so extraordinary as to be
unforeseeable to [defendant] PENNDOT when designing the highway”);
Crowell v. City of Phila., 613 A.2d 1178, 1185 n.12 (Pa. 1992) (holding
that a defendant’s drunk driving conviction did not constitute a superseding
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cause and relieve the City of Philadelphia of liability for placing a dangerous
street sign because, among other reasons, the defendant’s criminal act of
drunk driving was foreseeable); Jones v. Chieffo, 700 A.2d 417 (Pa. 1997)
(plurality) (plaintiffs were struck by a car that was being pursued by the
Philadelphia police and the plaintiffs sued the City of Philadelphia; the
Supreme Court held that a jury must decide whether the criminal act of the
driver constituted a superseding cause, which would relieve the city of
liability).
Finally, we note that ordinary human experience tells us that drivers
may commonly violate the posted speed limits, that they may occasionally
be inattentive to the road, that they may occasionally drive dangerously, and
that it may not be “extraordinary” for them to be intoxicated. See also
Powell, 653 A.2d at 624-625 (holding: “[i]t is for the jury . . . to determine
whether [one defendant’s] actions in attempting to pass a car while under
the influence of alcohol thus crossing into [the plaintiff’s] lane were so
extraordinary as to be unforeseeable to [defendant] PENNDOT when
designing the highway”). Stated another way, ordinary human experience
tells us that drivers sometimes act criminally on the roads. Therefore, in
accordance with our Supreme Court’s precedent, we conclude that a jury
must determine whether Mr. Fair’s criminal acts and particular combination
of speeding, inattentive driving, and (alleged) intoxication were “so
extraordinary as not to be reasonably foreseeable” to the Additional
Defendants and, relatedly, whether the case falls within Sections 442B or
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449 of the Second Restatement of Torts. Powell, 653 A.2d at 624;
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 442B and 449; c.f. Ford, 379 A.2d at 115
(holding: “[i]f one engages in negligent conduct toward another, such as
unreasonably increasing the risk that that person will suffer a particular kind
of harm, it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the actor is not liable
simply because the foreseeable plaintiff suffered the foreseeable harm in a
manner which was not foreseeable. Appellee's conduct in this case could
have increased the risk that appellant's house would be damaged by fire.
Such harm in fact occurred. Given these circumstances, it was for the jury
to determine whether the appellee's conduct, if it was negligent, was
superseded by the intervening force”). The trial court erred in holding
otherwise.18
____________________________________________
18 Within their briefs to this Court, Tower Auto and NAPA Auto Parts rely
upon our Supreme Court’s opinion in Ashworth v. Hannum, 32 A.2d 407
(Pa. 1943), to support their claims that Appellants’ conduct was a
superseding cause of Plaintiffs’ harm. However, Ashworth was based upon
a case and a legal doctrine that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court later
explicitly overruled. To be sure, Ashworth was based upon the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s earlier opinion in Kline v. Moyer, 191 A. 43
(Pa. 1937) and upon the doctrine that, “[i]f the defendant has created only a
passive, static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is
said not to be liable.” W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 42 (5th ed. 1984); Ashworth, 32 A.2d at 409 (“As we said in
Kline v. Moyer[]: ‘Where a second actor has become aware of the
existence of a potential danger created by the negligence of an original
tort-feasor, and thereafter, by an independent act or negligence, brings
about an accident, the first tort-feasor is relieved of liability, because the
condition created by him was merely a circumstance of the accident and not
its proximate cause.’ Thus, [the first actor’s] negligence in parking the truck
as he did was superseded by appellant's negligent and unforeseeable
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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II.B.2.b.ii. Additional Defendants’ Negligence and Proximate Cause
Analysis
Further, and for many of the same reasons set forth above, we
conclude that a jury must determine whether Additional Defendants’
negligence was a substantial factor in causing Plaintiffs’ harm. Rabutino v.
Freedom St. Realty Co., 809 A.2d 933, 941 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[w]hether
a defendant’s conduct has been a ‘substantial factor’ in causing plaintiff’s
harm is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury”).
First, as explained above, there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate
that Plaintiffs’ harm was within the scope of the original risk that Additional
Defendants’ negligence created and that Plaintiffs’ harm was the natural and
foreseeable result of Additional Defendants’ separate negligence.
Second, with respect to Additional Defendants, the evidence at the
summary judgment stage demonstrates that they each increased the risk of
physical harm to Mr. Straw and his passengers. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts §§ 323(a) and 324A(a); see also supra at **32-50.
As our Supreme Court has held:
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
conduct and made a remote cause of the accident”). Our Supreme Court
later adopted Section 447 of the Second Restatement of Torts (and Section
447’s focus upon “foreseeability”) to deal with the issue of superseding
cause and, therefore, held: “to the extent that Kline and any cases
following Kline are in conflict with § 447 they are expressly overruled.”
Grainy v. Campbell, 425 A.2d 379, 382 (Pa. 1981). Ashworth followed
Kline and Ashworth is in direct conflict with Section 447 of the Second
Restatement. Therefore, Ashworth is not good law and neither Tower Auto
nor NAPA Auto Parts should have relied upon the case.
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[O]nce a plaintiff has demonstrated that defendant's acts or
omissions, in a situation to which Section 323(a) applies,
have increased the risk of harm to another, such evidence
furnishes a basis for the fact-finder to go further and find
that such increased risk was in turn a substantial factor in
bringing about the resultant harm; the necessary proximate
case will have been made out if the jury sees fit to find
cause in fact.
Jones v. Montefiore Hosp., 431 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. 1981) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); Wilson v. U.S. Sec. Assoc’s, Inc., ___
A.3d ___, 2017 WL 3034031 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[t]he jury could have
properly concluded that th[e] failure to communicate an emergency
threatening situation was a substantial factor in increasing the risk of harm,
setting in operation the sequence of events by which [the shooter] could
proceed unimpeded to the break room, where she shot her victims”).
Thus, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Appellants,
demonstrates that Additional Defendants increased the risk of physical harm
to Mr. Straw and his passengers; as such, Appellants established a jury
question that Additional Defendants’ negligence was a substantial factor in
causing Plaintiffs’ injuries. Jones, 431 A.2d at 924.
Finally, even though Tower Auto, Jiffy Lube, and NAPA Auto Parts
performed their services weeks or months prior to the accident, the mere
lapse of time does not take the proximate cause issue away from the jury.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellants, a jury could
properly conclude that the hood latch had been damaged “for a substantial
amount of time” prior to the accident and that it merely took weeks or
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months for the air speed and drag to finally, and foreseeably, open the
dangerously unsecured hood. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (5th ed. 1984) (“[r]emoteness in time or
space may give rise to the likelihood that other intervening causes have
taken over the responsibility. But when causation is found, and other factors
are eliminated, it is not easy to discover any merit whatever in the
contention that such physical remoteness should of itself bar recovery. The
defendant who sets a bomb which explodes ten years later, or mails a box of
poisoned chocolates from California to Delaware, has caused the result, and
should obviously bear the consequences”).
Hence, in the case at bar it is for a jury to determine whether
Additional Defendants’ negligence was a substantial factor in causing
Plaintiffs’ harm.
We have thus determined that the trial court erred in granting
Additional Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We next explain why
the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants’ cross-claim against Thomas
Straw.
II.C. The Trial Court Erred in Dismissing Appellants’ Cross-Claim
Against Thomas Straw
As explained above, Appellants filed a cross-claim against Mr. Straw
and alleged that Mr. Straw was directly liable to Jennifer Straw, Rowan
Straw, and the Estate of Elijah Straw, or liable over to Appellants for
contribution or indemnity. According to Appellants, Mr. Straw was negligent
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for, among other things, driving his vehicle even though he knew that “the
hood and/or latching mechanism on the vehicle was not in good operating
condition” and for “allow[ing the vehicle] to remain in the lane of travel
when it was unsafe and hazardous to do so.” Appellants’ Cross-Claim,
5/22/13, at ¶ 2. The trial court granted Mr. Straw’s motion for summary
judgment and dismissed the cross-claim against him because, it held: 1)
Mr. Straw’s conduct was not a proximate cause of the harm, and 2) Mr.
Straw’s alleged “contributory negligence cannot be weighed or applied to
[Mr. Fair’s] reckless conduct.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/16, at 4-5.
Appellants claim that the trial court erred in dismissing their
cross-claim against Mr. Straw. We agree.
II.C.1. Mr. Straw’s Conduct and Negligence Analysis
At the outset, the trial court erred in concluding that summary
judgment was proper because “Mr. Straw’s conduct could not be found to be
the proximate cause of [the] harm.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/8/16, at 5 n.3.
Given our earlier discussion in this opinion, we need not speak long on
the current issue. However, we note that, when the evidence is viewed in
the light most favorable to Appellants, there is a genuine issue of material
fact that Mr. Straw knew there was a problem with his hood latch and,
nevertheless, drove his wife and children on the day in question. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania State Police General Investigation Report, 1/22/13, at 21 (“in a
post-crash interview with investigators, [Thomas Straw] related that he was
aware of the faulty hood latch and attempted to have the latch repaired one
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or two weeks prior”); Weber Report, 8/11/15, at 1 (“Mr. and Mrs. Straw
knowingly operated the Pontiac with the hood not completely latched. The
Pontiac should not have been driven at higher speeds until the hood was
properly repaired and latched.”) (internal paragraphing omitted). Therefore,
there is evidence that Mr. Straw violated his duty to his passengers by
acting unreasonably in light of the recognizable risk.
Further, as explained above, it is for a jury to determine whether Mr.
Straw’s alleged breach of his duty to his occupants was the proximate cause
of the accident and whether Mr. Fair’s conduct constituted a superseding
cause of the harm. The trial court’s contrary holding was in error.
II.C.2. Apportionment of Liability and Contribution Between Reckless
and Negligent Co-Defendants
The trial court also granted Mr. Straw’s summary judgment motion
because, it held, Mr. Straw’s alleged “contributory negligence cannot be
weighed or applied to [Mr. Fair’s] reckless conduct.” Trial Court Opinion,
9/8/16, at 4-5. With respect, we conclude that this holding was in error.
Initially, the trial court mistakenly confused Appellants’ cross-claim
against Mr. Straw with Appellants’ affirmative defense that Mr. Straw was
comparatively negligent for his own injuries. True, under the plain terms of
the Comparative Negligence Act, a defendant’s reckless conduct cannot be
compared to the plaintiff’s negligence. See Johnson v. City of Phila., 808
A.2d 978, 983 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (“[u]nder the Comparative Negligence
Act, the only conduct that is statutorily authorized to be compared is
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negligent conduct”) (emphasis in original). To be sure, Section 7102(a) of
the Comparative Negligence Act declares:
(a) General rule.--In all actions brought to recover
damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to
person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been
guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery
by the plaintiff or his legal representative where such
negligence was not greater than the causal negligence
of the defendant or defendants against whom recovery is
sought, but any damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be
diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a) (emphasis added); see also McMeekin v. Harry M.
Stevens, Inc., 530 A.2d 462, 464 (Pa. Super. 1987) (noting that Section
7102(a) only applies to “actions brought to recover damages for
negligence”).
However, with respect to Appellants’ cross-claim against Mr. Straw,
Appellants did not claim that Mr. Straw’s negligence should bar or diminish
Mr. Straw’s own recovery. Rather, they claimed that Mr. Straw’s
negligence rendered him directly liable to Jennifer Straw, Rowan Straw, and
the Estate of Elijah Straw, or liable over to Appellants for contribution or
indemnity. Under this theory, Mr. Straw was simply another defendant in
the action and, thus, the plain terms of Section 7102(a) have no application
to Appellants’ cross-claim against Mr. Straw. See Pa.R.C.P. 1031.1 (“Any
party may set forth in the answer or reply under the heading “Cross-claim” a
cause of action against any other party to the action that the other party
may be (1) solely liable on the underlying cause of action or (2) liable to or
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with the cross-claimant on any cause of action arising out of the transaction
or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences upon which the
underlying cause of action is based”); Pa.R.C.P. 1031.1 cmt. (“[t]he claims
which may be asserted in a cross-claim are identical to those which serve as
bases for joining an additional defendant”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 404 (8th
ed. 2004) (defining a “cross-claim” as “[a] claim asserted between
codefendants or coplaintiffs in a case”).
Moreover, nothing in Section 7102(a.1) or in the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA) would prohibit apportionment of liability or
contribution between reckless and negligent co-defendants. Section
7102(a.1) declares:
(a.1) Recovery against joint defendant;
contribution.—
(1) Where recovery is allowed against more than one
person, including actions for strict liability, and where
liability is attributed to more than one defendant, each
defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total
dollar amount awarded as damages in the ratio of the
amount of that defendant's liability to the amount of liability
attributed to all defendants and other persons to whom
liability is apportioned under subsection (a.2).
(2) Except as set forth in paragraph (3), a defendant's
liability shall be several and not joint, and the court shall
enter a separate and several judgment in favor of the
plaintiff and against each defendant for the apportioned
amount of that defendant's liability.
(3) A defendant's liability in any of the following actions
shall be joint and several, and the court shall enter a joint
and several judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
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the defendant for the total dollar amount awarded as
damages:
...
(ii) An intentional tort.
(iii) Where the defendant has been held liable for not
less than 60% of the total liability apportioned to all
parties.
...
(4) Where a defendant has been held jointly and severally
liable under this subsection and discharges by payment
more than that defendant's proportionate share of the total
liability, that defendant is entitled to recover contribution
from defendants who have paid less than their
proportionate share. . . .
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.1).19
Thus, unlike Section 7102(a), Section 7102(a.1) does not only apply to
claims sounding in negligence. To the contrary, Section 7102(a.1) expressly
permits apportionment and contribution between co-defendants in strict
liability actions. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.1)(1). Further, Section 7102(a.1)
specifically declares that apportionment (and, potentially, contribution)
exists between co-defendants “[w]here recovery is allowed against more
than one person” and “where liability is attributed to more than one
defendant.” These broad terms do not limit themselves to “negligent”
____________________________________________
19 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.1) became effective on June 28, 2011. Since the
accident in this case occurred on May 1, 2012, Section 7102(a.1) applies to
this case.
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conduct – rather, the terms necessarily include “liability” for reckless and
negligent conduct.20
Likewise, the UCATA (42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8321 et seq.) “is not geared only
toward negligence situations.” McMeekin, 530 A.2d at 465 (Pa. Super.
1987). Rather, as this Court explained:
[Under the UCATA, “joint tortfeasors”] are defined as ‘two
or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the
same injury to persons or property.’ . . . The statutory
language does not limit the right of contribution to
tortfeasors who have been guilty of negligence.
Contribution is available whenever two [or] more persons
are jointly or severally liable in tort, irrespective of the
theory by which tort liability is imposed.
...
The Uniform Contribution Among Tort-feasors Act in
Pennsylvania provides that a joint tortfeasor who has
discharged more than his pro rata share of a common
liability may seek contribution from any other tortfeasor
who contributed to the loss. The doctrine of contribution is
based on equity. Therefore, the Act must be examined with
equity in mind.
The focus of the Uniform Act is on the relationship existing
between tortfeasors rather than the manner in which
several tortfeasors have been held liable to an injured
claimant. . . . Thus, a tortfeasor's right to receive
contribution from a joint tortfeasor derives not from his
liability to the claimant but rather from the equitable
principle that once the joint liability of several tortfeasors
____________________________________________
20Again, Plaintiffs have never claimed that Mr. Fair acted intentionally in
causing the accident. Therefore, the case at bar does not concern any
potential apportionment or contribution between an intentional and a
negligent tortfeasor.
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has been determined, it would be unfair to impose the
financial burden of the plaintiff's loss on one tortfeasor to
the exclusion of the other. It matters not on which theory a
tortfeasor has been held responsible for the tort committed
against the plaintiff. So long as the party seeking
contribution has paid in excess of his or her share of
liability, it would be inequitable under the Act to deny that
party's right to contribution from a second tortfeasor who
also contributed to the plaintiff's injury.
McMeekin, 530 A.2d at 465 (quoting Svetz v. Land Tool Co., 513 A.2d
403 (Pa. Super. 1986)) (some internal quotations, citations, and corrections
omitted); see also Commonwealth, Dep’t of Transp. v. Popovich, 542
A.2d 1056, (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988), affirmed, 564 A.2d 159 (Pa. 1989) (holding
that a “reckless” co-defendant may seek contribution from a “negligent”
co-defendant).
We conclude that the plain language of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.1) and
the UCATA permits apportionment and contribution between reckless and
negligent co-defendants. Therefore, since Appellants’ cross-claim against
Mr. Straw rendered Mr. Straw a cross-claim defendant in the action – and,
since Mr. Fair’s recklessness does not preclude apportionment (or,
potentially, contribution) between him and his (allegedly) negligent
co-defendants,21 including Mr. Straw – the trial court erred in dismissing
Appellants’ cross-claim against Mr. Straw.22
____________________________________________
21 Within its brief to this Court, Jiffy Lube contends that it was entitled to
summary judgment because it cannot be considered a joint tortfeasor with
Appellants. This argument fails because there is a genuine issue of material
fact that Plaintiffs suffered indivisible injuries as a result of Jiffy Lube’s
negligence and Mr. Fair’s conduct. Carrozza v. Greenbaum, 916 A.2d 553,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Judgment vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Strassburger files a Concurring and Dissenting Opinion.
Judge Stabile files a Dissenting Opinion.
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
556 (Pa. 2007) (“[a]lthough joint and several liability requires an indivisible
injury for which two or more parties are partially responsible, it is the
indivisibility of the injury, rather than of culpability, that triggers joint
liability”). Therefore, at the summary judgment stage, it is too early to say
whether Jiffy Lube’s liability is joint and several or several only. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 7102(a.1) (“A defendant's liability in any of the following actions
shall be joint and several . . . (iii) Where the defendant has been held liable
for not less than 60% of the total liability apportioned to all parties”).
Further, even if it becomes true that Jiffy Lube and Appellants are not jointly
liable, this fact alone would not entitle Jiffy Lube to relief. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 7102(a.1) (regarding apportionment of liability).
22 Given our disposition, Appellants’ claims that the “the trial court err[ed] in
refusing to award a new trial based on numerous improper and prejudicial
rulings at trial” are moot. See Appellant Kirk Fair’s Brief at 5; Appellant
Golon Masonry’s Brief at 5-6 (some internal capitalization omitted);
Banohashim v. R.S. Enter’s., LLC, 77 A.3d 14, 27 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(“[t]he grant of a new trial wipes the slate clean of the former trial”),
quoting Commonwealth v. Oakes, 392 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Pa. 1978).
Further, reaching the other issues on appeal would be inappropriate in this
case, as we have vacated the grant of summary judgment to the Additional
Defendants and Mr. Straw; the Additional Defendants and Mr. Straw are
entitled to weigh in on the issues before the trial court, if the issues arise
again.
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J-A07012-17
J-A07013-17
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/30/2018
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