Com. v. Provance, D. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S54012-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                                   :
    :
    :
    DARYL SCOTT PROVANCE                           :
    :
    Appellant                     :   No. 1934 WDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order November 16, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000500-2015
    BEFORE:        OTT, J., MOULTON, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                               FILED DECEMBER 08, 2017
    Daryl Scott Provance appeals, pro se,1 from the order entered on
    November 16, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, denying
    him relief on his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9541 et seq. In this timely appeal, Provance argues the
    PCRA court erred in determining trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to
    introduce photographs of damage to the rear end of his truck, which Provance
    asserts would have proven that he was not at fault for the accident that led to
    his conviction of aggravated assault and related charges.2 After a thorough
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 The trial court granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw after fulfilling
    the Turner/Finley no-merit requirements.
    2  Provance received an aggregate sentence of four to eight years’
    incarceration.
    J-S54012-17
    review of the submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the certified
    record, we affirm.
    Initially, we note that this appeal is facially untimely. The appeal from
    the November 16, 2016 order denying him relief, was due on Friday,
    December 16, 2016, but was not docketed until Monday, December 19, 2016,
    three days late. However, we recognize that under the prisoner mailbox rule,
    which holds the appeal is deemed filed when it is delivered to the proper
    authority at the prison for mailing. It is obvious that, having been docketed
    on a Monday, the appeal was submitted to the prison authority for mailing by
    Friday, December 16, 2016 at the latest. Accordingly, this appeal is timely.
    The fact that the appeal is timely does not, however, provide any further
    aid to Provance. As referred to above, the charges against Provance arose
    from an incident in which Provance crashed his pickup truck into the victims’
    vehicle.   Provance then fled the scene.   At trial, Provance claimed he was
    intoxicated on the night in question and a stranger, who only identified himself
    as a friend of the family, drove Provance home.       Provance supposed that
    someone else took his car keys from him while he was intoxicated and caused
    the accident.
    -2-
    J-S54012-17
    Provance     now    attempts      to    present   photographs   of   his   truck
    demonstrating rear end damage, thereby proving he did not cause the
    accident, rather, his truck was rear-ended and forced into the victims’ car.3
    Our standard of review for an order denying PCRA relief is as follows:
    This Court's standard of review regarding an order denying a
    petition under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA
    court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal
    error.
    Commonwealth v. Rizvi, 
    166 A.2d 344
    , 347 (Pa. Super. 2017).
    In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
    petitioner:
    [M]ust plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
    (1) the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had
    no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) Appellant
    suffered prejudice because of counsel's action or inaction. With
    regard to the [reasonable basis] prong, we will conclude that
    counsel's chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis only if
    Appellant proves that an alternative not chosen offered a potential
    for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued.
    To establish the [prejudice] prong, Appellant must show that there
    is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings
    would have been different but for counsel's action or inaction.
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    161 A.3d 960
    , 965 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation
    omitted).
    In denying his petition, the trial court accurately observed that because
    Provance’s trial testimony was that he was not driving his truck at the time of
    ____________________________________________
    3 Provance raised this claim as ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
    introduce photographs of his truck at trial. He attempts to reframe the issue
    as newly discovered exculpatory evidence. In substance, they are essentially
    the same claim. We address the issue as originally raised.
    -3-
    J-S54012-17
    the incident, the photographs were irrelevant to the trial and counsel could
    not have been ineffective for failing to introduce them at trial.
    We have reviewed the certified record, including the notes of testimony
    of the trial, and we rely upon the PCRA court’s analysis of this issue found at
    page 3 of his Rule 907 Notice, which states:
    You next allege that Attorney Spegar was ineffective for failing to
    present photographic evidence of the damage caused to your
    truck by the crash. When you took the witness stand in your own
    defense at trial, you told the jury that you were not driving your
    vehicle when it crashed into the other vehicle and then went down
    an embankment and crashed again into a tree. Your sworn
    testimony at trial was that some unknown person had stolen your
    truck prior to the crashes. You told the jurors that it was the thief
    who drove your truck, not you. You did not dispute that your
    vehicle had been involved in two separate crashes on the night of
    the crimes, and thus the photographic evidence of the resulting
    damage was irrelevant since the extent of that damage was not
    at issue. The failure to present any photographic evidence of the
    physical damage to your truck did not cause you prejudice since
    your defense was that you were not the driver at the time of the
    crashes.
    Rule 907 Notice, 10/24/206, at 3.
    Simply put, the photographs of Provance’s truck were irrelevant to his
    defense. Accordingly, there was no error in failing to introduce them at trial
    and, parenthetically, the photographs are not exculpatory.
    In light of the above, the PCRA court’s order is supported by the certified
    record and there has been no error of law.
    Order affirmed.
    -4-
    J-S54012-17
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/8/2017
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1934 WDA 2016

Filed Date: 12/8/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/8/2017