Citizens Bank v. Pincus, M. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • J-A31019-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    CITIZENS BANK OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    MICHAEL L. AND JESSIE PINCUS               :
    :
    Appellants               :   No. 21 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered November 29, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Civil Division at No(s):
    2014-11643-RC
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                                   FILED MAY 09, 2018
    Appellants, Michael L. and Jessie Pincus, appeal from an order entered
    on November 29, 2016 in which the Court of Common Pleas of Chester
    County granted summary judgment in favor of Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania
    (“Citizens”) on its mortgage foreclosure claims. We affirm.1
    ____________________________________________
    1 Although counsel represented Appellants before the trial court, Michael L.
    Pincus, acting pro se, alone signed Appellants’ brief to this Court. In
    addition, Mr. Pincus appeared at oral argument seeking to present argument
    on behalf of both he and his wife. This practice is not permitted. See David
    R. Nicholson, Builder, LLC v. Jablonski, 
    163 A.3d 1048
    , 1054 (Pa. Super.
    2017) (“With very few exceptions, the general rule is that non-attorneys are
    unable to represent parties before Pennsylvania courts and most
    administrative agencies.”). Thus, while Mr. Pincus enjoyed the right to
    appear on his own behalf, he does not have the right to represent his wife
    before this Court. In light of our disposition of the merits of this appeal,
    however, we need not formulate a remedy for Mr. Pincus’s transgression.
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A31019-17
    The historical and procedural facts in this case are as follows.          On
    December 30, 2003, Michael L. Pincus executed a home equity line of credit
    agreement with a principal amount of $250,000.00 in favor of Citizens. The
    agreement was secured by a mortgage that created a lien against
    Appellants’ residence in West Chester, Pennsylvania. The mortgage, which
    Appellants both signed, was recorded in the Chester County Office of the
    Recorder of Deeds on March 12, 2004. Appellants made payments toward
    their obligation with Citizens until February 2014, when the last payment
    was tendered. Citizens forwarded statutory notice of default to Appellants
    on July 9, 2014.        On July 9, 2014, Appellants met with an agent of the
    Pennsylvania        Housing   Finance     Agency   (“PHFA”)   and   completed   an
    application    to    participate   in   the   Homeowners    Emergency   Assistance
    Program.      PHFA, however, denied Appellants’ application for assistance on
    September 9, 2014.
    Citizens filed its complaint in this mortgage foreclosure action on
    November 25, 2014.            Appellants filed their answer, together with new
    matter, on December 29, 2014. Citizens replied to Appellants’ new matter
    on January 16, 2015.
    Appellants applied to Citizens for a loan modification on April 6, 2015.
    On April 16, 2015, Citizens advised Appellants’ counsel by letter that
    Appellants’ application for loan modification was incomplete because it failed
    to include all requested documents.           Citizens also advised Appellants that
    they needed to submit all required documents no later than May 30, 2015 to
    -2-
    J-A31019-17
    avoid removal from the loss mitigation program. Citizens thereafter did not
    receive the necessary documents and, on May 20, 2015, sent a second letter
    to Appellants’ counsel that the requested documents were needed on or
    before May 30, 2015. Because Appellants’ loss mitigation materials were not
    received in a timely manner, Citizens rejected Appellants from the loss
    mitigation program on June 4, 2015.
    Citizens served Appellants with discovery requests on June 13, 2016,
    including requests for admissions, interrogatories, and document requests.
    Appellants served their responses on July 29, 2016. On August 24, 2016,
    Citizens filed its motion for summary judgment.      Appellants filed their
    response to Citizens’ motion for summary judgment on September 20, 2016.
    The trial court granted Citizens’ motion on November 29, 2016.
    On December 8, 2016, Appellants filed a petition asking the court to
    reconsider its order granting Citizens’ motion for summary judgment. The
    petition alleged that Appellants were denied equal protection under the
    United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions because Chester County did
    not adopt a foreclosure mediation program as other counties in Pennsylvania
    had done. The trial court denied Appellants’ petition on December 13, 2016.
    On December 23, 2016, Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the
    order granting Citizens’ motion for summary judgment.       Thereafter, on
    January 3, 2017, the trial court ordered Appellants to file a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    On January 12, 2017, Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the court’s
    -3-
    J-A31019-17
    December 23, 2016 order denying their motion for reconsideration.             On
    January 18, 2017, Appellants filed a concise statement asserting that the
    affidavit and documents submitted by Citizens in support of its motion for
    summary judgment constituted inadmissible hearsay. No other issues were
    asserted.    The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion on February 14,
    2017.
    Appellants’ brief raises the following questions for our review.
    [Did the trial court err in considering the affidavit and documents
    submitted by Citizens to establish Appellants’ payment history
    under their loan agreement?]
    [Was Citizens obligated to set up a face-to-face meeting with
    Appellants to negotiate in good faith a payoff amount to avoid
    mortgage foreclosure litigation?]
    [Should the trial court have denied Citizens’ motion for summary
    judgment because the lender ignored Appellants’ efforts to pay
    off the outstanding amount owed under the loan?]
    [Were Appellants denied equal protection of the law under the
    United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions because Chester
    County did not adopt a mortgage foreclosure mediation
    program?]
    Appellants’ Brief at 3-4.2
    Appellants assert that the trial court erred in granting Citizens’ motion
    for summary judgment.
    We review an order granting summary judgment for an abuse of
    discretion. Indalex, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
    ____________________________________________
    2   We have re-ordered Appellants’ claims to facilitate our review.
    -4-
    J-A31019-17
    Pittsburgh, PA, 
    83 A.3d 418
    , 420 (Pa. Super. 2013). Our
    scope of review is plenary, and we view the record in the light
    most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
    Id. A party
    bearing the
    burden of proof at trial is entitled to summary judgment
    “whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a
    necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could
    be established by additional discovery or expert report[.]”
    Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1).     In response to a summary judgment
    motion, the nonmoving party cannot rest upon the pleadings,
    but rather must set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine
    issue of material fact. Pa.R.C.P. 1035.3.
    Bank of America, N.A. v. Gibson, 
    102 A.3d 462
    , 464 (Pa. Super. 2014).
    The holder of a mortgage has the right, upon default, to bring a
    foreclosure action. Cunningham v. McWilliams, 
    714 A.2d 1054
    , 1056–57
    (Pa. Super. 1998).    Summary judgment is proper in mortgage foreclosure
    litigation where the defendant admits the failure to make payment and fails
    to state a cognizable defense to the plaintiff’s claim.    Gateway Towers
    Condominium Ass’n v. Krohn, 
    845 A.2d 855
    (Pa. Super. 2004).
    Although Appellants’ initial claim is undeveloped, they appear to argue
    that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because evidence of
    their payment history and default was established by the affidavit of a loan
    officer   and   supporting   documentation.   Appellants   are   correct   that
    Pennsylvania law ordinarily prohibits the entry of summary judgment based
    on the moving party's oral testimony. See Sherman v. Franklin Regional
    Med. Ctr., 
    660 A.2d 1370
    , 1372 (Pa. Super. 1995); Nanty–Glo v.
    American Surety Co., 
    163 A. 523
    (Pa. 1932). “An exception to this rule
    exists, however, where the moving party supports the motion by using
    -5-
    J-A31019-17
    admissions of the opposing party....” 
    Sherman, 660 A.2d at 1372
    . Such
    admissions include facts admitted in pleadings. Durkin v. Equine Clinics,
    Inc., 
    546 A.2d 665
    , 670 (Pa. Super. 1988).
    Here, Appellants generally denied the material portions of Citizens’
    complaint and their responses to discovery did not contradict Citizens’
    factual averments surrounding Appellants’ payment history and default.
    General denials constitute admissions where specific denials are required.
    See Pa.R.C.P. 1029(b). Appellants’ admissions with respect to the material
    allegations of Citizens’ complaint permitted the trial court to enter summary
    judgment in this case.     Moreover, the affidavit of Citizens’ loan officer
    referenced loan history documents, which are records of regularly conducted
    activity, or business records, and would be admissible at trial with proper
    foundation. See Pa.R.E. 803(6). In sum, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in considering the affidavit and documents proffered by Citizens.
    Appellants’ next two claims assert that the trial court should have
    denied   summary     judgment   because    Citizens   overlooked   or   ignored
    Appellants’ efforts to negotiate a payoff of their loan obligations and avoid
    foreclosure.   These claims do not merit relief.      As a preliminary matter,
    Appellants did not include these issues in a court-ordered concise statement;
    hence, they are waived.     Even if they are not waived, these claims are
    unavailing.    This Court has held that new regulations, entitled “Mortgage
    Servicing Rules under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (Regulation
    -6-
    J-A31019-17
    X),” codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 1024.30 et seq., prohibit a loan servicer from
    foreclosing on a property if the borrower has submitted a completed loan
    modification, or loss mitigation, application. Bank of New York Mellon v.
    Brooks, 
    169 A.3d 667
    , 670 (Pa. Super. 2017). Here, however, the record
    establishes that Appellants never submitted a completed loan modification,
    or loss mitigation, application.      Indeed, Appellants’ December 8, 2016
    petition for reconsideration asserts that they never filed a loan modification.
    See Petition for Reconsideration, 12/8/16, at 1. The record further reflects
    that Citizens twice informed Appellants that their application materials were
    incomplete and that the required documents needed to be submitted no
    later than May 30, 2015.        Appellants were deemed ineligible for Citizens’
    modification/mitigation program only after the deadline passed without the
    submission of a timely and complete application.       Accordingly, Appellants’
    second and third claims fail.
    Appellants’ final claim asserts that they were denied equal protection
    of the law because Chester County did not adopt a mortgage foreclosure
    mediation program, as other Pennsylvania counties had done, at the urging
    of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.         Again, Appellants waived appellate
    review of this claim by failing to include it in a court-ordered concise
    statement. In addition, Chester County was not obligated to adopt such a
    program and Appellants cite no authority for the proposition that they were
    -7-
    J-A31019-17
    entitled to rely on the adoption of such a program.   Thus, this claim also
    fails.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/9/18
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 5/9/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/9/2018