In the Interest of: T.J.J.M., a Minor ( 2018 )


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  • J-S14001-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: T.J.J.M., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: C.M., FATHER                    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 2807 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 4, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000447-2017
    IN THE INTEREST OF: T.M., A                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    APPEAL OF: C.M., FATHER                    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 2810 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered August 4, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Family Court at No(s): CP-51-DP-0002285-2016
    BEFORE:      OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and RANSOM, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                                      FILED MAY 18, 2018
    C.M. (“Father”) appeals from the August 4, 2017 decree involuntarily
    terminating his parental rights and the order changing the placement goal to
    adoption with respect to his female child, T.J.J.M. a/k/a T.M. (“Child”), born
    ____________________________________________
       Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S14001-18
    in July of 2016.1 Upon careful review, we vacate and remand in accordance
    with the following decision.
    Child was born prematurely at 35 weeks gestation, and she had cocaine,
    opiates, and benzodiazepines in her system. Trial Court Opinion, 11/27/17,
    at 3; N.T., 8/4/17, at 38-39. She remained hospitalized for approximately
    three months.      N.T., 8/4/17, at 42.        Around the time of Child’s birth, the
    apartment where Father and Mother resided sustained property damage due
    to a flood. 
    Id. at 68-69.
    Upon Child’s discharge from the hospital in October
    of 2016, Father did not have housing. 
    Id. at 68.
    The court placed Child in
    the care of the Department of Human Services (“DHS”). The court adjudicated
    Child dependent on October 28, 2016, and assigned her the placement goal
    of reunification. DHS did not request a finding that aggravated circumstances
    existed as to Father.        As such, there is no order attributing aggravated
    circumstances to him.
    Father was required to satisfy Single Case Plan (“SCP”) goals to attend
    supervised visitation at the office of the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”),
    and to participate in a parenting and housing program. N.T., 8/4/17, at 42.
    The CUA scheduled weekly visitation for Father with Child. 
    Id. at 43.
    Father
    attended three supervised visits after Child’s discharge from the hospital in
    October 2016, which “went pretty well.” 
    Id. at 43,
    69-70. In October 2016,
    ____________________________________________
    1 By separate decree entered on August 4, 2017, the trial court involuntarily
    terminated the parental rights of D.C. (“Mother”), who did not appeal.
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    subsequent to his supervised visits, Father was incarcerated for a probation
    violation. 
    Id. at 43,
    101. Father remained incarcerated for two months. 
    Id. Upon his
    release, Father was required to reside in a self-help program for 90
    days. 
    Id. at 88-89.
    The CUA caseworker’s first contact from Father after his release from
    prison was on February 23, 2017, when he was in the self-help program. 
    Id. at 43.
    By that time, Father had obtained employment, for which he explained
    he was on a probationary period for an unspecified amount of time.2,    3   
    Id. at 92.
    Father attended two supervised visits at an unspecified time in 2017, but
    he did not consistently attend visits thereafter because of his work schedule 4
    and his responsibilities and/or restrictions in the self-help program. 
    Id. at 44,
    48. Specifically, Father testified that the CUA office was a distance by public
    transportation of approximately one hour and 45 minutes from his place of
    employment.       
    Id. at 92.
        Nevertheless, the CUA caseworker testified that
    ____________________________________________
    2 Father introduced into evidence, and the court admitted, a letter from his
    direct supervisor at his place of employment, which attested to Father’s
    character and work ethic. See Father’s Exhibit 1.
    3 Father testified that he began his employment in January. N.T., 8/4/17, at
    91. With respect to the time of his shift, Father testified he started working
    from “7:00 to 3:30 and then on to 9:00 to 5:30.” 
    Id. at 91-92.
    4 Father’s supervised visits were scheduled at the same time as Mother’s visits
    every Thursday at 4:00 p.m. N.T., 8/4/17, at 73, 76-78. Father was unable
    to arrive for the visits until 7:00 p.m. 
    Id. at 73.
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    Father stayed in contact with her on “at least [a] monthly” basis. 
    Id. at 45-
    46.
    To accommodate his work schedule, the CUA scheduled one Saturday
    visit for Father with Child, and, on June 30, 2017, Father confirmed that he
    would attend the visit. 
    Id. at 73,
    76. However, the visit did not occur because
    the foster parent was unavailable to bring Child. 
    Id. at 73,
    76. There is no
    evidence that the CUA attempted to accommodate Father’s schedule for
    supervised visits during April, May, or June of 2017. 
    Id. at 77-81.
    During
    Father’s phone call to the CUA caseworker on June 30, 2017, wherein he
    confirmed the Saturday visit, Father informed the caseworker that, effective
    July 17, 2017, his work schedule would change, and that he would be available
    for supervised visits during the agency’s daytime hours. 
    Id. at 46,
    78-79.
    With respect to his parenting and housing goals, the CUA referred Father
    to the Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) on December 14, 2016. 
    Id. at 48.
    Father reported to ARC for his orientation meeting on December 20, 2016,
    but ARC closed his case on February 23, 2017, due to his non-participation.
    
    Id. at 48;
    DHS Exhibit 7.
    On April 19, 2017, DHS filed a petition for the involuntary termination
    of Father’s and Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
    (2), (5), (8), and (b). On the same date, DHS filed a petition for a goal change
    to adoption.
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    On August 4, 2017, a hearing occurred on the petitions, during which
    DHS requested termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section
    2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).       DHS presented the testimony of the CUA
    caseworker, Amanda Mosley. Father testified on his own behalf. Mother did
    not appear for the hearing, but she was represented by counsel. Child was
    represented by a Child Advocate and a Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”).
    At the conclusion of the testimonial evidence, counsel for the parties
    made closing arguments. See N.T., 8/4/17, at 112-121. The GAL stated, in
    part, “I don’t think [Father’s] got [sic] a settled intent to abandon the child
    and I think that he’s made some strides towards (inaudible) the dependent
    issues which brought the case to [c]ourt. So I’m not sure [DHS has] met its
    burden.   And I’d hate to lose the possibility of [him as a] reunification
    resource. . . .” 
    Id. at 115.
    Thereafter, the trial court granted the involuntary
    termination petition on the record in open court pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
    2511(a)(1) and (2). 
    Id. at 126.
    The court did not address Section 2511(b)
    on the record in terminating Father’s parental rights. Further, the court did
    not dispose of the goal change petition on the record in open court.
    By decree dated and entered on August 4, 2017, the court granted the
    involuntary termination petition pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),
    (8), and (b). By separate permanency review order dated August 4, 2017,
    the court changed Child’s goal to adoption. Father timely filed a notice of
    appeal along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
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    pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b), which this Court consolidated sua
    sponte. The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on November 27, 2017.5
    On appeal, Father presents the following issues for our review:
    1.     Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it
    involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights where such
    determination was not supported by clear and convincing
    evidence under the [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8)?
    2.     Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it
    involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights without
    giving primary consideration to the effect that the
    termination would have on the . . . developmental, physical
    and emotional needs of the child as required by the
    [A]doption [A]ct, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
    3.     Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error, when it
    terminated Father’s parental rights and changed the child’s
    goal to adoption as substantial, sufficient, and credible
    evidence was presented at the time of trial which would
    have substantiated denying the [p]etition for [g]oal
    [c]hange?
    4.     Did the [t]rial [c]ourt commit reversible error when it
    involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights and
    changed the child’s goal to adoption where Father was not
    provided adequate services for a sufficient period of time?
    Father’s brief at 4.6
    ____________________________________________
    5The trial court addressed the involuntary termination decree but not the goal
    change order in its opinion.
    6 Pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301, et seq., permanency
    planning for dependent children is conducted under the jurisdiction of the
    juvenile court. Pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2101, et seq.,
    involuntary termination of parental rights is conducted under the jurisdiction
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    We begin with Father’s third and fourth issues regarding the goal change
    order, which we review for an abuse of discretion. In re R.J.T., 
    9 A.3d 1179
    ,
    1190 (Pa. 2010). The Juvenile Act provides that it “shall be interpreted and
    construed as to effectuate” its purposes. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b). The Juvenile
    Act’s first purpose is “[t]o preserve the unity of the family whenever possible
    or to provide another alternative permanent family when the unity of the
    family cannot be maintained.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1).
    The Juvenile Act provides that the court shall conduct periodic
    permanency hearings “for the purpose of determining or reviewing the
    permanency plan of the child, the date by which the goal of permanency for
    the child might be achieved and whether placement continues to be best
    suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare of the
    child.”   42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(e)(1). Specifically, Section 6351(f) provides as
    follows, in relevant part.
    (f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—
    At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the
    following:
    (1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
    placement.
    (2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance with
    the    permanency      plan     developed      for    the    child.
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    of the orphans’ court. Instantly, the Honorable Lyris F. Younge presided over
    both matters.
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    (3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
    circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
    (4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement
    goal for the child.
    (5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child
    might be achieved.
    (5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the
    permanency plan in effect.
    (6) Whether the child is safe.
    ...
    (9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the
    last 22 months or the court has determined that aggravated
    circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts to . . . preserve
    and reunify the family need not be made or continue to be made,
    whether the county agency has filed or sought to join a petition to
    terminate parental rights and to identify, recruit, process and
    approve a qualified family to adopt the child. . . .
    42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9) (emphasis added).              “These statutory
    mandates clearly place the trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.”
    In re S.B., 
    943 A.2d 973
    , 978 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “Safety,
    permanency, and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other
    considerations.” 
    Id. (citation omitted)
    (emphasis in original). Moreover, the
    burden is on the child welfare agency “to prove the change in goal would be
    in the child’s best interest.” In re D.P., 
    972 A.2d 1221
    , 1227 (Pa. Super.
    2009).
    Instantly, Father asserts that he was “working full time,” which “was the
    best way to obtain the stable housing needed for him to be reunited” with
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    Child. Father’s brief at 19-20 (citation to record omitted). Father argues that
    changing Child’s placement goal to adoption was against the weight of
    evidence, as follows.
    Despite being in regular contact with the CUA social worker, DHS
    and CUA failed to offer Father any visits at a time that was
    compatible with his work schedule. Similarly, Father is willing to
    attend parenting and housing classes, but was not offered these
    services at a time compatible with his work schedule. If DHS and
    CUA worked with Father to establish a consistent visitation
    schedule and other reunification services that did not conflict with
    his work schedule he would be able to complete his goals, reunite
    with [Child] and preserve the family.
    
    Id. at 20
    (citations to record omitted).    For the following reasons, we are
    constrained to agree.
    The juvenile court’s certified record indicates that the first permanency
    review hearing occurred on March 9, 2017, which found minimal compliance
    by Father with the permanency plan.        Contrary to Section 6351(f)(5), the
    order did not include the likely date by which the goal might be achieved. On
    April 19, 2017, DHS filed the petition for a goal change, which was
    approximately six months after Child was placed.        The next permanency
    review hearing occurred on June 8, 2017, which maintained the placement
    goal of reunification, but made no findings with respect to either parent’s
    compliance. Like the first permanency review order, the June 8, 2017 order
    did not include the likely date by which the goal might be achieved.
    Thereafter, on August 4, 2017, the goal change/termination hearing occurred,
    at which time Child was in placement for ten months, less than the statutory
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    15 - 22 months provided for in Section 6351(f)(9). The August 4, 2017 goal
    change order found that there was no compliance by Mother with the
    permanency plan, but omits any finding with respect to Father’s compliance.
    During the subject proceedings, Ms. Mosley, the CUA caseworker,
    testified that Child was placed because Father did not have housing at the
    time of Child’s discharge from the hospital. N.T., 8/4/17, at 68. She testified
    that Father was appropriate at the visits she supervised, and that the visits
    “went pretty well.” 
    Id. at 69-70.
    Ms. Mosley testified that Father has been
    cooperative with her. 
    Id. at 83.
    It is undisputed that Father worked full-time and had maintained
    communication with Ms. Mosley regarding scheduling supervised visits. There
    is no evidence that Ms. Mosley attempted to accommodate Father’s work
    schedule more than once, by scheduling a Saturday visit sometime after June
    30, 2017, which never occurred because of the unavailability of Child’s foster
    parents. Father testified that his new work schedule gives him off on Fridays.
    However, he testified that Ms. Mosley told him that the foster parents are only
    available on Mondays – Wednesdays, which are impossible for him due to his
    work schedule. 
    Id. at 94-95.
    Father testified that it would be easier for him
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    to visit with Child if she were placed in kinship care with her maternal aunt,
    who resides in South Philadelphia.7,       8   
    Id. at 95,
    97.
    With respect to his parenting and housing goals, the CUA referred
    Father to ARC on December 14, 2016, four months before filing the petition
    for the goal change. Father testified that he was in contact with ARC regarding
    his work schedule, and that he and the agency tried to work around it but had
    been unsuccessful. 
    Id. at 95.
    Father testified that he is willing to participate
    in the required classes. 
    Id. Ms. Mosley
    testified that Child currently receives early intervention
    services, which includes occupational therapy, and she is under the care of a
    medical specialist for gastrointestinal issues. 
    Id. at 40.
    DHS did not present
    any evidence concerning Child’s daily medical needs. As such, DHS did not
    focus on whether Father is capable of meeting Child’s medical needs.9
    ____________________________________________
    7 Father testified that he was unaware why Child was not placed with her
    maternal aunt. N.T., 8/4/17, at 95. At the conclusion of the testimonial
    evidence, the trial court stated that it would be willing to entertain a hearing
    on placing Child in kinship care with her aunt. 
    Id. at 128-130.
    8There is no record evidence regarding where Child’s foster parents reside.
    Importantly, Ms. Mosley testified that they “are older[,] and they are not
    willing to adopt.” 
    Id. at 50
    (emphasis added).
    9 Ms. Mosley provided the only testimony on direct examination regarding
    Father’s ability to meet Child’s medical needs, as follows.
    Q. And do you believe that [Father] is prepared to provide for
    [Child’s] medical needs at this point?
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    In sum, the court issued the goal change order when Child had been in
    placement for approximately ten months, and no likely date had ever been
    set for the achievement of Child’s placement goal. Father participated in three
    supervised visits immediately after Child’s placement and before his
    incarceration and two visits on an unspecified date after his release from
    prison. Upon his release, Father secured full-time employment, and he was
    working to obtain housing and be reunited with Child.        Father maintained
    communication with the CUA caseworker after he secured employment in an
    attempt to resolve the conflict between his work schedule and the requisite
    supervised visitation. Likewise, Father communicated with ARC in an attempt
    to resolve the conflict between his work schedule and the requisite parenting
    and housing classes. Finally, the record reveals that Child is not placed with
    a pre-adoptive resource, and that the foster parents are limited in their
    availability to bring Child to supervised visits. Based on the foregoing, we
    conclude that the evidence does not support changing Child’s placement goal
    to adoption.     Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in issuing the
    order, and we are constrained to vacate.
    ____________________________________________
    A. No.
    Q. Has he ever participated in her medical care at this time?
    A. Not to my knowledge.
    N.T., 8/4/17, at 48.
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    It follows that we agree with Father’s first and second issues on appeal,
    that the court abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights. We
    review these issues according to the following standard.
    The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
    requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
    credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
    by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
    courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
    or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
    of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
    unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
    court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
    the record would support a different result. We have previously
    emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
    observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    In Santosky v. Kramer, 
    455 U.S. 745
    , 747-748 (1982), the United
    States Supreme Court held, “Before a State may sever completely and
    irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires
    that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing
    evidence.” In addition, the Court explained:
    The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care,
    custody, and management of their child does not evaporate
    simply because they have not been model parents or have lost
    temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood
    relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
    preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. If
    anything, persons faced with forced dissolution of their parental
    rights have a more critical need for procedural protections than do
    those resisting state intervention into ongoing family affairs.
    When the State moves to destroy weakened familial bonds, it
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    must provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures.
    
    Id. at 753-754.
    Instantly, termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of
    the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
    Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
    that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
    termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
    determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
    or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
    the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
    needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
    of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
    concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
    parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
    of permanently severing any such bond.
    In re L.M., 
    923 A.2d 505
    , 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).           In
    addition, we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
    Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. See In re
    B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
    The relevant sections of the Adoption Act in this case are as follows:
    (a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
    may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
    grounds:
    (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
    least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
    petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
    relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
    failed to perform parental duties.
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
    essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
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    for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
    causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot
    or will not be remedied by the parent.
    ...
    (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
    by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
    agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions
    which led to the removal or placement of the child continue
    to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those
    conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services
    or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not
    likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
    placement of the child within a reasonable period of time
    and termination of the parental rights would best serve the
    needs and welfare of the child.
    ...
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
    by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
    agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
    removal or placement, the conditions which led to the
    removal or placement of the child continue to exist and
    termination of parental rights would best serve the needs
    and welfare of the child.
    ...
    (b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
    of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
    physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
    of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
    environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
    income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
    control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
    to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
    efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
    which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), (b).
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    With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held,
    Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties
    or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court
    must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation
    for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
    parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination
    of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
    In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 
    550 Pa. 595
    , 602, 
    708 A.2d 88
    , 92 (Pa.
    1988). Further,
    the trial court must consider the whole history of a given case and
    not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision.
    The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case
    and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing
    termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the
    evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly
    warrants the involuntary termination.
    In re N.M.B., 
    856 A.2d 847
    , 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted)
    (emphasis added).
    Our courts have explained that parental duty “is best understood in
    relation to the needs of a child.” In re Burns, 
    474 Pa. 615
    , 624-625, 
    379 A.2d 535
    , 540 (Pa. 1977).
    A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
    needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive
    interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held
    that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires
    affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses
    more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in
    the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and
    association with the child. Because a child needs more than a
    benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent ‘exert himself to
    take and maintain a place of importance in the child's life.’
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    Id. (citations omitted);
    see also In re C.M.S., 
    832 A.2d 457
    , 462 (Pa. Super.
    2003), appeal denied, 
    859 A.2d 767
    (Pa. 2004).
    To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the
    following factors must be demonstrated: (1) repeated and continued
    incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
    refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or
    subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
    causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
    remedied. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 
    825 A.2d 1266
    , 1272 (Pa. Super.
    2003).
    To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5), the
    following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the child has been removed from
    parental care for at least six months; (2) the conditions which led to the child’s
    removal or placement continue to exist; (3) the parents cannot or will not
    remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a reasonable
    period of time; (4) the services reasonably available to the parents are unlikely
    to remedy the conditions which led to removal or placement within a
    reasonable period of time; and (5) termination of parental rights would best
    serve the needs and welfare of the child. See In re Adoption of 
    M.E.P., supra
    at 1273-1274.
    To terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8), the
    following factors must be demonstrated: (1) the child has been removed from
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    parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the
    conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist;
    and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
    of the child. In re Adoption of 
    M.E.P., supra
    at 1275-1276; 23 Pa.C.S. §
    2511(a)(8). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to
    remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re
    A.R., 
    837 A.2d 560
    , 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has
    been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that
    led to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith
    efforts of the child welfare agency supplied over a realistic time-period. 
    Id. Termination under
    Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate
    a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially
    caused placement or the availability or efficacy of agency services.       In re
    Adoption of T.B.B., 
    835 A.2d 387
    , 396 (Pa. Super. 2003); In re Adoption
    of 
    M.E.P., supra
    .
    Finally, with respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated that,
    “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
    inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 
    884 A.2d 1284
    ,
    1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also
    discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention
    to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” 
    Id. (citation omitted)
    .   However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond
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    J-S14001-18
    between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
    The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
    circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 762-763
    (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
    Initially, Father argues that the court did not intend to terminate his
    parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) because it granted the
    involuntary termination petition on the record in open court pursuant to
    Section 2511(a)(1) and (2) only. N.T., 8/4/17, at 126. In its appellee brief,
    DHS agrees. DHS brief at 8-9. The record confirms that, although DHS filed
    the petition under Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), it sought termination
    under (a)(1) and (2) during the hearing, which the trial court granted on the
    record in open court. N.T., 8/4/17, at 114, 126. Because DHS did not proceed
    under Section 2511(a)(5) and (8), we conclude that the trial court erred to
    the extent it terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant to these
    subsections.
    With respect to both Section 2511(a)(1) and (2), Father argues, in part:
    DHS filed a termination petition only six (6) months after [Child]
    came into care. For four (4) of those six months, Father was not
    offered any visits that did not conflict with his work schedule.
    Between the time the termination petition was filed and the time
    of the termination hearing, Father was offered one Saturday visit.
    . . . Father confirmed his attendance, but the visit was ultimately
    cancelled due to the foster family’s schedule. Similarly, DHS
    offered no evidence that Father was offered parenting and housing
    class at a time that did not conflict with his work schedule.
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    J-S14001-18
    DHS’s failure to provide Father with visits with [Child] and other
    necessary reunification services before filing for termination of his
    parental rights violates his due process rights.
    Father’s brief at 13-14 (citations to record omitted).
    The trial court reasoned on the record in open court, “I did have an
    opportunity to receive testimony from [Father], not that I don’t find him
    credible, but I find his testimony to be very telling.” N.T., 8/4/17, at 122.
    The court emphasized Father’s acknowledgment that he relied on Mother with
    respect to learning how Child was doing. 
    Id. at 122-123.
    The court stated,
    “I don’t know why [Father] would allow mom to be the filter by which [he]
    kept in contact with [Child]. Given that mom has had challenges and mom’s
    issues are what really brought [Child] into care. Father was aware of it. He
    said he was working prior to, but as soon as [Child] was born positive for
    [illicit] substances, [F]ather was on notice at that point that maybe mom was
    not going to be a viable resource in terms of parenting for [Child].” 
    Id. at 123.
    The court reasoned that, because Father communicated with Mother
    about Child’s medical condition, he did not “demonstrate that he could
    independently take care of this child.” 
    Id. at 123.
    Indeed, in its Rule 1925(a)
    opinion, the trial court found, “Father failed to demonstrate he was capable of
    being a single parent of [Child] and depended on [Child’s] [m]other.” Trial
    Court Opinion, 11/27/17, at 4 (citation to record omitted).
    Father indeed testified that he learned about Child’s medical problems
    by talking to Mother.     N.T., 8/4/17, at 106.     However, pursuant to the
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    J-S14001-18
    applicable law relating to Section 2511(a)(1), the trial court was required to
    consider Father’s explanation for his conduct, which he expressed as follows
    on direct examination:
    I’m just asking for like a fair shot and like work with me.
    Sometimes, like, I understand people’s schedules get messed up.
    . . . Don’t work against me. Ms. [Mosley] . . . [w]e don’t
    communicate, because we used to communicate through
    [Mother]. And maybe that’s my fault that I used to communicate
    through the child’s mother. But I thought she was on the same
    path that I want to be on, you know what I’m saying? But now I
    realize today, . . . I got to do it on my own. . . .
    
    Id. at 97-98.
    We conclude that the trial court in this case abused its discretion
    in mechanically applying the six-month statutory provision under Section
    2511(a)(1) and not considering Father’s explanation for his conduct. See In
    re 
    N.M.B., supra
    . We conclude, in light of the totality of the evidence, that
    Father’s conduct does not clearly warrant the termination of his parental rights
    pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1).
    With respect to Section 2511(a)(2), Father argues that, “[i]f DHS and
    CUA worked with Father to establish a consistent visitation schedule and other
    reunification services that did not conflict with his work schedule[,] he would
    be able to complete his goals and reunite with [Child].” Father’s brief at 15.
    We conclude that the foregoing testimonial evidence did not demonstrate that
    the causes of Father’s parental incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.
    Therefore, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in terminating
    Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
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    J-S14001-18
    Further, we reject the contention of DHS in its appellee brief that our
    Supreme Court’s decision in In the Interest of D.C.D., 
    105 A.3d 662
    (Pa.
    2014) defeats Father’s argument that the court abused its discretion in
    terminating his parental rights because DHS did not provide reasonable efforts
    to reunify him with Child. See DHS’s brief at 12-13. The D.C.D. Court held
    that this Court erred in reversing the trial court’s termination of the father’s
    parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b) as a result of the
    agency’s failure to provide reasonable efforts to enable the father to reunify
    with his child. The Court held that there is no Pennsylvania or federal provision
    “that requires delaying permanency for a child due to the failure of an agency
    to provide reasonable services, when the court has otherwise held that
    grounds for termination have been established and the court has determined
    that termination is in the best interests of the child by clear and convincing
    evidence.” 
    D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 676
    . The D.C.D. Court concluded:
    Applying this standard to the case at bar, the trial court did not
    abuse its discretion in holding that [the agency] established
    grounds for termination of [the f]ather’s parental rights by clear
    and convincing evidence based on [the f]ather’s continued
    incapacity to care for child. Moreover, the trial court recognized
    for purposes of subsection 2511(b) that a parent’s continued
    incarceration may factor into a determination of the child’s best
    interests. In this case, the court did not abuse its discretion in
    determining that [the c]hild’s best interests will be served by
    terminating [the f]ather’s parental rights given the absence of
    a bond with [the f]ather, [the f]ather’s expected incarceration
    until [the c]hild is at least seven and likely longer, and her strong
    bond with her foster family with whom she has lived nearly all her
    life and who has indicated a desire to adopt her.
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    J-S14001-18
    
    Id. at 677
    (citation omitted). Instantly, we have concluded that DHS failed
    to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s parental incapacity
    cannot or will not be remedied. To the extent that DHS did not provide Father
    with ample time and opportunity to participate in supervised visitation and
    parenting and housing classes at ARC, D.C.D. does not control in this case.
    Based on our disposition that the court abused its discretion in
    terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a), we need not
    consider the decree pursuant to Section 2511(b).           See In re 
    L.M., supra
    (explaining, “Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
    termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second
    part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs
    and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.”)
    Accordingly, we vacate the decree involuntarily terminating Father’s parental
    rights and remand for entry of an order denying the involuntary termination
    petition.
    Goal change order vacated.         Case remanded for entry of a new
    permanency order maintaining Child’s placement goal of reunification and for
    further     permanency   review    hearings    in   juvenile   court.   Involuntary
    termination decree vacated. Case remanded for entry of an order denying the
    involuntary termination petition.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
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    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/18/18
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