Com. v. Cash, C. ( 2022 )


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  • J-S11028-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CHRISTOPHER LEE CASH                       :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1294 WDA 2021
    Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 14, 2021
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-02-CR-0003511-2018
    BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                 FILED: MAY 13, 2022
    Appellant, Christopher Lee Cash, appeals pro se from the September
    14, 2021 order denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief
    Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
    The record reveals that, in February 2018, Appellant was charged with
    persons not to possess, use, manufacture, control, sell, or transfer firearms,
    firearms not to be carried without a license, resisting arrest or other law
    enforcement, manufacture, delivery, or possession with the intent to
    manufacture or deliver a controlled substance, and knowingly or intentionally
    possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance (2 counts).1          Appellant’s
    charges stemmed from a traffic stop on February 23, 2018, of a vehicle in
    ____________________________________________
    1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 5104,              and     35   P.S.
    §§ 780-113(a)(30) and (a)(16) (2 counts), respectively.
    J-S11028-22
    which Appellant was a passenger. On September 20, 2018, the trial court
    appointed trial counsel for Appellant.
    On December 20, 2019, prior to the resolution of his charges pending
    before the trial court, Appellant filed pro se a PCRA petition asserting, inter
    alia, that trial counsel “show[ed] little interest in [Appellant’s] case” and
    “failed to respond to any of [Appellant’s] requests” for information, and that
    Appellant “lack[ed] counsel[.]”2 Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 12/20/19,
    at ¶5.    In his pro se PCRA petition, Appellant requested, inter alia, the
    appointment of new counsel. Id. at ¶10. On December 26, 2019, trial counsel
    filed a motion to transfer bail, asserting that he “met with [Appellant] several
    times at the Allegheny County [j]ail to prepare for trial” and requested that
    Appellant’s bail be transferred to “alternative housing so that [Appellant] can
    more actively participate in his own defense.”       Motion to Transfer Bail,
    12/26/19, at ¶¶10-11. The trial court denied Appellant’s motion to transfer
    bail on January 16, 2020. The trial court docket does not, however, contain
    an entry indicating that the trial court disposed of Appellant’s pro se request
    for new counsel.
    On January 17, 2020, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to
    suppress certain evidence, which the trial court subsequently denied on
    January 21, 2020.        On January 22, 2020, pursuant to a negotiated plea
    ____________________________________________
    2 Since Appellant’s underlying charges were unresolved and his judgment of
    sentence had not become final, Appellant’s pro se PCRA petition filed on
    December 20, 2019 was premature.          Thus, we shall treat Appellant’s
    December 20, 2019 filing as a request for new counsel.
    -2-
    J-S11028-22
    agreement, Appellant pleaded guilty to persons not to possess, use,
    manufacture, control, sell, or transfer firearms, knowingly or intentionally
    possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance (1 count), and resisting arrest
    or other law enforcement. That same day, the trial court sentenced Appellant
    to an aggregate sentence of two and one-half to five years’ incarceration, with
    a recommendation for boot camp, to be followed by one year of probation. 3
    Sentencing Order, 1/22/20.            Appellant did not appeal his judgment of
    sentence and, as such, his judgment of sentence became final on February
    21, 2020. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3) (stating, “[a] judgment becomes
    final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
    Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
    or at the expiration of the time for seeking a review”); see also Pa.R.A.P.
    903(a) (requiring a notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days after entry of
    an order from which an appeal is taken).
    On April 15, 2020, Appellant filed pro se the instant PCRA petition. On
    June 11, 2020, the PCRA court appointed PCRA counsel to represent Appellant.
    On April 21, 2021, PCRA counsel filed a motion to withdraw, as well as a
    Turner/Finley “no-merit” letter.4 Attached as an exhibit to PCRA counsel’s
    ____________________________________________
    3 Pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, the Commonwealth withdrew
    the remaining criminal charges upon entry of Appellant’s guilty plea.
    4See Commonwealth v. Turner, 
    544 A.2d 927
     (Pa. 1988); see also
    Commonwealth v. Finley, 
    550 A.2d 213
     (Pa. Super. 1998).
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    J-S11028-22
    motion to withdraw was a letter directed to Appellant stating that, upon her
    review of the record and the issues raised by Appellant in his pro se PCRA
    petition, counsel determined that “there are no meritorious issues that have
    been or could possibly be raised” and that Appellant’s claims were without
    merit.    Motion to Withdraw, 4/21/21, at Exhibit 2.    The letter directed to
    Appellant stated that copies of the motion to withdraw and the Turner/Finley
    “no-merit” letter were enclosed. 
    Id.
     PCRA counsel also advised Appellant
    that he could withdraw his pro se PCRA petition, proceed pro se with the
    petition, or retain private counsel. 
    Id.
    On July 19, 2021, the PCRA court notified Appellant of its intent to
    dismiss Appellant’s PCRA petition pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.        In that
    notice, the PCRA court also granted PCRA counsel’s motion to withdraw. The
    PCRA court advised Appellant, inter alia, that he may respond to the PCRA
    court’s notice of intent to dismiss within 20 days.    Appellant did not file a
    response. On September 14, 2021, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s PCRA
    petition.
    In correspondence dated September 23, 2021, and directed to the PCRA
    court, Appellant requested a copy of his then-current PCRA court docket
    sheet.5 An entry on the PCRA court’s docket sheet shows that a copy of the
    ____________________________________________
    5   Appellant’s correspondence stated as follows:
    Would you please provide me with a complete copy of my “docket
    entries” reflecting everything filed in my court case.
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    J-S11028-22
    docket     sheet   was    sent   to   the      Allegheny   County   District   Attorney’s
    Office – Criminal Division, trial counsel, and PCRA counsel on October 7, 2021.
    The docket sheet does not, however, reflect that a copy of the docket sheet
    was forwarded to Appellant.              Moreover, although Appellant’s pro se
    correspondence dated September 23, 2021, is timestamped as having been
    received by the PCRA court on October 8, 2021, there is no corresponding
    entry on the docket sheet showing receipt of this correspondence by the PCRA
    court.
    Appellant subsequently filed pro se a notice of appeal of the September
    14, 2021 order denying his PCRA petition.6 Appellant’s notice of appeal bears
    a timestamp showing a filing date of October 25, 2021. This Court, upon
    receipt of Appellant’s notice of appeal, docketed the appeal at 1294 WDA
    2021.      On October 25, 2021, the PCRA court entered an order stating as
    follows:
    AND NOW, this 25th day of October, 2021, it is ORDERED that
    [Appellant’s] correspondence dated October 8, 2021, will
    constitute a pro se PCRA [petition] requesting to reinstate his
    appellate rights nunc pro tunc. Said PCRA [petition] is hereby
    GRANTED, and [Appellant] is advised that he shall file a Notice
    ____________________________________________
    Appellant’s Pro Se Correspondence, 10/8/21 (extraneous capitalization
    omitted).
    6Although Appellant captioned his pro se filing as a “Petition for Allowance of
    Appeal from the order of [the] Common Plea Court of Pennsylvania, Allegheny
    County,” a review of this filing demonstrates that it was, in fact, a notice of
    appeal and that Appellant was appealing from the September 14, 2021 order
    denying his PCRA petition.
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    J-S11028-22
    of Appeal within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order.
    [Appellant] is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis on any
    appeal.
    PCRA Court Order, 10/25/21. Appellant did not file a subsequent notice of
    appeal.
    Regarding his October 25, 2021 notice of appeal, the PCRA court did not
    order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Instead, the PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a)
    opinion on December 1, 2021, stating that it relied on the reasons set forth in
    its Rule 907 notice to support its order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition.
    Preliminarily, we must determine whether Appellant filed a timely
    appeal, as the timeliness of an appeal implicates this Court’s jurisdiction.
    Commonwealth v. Crawford, 
    17 A.3d 1279
    , 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011)
    (stating that, it is well-settled that jurisdiction is vested in this Court upon the
    filing of a timely notice of appeal, and the timeliness of an appeal may be
    considered sua sponte); see also Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (stating that, in general,
    a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order
    from which the appeal is taken).
    A review of the record demonstrates that, on September 14, 2021, the
    PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition and granted PCRA counsel’s motion to
    withdraw as Appellant’s counsel. PCRA Court Order, 9/14/21. Pursuant to
    the “prisoner mailbox rule,” Appellant filed his pro se notice of appeal on
    October 22, 2021, as indicated by the postmark on the envelope used to
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    J-S11028-22
    submit the same.7 To reiterate, a notice of appeal must be filed within 30
    days of the entry of the order from which the appeal was taken. Pa.R.A.P.
    903(a). As such, Appellant’s notice of appeal needed to be filed on or before
    October 14, 2021. Therefore, Appellant’s notice of appeal filed on October 22,
    2021 appears, ostensibly, as untimely.
    The PCRA court docket, however, indicates that, although the
    September 14, 2021 order related to Appellant’s PCRA petition and
    permitted PCRA counsel to withdraw from representing Appellant, service
    of the September 14, 2021 order was provided only to Appellant’s trial
    counsel and Appellant’s now-former PCRA counsel, as well as the district
    attorney’s office.     There is no indication on the docket that service was
    provided to Appellant, who, at this point, was unrepresented and acting pro
    se by virtue of the PCRA court’s earlier order granting PCRA counsel’s motion
    to withdraw.8
    ____________________________________________
    7The “prisoner mailbox rule” provides that, “a pro se prisoner's appeal shall
    be deemed to be filed on the date that he[, or she,] delivers the appeal to
    prison authorities [or] places his[, or her,] notice of appeal in the institutional
    mailbox.” Commonwealth v. Chambers, 
    35 A.3d 34
    , 39 (Pa. Super. 2011),
    appeal denied, 
    46 A.3d 715
     (Pa. 2012). In the case sub judice, the postmark
    on the envelope constitutes proof of the date Appellant placed the notice of
    appeal in the institutional mailbox.
    8 We recognize that the PCRA court made a notation indicating Appellant’s
    prison mailing address on the bottom of the September 14, 2021 order
    denying his PCRA petition. The PCRA court docket, however, does not indicate
    that service of this order was provided to Appellant at the mailing address so
    provided.
    -7-
    J-S11028-22
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 114(B)(1) requires the clerk of
    courts to serve promptly a copy of any trial court order or notice on each
    party’s attorney-of-record or the party if unrepresented.9            Pa.R.Crim.P.
    114(B)(1). To memorialize that proper service of a trial court order or notice
    was provided, Rule 114(C)(2)(c) requires the clerk of courts to note, via a
    docket entry, the date of service of such trial court order or notice.10
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c). It is well-settled that the appeal period only begins
    to run on the date the clerk of courts mails or delivers a copy of the trial court
    order or notice to the parties. Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d), and Note (stating, the
    purpose of this rule is to fix that date from which the time for appeal shall be
    computed); see also Commonwealth v. Carter, 
    122 A.3d 388
    , 391
    (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that, the “appeal period only begins running on the
    date the [clerk of courts] mails or delivers copies of the orders to the parties”
    (original quotation marks omitted)), appeal denied, 
    195 A.3d 561
     (Pa. 2018);
    Commonwealth v. Jerman, 
    762 A.2d 366
    , 368 (Pa. Super. 2000).
    Because the PCRA court docket does not contain the entry information
    prescribed by Rule 114, we are unable to discern the date upon which the
    ____________________________________________
    9 In most instances, the clerk of courts is tasked with serving a copy of the
    trial court order or notice on the party’s attorney or the pro se party unless
    otherwise prescribed by local rule. Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(2).
    10 The docket entry must also contain, at a minimum, a notation of the date
    of receipt in the clerk of courts’ office of the trial court order or notice and the
    date appearing on the trial court order or notice. Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(a)
    and (b).
    -8-
    J-S11028-22
    clerk of courts served Appellant with a copy of the September 14, 2021
    dismissal order.     A breakdown in the judicial system occurs if the clerk of
    courts fails to note on the docket the date upon which a trial court order or
    notice has been served upon a party. Jerman, 
    762 A.2d at 368
     (finding a
    breakdown in the judicial system and deeming the appeal timely when the
    clerk of courts failed to serve a copy of an order on the party). As a result of
    this breakdown, the period in which Appellant may file a notice of appeal has
    not begun to run. Therefore, we deem Appellant’s pro se notice of appeal to
    be timely filed on October 22, 2021.11 
    Id.
    Turning now to the merits of the underlying appeal, a review of
    Appellant’s pro se brief demonstrates that he raises a claim of ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel.12 Appellant’s Third Amended Brief, 3/25/22, at
    1-3.
    ____________________________________________
    11 It may be inferred that, despite the breakdown in the judicial system,
    Appellant received a copy of the September 14, 2021 order at some point
    thereafter because he attached a copy of said order to his October 22, 2021
    notice of appeal. Nevertheless, we are unable to determine from the record
    when the clerk of courts mailed the September 14, 2021 order to Appellant
    and, thereby, triggered the commencement of the appeal period.
    12On March 15, 2022, Appellant filed pro se an application with this Court to
    amend his original appellate brief. Appellant attached a copy of the proposed
    second amended brief thereto. On March 25, 2022, Appellate filed pro se a
    second application with this Court to amend his appellate brief and attached
    a copy of the proposed third amended appellate brief thereto. We grant
    Appellant’s March 25, 2022 application to file an amended appellate brief and
    deny his March 15, 2022 application to file an amended appellate brief as
    moot. In addressing the merits of Appellant’s appeal, we shall rely on his third
    amended appellate brief provided to this Court on March 25, 2022.
    -9-
    J-S11028-22
    In addressing Appellant’s issue, we are mindful of our well-settled
    standard and scope of review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition.
    Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a petition is limited to
    the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is supported by
    the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    102 A.3d 988
    ,
    992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s findings will not
    be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record.”
    Commonwealth v. Lawson, 
    90 A.3d 1
    , 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
    omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court,
    and we will not disturb those findings merely because the record could support
    a contrary holding.”    Commonwealth v. Hickman, 
    799 A.2d 136
    , 140
    (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). In contrast, we review the PCRA court’s
    legal conclusions de novo.     Commonwealth v. Henkel, 
    90 A.3d 16
    , 20
    (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    101 A.3d 785
     (Pa. 2014).
    In order to plead and prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
    “a petitioner must establish: (1) that the underlying issue has arguable merit;
    (2) counsel's actions lacked an objective reasonable basis; and (3) actual
    prejudice resulted from counsel's act or failure to act.” Commonwealth v.
    Stewart, 
    84 A.3d 701
    , 706 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), appeal denied, 
    93 A.3d 463
     (Pa. 2014).       “A claim of ineffectiveness will be denied if the
    petitioner's evidence fails to meet any of these prongs.” Commonwealth v.
    Martin, 
    5 A.3d 177
    , 183 (Pa. 2010). “Counsel is presumed to have rendered
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    effective assistance[.]” Commonwealth v. Montalvo, 
    114 A.3d 401
    , 410
    (Pa. 2015).
    Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
    guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness
    caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.
    Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
    voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice
    was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in
    criminal cases.
    Commonwealth v. Barndt, 
    74 A.3d 185
    , 192 (Pa. Super. 2013). “Central
    to the question of whether [a] defendant's plea was entered voluntarily and
    knowingly is the fact that the defendant knows and understands the nature of
    the offenses charged in as plain a fashion as possible.” 
    Id.
    Here, a review of Appellant’s pro se brief reveals that he raises a claim
    that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to plead guilty.         Appellant’s
    Third Amended Brief, 3/25/22, at 2-3, ¶4 (asserting that, he believed he had
    no other choice but to plead guilty because “he knew [he would be] going to
    trial without proper representation[, which] would lead to [his being found
    guilty]”). Specifically, Appellant asserts, inter alia, that trial counsel (1) failed
    to disclose his relationship to the then-current Allegheny County sheriff prior
    to Appellant entering his guilty plea;13 (2) failed to request, prior to
    ____________________________________________
    13 Appellant alleges that the then-Sherriff of Allegheny County supervised the
    sheriff’s deputy involved in the traffic stop which led to the filing of criminal
    charges against Appellant. Appellant’s Third Amended Brief, 3/25/22, at 2
    (stating, “Appellant and [trial counsel] engage[d] in defense strategy without
    knowing the fact [that trial counsel] is related to the sheriff”); see also 
    id.
     at
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    sentencing, that the trial court impose a sentence so that it would run
    concurrently with any sentence that may later be imposed, in a separate
    proceeding, as a result of Appellant being found in violation of his parole,
    which was triggered, Appellant contends, upon his pleading guilty in the
    instance case; and (3) failed to challenge the credibility of the sheriff’s deputy
    who testified at a suppression hearing as to his basis for bringing the
    aforementioned charges against Appellant. Id. at 2-3.
    In denying Appellant’s PCRA petition, the PCRA court stated,
    [Appellant] clearly understood the crimes to which he [pleaded]
    guilty as evidenced from his answers to his plea colloquy and
    further acknowledged on the record that he understood and
    accepted the terms of the plea agreement, had committed said
    crimes, had ample opportunity to consult with counsel prior to
    entering the plea, that no promises had been made to him to enter
    the plea, was satisfied with counsel's representation, and was
    entering the plea voluntarily and of his own free will. A petitioner
    is bound by the statements made under oath at the time of his
    plea in open court and may not subsequently contradict them as
    grounds to withdraw his plea. See Commonwealth v. Pollard,
    
    832 A.2d 517
    , 523 (Pa. Super. 2003). There is simply no evidence
    to support that trial counsel coerced him into taking the plea in
    light of [Appellant’s] averments during the plea and answers to
    his plea colloquy.
    PCRA Court Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, 7/19/21,
    at 2 (unpaginated; record citations and footnote omitted).
    ____________________________________________
    3 (stating, “[trial counsel’s] only [intentions] were to protect [the sheriff’s
    deputy] not the rights of Appellant in the court of law”).
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    J-S11028-22
    The record reveals that, prior to accepting Appellant’s guilty plea, the
    trial court inquired of Appellant as follows:
    [Trial Court]:        There has been some discussion before in the
    aftermath of the suppression hearing that
    the [trial] court would consider an aggregate
    sentence of two and [one-]half to five years[’
    incarceration] and a period of probation to
    follow; correct?
    [Commonwealth]:       My understanding, Your Honor, yes.
    [Trial Court]:        And a recommendation for boot camp?
    [Trial counsel]:      That is correct.
    [Trial Court]:        [Appellant], are you clear headed today?
    [Appellant]:          Say that again.
    [Trial Court]:        Are you clear headed today?
    [Appellant]:          Yes.
    [Trial Court]:        Have you had enough time to speak with
    your attorney about the elements of each
    crime of which you are pleading guilty, and
    the maximum penalties allowed by the law,
    and your right to have a trial?
    [Appellant]:          Yes.
    [Trial Court]:        Are you satisfied with his representation?
    [Appellant]:          Yes.
    [Trial Court]:        Other than what's been stated in open court
    by the [Commonwealth, trial counsel], and
    myself, other than that, has anyone
    threatened or promised you anything or
    forced you to plead guilty?
    [Appellant]:          No, sir.
    [Trial Court]:        I have in front of me, sir, a guilty plea
    colloquy, it bears your signature as well as
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    J-S11028-22
    that of your attorney, did you read and
    understand each question?
    [Appellant]:       Yes.
    [Trial Court]:     Did you answer each question honestly?
    [Appellant]:       Yes.
    [Trial Court]:     Was your attorney available in the event you
    had any questions about this document or
    any matter related to this case?
    [Appellant]:       Yes.
    [Trial Court]:     [Trial counsel], based on your experience in
    the contacts with [Appellant], do you believe
    he understands the elements of the crimes,
    the maximum penalties allowed by law, and
    he's otherwise making a knowing, intelligent,
    and a voluntary decision to plead guilty?
    [Trial counsel]:   Yes, I do, Your Honor.
    [Trial Court]:     Will the plea violate any then[-]existing
    probation or parole?
    [Trial counsel]:   [Appellant] did inform me that at the time he
    believes he was on parole with a few days
    left.
    [Trial Court]:     Okay.       Have  you        explained  the
    consequences, and do        you believe he
    understands them?
    [Trial counsel]:   I did, and I believe he does.
    [Trial Court]:     Is that accurate, sir?
    [Appellant]:       What?
    [Trial counsel]:   That we've discussed -
    [Appellant]:       Yes.
    [Trial Court]:     With the agreement of all parties, we will
    incorporate  the   testimony     from   the
    suppression hearing as the factual basis for
    the plea. [Trial counsel] stipulated to the
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    J-S11028-22
    crime lab [report] as to the possession of the
    heroin that was recovered was, in fact,
    heroin and that [Appellant] was a person not
    to possess by virtue of his history; correct?
    [Trial counsel]:        Correct.
    [Trial Court]:          Sir, are you pleading guilty to those three
    charges because you are in fact guilty?
    [Appellant]:            Yes.
    [Trial Court]:          The [trial] court will accept the plea.
    N.T., 1/22/20, at 4-7 (extraneous capitalization omitted).
    Upon review, we concur with, and the record supports, the PCRA court’s
    determination that Appellant entered his guilty plea knowingly, intelligently,
    and voluntarily and, therefore, his underlying claim of ineffective assistance
    of trial counsel was without merit.14 Appellant was aware of, and agreed with,
    ____________________________________________
    14The official comment to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590 states
    that, prior to accepting a guilty plea,
    [a]t a minimum the [trial court] should ask questions to elicit the
    following information:
    (1) Does the defendant understand the nature of the charges to
    which he or she is pleading guilty or nolo contendere?
    (2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
    (3) Does the defendant understand that he or she has the right to
    trial by jury?
    (4) Does the defendant understand that he or she is presumed
    innocent until found guilty?
    (5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible range of sentences
    and/or fines for the offenses charged?
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    J-S11028-22
    the factual circumstances, as understood from the testimony offered at the
    suppression hearing, that led to the criminal charges filed against him. See
    N.T., 1/21/20, at 4-17. Appellant admitted that he was guilty of the crimes
    to which he was pleading guilty. Appellant further stated, inter alia, that he
    was satisfied with trial counsel’s representation, that he understood the
    maximum possible sentence that could be imposed if he were found guilty by
    a jury, that he had the right to a trial-by-jury, and that pleading guilty in the
    instant   matter     may    lead    to   collateral   consequences   concerning   his
    then-current parole situation.15 Although Appellant alleges that trial counsel
    was related to the then-sheriff for Allegheny County and that trial counsel
    failed to disclose this fact to Appellant prior to his pleading guilty, a review of
    Appellant’s brief demonstrates that he failed to prove the veracity of this
    ____________________________________________
    (6) Is the defendant aware that the [trial court] is not bound by
    the terms of any plea agreement tendered unless the [trial court]
    accepts such agreement?
    (7) Does the defendant understand that the Commonwealth has
    a right to have a jury decide the degree of guilt if the defendant
    pleads guilty to murder generally?
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 at Comment.
    15 Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Sentencing Code, a parolee is required to
    serve his or her backtime sentence re-imposed as part of a parole violation
    and then serve his or her newly imposed sentence in consecutive order
    regardless of any arrangements agreed upon as part of a guilty plea
    agreement. See 63 Pa.C.S.A. § 6138(a)(5)(i-iii); see also Commonwealth
    v. Kelley, 
    136 A.3d 1007
    , 1013-1014 (Pa. Super. 2016) (stating,
    “[i]mposition of a new state sentence concurrent with parolee's backtime on
    the original state sentence is an illegal sentence under [the Sentencing Code]”
    (citation omitted)).
    - 16 -
    J-S11028-22
    familial relationship, much less explain how learning of this information left
    him with no choice but to plead guilty. As such, Appellant failed to plead and
    prove by a preponderance of the evidence a meritorious claim for ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel. See Stewart, 
    84 A.3d at 706
    ; see also Barndt,
    
    74 A.3d at 192
    .
    Order affirmed.     Application to file third amended brief granted.
    Application to file second amended brief denied as moot.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/13/2022
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