Com. v. Miller, S. ( 2018 )

J-S79036-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
STRANDON MILLER :
:
Appellant : No. 143 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order December 20, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002279-2009
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2018
Appellant, Strandon Miller, appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition
brought pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
In its amended opinion, the PCRA court fully and accurately sets forth
the relevant facts and procedural history. Therefore, we have no need to
restate them.
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
WHETHER APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICED BY TRIAL AND
APPELLATE COUNSEL[S’] FAILURE TO PRESERVE THE
ISSUE OF SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE FOR
CONSIDERATION IN APPELLANT’S DIRECT APPEAL[?]
____________________________________________
1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
J-S79036-17
(Appellant’s Brief at 4).
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to
examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s
determination and whether its decision is free of legal error.
Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101, 108 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal
denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 (2011). This Court grants great deference
to the findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those
findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 515 (Pa.Super. 2007),
appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). We give no such
deference, however, to the court’s legal conclusions. Commonwealth v.
Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa.Super. 2012). Further, a petitioner is not
entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the PCRA court can decline
to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue concerning any material fact,
the petitioner is not entitled to PCRA relief, and no purpose would be served
by any further proceedings. Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338
(Pa.Super. 2012); Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906
(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 598 Pa. 764, 956 A.2d 433 (2008).
The law presumes counsel has rendered effective assistance.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 858 A.2d 1219 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal
denied, 582 Pa. 695, 871 A.2d 189 (2005). To prevail on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, which, in
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J-S79036-17
the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
have taken place. Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa.Super.
2007), appeal denied, 596 Pa. 707, 940 A.2d 365 (2007). The petitioner
must demonstrate: “(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2)
…counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his…action or inaction; and
(3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.”
Id. at 880. “The petitioner bears the burden of proving all three prongs of
the test.” Id. “If a petitioner fails to plead or meet any elements of the
[ineffectiveness] test, his claim must fail.” Commonwealth v. Burkett, 5
A.3d 1260, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2010). See also Commonwealth v. Chmiel,
612 Pa. 333, 362, 30 A.3d 1111, 1128 (2011) (explaining boilerplate
allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing
prejudice cannot satisfy petitioner’s burden to prove ineffectiveness).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Giovanni O.
Campbell, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court’s opinion. The PCRA
court comprehensively addresses and properly disposes of Appellant’s issue.2
____________________________________________
2 Regarding the ineffective assistance claim related to trial counsel’s alleged
failure to object to the introduction of evidence at trial Appellant presented
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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J-S79036-17
(See Amended PCRA Court Opinion, filed May 9, 2017, at 5-8) (finding: this
Court previously determined that even if Appellant had preserved on direct
appeal sufficiency of evidence claim, it lacked merit; evidence at trial
established Appellant’s use of physical force upon minor Victim was not
necessary to maintain discipline and was not consistent with Victim’s
welfare; Victim’s alleged misconduct in failing to clean cat’s litterbox was
insignificant; nature and severity of physical punishment Appellant inflicted
upon minor Victim was grossly disproportionate to any infraction, let alone
trivial misconduct alleged against six-year-old Victim; ample alternative
means of discipline was available to Appellant and his co-conspirator;
evidence presented at trial was sufficient; prior counsel’s failure to preserve
(Footnote Continued) _______________________
in his original concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), the PCRA court reasoned as follows:
Appellant’s January 31, 2017, Rule 1925(b) Statement
raises as error the denial of the request for a new trial
based upon alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel for
“failure to object to the introduction of evidence at trial.”
There is nothing in the original PCRA Petition, the
Amended Petition or the Supplemental Petition addressing
such alleged failure. ….
(Amended PCRA Court Opinion at 4). The record supports the PCRA court’s
rationale. Accordingly, Appellant waived for our review his ineffectiveness
claim relating to the admission of evidence at trial. See Commonwealth v.
Bond, 572 Pa. 588, 819 A.2d 33 (2002) (providing failure to raise issue
before PCRA court constitutes waiver of claim for appeal); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)
(stating issues not raised in lower court are waived and cannot be raised for
first time on appeal).
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meritless challenge to sufficiency of evidence does not render counsel
ineffective; even if prior counsel had preserved on direct appeal sufficiency
claim, it lacks arguable merit). The record supports the PCRA court’s
rationale, and we see no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/24/18
-5-
FILED
Circulated 01/08/2018 12:18 PM
MAY O 92017
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS Office of Judicial Records
FOR THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appeals/Post Trial
TRIAL DNISION - CRIMINAL
COMMONWEALTH CP-51-CR-0002279-2009
CP-51-CR-0002279-2009 Comm. v. Miller, Strandoo
v. Op,nlon
STRANDON MILLER
II I I Ill Ill 111111111111111
7944176461
AMENDED MEMORANDUM OPINION
CAMPBELL, J. May 91'H, 2017
Procedural History
On September 17, 2009, following a jury trial before the Honorable Earl Trent; Appellant
Strandon Miller (aka Brandon Miller), was found guilty of aggravated assault graded as a first
degree felony, criminal conspiracy, endangering the welfare of a child, possessing an instrument
of crime, and recklessly endangering another person. On November 5, 2009, Appellant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 /2.. · fv ·z. 5 years incarceration.
Appellant appealed to the Superior Court, which affirmed the judgment of sentence.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 32 A.3d 846 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Appellant filed an application for en bane re-argument, which the Superior Court denied
on October 26, 2011. Commonwealth v, Mill�r, 2011 Pa. Super. LEXIS 4256 (Pa. Super 2011).
On May l, 2012, Appellant filed the instant prose petition under the Pennsylvania Post
Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA").
On October 15, 2012, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted Appellant leave to file a
petition for allowance of appeal, nunc pro tune. Commonwealth v. Miller, 55 A.3d 98 (Pa.
2012).
Appellant filed his petition for allowance of appeal on November 2, 2012, which the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on June 12, 2013. Commonwealth v. Strandon Miller, 69
A.3d 243 (Pa. 2013).
Appellant filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and accompanying
Memorandum of Law in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Court on November 25, 2013. Therein Appellant alleged that: (1) trial counsel was ineffective
for not arguing that use of force by a parent or guardian may be justifiable wider 18 Pa.C.S.
§509(1)(i); (2) direct appeal counsel was ineffective for not filing a timely allocatur petition; and
(3) trial and direct appeal counsel were ineffective for not relying on specific cases Miller v.
Pennsylvania, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95443, *6-7 (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2014).1
On June 19, 2014, United States Magistrate Judge Henry S. Perkin recommended that the
petition be denied and dismissed without prejudice. On July 10, 2014, United States District
Court Judge Nitza Quinones Alejandro adopted Judge Perkins' recommendations. Miller v.
Pennsylvania, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94723, *2, 2014 WL 3401111 (E.D. Pa. July 10, 2014).
Counsel for Appellant filed an Amended PCRA Petition on November 7, 2014. He filed
a Supplemental Amended PCRA Petition on September 14, 2015.
The Commonwealth filed an Answer to the Petition on February 5, 2016.
The matter was assigned to this Court on February 10, 2016.
On November 28, 2016, the Court sent Appellant a Notice of Intent to Dismiss the PCRA
Petition, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.
On December 20, 2016, the PCRA petition was dismissed and Appellant was sent Notice
of the dismissal and a copy of the Order.
1 Appellant's filings iu the federal habeas case are docketed under the name Brandon Miller, at E.O. Pa. No. 13-cv-
06862.
2
On December 23, 2016, a timely Notice\of Appeal was filed.
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(2) and (3), the: Court entered an order on January 23,
2017, directing the filing of a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, not later than
twenty-one (21) days after entry of the order.
A Rule 1925(b) Statement of Errors was filed on January 31, 2017, raising a single
ground of error in denial of the request for a new trial based upon alleged ineffectiveness of trial
counsel for "failure to object to the introduction of evidence at trial."
The claim of ineffectiveness of counsel in failing to advance the argument that the
conduct fell within the range of permissible parental discipline or punishment, which had been
raised in the amended petition, was not preserved by raising it in the Pa.R.A.P. l 92S(b)
statement.
On February 13, 2017, this Court filed its Memorandum Opinion noting the failure to
raise this second allegation in the Rule 1925(b) statement, but nonetheless addressing the issue in
the opinion.
On April 25, 2017, the Superior Court granted Appellant's counsel's motion for a remand
to file a supplemental Rule l 925(b) statement.
On May 7, 2017, counsel for Appellant .filed a Supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement
raising the omitted allegation of error.
Factual History
The Conunonwealth established at trial that Appellant and Crystal Otte, his live-in
girlfriend, repeatedly beat the girlfriend's six-year old daughter with a metal-studded belt. School
personnel observed injuries to the child's hands, back, and buttocks, and reported the abuse. The
3
jury also heard evidence, by way of stipulation, that:
A jury found that Strandon Miller similarly assaulted two-year-old M , ·� • )
the son
of his then girlfriend. M, � o died in the hospital eight days after the assault. He
never regained consciousness and died from a lacerated liver, pancreatic injury, facial
bruises, and hypoxia, which is lack of blood flow and/or oxygen to the brain. A jury
determined that :M . R • '5 death was caused by Strandon Miller. The jury convicted
Strandon Miller of the involuntary manslaughter of · fv1,, R � Strandon Miller is
currently appealing that jury's guilty verdict.
(N.T. 9/16/09, 66·67).
The other evidence adduced at trial is adequately set forth in Judge Trent's September 20,
2010, Opinion. We adopt Judge Trent's summary as though fully set forth herein.
Dis4?nssion
1. Appellant's alleged claim of failure to object to· the introduction of evidence at
trial bas been previously litigated.
The May 3, 2012, prose PCRA Petition raises the single ground of failure of trial and
appellate counsel to advance the defense .of parental discipline or punishment. The September
14, 2015, Supplemental Amended PCRA Petition raises this claim in the context of failure of
trial and appellate counsel to preserve the claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support the
conviction. 2
Appellant's January 31, 2017, Rule 1925(b) Statement raises as error the denial of the
request for a new trial based upon alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel for "failure to object to
the introduction of evidence at trial." There is nothing in the original PCRA Petition, the
Amended Petition or the Supplemental Petition addressing such alleged failure. If the alleged
2 The November 7, 2014, Amended PCRA Petition raises as the sole ground for relief the failure to file a Petition
for Allowance of Appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted leave to file a Petition for Allowance of
Appeal, nunc pro tune on October l 5, Z012 (Commonwealth v. Miller, SS A.3d 98 (Pa. 2012)), and because such a
petition was filed and denied by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on June .12, 2013. Commonwealth v.
Strandon Miller, 69 A.3d 243 (Pa. 2013). As acknowledged in paragraph 2 of the September 14, 2015, ·
Supplemental Amended Petition, this ground is clearly moot.
·4
failure to object goes to the introduction of the child's statements under the tender years
exception, that issue has been previously litigate�. See Superior Court Opinion, pp. 3-5. If the
alleged failure to object goes to the. evidence of Appellant's prior conviction for the beating
death of his prior girlfriend's two year old son, that too has been previously litigated. See
Superior Court Opinion, pp. 8-11. The PCRA provides that in order to be eligible for relief, "the
allegation.of error has not been previously litigated or waived." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). See
also 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544.
2. The evidence was sufficient to overcome any license to impose discipline
under 18 Pa.C.S. § 509.
Appellant's claim that trial and appellate counsel failed to preserve the claim of
insufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction, is without merit. As the Superior stated
regarding his previous effort to argue sufficiency of the evidence on appeal: "Even if Miller had
preserved his claim for appellate review, we would conclude that it lacks merit for the reasons
stated in the trial court's Opinion. See Trial Court -Opinion, 9/20/10, at 5-7 (unnumbered)
(concluding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Miller intended to cause serious
bodily inj�J". Commonwealth v. Miller, No. 3490 EDA 2009, Slip. Op. 13, note 5 (Pa. Super.
8/30/11). This Court likewise adopts Judge Trent's reasoning.
A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (2000). We must determine "whether
the evidence is sufficient to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 555 A.2d 1264, 1267 (1989). We "must view evidence
in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and accept as true all
evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom upon which, if believed, the fact finder
5
properly could have based its verdict." Id.Our Supreme Court has instructed:
[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not
preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt
may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circwnstances. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally,
the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of
the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 594 Pa. 176, 934 A.2d 1233, 1236 n. 2 (2007).
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 65 A.3d 939, 943 (Pa. Super. 2013).
18 Pa.C.S. § 509. Use of force by persons with special responsibility for care, discipline
or safety of others, provides, in pertinent part:
The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable if:
·· (1) The actor is the parent or guardian or other person similarly responsible for
the general care and supervision of a. minor or a person acting at the request of
such parent, guardian or other responsible person and:
(i) the force is used for the purpose of safeguarding or promoting the welfare of
the minor, including the preventing or punishment of his misconduct; and
(ii) the force used is not designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of
causing death, serious bodily injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental
distress or gross degradation.
As in Commonwealth v. Bradley, 69 A.3d 253, (Pa Super. 2013), even if prior counsel
has preserved the claim that the use of force was justified under 18 Pa.C.S. § 509, the conviction
would have been affirmed.
The conduct here was that:
[l]n the evening of December 8, 2008, the [six year-old] complainant was instructed to
clean a litter box. Ms. Otte concluded that the complainant improperly executed the
cleaning, and decided to beat her with a belt partially composed of metal rings. Ms. Otte
proceeded to strike the backside of her body for an extended period of time. The
complainant attempted to deflect the strikes and defend herself by extending her ann
back behind her body. At some point, Ms. Otte ceased and physically transferred the belt
6
to the Appellant. Later that evening, the [Appellant] resumed the beating of the
complainant with the belt. Extensive physical injuries were sustained by the complainant
as a result of the beating.
Trial Court Opinion, unnwnbered pp. 6�7.
Regarding§ 509, the Superior Court has explained: "In applying this section, we believe
that the fact finder must assess whether the [parent] believed the use of force was necessary to
maintain reasonable discipline and whether it was consistent with the child's welfare, in
consideration of, the child's [alleged] misconduct, the nature and severity of the punishment
inflicted, the age and size of the child and alternative means of discipline that were available."
Commonwealth v. Tullius, 582 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 1990).
In considering the evidence, we are guided by the sage analysis of our colleague, Judge
Wallace H. Bateman, Jr.:
It is true that parents have the privilege to subject their children to corporal punishment
when the children misbehave. This is so because our society recognizes the primary role
of parents in preparing children to assume the obligations and responsibilities of adults,
and because there is a need to ensure that the state, through its criminal justice system,
does not unduly interfere with the private realm of family life. See [Commonwealth v.
Ogin, 540 A.2d 549, 554 (Pa. Super. 1988)]. Nevertheless, there are limits regarding the
type and severity of the corporal punishment which a parent may impose. Id. The law
long ago abandoned the view. that children are essentially "chattels of their parents
without independent legal rights." Id. Moreover, it is now clear that child abuse is a
serious and widespread problem, which the state has a powerful interest in preventing and
deterring. Id. According to 18 Pa.C.S.A § 509(l)(ii), "the force upon or toward the person
of another is justifiable if the actor is the parent or guardian... and the force used is not
designed to cause or known to create a substantial risk of causing death, serious bodily
injury, disfigurement, extreme pain or mental distress or gross degradation." 18 Pa.C.S.A
§ 509(l)(ii).
Commonwealth v. Riggins, 2011 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 551, *17-18 (Pa. County Ct.
2011).
Under the facts presented here, granting all reasonable inferences to the Commonwealth
7
as the verdict winner, we have no difficulty concluding that the use of force was not necessary to
maintain reasonable discipline; that the force used was not consistent with the child's welfare;
that the child's alleged misconduct in failing to adequately clean the cat's litterbox was
insignificant and certainly did not warrant anywhere near the level of physical punishment
inflicted; that the nature and severity of the punishment inflicted was grossly out of proportion to
any infraction, let alone the minor misconduct alleged against this 6 year-old; and there were
ample alternative means of appropriate, reasonable discipline available to Appellant and his co-
conspirator.
"It is well established that ... counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a
meritless claim." Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 960 A.2d 473, 478 (Pa. Super. 2008), citing
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 947 A.2d 795, 798 (Pa. Super. 2008). Here, the evidence presented
was clearly sufficient, and counsel's failure to preserve a meritless challenge to that sufficiency
does not render counsel ineffective or warrant relief.
For all the reasons set forth herein, Appellant's Petition under the Post Conviction Relief
Act was properly dismissed.
By The Court:
8
COMMONWEALTH v, STRANDON MILLER CP-51-CR-0002279-2009
PROOF OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing Court Order upon the persoras), and in the
manner indicated below, which service satisfies the requirements of PaR.Crim.P.114:
Defense Counsel/Party:
Joseph Shultz. Esquire
219 Race Street, Suite B
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Type of Service: (X ) First Class Mail
District Attorney:
Robin Godfrey, Esquire
Barbara R. Paul, Esquire
Office of the District Attorney
Three South Penn Square
Philadelphia, PA 19107-3499
Type of Service: (X) First Class Mail
Dated: May 9, 2017
�
Vanessa A. Montone
Judicial Secretary to
HonorableGiovanni 0. Campbell