Com. v. Roberts, N. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NICHOLAS A. ROBERTS :
:
Appellant : No. 2168 EDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 20, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-46-CR-0005728-2003
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED MARCH 05, 2018
Appellant, Nicholas A. Roberts, appeals pro se from an order entered
on June 20, 2016 that dismissed his second petition filed under the
Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546, as untimely.
After careful review, we affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history is as follows. During the
early morning hours of August 3, 2001, Appellant was driving a Toyota
Camry in Pottstown, Pennsylvania, accompanied by Joel Muir in the rear
passenger seat. Earlier in the evening, Appellant and Muir had engaged in a
verbal altercation with some other men. Eventually, Appellant and Muir
located a Ford Taurus in which two of the men from the earlier argument
were traveling. Appellant sped up alongside the Taurus and Muir discharged
a firearm into the vehicle, killing Michael Ziegler. The Commonwealth
charged both Appellant and Muir with first-degree murder, third-degree
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murder, criminal conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, criminal
conspiracy to commit third-degree murder, and aggravated assault.
At a joint trial, Appellant defended the charges by arguing that while
he drove the Camry, the evidence failed to show that he intended to kill the
victim or that he conspired to commit murder. Neither Appellant nor Muir
testified at trial. At the conclusion of trial, the jury convicted both Appellant
and Muir of the aforementioned crimes. The trial court sentenced Appellant
to, inter alia, life imprisonment for first-degree murder. This Court affirmed
Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 12, 2006 and our Supreme Court
denied further review on January 3, 2007. Accordingly, because Appellant
did not seek review before the United States Supreme Court, his judgment
of sentence became final on April 3, 2007. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3)
(“a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review[ ]”); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13(1) (“A petition for a writ of certiorari seeking
review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary
review by the state court of last resort is timely when it is filed with the
Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review.”);
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 993 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Appellant filed his first PCRA petition on June 15, 2007, alleging that
trial counsel was ineffective. The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on
January 11, 2008. This Court affirmed the dismissal of Appellant’s first
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petition on August 26, 2009 and our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s
petition for allowance of appeal on July 14, 2010. Thereafter, Appellant
unsuccessfully litigated a federal petition for habeas corpus.
Appellant filed the instant PCRA petition on December 10, 2014.1
Although he acknowledged that his petition was filed outside the one-year
time bar set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1), Appellant asserted that he
invoked the “newly discovered fact” exception under 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§9545(b)(1)(ii). To support this claim, Appellant attached notes of the
testimony offered by Muir at a hearing on Muir’s collateral challenge to his
own murder convictions. At the hearing, Muir testified that on the night of
the murder, neither he nor Appellant discussed shooting anyone and “truth
be told, [Appellant] didn’t know I had a gun that night.” N.T. Joel Muir’s
PCRA Hearing, 1/22/04, at 12. In addition, Appellant supplemented his
petition with a sworn affidavit by Muir in which Muir confirmed the
exculpatory statements made at his PCRA hearing.
The PCRA court appointed counsel on January 16, 2015. Following
review, counsel petitioned the court for leave to withdraw and attached a
no-merit letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa.
____________________________________________
1 The PCRA court found that the envelope in which Appellant mailed his
second petition was postmarked December 10, 2014. See, PCRA Court
Opinion, 7/12/17, at 4 n.3, citing Commonwealth v. Crawford, 17 A.3d
1279, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2011) (pro se documents are filed on the date they
are placed into the hands of prison authorities for mailing).
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1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 50 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en
banc). The court thereafter issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition
without a hearing under Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Appellant replied on June 7,
2016, claiming that Muir’s testimony constituted a “newly discovered fact”
that could not have been obtained before the conclusion of trial because Muir
held a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incriminating testimony.
Appellant also argued that Muir’s statements were not merely corroborative
or cumulative of evidence introduced at trial. The PCRA court dismissed
Appellant’s petition without a hearing on June 20, 2016.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on July 5, 2016. Thereafter,
pursuant to court order, Appellant filed a concise statement of matters
complained of on appeal on July 28, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The
PCRA court issued its opinion on July 12, 2017.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition as
untimely where [Appellant invoked the newly discovered facts
exception, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), to the one-year time
limitation of the PCRA]?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
Appellant concedes that the instant petition for collateral relief is
untimely but maintains that he properly invoked the newly discovered facts
exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar. To establish this claim,
Appellant relies on Muir’s testimony from a January 22, 2014 PCRA hearing
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in which Muir alleged that neither he nor Appellant discussed shooting
anyone and that Appellant was unaware that Muir possessed a firearm on
the night of the murder. Appellant’s position is that Muir’s testimony was
not only unknown to him, it was also unavailable at the time of trial because
Muir had a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. On this
basis, Appellant claims he invoked the timeliness exception set forth at 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) since he did not know what Muir’s testimony
would have been until he received his co-defendant’s confirmatory affidavit.
See Appellant’s Brief at 9. Appellant concludes that the PCRA court erred in
dismissing his second PCRA petition as untimely because Muir’s testimony
was previously unknown and unavailable through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.
Our task when reviewing an order that dismisses a petition for
collateral relief is to determine whether the PCRA court’s findings are
supported by the record and whether the order denying relief is free of legal
error. Commonwealth v. Grant, 992 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. Super. 2010).
The PCRA court may dismiss a petition for collateral relief without holding a
hearing where it determines that the petitioner’s claim are facially devoid of
merit and no purpose would be served by further proceedings. Pa.R.Crim.P.
907(1). Rule 907 authorizes summary dismissal where the petitioner fails to
plead and prove that he has met the PCRA’s timeliness requirements. See
Commonwealth v. Burton, 936 A.2d 521, 527 (Pa. Super. 2007).
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[Where a petition is] clearly untimely, the courts have “no
jurisdiction to grant [relief unless the petitioner] can plead and
prove that one of the exceptions to the time bar provided in 42
Pa.[C.S.A.] § 9545(b)(i)-(iii) applies.” Commonwealth v.
Pursell, []749 A.2d 911, 914–915 (Pa. 2000). See also
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d 331 (Pa. Super. 2003)
(en banc ), appeal denied, []839 A.2d 352 (Pa. 2003).
Specifically, Section 9545 provides, in pertinent part, the
following:
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the
judgment becomes final, unless the petition alleges and the
petitioner proves that:
***
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence;
***
42 Pa.[C.S.A.] § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
Burton, 936 A.2d at 524-525. We have observed that, “the focus of [the
exception found at § 9545(b)(1)(ii)] is on the newly discovered facts, not on
a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.”
Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (internal
quotations omitted), appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015).
Appellant’s contentions in this appeal do not merit relief. At the time
of trial, Appellant knew whether he and Muir discussed a killing on the night
of the murder. Appellant also knew at that time whether he believed Muir
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was in possession of a firearm. As such, Muir’s recent statements constitute
only a newly willing source of previously known facts. Because such
statements do not trigger the timeliness exception found at § 9545(b)(1)(ii),
the PCRA court correctly dismissed Appellant’s petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/5/18
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