Com. v. Jones, H. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
HAROLD ALLEN JONES, III
Appellant No. 695 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 11, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0001582-2014
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., MOULTON, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 07, 2017
Harold Allen Jones, III appeals from the April 11, 2016 judgment of
sentence entered in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
On January 9, 2014, a criminal complaint was filed against Jones. On
February 23, 2016, Jones filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Pennsylvania
Rule of Criminal Procedure 600. On April 6, 2016, following a March 31,
2016 hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Also on April 6, 2016, Jones
entered a nolo contendere plea at docket number CP-26-CR-0001582-20141
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
At the plea hearing, Jones also pled nolo contendere to simple
assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1), and harassment, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(1),
at docket number CP-26-0000976-2015. In this appeal, Jones does not
challenge the judgment of sentence entered at that docket.
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to possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (“PWID”),
possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia.2
On April 11, 2016, the trial court sentenced Jones to 12 to 24 months’
imprisonment for the PWID conviction, with no further penalty for the
convictions for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
On May 11, 2016, Jones filed a timely pro se notice of appeal. This
Court remanded for the trial court to conduct a Grazier3 hearing to
determine whether Jones wished to proceed pro se. Following this hearing,
the trial court appointed counsel, counsel filed a statement of matters
complained of on appeal pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925(b), the trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion, and
counsel filed an appellate brief.
On appeal, Jones raises the following issue: “Did the court err when it
failed to dismiss the criminal charges in this case when the Commonwealth
violated [Jones’] righ[t] to a speedy trial pursuant to Pa. Rule of Criminal
Procedure 600?” Jones’ Br. at 10.
“A plea of nolo contendere should be treated the same as a guilty plea
in terms of its effect upon a particular case.” Commonwealth v. Thomas,
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2
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (16), and (32), respectively.
3
Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).
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506 A.2d 420, 422 (Pa.Super. 1986). “A plea of guilty constitutes a waiver
of all nonjurisdictional defects and defenses. When a defendant pleads
guilty, he waives the right to challenge anything but the legality of his
sentence and the validity of his plea.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d
205, 212 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 401 A.2d
318, 319 (Pa. 1979)). Therefore, a defendant who pleads nolo contendere
may not raise a Rule 6004 challenge unless he can show the Rule 600
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4
Rule 600(A) provides:
(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial
(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to
commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to
trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere.
(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint
is filed against the defendant shall commence within
365 days from the date on which the complaint is
filed.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A). Further, this Court has stated:
Rule [600] serves two equally important functions: (1) the
protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the
protection of society. In determining whether an accused’s
right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration
must be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of
criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to
deter those contemplating it. However, the administrative
mandate of Rule [600] was not designed to insulate the
criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed
through no fault of the Commonwealth.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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violation affected the voluntariness of the plea itself. Commonwealth v.
Gibson, 561 A.2d 1240, 1242 (Pa.Super. 1989).
In the written plea colloquy signed by Jones, he acknowledged that he
had a right to a speedy trial and that the Commonwealth must bring the
case to trial within 365 days of filing the charge against him. Guilty Plea
Petition, 4/6/16. He further acknowledged that, by entering a nolo
contendere plea, he was waiving his right to a speedy trial. Id.; see N.T.,
4/6/16, at 5-6. At the plea hearing, Jones stated “yes” when asked whether
he reviewed the form and “no” when asked whether he had any questions
about the form. N.T., 4/6/16, at 5-6. Jones contends the trial court erred in
denying the Rule 600 motion and that his speedy trial rights were violated;
he does not contend that the denial of the Rule 600 motion affected the
voluntariness of his plea. We conclude that Jones has waived his challenge
to the trial court’s denial of his Rule 600 motion.5
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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(Footnote Continued)
Commonwealth v. Aaron, 804 A.2d 39, 42 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc)
(internal citations omitted).
5
Further, even if Jones had not waived his Rule 600 claim, we would
conclude it lacks merit. Our standard of review for Rule 600 claims is an
abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478, 486
(Pa.Super. 2014). Jones maintains his Rule 600 rights were violated
because the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in retrieving him
from federal custody. For the reasons outlined in the well-reasoned opinion
of the Honorable Gerald R. Solomon, we would conclude that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 600 motion. See Opinion,
6/1/17, at 4-7.
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Judge Shogan joins the memorandum.
Judge Strassburger concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/7/2017
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