O'Connor, R. v. O'Connor, J. ( 2017 )

J-A20014-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ROBERT O'CONNOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. :
:
JANICE O'CONNOR :
:
Appellee : No. 1666 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Decree Entered September 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Civil Division at No(s): 2014-0011
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2017
Appellant, Robert O’Connor (“Husband”), appeals from the divorce
decree entered in the Centre County Court of Common Pleas, specifically
challenging the order granting the petition of Appellee, Janice O’Connor
(“Wife”), to enforce a property settlement agreement. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
The parties were married on July 1, 1978. The parties’ primary marital
residence was in Boalsburg, Pennsylvania. Husband, however, has not
resided full-time at the marital residence since 2001. Since approximately
2009, Husband has lived at the parties’ condominium in Arlington, Virginia.
Husband works at the National Science Foundation (“NSF”), a federal agency
in Washington, D.C.
On December 22, 2013, Husband informed Wife he wanted a divorce.
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The following day, December 23, 2013, Husband provided Wife with a
document labeled “Divorce Ideas/Proposal,” which generally set forth
Husband’s suggestions and questions about alimony and dividing the parties’
assets. Husband retained counsel and filed a divorce complaint on January
2, 2014. Wife subsequently retained counsel.
On April 15, 2014, the parties met without counsel and discussed a
property settlement agreement (“PSA”) Wife had drafted herself. The PSA
stated Wife would, as alimony, receive sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s
income and sixty percent (60%) of Husband’s consulting income. The PSA
provided the parties would later specify whether Wife would receive a
percentage of Husband’s gross or net income. The PSA specified Wife would
receive sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s retirement income and
required Husband to work until age 74. During the April 15th meeting, the
parties executed the PSA. Husband did not consult with counsel before
signing the agreement. Later on April 15, 2014, Husband sent Wife an e-
mail asking her to reduce the percentage of income Husband owed Wife as
alimony under the PSA.
On June 13, 2014, Wife filed a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement
Agreement. Husband filed an answer on July 29, 2014. Husband asserted
no new matter with affirmative defenses in response to Wife’s petition. The
court conducted hearings on Wife’s petition on July 29, 2014, and on August
13, 2014, during which Husband and Wife testified.
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On July 29, 2014, Wife testified she drafted the PSA based on
Husband’s “Divorce Ideas/Proposals” document. Wife stated the parties
discussed economic settlement conditions from December 23, 2013, until
April 15, 2014. Wife said when she met with Husband on April 15, 2014,
she told him she had given to her counsel an envelope containing
information disparaging to Husband. Wife noted if Husband caused anything
to happen to her, she intended counsel to give the envelope to the police,
Husband’s girlfriend, and Husband’s employer. Wife also stated she believed
she was entitled to sixty-six percent (66%) of Husband’s gross salary.
On August 13, 2014, Husband testified when he drafted the “Divorce
Ideas/Proposals” document, he believed Pennsylvania had no alimony
requirement and Wife would receive fifty percent (50%) of his retirement
funds and income. Husband said he did not threaten Wife and there was no
history of domestic violence incidents between the parties.
Husband explained Wife told him on April 15, 2014, she intended to
use information she had found on a computer at the marital residence to
blackmail Husband. Husband said Wife told him she had provided several
blackmail documents to her attorney. Husband testified Wife claimed she
had obtained an e-mail Husband wrote ridiculing a United States Senator, a
leader of critics of the NSF. Husband added Wife said she found e-mails
demonstrating Husband used his NSF e-mail address to participate in a
NCAA men’s basketball pool and send personal correspondence to his
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girlfriend. Husband stated Wife also claimed she had obtained gay club
entrance passes and a parking pass to a nude beach from the 1990’s.
Husband testified Wife gave him 24 hours to review and sign the PSA.
Husband added Wife told him not to discuss the PSA with counsel or the
April 15th meeting. Husband explained he signed the PSA for several
reasons: he feared Wife would make good on her threats to blackmail him if
he did not sign the PSA; he hoped the language in the PSA was so vague the
agreement would be unenforceable; and he believed the PSA terms were so
unfair as to render the PSA unenforceable.
Husband testified he contacted his attorney about the PSA after he had
signed the agreement. Husband stated his attorney later contacted Wife’s
attorney to rescind his signature on the PSA. Husband said he believed Wife
was entitled to sixty-six percent (66%) of his net income under the PSA.
Husband explained if Wife received sixty-six percent (66%) of his gross
income, Husband would receive only $347 per month in income. Both
parties testified they were aware on April 15, 2014, that the appraisal for the
marital residence had not yet been completed.
On October 22, 2014, the trial court granted Wife’s Petition to Enforce
Property Settlement Agreement. Husband filed a motion for reconsideration
and a petition to stay enforcement of the PSA pending appeal on November
20, 2014. On March 24, 2015, the court denied Husband’s reconsideration
motion and granted Husband’s petition to stay enforcement of the PSA. On
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October 16, 2015, Wife filed an answer and new matter to the divorce
complaint.1 The court entered a divorce decree on September 12, 2016. On
October 5, 2016, Husband filed a timely notice of appeal and a voluntary
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Husband raises three issues for our review:
WAS THE APRIL 15, 2014 TWO-PAGE DOCUMENT WITH
SOME OF ITS TERMS HANDWRITTEN SO VAGUE THAT NO
MEETING OF THE MINDS OCCURRED BETWEEN
[HUSBAND] AND [WIFE], AND THUS NO ENFORCEABLE
CONTRACT EXISTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES?
WAS A FULL AND FAIR DISCLOSURE OF THE PARTIES’
FINANCIAL POSITIONS EVER MADE, AS IS REQUIRED FOR
ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA?
DID [HUSBAND] SIGN THE TWO-PAGE DOCUMENT UNDER
DURESS, RENDING THE EXECUTED DOCUMENT
UNENFORCEABLE?
(Husband’s Brief at 4).
Our review of a marital settlement agreement implicates the following
principles:
A settlement agreement between spouses is governed by
the law of contracts unless the agreement provides
otherwise.
____________________________________________
1We observe the trial court entered an order on November 9, 2015, allowing
Husband to appeal from the October 22, 2014 order enforcing the PSA. On
December 8, 2015, Husband filed a notice of appeal from the October 22,
2014. On February 5, 2016, this Court sua sponte quashed Husband’s
December 8, 2015 appeal as interlocutory, because the trial court had not
yet entered a divorce decree and the November 9, 2015 order failed to
comply with Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).
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* * *
Because contract interpretation is a question of law,
this Court is not bound by the trial court’s
interpretation. Our standard of review over
questions of law is de novo and to the extent
necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as the
appellate court may review the entire record in
making its decision. However, we are bound by the
trial court’s credibility determinations.
* * *
When interpreting a marital settlement agreement,
the trial court is the sole determiner of facts and
absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the
trial court’s fact-finding function. On appeal from an
order interpreting a marital settlement agreement,
we must decide whether the trial court committed an
error of law or abused its discretion.
[Stamerro v. Stamerro, 889 A.2d 1251, 1257-58
(Pa.Super. 2005)].
Kraisinger v. Kraisinger, 928 A.2d 333, 339 (Pa.Super. 2007) (some
internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
[U]nder the law of contracts, the court must ascertain the
intent of the parties when interpreting a contractual
agreement. The standard of enforceability of a contractual
agreement is also clear: absent fraud, misrepresentation,
or duress, spouses should be bound by the terms of their
agreements. As such, a trial court may interpret a
property settlement agreement as it would a contract, but
it has neither the power nor the authority to modify or
vary the decree unless there is conclusive proof of fraud or
mistake. Moreover, the long-standing law of this
Commonwealth is that property settlement agreements are
presumed to be valid and binding upon the parties.
When construing agreements involving clear and
unambiguous terms, a trial court need only examine the
writing itself to give effect to the parties’ understanding. A
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court may not modify the plain meaning of the words
under the guise of interpretation. In addition, this Court
must consider such contracts without reference to matters
outside of the document, and we must ascertain the
parties’ intentions when entering into the contract from the
entire instrument. Also, the parties are bound without
regard to whether the terms were read and fully
understood and irrespective of whether the agreements
embodied reasonable or good bargains.
Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa.Super. 2006) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted).
Generally, a contract is enforceable if its terms are “certain and
explicit, not vague or indefinite.” Potter v. Leitenberger Mach. Co., 70
A.2d 390, 392 (Pa.Super. 1950). The language of a contract “should be
interpreted in the light of the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose
of the parties and the conditions existing when it was executed.” Hart v.
Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 333 (Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 587 Pa. 695,
897 A.2d 458 (2006). “When the words of a contract are clear and
unambiguous, the meaning of the contract is ascertained from the contents
alone.” Chen v. Chen, 586 Pa. 297, 307, 893 A.2d 87, 93 (2006). “If left
undefined, the words of a contract are to be given their ordinary meaning.”
Kripp v. Kripp, 578 Pa. 82, 90, 849 A.2d 1159, 1163 (2004). “In the
absence of an ambiguity, the plain meaning of the agreement will be
enforced.” Murphy v. Duquesne University Of The Holy Ghost, 565 Pa.
571, 591, 777 A.2d 418, 430 (2001). “The meaning of an unambiguous
written instrument presents a question of law for resolution by the court.”
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Id.“Before a court will interpret a provision in…a contract in such a way
as to lead to an absurdity or make the…contract ineffective to accomplish its
purpose, it will endeavor to find an interpretation which will effectuate the
reasonable result intended.” Pocono Manor Ass’n v. Allen, 337 Pa. 442,
446-47, 12 A.2d 32, 35 (1940). An agreement is valid “if the parties
intended to form a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving
an appropriate remedy.” Jeannette Paper Co. v. Longview Fibre Co.,
548 A.2d 319, 324 (Pa.Super. 1988), appeal denied, 522 Pa. 577, 559 A.2d
38 (1989). Furthermore, if the “vagueness as to some terms was not so
overwhelming that it voided the basic understanding which was found to
exist between the parties” the contract is valid. Id. at 325.
A postnuptial agreement requires a “full and fair disclosure of the
parties’ financial positions.” Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 671, 819 A.2d
529, 532 (2003). The disclosure need not be precise, as long as it is “full
and fair.” Simeone v. Simeone, 525 Pa. 392, 403, 581 A.2d 162, 167
(1990). Full and fair economic disclosure can be waived and such waiver is
enforceable absent a showing of “fraud, misrepresentation, or duress.”
Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d 1109, 1113 (Pa.Super. 2013).
“Economic duress renders a contract voidable.” Nat’l Auto Brokers
Corp. v. Aleeda Dev. Corp., 364 A.2d 470, 473 (Pa.Super. 1976). “[T]he
elements in the applicability of the doctrine of economic duress or business
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compulsion are that (1) there exists such pressure of circumstances which
compels the injured party to involuntarily or against his will execute an
agreement which results in economic loss, and (2) the injured party does not
have an immediate legal remedy.” Id. at 474. (citations omitted). “[T]here
can be no duress where the contracting party is free to come and go and to
consult with counsel before assuming…contractual obligations,” even if the
contracting party was surprised by negotiations and pressured into accepting
contractual obligations. Degenhardt v. Dillon Co., 543 Pa. 146, 155 n.4,
669 A.2d 946, 951 n.4 (1996). See also Simeone, supra, at 404, 581
A.2d at 167 (holding no duress existed when plaintiff was able to consult
with legal counsel); Adams v. Adams, 848 A.2d 991, 994 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(holding divorce settlement agreement was valid, because no duress existed
when wife had opportunity to consult with counsel even though wife
experienced stress and anxiety during divorce process).
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1030 provides as follows:
Rule 1030. New Matter
(a) Except as provided by subdivision (b), all affirmative
defenses including but not limited to the defenses of
accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, consent,
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of
consideration, fair comment, fraud, illegality, immunity
from suit, impossibility of performance, justification,
laches, license, payment, privilege, release, res judicata,
statute of frauds, statute of limitations, truth and waiver
shall be pleaded in a responsive pleading under the
heading “New Matter”. A party may set forth as new
matter any other material facts which are not merely
denials of the averments of the preceding pleading.
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(b) The affirmative defenses of assumption of the risk,
comparative negligence and contributory negligence need
not be pleaded.
Pa.R.C.P. 1030. Rule 1032 reads in part:
Rule 1032. Waiver of Defenses. Exceptions.
Suggestion of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction or
Failure to Join Indispensable Party
(a) A party waives all defenses and objections which are
not presented either by preliminary objection, answer or
reply, except a defense which is not required to be pleaded
under Rule 1030(b), the defense of failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to
join an indispensable party, the objection of failure to state
a legal defense to a claim and any other nonwaivable
defense or objection.
Pa.R.C.P. 1032(a). Importantly, the list of affirmative defenses contained in
Pa.R.C.P. 1030(a) is not exclusive. Falcione v. Cornell School District,
557 A.2d 425, 428 (Pa.Super. 1989). “An affirmative defense is
distinguished from a denial of facts which make up a plaintiff’s cause of
action in that a[n affirmative] defense will require the averment of facts
extrinsic to the plaintiff’s claim for relief.” Id. at 428-29. “Failure to plead
an affirmative defense in compliance with [Pa.R.C.P.] 1030 results in waiver
of the defense.” Werner v. Werner, 573 A.2d 1119, 1121 (Pa.Super.
1990), appeal denied, 527 Pa. 668, 593 A.2d 843 (1991); Pa.R.C.P.
1032(a).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinions of the Honorable Pamela A.
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Ruest, we conclude Husband’s issues merit no relief. The trial court opinions
comprehensively discuss and properly dispose of the questions presented.
(See Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed October 17, 2016, at 1 unpaginated; Trial
Court Opinion, filed October 22, 2014, at 2-5) (finding: (1) parties
negotiated settlement of their marital estate from December 2013, when
Husband informed Wife he wanted to divorce, until April 2014; parties
intended PSA to settle their marital estate amicably; PSA specifies allocation
of real estate, alimony, retirement money, joint financial accounts, vehicles,
jewelry, family antiques, and inherited possessions; under circumstances,
parties’ intent was clear; (2) Husband waived full economic disclosure,
because he knew when he entered into PSA that appraisal of marital
residence was not complete; court will not question reasonableness of
Husband’s negotiation of agreement; (3) Wife’s purported actions do not
amount to economic duress; Husband testified Wife offered him 24 hours to
consult with counsel before signing agreement; Wife’s alleged conduct also
does not constitute traditional duress, because Husband alleged no threat of
physical harm; further, purported threats Wife made to Husband were not
impending; rather, Wife provided Husband 24 hours to discuss PSA with his
attorney; further, Husband signed PSA on same day; therefore, Husband
was not under “duress” to sign agreement). The record supports the trial
court’s rationale.
With respect to Husband’s specific complaints about the PSA, Husband
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failed to raise any affirmative defenses to Wife’s petition to enforce the PSA,
such as ambiguity, lack of full and fair disclosure, and duress. These claims
are affirmative defenses, which required Husband to aver facts extrinsic to
Wife’s petition in order to prevent enforcement of the PSA. See Falcione,
supra. Husband averred in his answer to Wife’s petition that the PSA was
ambiguous but did not explain what terms of the PSA were vague. See id.Because Husband failed to raise his affirmative defenses in response to
Wife’s petition to enforce the PSA, the defenses are waived. See Werner,
supra. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinions.
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/21/2017
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Circulated 11/02/2017 02:31 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CENTRE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION- LAW
ROBERT O'CONNOR,
Plaintiff
v. No. 2014-0011
JANICE O'CONNOR,
Defendant --A
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3 ;-71
Attorney for Plaintiff: Laura Robbins, Esq?"
Attorney for Defendant: Rosadele Kauffman, Esq.
Opinion in Response to Matters Complained of on Appeal
Ruest, J.
Robert O'Connor ("Plaintiff') filed a Notice of Appeal contemporaneously with a
Statement of Matters Complained of Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
1925(a) on October 5, 2016. Plaintiff appeals from this Court's Opinion and Order entered on
October 22, 2014, granting a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement Agreement. The Court
believes the matters Plaintiff complains of on appeal have been adequately addressed in this
Court's Opinion and Order entered on October 22, 2014. The Court relies on that opinion and
order and respectfully submits that no further opinion is necessary at this time.
BY THE COURT:
f
Wo-v
Pamela A. Ruest, Judge
Date: Oe..-1-12foe.r 17 ,10/ to
00 ORD CIS
Circulated 11/02/2017 02:31 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF CENTRE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CIVIL ACTION
ROBERT O'CONNOR,
Plaintiff No. 2014-0011
v.
JANICE O'CONNOR,
Defendant
Attorney for Plaintiff:
Attorney for Defendant:
Laura Robbins, Esq.
Rosadele Kauffman, Esq.
-
OPINION AND ORDER
Ruest, J.
Presently before the Court is a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement Agreement filed
by Defendant Janice O'Connor on June 13, 2014. The Court held hearings on this matter on
July 29, 2014 and August 13, 2014. The parties thereafter timely filed briefs on September 12,
2014. Upon consideration of the record, the briefs, and the arguments of counsel, the Court is
now ready to render its decision.
Background
Plaintiff Robert O'Connor ("Husband") and Defendant Janice O'Connor ("Wife") were
married on July 1, 1978. On December 22, 2013, Husband told Wife he wanted a divorce. On
the following day, he presented her with a document titled "Divorce Ideas/Proposal." On April
15, 2014, the parties signed an agreement prepared by Wife and interlineated by the parties.
On April 23, 2014, Husband's attorney sent Wife's attorney a letter indicating that she had
reviewed the signed agreement and that the letter was to be considered a written revocation of
Husband's signature as he had signed it under duress and did not agree to its terms.
O RD MS
Wife filed a Petition to Enforce Property Settlement Agreement on June 13, 2014.
Husband filed an Answer on July 29, 2014. Hearings were held on this matter on July 29, 2014
and August 13, 2014.
Discussion
Wife seeks to enforce the Agreement the parties signed on April 15, 2014. Husband
alleges that it is unenforceable because he signed it under duress, it is too vague to be
enforceable, and there was no full and fair disclosure of the marital estate. The Court will
address each of Husband's arguments in turn.
I. Duress
Husband first argues that the Court should not enforce the Agreement, which both
parties agree should be treated as a contract, because he signed it under duress According to
Husband's testimony, Wife presented him with an Agreement and threatened she had
downloaded his hard disc and was using information found on the hard disc to blackmail him.
He testified that she told him she would give him 24 hours to sign or she would send a copy of a
2009 email from Husband criticizing a U.S. Senator to the Senator; inform his employer, the
National Science Foundation, that he had used his work email to place an illegal bet on an
NCAA pool; and send his girlfriend and her adult children copies of passes to a gay club he had
attended in the 1990s. Husband stated that Wife told him he had 24 hours to sign before she
acted on her threats, and he could think about it on his drive from State College, Pennsylvania
to Arlington, Virginia. Husband signed the Agreement before he left State College on April 15.
He stated that he did so because he thought her threats regarding his reputation to his employer
and girlfriend were credible and the Agreement was too vague and unfair to be enforceable.
"[A]losent fraud, misrepresentation or duress, spouses should be held to the terms of
their agreements." Lugg v. Lugg, 2013 PA Super 67, 64 A.3d 1109, 1112. Accordingly,
contracts made under duress-either traditional duress or economic duress-may be avoided
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under certain circumstances Husband cites to case law regarding the economic duress
doctrine, while Wife cites to case law involving traditional duress. The Court will therefore
consider both defenses to enforcing the Agreement.
"[The elements in the applicability of the doctrine of economic duress or business
compulsion are that (1) there exists such pressure of circumstances which compels the injured
party to involuntarily or against his will execute an agreement which results in economic loss,
and (2) the injured party does not have an Immediate legal remedy." Nat'l Auto Brokers Corp.
v. Aleeda Dev. Corp 243 Pa. Super. 101, 364 A.2d 470, 474 (1976) (citations omitted).
Traditional duress is "[t]hat degree of restraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened
and impending, which is sufficient in severity or apprehension to overcome the mind of a person
of ordinary firmness." Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d at 1113 (citing Adams v. Adams, 414 Pa.Super.
634, 607 A.2d 1116, 1119 (1992)). "Moreover, in the absence of threats of actual harm there
can be no duress where the contracting party is free to consult with counsel." Id. In the instant
matter, Wife's actions as presented by Husband do not amount to economic duress or duress
because by Husband's own testimony Wife offered him 24 hours to consult with counsel before
signing the Agreement. Husband cannot satisfy the second element of economic duress
because Wife provided him an opportunity to seek legal remedies. Similarly, because Husband
does not allege that Wife threatened him with physical harm, the elements of traditional duress
are not met because Wife specifically offered him 24 hours to discuss the Agreement with his
attorney. In fact, less than 24 hours after signing the Agreement, Husband emailed Wife to
further discuss it. Husband emailed Wife that same day at 11:58 p.m. asking if alimony could
be reduced if she got remarried or cohabitated and if she would consider reducing her share of
the consulting income from 60% to 50% or even 25%. There was therefore no duress.
II. Vagueness
Husband argues the Court should not enforce the Agreement because the Agreement is
too vague for a court to ascertain the parties' intent to a reasonable degree of certainty.
in
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support of his argument, Husband reviews the facts of one employment law case from 1922
where the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to enforce an employment contract "for life"
between an employer and an employee. See Edgcomb v. Clough, 275 Pa. 90, 118 A.2d 610(1922). The Court finds it telling that Husband did not cite to any case in Pennsylvania where a
court refused to enforce a post -nuptial agreement because it was too vague.
The Court's goal in interpreting a post -nuptial agreement is to "ascertain and give effect
to the parties' intent." Laudig v. Laudig, 425 Pa. Super. 228, 233, 624 A.2d 651, 653 (1993).
To do so, the court "may take into consideration the surrounding circumstances, the situation of
the parties, the objects they apparently have in view, and the nature of the subject-matter of the
agreement." Id. (internal citations omitted). "The court will adopt an interpretation that is most
reasonable and probable bearing in mind the objects which the parties intended to accomplish
through the agreement." Id. In this case, the parties negotiated from December 2013, when
Husband informed Wife of his intention to seek a divorce, until April 2014 regarding settling their
marital estate. In December 2013, Husband drafted a document titled "Divorce Ideas/Proposal"
specifying that "[t]he more we can agree on things, the happier we will be and the less we will
pay to lawyers." It is clear that the parties' intent in signing the April 15, 2014 agreement was to
settle their marital estate amicably. The agreement specifies allocations of real estate, alimony,
retirement money, joint financial accounts, vehicles, jewelry, family antiques, and inherited
possessions. The Court cannot find based on these circumstances that the intent of the parties
was vague.
III. Full and Fair Disclosure
Husband argues that the Court should not enforce the Agreement because Wife did not
make a full and fair disclosure of the marital estate to Husband and the Agreement does not
provide Husband with reasonable provisions. In 2003, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
explained that "the postnuptial agreement should be evaluated as any other contract. All that is
required is full and fair disclosure of the parties' financial positions; inquiry into the
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reasonableness of the bargain or the parties' understanding is improper." Stoner v. Stoner,
572 Pa. 665, 819 A.2d 529, 532 (2003). "null economic disclosure is waiveable in a post-
nuptial agreement." Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d at 1113. In this case, Husband alleges that Wife
did not provide him with a full and fair disclosure of the value of the Boalsburg, Pennsylvania,
property because the appraisal was not complete at the time the parties' executed the
Agreement on April 15, 2014. The Court finds that Husband waived full economic disclosure
because he knew at the time he entered the Agreement that the appraisal was not complete.
The Court will not inquire into the reasonableness of the bargain on behalf of Husband pursuant
to Stoner v. Stoner, 572 Pa. 665, 819 A.2d 529, 532 (2003).
Accordingly, the following Order is entered:
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of October, 2014, the Petition to Enforce Property Settlement
Agreement filed by Defendant Janice O'Connor on June 13, 2014 is GRANTED.
BY E COURT:
g)ILLI-7(L11O ' (JA-9-1k
Pamela A, Ruest, Judge
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