Com. v. Palaia, K. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S72039-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF                         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    KAREN PALAIA                            :
    :   No. 1334 EDA 2017
    Appellant
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 30, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-45-CR-0000719-2016
    BEFORE:    BENDER, P.J.E., MUSMANNO, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                  FILED DECEMBER 11, 2017
    Appellant, Karen Palaia, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County after a jury found her guilty
    on twelve counts of intentionally possessing a controlled substance and one
    count of theft by unlawful taking. Sentenced to not less than one month nor
    more than 12 months’ incarceration, to be followed by nine months’ probation,
    Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the court’s exercise of
    sentencing discretion, and asserts that prosecutorial misconduct tainted both
    her trial and sentencing. We affirm.
    The trial court aptly sets forth the facts and procedural history pertinent
    to the present appeal as follows:
    Karen Palaia [hereinafter “Appellant”] was arrested on January
    20, 2016, and charged with twelve counts of intentionally
    possessing a controlled substance, [35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16),] as
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S72039-17
    well as one count of theft by unlawful taking[, 18 Pa.C.S. §
    3921(a)]. Appellant was accused of stealing twelve pills of
    Adderall from a locked medicine cabinet located in the nurse’s
    office at East Stroudsburg High School South (“the school”),
    where Appellant was employed as a security officer. Affidavit of
    Probable Cause. . . . Appellant was convicted of all 13 charges
    after a trial by jury.
    Appellant appeared for sentencing on August 11, 2016, at which
    time sentencing was continued to September 29, 2016, to permit
    Appellant to undergo a urinalysis and sign releases necessary to
    allow the Monroe County Probation Department to confirm any
    medication prescribed to Appellant with her treating physicians.
    Order of Court, August 11, 2016. . . . Appellant was sentenced
    on September 30, 2016, to one to twelve months’ incarceration
    and a consecutive nine-month period of probation. Order of
    Court, September 30, 2016. Appellant was released on parole on
    October 31, 2016. Order of Court, October 25, 2016[.]
    Appellant filed Post-Sentence Motions on October 11, 2016,
    asserting that (1) the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient
    to sustain the jury’s verdict, (2) th[e trial] court abused its
    discretion in sentencing Appellant to a term of incarceration, and
    (3) the prosecution denied Appellant a fair trial by, inter alia, filing
    a vague and misleading information. [After reviewing Appellant’s
    supporting brief (the Commonwealth filed no brief in opposition),
    the trial court] issued an opinion and order on March 22, 2017, in
    which [it] denied Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motions.
    Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/17/17, at 1-4.
    Appellant timely filed a counseled Notice of Appeal on April 18, 2017.
    On April 21, 2017, the trial court entered an Order on the docket directing
    Appellant to file a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal
    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) within twenty-one days.                  Accordingly,
    Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) Statement was due on or before May 12, 2017. The
    trial court’s Order notified Appellant that any issue not properly included in
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    J-S72039-17
    this Statement timely filed and served pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) would
    be deemed waived.
    On May 17, 2017, the trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) Opinion in which
    the court indicated that, as of that date, Appellant had not filed a Rule 1925(b)
    Statement as ordered. The trial court opined, therefore, that Appellant had
    waived all issues and requested that this Court quash the present appeal.
    In response to the trial court’s opinion, Appellant filed a counseled
    motion with the trial court seeking permission to file his concise statement
    nunc pro tunc. On May 24, 2017, the trial court entered an order denying
    Appellant’s motion, but it requested, in the interest of judicial economy, that
    this Court address the merits of Appellant’s appeal without first remanding for
    the filing of a supplemental Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion because the issues
    raised herein are identical to those disposed of in the trial court’s order and
    opinion denying Appellant’s post-sentence motions. Trial Court Order, filed
    5/24/17.
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3) provides that if an appellant court is convinced
    counsel has been per se ineffective in failing to file a court-ordered Rule
    1925(b) statement in a criminal matter, the court shall remand for the filing
    of a concise statement nunc pro tunc. The Comment to Rule 1925 explains,
    and this Court has noted, “[paragraph (c)(3)] allows an appellate court to
    remand in criminal cases only when the appellant has completely failed to
    respond to an order to file a Statement.” Note to Pa.R.A.P. 1925 (emphasis
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    provided); see also Commonwealth v. Hill, 
    16 A.3d 484
    , 496 n. 15
    (Pa.Super. 2011).
    Here, although counsel failed to file a timely court-ordered 1925(b), he
    did file a motion to the court, immediately upon receiving the trial court’s
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) statement recommending quashal, explaining the reasons
    for his inadvertent filing omission, advising the court of the issues Appellant
    wished to raise, and seeking the trial court’s permission to file a nunc pro tunc
    Statement to that effect. Therefore, in our view, there is absent in this case
    the “complete failure” to respond to an order to file a 1925(b) Statement
    contemplated by Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(3).
    Moreover, there is no dispute below that the trial court’s Order and
    Opinion denying Appellant’s post-sentence motions addressed the very issues
    now raised before this Court, thus obviating the need for remand for
    preparation of a responsive trial court opinion. Hence, we agree with the trial
    court that the better course is to act in the interest of judicial economy and
    view Appellant’s belated filing with the trial court as a proper statement of
    matters complained of on appeal.
    Appellant presents the following three questions for our review:
    I.    WAS THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PRESENTED
    SUFFICIENT TO SHOW BEYOND A REASONABLE
    DOUBT THAT [APPELLANT] COMMITTED THEFT AND
    POSSESSED A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE BELIEVED
    TO BE ADDERALL?
    II.   DID THE COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
    IMPOSING A SENTENCE OF INCARCERATION WHERE
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    J-S72039-17
    [APPELLANT] HAD A ZERO PRIOR RECORD SCORE
    AND    THE    PRE-SENTENCE   INVESTIGATION
    RECOMMENDED PROBATION?
    III. WAS THE PROSECUTOR IN THIS CASE SO BIASED
    AGAINST [APPELLANT] SO AS TO DENY HER A FAIR
    TRIAL AND FUNDAMENTAL DUE PROCESS?
    Appellant’s brief at 7.
    After a thorough review of the record, Appellant’s brief, controlling case
    law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that
    Appellant’s issues merit no relief.        The trial court opinion comprehensively
    discusses and properly disposes of each question presented. Accordingly, we
    adopt the reasoning of the trial court in this regard and affirm on this basis.1
    ____________________________________________
    1  Appellant’s third question presented asserts that the Commonwealth
    engaged in prosecutorial misconduct when it filed a criminal information listing
    January 20, 2016, as the sole offense date but presented evidence of
    Appellant’s alleged criminal conduct occurring on December 9, 2015. “The
    Commonwealth knew or should have known the date of the offense it was
    intending to pursue occurred on or about December 10, 2015, not January 20,
    2016, over a month later[,]” Appellant argues. Brief for Appellant, at 23. This
    disconnect between the criminal information and the evidence presented
    denied her the right to prepare adequately a defense to sufficiently specific
    charges, Appellant contends.
    We disagree. Our review confirms the criminal information lists January
    20, 2016, as the date of the eleven counts against her. In addition, January
    20, 2016, was also listed as an offense date on page one the criminal
    complaint. Police Criminal Complaint, 2/25/16, at 1. However, in describing
    the conduct that formed the basis for charges against Appellant, the criminal
    complaint specified that Appellant “did on December 9, 2015. . . unlawfully
    [take] or exercised unlawful control over, movable property of another with
    intent to deprive him thereof, that is to say Palaia did take twelve (12) – 5 mg
    pills of Adderall from a locked medication cabinet in the nurse’s office…. Id.
    at 2. The complaint also bases the possession of a controlled substance
    offense on Appellant’s possession of the 12 pills of Adderall taken on that day.
    Id.
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    J-S72039-17
    Judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.
    ____________________________________________
    Furthermore, the affidavit of probable cause indicated that the affiant,
    Detective Mario Orlando of the Monroe County Office of the District Attorney,
    took a complaint regarding the missing Adderall on January 20, 2016, but it
    listed the date of the theft as December 9, 2015, and the date of discovery of
    the missing pills as December 10, 2015. The detective’s affidavit also
    indicated that he viewed a surveillance video recorded on December 9, 2015
    capturing Appellant opening the locked medication cabinet on the evening of
    December 9, 2015. When confronted with the video, a Mirandized Appellant
    told the detective she took only her potassium pills from the cabinet, the
    affidavit stated.
    Our standard of review for a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is limited
    to whether the trial court abused its discretion. “In considering this claim, our
    attention is focused on whether the defendant was deprived of a fair trial, not
    a perfect one.” Commonwealth v. Proctor, 
    156 A.3d 261
    , 271 (Pa. Super.
    2017). Moreover, the purpose of advising a defendant of the date when an
    offense is alleged to have been committed is to provide him with sufficient
    notice to meet the charges and prepare a defense. Commonwealth v.
    Gibbons, 
    784 A.2d 776
     (Pa. 2001).
    Under the present facts, we cannot conclude that the Commonwealth
    deprived Appellant a fair trial by listing one offense date on the criminal
    information but presenting at trial evidence involving a different date that
    appeared in both the offense section and the affidavit of probable cause
    section of the criminal complaint. Indeed, Appellant had sufficient notice to
    prepare a defense to charges that she unlawfully took twelve Adderall pills
    from the school nurse’s office on the evening of December 9, 2015. Such
    notice was amply reflected in trial counsel’s unwavering defense, which was
    clearly designed to convince the jury that it should form reasonable doubt
    from events occurring from late November through and including December
    9, 2015. Accordingly, we concur with the trial court’s conclusion rejecting
    Appellant’s prosecutorial misconduct claim.
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    J-S72039-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/11/2017
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    Circulated 11 /30/2017 03:45 PM
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    .
    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
    FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                               No. 719 CR 2016
    v.
    KAREN PALAIA,                                              POST -SENTENCE MOTIONS
    Defendant
    OPINION
    This case comes before the Court on Post-Sentence Motions filed by
    Defendant, Karen Palaia. For reasons detailed below, we DENY these Post-
    Sentence Motions.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    Karen Palaia (hereinafter "Defendant") was arrested on January 20,
    2016, and charged with twelve counts of intentionally possessing a controlled
    substance,' as well as one count of theft by unlawful taking.' Defendant was
    accused of stealing twelve pills of Adderall from a locked medicine cabinet
    located in the nurse's office at East Stroudsburg High School South (the
    "school"), where Defendant was employed as a security officer. Affidavit of
    Probable Cause.
    1
    35 P. S. § 780-l 13(a)(16)
    218    Pa. C.S. § 392l(a)
    .<: I _UtJII IIUI l·UI Ut:11 • ,-u::H·t,lllt:1111,;t, IVIUllUll::i Ut:111it1U,fJUI
    After learning that some of V.S.'s pills had gone missing, V.S.'s mother
    sent a letter to the head nurse dated December 4, 2015, in which she enclosed
    45 Adderall pills. Id. at 19-21. The head nurse verified that there were 45
    pills enclosed, as did another nurse that worked at the school. Id. at 33. On
    December 10, 2015, while maintaining the inventory log, the head nurse
    realized that 12 of V.S.'s Adderall pills had gone missing. Id. at 39. Officer
    Sutter reviewed the tape from the motion-activated camera for the night of
    December 9, 2015, which revealed that Defendant had entered the nurse's
    office at about 8:16 that evening and accessed the locked medicine cabinet.
    Id. at 89-92.
    Officer Sutter and Chief Mill interviewed Defendant on December 10,
    2015, at which time she denied taking V.S.'s Adderall, and instead indicated
    that she had accessed the locked medicine cabinet in order to take her
    potassium pills. Id. at 96, 110. Defendant told Officer Sutter and Chief Mill
    that she had found a key to the medicine cabinet in a junk drawer in the
    school's main office. Id. at 97. She also indicated that she had previously
    moved her potassium pills to a lower portion of the medicine cabinet so that
    she would be able to reach them. Id. at 110. Defendant was later interviewed
    by Detectives from the Monroe County District Attorney's office, at which time
    she again indicated that she had only accessed the locked medicine cabinet to
    take her potassium pills. Id. at 118, 135.
    3
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    The Commonwealth filed an Information on April 9, 2016, alleging that,
    on or about January 20, 2016, Defendant unlawfully took movable property of
    another with the intent to deprive said person thereof. The Information also
    included 12 identical counts, each alleging that, on or about January 20, 2016,
    Defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed a controlled substance.
    Defendant was convicted of all 13 charges after a trial by jury. Id. at 210-212.
    Defendant appeared for sentencing on August 11, 2016, at which time
    sentencing was continued to September 29, 2016, to permit Defendant to
    undergo a urinalysis and sign releases necessary to allow the Monroe County
    Probation Department to confirm any medication prescribed to Defendant
    with her treating physicians. Order of Court, August 11, 2016. Defendant did
    not appear on September 29, 2016, but her attorney advised the Court that
    she was attending her sister's funeral. Order of Court, September 29, 2016.
    Sentencing was continued to the following day. Id. Defendant was sentenced
    on September 30, 2016, to one to twelve months incarceration and a
    consecutive nine month period of probation. Order of Court, September 30,
    2016. Defendant was released on parole on October 31, 2016. Order of Court,
    October 25, 2016, Cheslock, J.
    Defendant filed Post-Sentence Motions on October 11, 2016, asserting
    that (1) the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's
    verdict, (2) this Court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant to a term
    4
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    of incarceration, and (3) the prosecution denied Defendant a fair trial by, inter
    alia, filing a vague and misleading information. We ordered Defendant to file
    a supporting brief within thirty days, and the Commonwealth to file a brief in
    opposition within forty-five days. Order of Court, November 21, 2016. We
    later amended this briefing schedule to reflect that Defendant's supporting
    brief and the Commonwealth's brief in opposition were due within thirty and
    forty-five days of the filing of the transcripts, respectively. Order of Court,
    December 20, 2016. The transcripts were filed on December 23, 2016. On
    Defendant's motion, we allowed Defendant until January 27, 2017 to file her
    supporting brief. Order of Court, January 24, 2017. Defendant filed her
    supporting brief on January 27, 2017. The Commonwealth did not file a brief
    in opposition.
    After reviewing Defendant's Post-Sentence Motions and brief in support
    thereof, we are prepared to render this opinion.
    DISCUSSION
    The Evidence Presented at Trial was Sufficient to Sustain the Jury's Verdict
    Defendant first asserts that the evidence submitted at trial was
    insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Post-Sentence Motions at� 7.
    Specifically, Defendant asserts that the Commonwealth's evidence that she
    committed an act of theft is "equivocal at best," and that the only evidence
    5
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    identifying the controlled substance was "unsubstantiated hearsay."
    Memorandum in Support of Post-Sentence Motions at 3-4. We disagree.
    In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we must
    consider whether, viewing all the evidence at trial in the light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth and drawing all
    reasonable inferences favorable to the Commonwealth, there
    exists sufficient evidence to enable the trier of fact to find
    every element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    382 A.2d 1200
    , 1201 (Pa. 1978).
    1. The Commonwealth Presented Sufficient Evidence to Sustain the Guilty
    Verdict of Theft by Unlawful Taking.
    "A person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful
    control over, movable property of another with intent to deprive him thereof."
    18 Pa. C.S. § 392l(a). At trial, the Commonwealth presented evidence that
    twelve Adderall pills belonging to V.S. went missing from the locked medicine
    cabinet in the nurse's office at the school on December 9, 2015. Transcript of
    Proceedings at 37-39, 93-94, 107; June 9, 2016. The Commonwealth also
    presented a video of the Defendant entering the nurse's office and accessing
    the locked medicine cabinet from which these pills were taken on the night of
    December 9, 2015. Id. at 89-92. No other motion was captured in the nurse's
    office by the camera on the night of December 9, 2015. Id. at 90.
    Defendant maintains that she accessed the locked medicine cabinet in
    the nurse's office at the school on the night of December 9, 2015, in order to
    obtain her potassium pills, an explanation she characterizes as "equally as
    6
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    likely" as the Commonwealth's theory that she was stealing V.S.'s Adderall
    pills. Memorandum in Support of Post-Sentence Motions at 3. We will not now
    disturb the jury's conclusion as to the credibility of this explanation, as the
    record contains legitimate reasons to discredit it. Officer Sutter testified that
    Defendant's potassium pills were located towards the top of the medicine
    cabinet, although Defendant does not appear to be reaching to this location in
    the video. Transcript of Proceedings at 94-95, June 9, 2016. Additionally,
    each nurse that worked at the school testified that they had never actually
    dispensed a potassium pill to Defendant. Id. at 30, 61, 71.
    Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    the video demonstrating that the Defendant was the only person to enter the
    nurse's office on the night of December 9, 2015, at which time she accessed
    the locked medicine cabinet from which pills were taken that night, was
    sufficient to enable the jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that she took
    V.S.'s Adderall pills with the intent to deprive her thereof.
    2. The Commonwealth Presented Sufficient Evidence to Sustain the
    Guilty Verdicts of Knowingly or Intentionally Possessing a Controlled
    Substance.
    "Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit
    substance by a person not registered under [The Controlled Substance, Drug,
    Device and Cosmetic Act]" is prohibited. 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(l6). The
    Commonwealth presented evidence that twelve Adderall pills went missing
    7
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    from the locked medicine cabinet in the nurse's office at the school on the
    night of December 9, 2015. Transcript of Proceedings at 3 7-39, 93-94, 107;
    June 9, 2016. The Commonwealth also presented a recording from a motion-
    activated camera demonstrating that the Defendant was the only person to
    enter the nurse's office on the night of December 9, 2015, at which time she
    accessed the locked medicine cabinet. Id. at 89-92.
    The Defendant contends that this evidence was insufficient to sustain
    her conviction for knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled
    substance because no controlled substances were actually found in her
    possession and the identity of the missing pills was not appropriately
    established at trial. Memorandum in Support of Post-Sentence Motions at 4.
    The Defendant is correct that she was never found in possession of a
    controlled substance; however, circumstantial evidence presented at trial
    established that twelve Adderall pills went missing on the night of December
    9, 2015, and that the Defendant accessed the locked medicine cabinet where
    these pills had been stored. This, combined with the recording from the
    motion activated camera which demonstrated that Defendant was the only
    person to enter the nurse's office at the school on the night of December 9,
    2015, enabled the trier of fact to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
    she was in possession of twelve Adderall pills, a controlled substance, on the
    night of December 9, 2015.
    8
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    We disagree with Defendant's contention that the Adderall was not
    appropriately identified at trial. Three nurses that were employed at the
    school testified that they are familiar with what Adderall looks like, that they
    had previously dispensed Adderall to V.S., and that they had no reason to
    believe that the pills that V.S. brought into the school were not the Adderall
    pills that V.S. and her mother had represented them to be. Transcript of
    Proceedings at 50, 59-60, 63-64, 69-70; June 9, 2016. This testimony, when
    viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to
    establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the missing pills were in fact
    Adderall, a controlled substance.
    This Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Sentencing Defendant to a Term of
    Incarceration
    Defendant next challenges this Court's imposition of a term of
    incarceration, claiming that we failed to provide our reasons for doing so on
    the record. Memorandum in Support of Post-Sentence Motions at 7.
    Defendant asserts that we simply indicated that the sentence was imposed
    "for the reasons in the presentence report," despite the presentence report's
    recommendation of a period of probation. Id. Defendant further asserts that
    the sentence imposed ignored her rehabilitative needs. Id.
    We are required at the time of sentencing to "state on the record the
    reasons for the sentence imposed." Pa.R.Crim.P. 704(C)(2). We clearly
    9
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    indicated on the record our reasons for deviating from the presentence
    report's recommendation. Transcript of Proceedings at 6-7, September 30,
    2016 ("I can't in good conscience adopt a recommendation that's going to
    allow somebody with an untreated addiction, potentially an untreated
    addiction issue go unchecked."). Our statements at the time of sentencing
    also made clear that the sentence imposed did not ignore the Defendant's
    rehabilitative needs, but rather considered the totality of the Defendant's
    situation. Id. at 7 ("I'm not sending her to counseling, because she doesn't
    think she has a problem."). We did not feel counseling would be effective for
    this particular Defendant until she acknowledged her substance abuse issues.
    Moreover, at the conclusion of the Defendant's sentencing, we indicated that
    we would consider an appropriate petition should the Def end ant be able to
    secure a spot in a rehabilitation program. Id. at 24.
    The Prosecution Did Not Deny Defendant a Fair Trial
    Defendant asserts that the prosecution in this matter operated under an
    "extreme bias and prejudice," to the extent that she was denied a fair trial.
    Post-Sentence Motions at� 8. Defendant asserts that the criminal information
    filed by the Commonwealth was "intentionally vague and misleading," in that
    it inaccurately indicated the date of the charged offenses as "on or about
    January 20, 2016," rather than December 9, 2015. Memorandum in Support of
    Post-Sentence Motions at 9. Defendant implies that such inaccuracy inhibited
    10
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    her ability to prepare her defense. Id. Defendant further submits that this
    same inaccuracy, which the Commonwealth failed to cure by amending the
    information, resulted in the Commonwealth's failure to prove the crimes
    charged. Id. Defendant also objects to the Commonwealth charging twelve
    counts of knowing or intentional possession of a controlled substance, which
    she characterizes as an attempt to disparage her in the eyes of the jury. Id. at
    10. Finally, Defendant cites the Commonwealth's assertion of aggravating
    factors at the time of sentencing as further evidence of their bias against her
    because the presentence report recommended a probationary sentence. Id.
    We disagree that the criminal information was so "vague and
    misleading" that the Defendant was unable to prepare an adequate defense to
    the crimes charged. The criminal information alleges that each charged
    offense occurred "[o]n or about January 20, 2016." December 9, 2015 could
    well be understood to fall within the period of time indicated by this phrase,
    and, accordingly, the Commonwealth proved the crimes charged in the
    criminal information. There is no indication in the record that the Defendant
    was unprepared to challenge the evidence presented at trial demonstrating
    that the charged offenses occurred on December 9, 2015. There is similarly
    no support in the record for Defendant's contention that the jury may have
    been improperly influenced by the fact that the Commonwealth charged her
    11
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    with twelve counts of knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled
    substance.
    We also disagree that the Commonwealth's assertion of aggravating
    factors at the time of sentencing indicated a bias against this Defendant. The
    Commonwealth submitted the following five aggravating factors for our
    consideration at the time of sentencing: (1) the Defendant continued to deny
    her guilt, (2) the Defendant had not accepted responsibility, (3) the Defendant
    "blame[d] everybody else," (4) the Defendant was uncooperative in providing
    medical records during the generation of the presentence report, and (5) the
    Defendant had recently been dispensed 445 narcotic pills from a local
    pharmacy. Transcript of Proceedings at 20, September 30, 2016. Importantly,
    we explicitly declined to accept these as aggravating circumstances. Id. at 20-
    21 ("Well I don't know that they truly constitute aggravating circumstances, I
    don't think that that's appropriate, quite frankly.").
    We do not disagree with Defendant's assertion that the
    Commonwealth's interest in a criminal prosecution is "not that it shall win a
    case, but that justice shall be done." Berger v. United States, 
    295 U.S. 78
    , 88
    (1935). It is also the prosecuting attorney's obligation to zealously pursue the
    Commonwealth's interests, within the bounds of the law. Pa. R.P.C. Preamble
    at� 9. The Commonwealth's assertion of circumstances that they believed
    constituted aggravating factors at the time of sentencing did not amount to a
    12
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    demonstrable bias against this Defendant, and did not ultimately influence the
    sentence we imposed.
    Accordingly, we enter the following ORDER.
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    COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONROE COUNTY
    FORTY-THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                       No. 719 CR 2016
    v.
    KAREN PALAIA,                                      POST -SENTENCE MOTIONS
    Defendant
    ORDER
    AND NOW, this    _J:2-,�f day of March, 2017, upon consideration of
    Defendant's Post-Sentence Motions and Brief in support thereof, Defendant's
    Post-Sentence Motions are DENIED.
    BY THE COURT:
    0                    0
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1334 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 12/11/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/11/2017