Com. v. Edwards, V. ( 2017 )

J-S45025-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
VICTORIA EDWARDS,
Appellant No. 2044 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order June 24, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0010468-2013
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:
FILED OCTOBER 12, 2017
I agree with the Majority that trial court denied properly the motion to
dismiss filed by Appellant; however, I disagree with the Majority that this
Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Perfetto, 2017 WL 3776631 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (en banc) controls the outcome of this case.
Perfetto was arrested for DUI and a summary traffic violation in July
2014, and in September 2014, he was convicted of the summary offense in
the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division. Prior to trial on the DUI in
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, Perfetto filed a motion to dismiss
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S45025-17
pursuant to the compulsory joinder rule, 42 Pa.C.S. § 110. The trial court
granted that motion, and the Commonwealth filed an appeal to this Court.
In Perfetto, this Court held that “in the context of compulsory joinder,
where a defendant is charged with a summary traffic violation and a
misdemeanor, the Title 75 summary offense must be disposed of in a
proceeding in the Philadelphia Municipal Court Traffic Division, which has
jurisdiction exclusive of the Court of Common Pleas, and a separate
proceeding must be held for the remaining, higher offenses.” Id. at 8. Thus,
it reversed the order of the trial court. In reaching this holding, this Court
relied specifically on jurisdictional guidance from 42 Pa.C.S. § 1302, which
“was instituted in tandem with the General Assembly’s 2013 restructuring of
the Philadelphia Municipal Court.” Id. at 6.
Instantly, Appellant was arrested and charged with DUI and two
summary traffic violations in March 2013. She was tried and convicted of the
summary traffic violations in May 2013, prior to the restructuring of the
Philadelphia Municipal Court. Accordingly, because section 1302 was not yet
in effect, it is improper for this Court to rely on that jurisdictional guidance.
Nevertheless, this Court can rely on the provisions of section 112,1
which were in effect at the time Appellant was convicted. That section
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1 This argument is set forth in the alternative by the Commonwealth, see
Commonwealth’s Brief at 11-16, and also in the concurring opinion in
Perfetto authored by Judge Moulton and joined by Judge Ott, see Perfetto,
at *9.
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J-S45025-17
provides that prosecution for a second offense is not prohibited where “[t]he
former prosecution was before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the
defendant or the offense.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 112(1). There is no dispute that the
Traffic Court of Philadelphia did not have jurisdiction over Appellant’s DUI
offense. Accordingly, there was no bar to her later prosecution for DUI in this
case.
P.J. Gantman joins.
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