Com. v. Brickhouse, L. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
LARRY BRICKHOUSE
Appellant No. 1888 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 8, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000395-2015
BEFORE: BOWES, SHOGAN AND FITZGERALD,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED JULY 22, 2016
Larry Brickhouse appeals from the judgment of sentence of thirty-
seven days to twelve months imprisonment that was imposed after Appellant
pled guilty to disorderly conduct. We affirm.
Appellant was charged with simple assault, harassment by subjecting
another person to physical contact, and disorderly conduct. The events
underlying these charges were as follows. At 3:30 a.m. on February 8,
2015, a newspaper delivery driver saw Ellsbhet E. Beltran walking on Ghaner
Drive, Patton Township. She was not wearing shoes, was clothed only in a
bra and spandex pants, and was bleeding from her nose. The driver called
police. Patton Township police spoke with Ms. Beltran who said that she
hurt herself when the vehicle in which she was riding crashed.
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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At the same time that the police were summoned to aid Ms. Beltran,
the cashier at a nearby Sheetz store called police to report that a man had
pulled into the parking lot in a Buick with a smashed windshield and that the
male had blood all over his white T-shirt. The cashier was able to provide a
partial license plate number. The two incidents were related, and police
linked Appellant to the car.
Patton Township police knew that Appellant lived in an apartment
above Sichuan Bistro restaurant on West College Avenue, State College, and
they asked State College police to check if Appellant was at home. In the
apartment, State College police saw blood and blood splatter and found Ms.
Beltran’s shirt. Items were knocked over, and it appeared as if a domestic
assault had occurred. Sichuan Bistro’s owner confirmed to police that
Appellant lived above the restaurant, and the owner said that, earlier that
day, he heard Appellant and Ms. Beltran arguing in the apartment and then
“thumping noises.” Affidavit of Probable Cause, 2/8/15, at 1.
Meanwhile, Patton Township police took Ms. Beltran to Mount Nittany
Medical Center. Ms. Beltran had a bloody nose and appeared to have been
struck in the face. Ms. Beltran admitted that she had not been in a car
accident and that, instead, she had argued with Appellant. Ms. Beltran told
police, “[Appellant] physically assaulted me.” Id. at 2.
While Patton Township police were attending to Ms. Beltran, State
College police searched for Appellant, who was found in his parked Buick
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sleeping near Ms. Beltran’s apartment. Appellant was wearing a ripped and
bloody T-shirt and had scratch marks on his right arm and neck. Appellant
acknowledged that he and Ms. Beltran had argued and, while he denied
striking her, he admitted that his car had not been involved in an accident.
On June 1, 2015, Appellant pled guilty to the disorderly conduct
offense, graded as a third-degree misdemeanor, and the other charges were
withdrawn. The Commonwealth also agreed to recommend a sentence of
time served to twelve months. Before sentencing, Appellant moved to
withdraw that plea on the grounds that he was innocent in that Ms. Beltran
had “some serious credibility issues.” N.T. Hearing, 8/6/15, at 2. Appellant
maintained that he did not strike Ms. Beltran and that, instead, she was
injured when she “slammed the gear shift into park slamming her head
against the windshield.” Id. The motion was denied, and, on October 8,
2015, the court sentenced Appellant to thirty-seven days to twelve months
imprisonment and immediately released him on parole. This timely appeal
followed, and Appellant presents this issue: “Did the sentencing judge
commit an error of law in denying [Appellant’s] motion to withdraw his guilty
plea prior to sentencing?” Appellant’s brief at 5.
Under Pa.R.Crim. 591, a trial court may, in its discretion, allow a
defendant to withdraw a guilty plea at any time before sentence is imposed.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A) (“At any time before the imposition of sentence, the
court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of the defendant, or direct,
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sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere and the
substitution of a plea of not guilty.”). Our standard of review in this context
is as follows.
The standard of review that we employ in challenges to a
trial court's decision regarding a presentence motion to withdraw
a guilty plea is well-settled. “A trial court's decision regarding
whether to permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn should not be
upset absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion
exists when a defendant shows any ‘fair and just’ reasons for
withdrawing his plea absent ‘substantial prejudice’ to the
Commonwealth.” Commonwealth v. Pardo, 35 A.3d 1222,
1227 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Prysock,
972 A.2d 539, 541 (Pa.Super. 2009); citing Commonwealth v.
Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 475 A.2d 1303, 1308 (1984)). In its
discretion, a trial court may grant a motion for the withdrawal of
a guilty plea at any time before the imposition of sentence.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 591(A).
Commonwealth v. Elia, 83 A.3d 254, 261–62 (Pa.Super. 2013).
In Commonwealth v. Forbes, 299 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1973), and
Commonwealth v. Randolph, 718 A.2d 1242 (Pa. 1998), the Court
articulated that a defendant’s bare assertion of innocence, standing alone,
required that a defendant be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea if
sentence has not been imposed. The strictures of Forbes and Randolph,
mandating the grant of a pre-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea
upon a bald assertion of innocence, were abrogated by the simultaneously-
issued pronouncements in Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284(Pa. 2015), and Commonwealth v. Hvizda, 116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 2015). In
Carrasquillo, the Court stated that a “bare assertion of innocence is not, in
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and of itself, a sufficient reason to require a court to grant” a pre-sentence
request to withdraw a guilty plea. Carrasquillo, supra at 1285 (emphasis
added).
In Carrasquillo, the trial court denied the defendant’s pre-sentence
request to withdraw his guilty plea based upon a finding that his claim of
innocence, which was premised upon the existence of vast governmental
scheme to frame him, was implausible and insincere. In determining that
the defendant’s avowal of innocence was not credible, the trial court relied
upon the evidence of guilt available to convict him.
Our High Court in Carrasquillo reinforced that the trial court has the
discretion to determine whether withdrawal will be granted as well as the
precept that “such discretion is to be administered liberally in favor of the
accused; and any demonstration by a defendant of a fair-and-just reason
will suffice to support a grant, unless withdrawal would work substantial
prejudice to the Commonwealth.” Id. at 1292. However, Carrasquillo
retracted the bright-line approach that permitted withdrawal based upon a
bald and unsupported claim of innocence. It was “persuaded by the
approach of other jurisdictions which require that a defendant's innocence
claim must be at least plausible to demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and
just reason for presentence withdrawal of a plea.” Id. Our High Court
announced that “the proper inquiry on consideration of such a withdrawal
motion is whether the accused has made some colorable demonstration,
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under the circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would
promote fairness and justice.” Id.; Hvizda, supra (upholding trial court’s
refusal to allow pre-sentence withdrawal of guilty plea where denial was
premised upon a finding of implausibility of defendant’s claim of innocence,
which was unsupported, and upon evidence of guilt).
In the present case, the trial court determined that Appellant asserted
a “bare assertion of innocence” and that he did not level a plausible and
“colorable demonstration that fairness and justice would be promoted by”
allowing the plea to be withdrawn. Trial Court Opinion, 9/14/15, at 2. We
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting
Appellant’s avowal of innocence as implausible.
Appellant suggests that the victim was not credible when she blamed
her injuries on an assault by Appellant and that she was injured in a car
accident. Appellant, however, overlooks substantial evidence supporting Ms.
Beltran’s statement to police at the medical facility that Appellant struck her.
When arrested, Appellant had blood on his T-shirt and denied that his car
had been in an accident. On the night of the incident, police found blood,
blood spatters, and Ms. Beltran’s shirt in Appellant’s apartment, which was
in disarray. Appellant’s landlord overheard Appellant and Ms. Beltran
arguing and then heard thumping noises. Given this evidence, the trial court
was justified in rejecting Appellant’s unsupported suggestion that he was
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innocent in that Ms. Beltran was not credible when she said that her bloody
nose and facial injuries were caused by Appellant.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Shogan joins the memorandum.
Justice Fitzgerald concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/22/2016
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