Com. v. Hamilton, D. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
v.
DICK RAY HAMILTON
Appellant No. 492 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order February 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000640-2011
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2016
Dick Ray Hamilton appeals the order entered February 11, 2015, in the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his first petition filed
pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et
seq. Hamilton seeks relief from the judgment of sentence of an aggregate
term of 44 to 100 years’ imprisonment imposed on July 5, 2012, after a jury
found him guilty of two counts of rape of a child, two counts of involuntary
deviate sexual intercourse (“IDSI”) with a child, two counts of indecent
assault, and two counts of endangering the welfare of children (“EWOC”). 1
On appeal, he contends the PCRA court erred in denying his petition based
on the following: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call various
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1
18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 3126(a)(7), and 4304(b), respectively.
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witnesses; (2) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to certain
prior bad acts evidence; and (3) the trial court imposed a mandatory
minimum sentence, which violated the Supreme Court’s mandate in Alleyne
v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2151 (U.S. 2013). For the reasons that follow,
we affirm in part and reverse in part the order of the PCRA court, vacate the
judgment of sentence, and remand for resentencing.
The following relevant facts were taken from the trial court’s opinion
following Hamilton’s direct appeal:
The evidence at trial established that [Hamilton] systematically
abused A.B. and A.W., who were both under ten years old at the
time. A.W. was also developmentally disabled. The abuse
occurred inside [Hamilton’s] mobile home, where he was
supposed to be babysitting the victims.
Police charged [Hamilton] with ten counts, all related to the
sexual abuse. For his part, [Hamilton] admitted to police during
questioning—and to the jury during trial—that he exposed
himself to the victims. He claimed that he was medically
incapable of performing intercourse, and generally denied the
other allegations of physical sexual abuse.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/2/2012, at 1-2.
On March 15, 2012, a jury convicted Hamilton of the above-mentioned
crimes. Hamilton filed post-trial motions, which were denied on May 11,
2012. On July 5, 2012, the court sentenced Hamilton to terms of 120-240
months’ imprisonment for each IDSI and rape crime pursuant to the
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 9718, and terms
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of 60-120 months’ incarceration for each indecent assault and EWOC count,
all to be served consecutively.2 He filed a direct appeal on August 3, 2012.
A panel of this Court affirmed his sentence on March 22, 2013, and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal on
October 16, 2013. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 69 A.3d 1299 [1410
MDA 2012] (Pa. Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied,
77 A.3d 1259 (Pa. 2013).
On May 21, 2014, Hamilton filed a timely PCRA petition. An
evidentiary hearing was held on December 1, 2014. On February 12, 2015,
the PCRA court issued an order and opinion, denying Hamilton’s petition.
This timely appeal followed.3
Based on the nature of Hamilton’s first two claims, we will address
them together. In his first argument, he complains trial counsel was
ineffective for failing to call character witnesses, his wife, and an expert
witness to testify at trial.4 In Hamilton’s second issue, he asserts trial
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2
The court also determined Hamilton was a sexually violent predator.
3
On March 12, 2015, the PCRA court ordered Hamilton to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Hamilton filed a concise statement on April 1, 2015. The trial court issued
an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on May 14, 2015.
4
Specifically, with respect to the character witnesses, Hamilton states:
Despite the existence of numerous character witnesses willing to
testify on [his] behalf, trial counsel chose not to call these
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the admission of prior bad act
evidence by the Commonwealth. Id. at 14. By way of background, during
opening statements, the prosecutor mentioned that Hamilton showed the
victims pornographic videos. N.T., 3/14/2012, at 6. Hamilton claims trial
counsel “should have objected immediately and moved for a mistrial upon
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
witnesses. [Hamilton] also related to counsel that his wife was
willing and able to testify that he had never been alone with the
alleged victims. Trial counsel also did not call [Hamilton]’s wife
to testify. The trial transcript is notably devoid of any testimony
either from character witnesses or from [Hamilton]’s wife. The
failure to call these witnesses clearly prejudiced [his] case as
testimony from members of the community regarding his
character and from his cohabitating wife explaining to the jury
that [Hamilton] was never alone with the victims would have
been extremely relevant and compelling.
Hamilton’s Brief at 13. With regard to the expert witness, Hamilton
contends:
Despite [Hamilton] informing counsel of his diagnosis of
erectile dysfunction, [trial] counsel failed to call an expert
witness, namely [Hamilton]’s medical doctor, to testify regarding
[Hamilton]’s condition and the resulting impossibility of
numerous … acts alleged by the Commonwealth. A review of the
trial record makes it clear that no such expert testimony was
provided. Further highlighting the impact such testimony could
have had is the Commonwealth’s line of questioning on cross
examination upon [Hamilton] taking the stand when she called
into question his diagnosis of erectile dysfunction by asking, “Do
you have the doctor here to talk about your problems with your
not being able to be erect?” (Trial Transcript Day 2, pg. 32).
Obviously, [Hamilton] did not have his doctor in court to testify
to his condition due to [trial] counsel’s failure to subpoena and
call as a witness the doctor.
Id. at 13-14.
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this utterance of prior bad acts of [Hamilton] which had not been disclosed
to [him] or [trial] counsel pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence
404(b).” Hamilton’s Brief at 14. Additionally, he argues trial counsel did not
object during direct examination of the first victim when she was asked
about the videos, and counsel also improperly asked the victim about the
videos during cross-examination. Id. at 15. Hamilton notes that it was not
until after multiple Commonwealth witnesses had been called to testify that
counsel requested a motion for a mistrial. Id. Moreover, Hamilton states
counsel erred by filing a post-trial motion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Criminal Procedure 720(c) (after-discovered evidence) instead of an oral
motion for extraordinary relief. Id.5
Before we may address the merit of these arguments, we note that
the transcript from the December 1, 2014, PCRA hearing was not included in
the certified record. A review of the record reveals Hamilton’s privately
retained counsel did not include a request for transcripts in the March 11,
2015, notice of appeal. After inquiring, this Court discovered Franklin
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5
Specifically, Hamilton alleges that prior to the second and final day of trial,
the Commonwealth was informed by one of the victims’ mother that her
daughter had been taken to the hospital and the doctors believed she had
genital herpes. Hamilton’s Brief at 15. Hamilton avers that he does not
have genital herpes. Id. The PCRA court determined that the appropriate
method to preserve his right to a new trial based on this evidence would
have been an oral motion, instead of a post-trial motion. PCRA Court
Opinion, 2/12/2015, at 14-16. As such, Hamilton claims counsel’s
procedural failure precluded him from being granted a new trial. Hamilton’s
Brief at 15.
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County Court Reporter’s Office never received a request to transcribe the
PCRA hearing.
We note the following: “[A]n appellate court is limited to considering
only the materials in the certified record when resolving an issue.”
Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc),
appeal denied, 916 A.2d 632 (Pa. 2007). “Simply put, if a document is not in
the certified record, the Superior Court may not consider it.” Id. at 7.
Moreover, this Court explained:
Where the appellant has not made the transcript of the
proceedings at issue a part of the certified record, we have said:
With regard to missing transcripts, the Rules of Appellate
Procedure require an appellant to order and pay for any
transcript necessary to permit resolution of the issues
raised on appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1911(a). . . . When the
appellant . . . fails to conform to the requirements of Rule
1911, any claims that cannot be resolved in the absence of
the necessary transcript or transcripts must be deemed
waived for the purpose of appellate review.
[Preston, 904 A.2d] at 7.
Commonwealth v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 456 (Pa. Super. 2014).6
Accordingly, we conclude Hamilton’s first two arguments, which concern
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, have been waived for appellate review
because he has not provided this Court the transcript from the PCRA
hearing.
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6
Both Hamilton and the Commonwealth aver that trial counsel testified at
the PCRA hearing, asserting he had a reasonable basis for his actions.
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Turning to Hamilton’s remaining argument, he asserts he was
sentenced, in part, pursuant to the mandatory sentencing statute, 42
Pa.C.S. § 9718, which subsequently has been found to be unconstitutional,
pursuant to Alleyne and its progeny. Hamilton’s Brief at 15. Consequently,
Hamilton argues his four consecutive terms of 120-240 months’
imprisonment for IDSI and rape are illegal.7
Our standard of review is well-settled:
Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is
whether the record supports the PCRA court’s determination and
whether the PCRA court’s decision is free of legal error. The
PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for the findings in the certified record.
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal
citations omitted).
In Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court held “[a]ny fact that, by
law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted
to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at
2155. In applying that mandate, an en banc panel of this Court, in
Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc),
appeal denied, 121 A.3d 496 (Pa. 2015), held that Alleyne rendered the
mandatory minimum sentencing provision at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1,
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7
The PCRA court and the Commonwealth both agree that Hamilton’s
sentence is illegal and a remand is necessary for re-sentencing. See PCRA
Court Opinion, 5/14/2015, at 5-28; Commonwealth’s Brief at 14.
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unconstitutional. Section 9712.1, which provides for a five-year mandatory
minimum prison term when a defendant possesses or is in close proximity to
a firearm while selling illegal drugs, includes a provision that permits the
trial court to determine at sentencing whether the elements necessary to
increase the mandatory minimum sentence were proven by a preponderance
of the evidence. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712.1(c). The Newman Court held
that, under Alleyne, Section 9712.1 “can no longer pass constitutional
muster [because] it permits the trial court, as opposed to the jury, to
increase a defendant’s minimum sentence based upon a preponderance of
the evidence” standard. Newman, supra, 99 A.3d at 98.
Further, the Newman Court found the unconstitutional provisions in
Section 9712.1 were not severable from the statute as a whole. See id. at
101 (“We find Subsections (a) and (c) of Section 9712.1 are essentially and
inseparably connected.”). Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015), applied the same
reasoning when it determined that another mandatory minimum sentencing
statute, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317, was unconstitutional under Alleyne. The
Supreme Court opined:
In conclusion, we hold … that numerous provisions of
Section 6317 are constitutionally infirm under Alleyne.
Moreover, the remaining provisions of Section 6317, standing
alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being vindicated in
accord with the intent of the General Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S. §
1925. Because of the significant provisions found to violate the
Constitution, which clearly express the intent of the legislature
that Section 6317 is a mandatory minimum sentencing statute,
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and not a substantive offense, we find the remaining unoffending
provisions of Section 6317 are incapable of being severed, and
we will not judicially usurp the legislative function and rewrite
Section 6317 or create a substantive offense which the General
Assembly clearly did not desire. Rather, we leave it to our sister
branch for an appropriate statutory response to the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Alleyne.
Id. at 262.
The mandatory sentencing statute applied sub judice, 42 Pa.C.S. §
9718, contains the same provision as in Sections 6317 and 9712.1, which
permits the trial court to make factual determinations at sentencing under
the relaxed preponderance of the evidence standard, and which has been
found to be unconstitutional under Alleyne. Indeed, in Commonwealth v.
Wolfe, 106 A.3d 800 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal granted, 121 A.3d 433 (Pa.
2015), a panel of this Court held that Section 9718 is “facially
unconstitutional.” Id. at 805 (holding “the mandatory minimum statute in
this case contains the same format as the statutes struck down as facially
unconstitutional in Newman and Valentine. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9712(a),
9712(c), 9712.1(a), 9712.1(c), 9713(a), 9713(c), 9718(a), 9718(c).
Following Newman’s instructions, we are required to conclude that Section
9718 is also facially unconstitutional.”).
Nevertheless, our review does not end there. We “note the Newman
Court instructed that Alleyne applies only to cases pending on direct appeal
as of June 27, 2013, the date of the Alleyne decision.” Commonwealth v.
Ruiz, __ A.3d __, 2015 PA Super 275, *9 (Pa. Super. Dec. 30, 2015).
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It is also settled that Alleyne does not invalidate a mandatory
minimum sentence when presented in an untimely PCRA petition. See
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988 (Pa. Super. 2014).8 Furthermore,
this Court also recently declined to give Alleyne retroactive effect to cases
on timely collateral review when the defendant’s judgment of sentence was
finalized before Alleyne was decided. See Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119
A.3d 1058 (Pa. Super. 2015).9
In Commonwealth v. Ruiz, ___ A.3d ___, 2015 PA Super 275 [1925
MDA 2014] (Pa. Super. filed December 30, 2015), this Court once again
revisited the Alleyne timeliness issue. It distinguished the underlying case
from Miller and Riggle with respect to the fact that the defendant had filed
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8
In concluding Alleyne does not satisfy the new retroactive constitutional
right exception to the PCRA’s one year time bar, 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(iii), the Miller Court explained:
Even assuming that Alleyne did announce a new constitutional
right, neither our Supreme Court, nor the United States
Supreme Court has held that Alleyne is to be applied
retroactively to cases in which the judgment of sentence
had become final. This is fatal to Appellant’s argument
regarding the PCRA time-bar. This Court has recognized that a
new rule of constitutional law is applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review only if the United States Supreme Court or our
Supreme Court specifically holds it to be retroactively applicable
to those cases.
Id. at 995 (citations omitted) (emphasis supplied).
9
We note this issue is presently before an en banc panel of this Court. See
Commonwealth v. Aybar, 1224 MDA 2014 [E01010-16, Feb. 23, 2016].
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a timely PCRA petition and his judgment of sentence was finalized after
Alleyne was decided. Id. at *11.
The Ruiz Court determined:
[W]e are guided by this Court’s discussion in Newman, where
the appellant’s judgment of sentence was affirmed by this Court
five days before the United States Supreme Court issued
Alleyne. This Court recognized:
Although this court had already rendered its decision in
appellant’s appeal at the time Alleyne was announced, we
retain jurisdiction for 30 days thereafter, to modify or
rescind our holding, or grant reargument as we have here,
so long as the appellant does not seek allowance of appeal
before our supreme court. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505.
Moreover, our decision does not become final until 30 days
have elapsed and the time for filing a petition for
allowance of appeal with our supreme court expires. See
Pa.R.A.P., Rule 1113(a), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5505. Therefore,
appellant’s case was still pending on direct appeal when
Alleyne was handed down, and the decision may be
applied to appellant’s case retroactively.
Newman, 99 A.3d at 90 (footnote omitted).
Here, similar to the appellant in Newman, [the defendant’s]
June 5, 2013, judgment of sentence was not final when Alleyne
was decided because, in this case, the 30-day period within
which the trial court’s order may be appealed, modified or
rescinded, had not yet expired on June 17, 2013 — the date of
the Alleyne decision. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a), 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505.
As such, [the defendant’s] case “was still pending on direct
appeal when Alleyne was handed down, and the decision may
be applied to [the defendant’s] case retroactively.” Newman,
id.
The Newman Court also made clear that an Alleyne claim is a
non-waivable challenge to the legality of sentence. Such a claim
may be raised on direct appeal, or in a timely filed PCRA
petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (“persons serving illegal
sentences may obtain collateral relief”); Commonwealth v.
Hockenberry, 455 Pa. Super. 626, 689 A.2d 283, 288 (Pa.
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Super. 1997) (“Issues relating to the legality of sentence cannot
be waived and are cognizable under the PCRA”; addressing
challenge to imposition of a mandatory minimum under 18
Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)). Indeed, in Newman, the en banc panel
recognized that Alleyne constituted a “new rule” that “applies to
all criminal cases still pending on direct review.” Newman,
supra, 99 A.3d at 90 (emphasis supplied), quoting Schriro v.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 159 L. Ed. 2d 442(2004). Although the procedural posture in the present appeal
differs from Newman in that [the defendant] raised his claim in
a timely PCRA petition, the fact remains that [the defendant’s]
judgment of sentence was “still pending on direct review” when
Alleyne was decided. Newman, id.Ruiz, 2015 PA Super 275, *12-14 (footnote omitted).10
Turning to the present matter, Hamilton was found guilty on March 15,
2012, and sentenced on July 6, 2012. On March 22, 2013, this Court
affirmed his judgment of sentence. Hamilton then filed a timely petition of
allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on April 25, 2013.
While his case was pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court filed its decision in Alleyne on June 17, 2013.
Thereafter, on October 16, 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
Hamilton’s petition.
We note a sentence is deemed final “at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
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10
As of the date of this memorandum, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
not definitively determined whether an Alleyne challenge implicates the
legality of the sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Wolfe, 121 A.3d 433,
434 (Pa. 2015).
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review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). Accordingly, Hamilton’s judgment of
sentence became final on January 14, 2014, 90 days after the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal and the time for
filing a petition for review with the United States Supreme Court expired.
See U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13.
Therefore, in accordance with Newman and Ruiz, Hamilton’s July 6,
2012, judgment of sentence was not final when Alleyne was decided
because the matter was still pending before the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. Consequently, Hamilton’s case “was still pending on direct appeal
when Alleyne was handed down, and the decision may be applied to [the
defendant’s] case retroactively.” Newman, 99 A.3d at 90. Moreover,
Hamilton filed a timely PCRA petition on May 21, 2014, well within the one
year of the date that his judgment of sentence became final. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). As such, like Ruiz, the holdings in Miller and Riggle
are not implicated herein.11
Based on our review of the procedural background of this case and the
relevant law, we agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion in its May 14, 2015,
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11
Furthermore, it merits mention that Hamilton raised this issue for the first
time in his concise statement. This is of no consequence as we recognize
that “[i]ssues relating to the legality of sentence cannot be waived and are
cognizable under the PCRA.” Commonwealth v. Hockenberry, 689 A.2d
283, 288 (Pa. Super. 1997), appeal denied, 695 A.2d 784 (Pa. 1997). See
also Newman, 99 A.3d at 90; Commonwealth v. Roney, 866 A.2d 351(Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 860 (2005).
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Rule 1925(a) opinion that Hamilton is entitled to be resentenced without
consideration of the mandatory minimum sentencing provision of 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9718. Accordingly, finding error in the PCRA court’s dismissal of
Hamilton’s petition, we reverse the order denying PCRA relief, vacate the
judgment of sentence, and remand for resentencing. In all other respects,
we affirm.
Order affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of sentence
vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/2016
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