Com. v. Croasmun, M. ( 2016 )

J-S20038-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL SCOTT CROASMUN,
Appellant No. 1410 WDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order August 26, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-33-CR-0000401-2012
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 21, 2016
Appellant, Michael Scott Croasmun, appeals from the order dismissing
his counseled first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On January 16, 2013, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one
count each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child and
aggravated indecent assault of a child.1 The charges stem from his sexual
abuse of his then-girlfriend’s daughter. In exchange for the plea, the
Commonwealth nolle prossed 249 related counts against him. On May 28,
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(b) and 3125(b), respectively.
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2013, after consideration of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI), the
trial court sentenced Appellant, in accordance with the plea agreement, to
an aggregate term of not less than ten nor more than thirty years’
incarceration. The court also designated Appellant a sexually violent
predator (SVP). Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion or direct
appeal.
On May 21, 2014, Appellant, acting pro se, filed a timely PCRA petition
raising numerous claims of ineffective assistance of plea counsel. The PCRA
court appointed counsel, and held an evidentiary hearing on August 6, 2015,
at which plea counsel Kenneth A. Young, Esq. and Appellant testified.
Appellant introduced into evidence a letter Attorney Young wrote to him
dated May 1, 2013 (after Appellant entered the guilty plea, but before the
court imposed sentence). The letter reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
. . . I am sorry that you are concerned regarding the Megan’s
Law implication regarding your case. You informed me that you
would accept the plea and knowingly and intentionally pled guilty
to this matter with the negotiation of a 10 to 30 year sentence.
Pursuant to conversations with you and my partner, . . . it was
our global agreement that this case was un-defendable due to
the severity of the charges, your submissions to both [my
partner] and myself, the severity of the crimes charged, the
mandatory minimums involved and the fact that the [c]ourt
would sentence you to consecutive mandatory minimums if you
were found guilty in this matter.
If you desire to withdraw your plea, I will of course
prepare the necessary documentation, but, I would also have to
withdraw as counsel in this matter. I don’t believe any
additional money would assist you in this terrible situation. I
have tried thousands of cases in this Commonwealth and
professionally evaluated your case with my colleagues and
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yourself and we all believe that we would be unsuccessful
obtaining a not guilty verdict in this matter.
Please immediately contact me by correspondence as soon
as possible with your position in this matter. I again stress that
this was the best negotiated sentence that could have been
achieved due to the facts and severity of charges against you.
(Letter from Kenneth A. Young, Esq. to Appellant, 5/01/13, at unnumbered
pages 1-2).2
On August 26, 2015, the court entered an opinion and order denying
Appellant’s PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed.3
Appellant raises one issue for our review:
Did the [PCRA] court err in its August 26, 2015, opinion and
order, which denied [Appellant’s] PCRA claim that [Appellant]
was rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by being
pressured, coerced, and unlawfully induced by his trial attorney,
under threat of abandonment, to plead guilty pursuant to the
plea agreement rather than go to trial?
(Appellant’s Brief, at 4).4
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2
Appellant did not respond to the letter. (See PCRA Court Opinion,
8/26/15, at 4).
3
Pursuant to the PCRA court’s order, Appellant filed a timely concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal on September 24, 2015. The
court entered an opinion on September 25, 2015, in which it referred this
Court to its previous opinion filed August 26, 2015 for its reasons for
denying the PCRA petition. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
4
The Commonwealth did not file a brief; it filed a letter stating that it is
relying on the PCRA court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion. (See Commonwealth’s
letter, 11/23/15).
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In his issue on appeal, Appellant argues that counsel provided
ineffective assistance by coercing and pressuring him into proceeding with
the guilty plea instead of a trial. (See id. at 13-18). He asserts that
counsel threatened to abandon him if he withdrew the plea, and in support,
points to counsel’s May 1, 2013 letter. (See id. at 14, 16-17). Appellant
further maintains that counsel’s actions rendered his plea involuntary and
requests that this Court remand his case for trial. (See id. at 17-18). This
issue does not merit relief.
We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review. In
reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we examine whether the
PCRA court’s determination is supported by the record and free
of legal error. The scope of review is limited to the findings of
the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level. It is
well-settled that a PCRA court’s credibility determinations are
binding upon an appellate court so long as they are supported by
the record. However, this Court reviews the PCRA court’s legal
conclusions de novo.
Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations
and quotation marks omitted).
To prevail on a petition for PCRA relief on grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence:
(2) That the conviction or sentence resulted from . . . :
* * *
(ii) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
have taken place.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).
An appellant must demonstrate “(1) that the underlying claim is of
arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or
her action or inaction; and (3) that, but for the errors and omissions of
counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
proceedings would have been different.” Commonwealth v. McDermitt,
66 A.3d 810, 813 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). “The failure to
satisfy any prong of this test will cause the entire claim to fail.” Id. (citation
omitted). “It is well-established that counsel is presumed effective, and [a
PCRA petitioner] bears the burden of proving ineffectiveness.”
Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779-80 (Pa. Super.
2015) (en banc), appeal denied, 123 A.3d 331 (Pa. 2015) (citations
omitted).
It is clear that a criminal defendant’s right to
effective counsel extends to the plea process, as well
as during trial. However, [a]llegations of
ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a
guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the
ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an
involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant
enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the
voluntariness of the plea depends on whether
counsel’s advice was within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.
[T]he law does not require that [the defendant] be pleased
with the outcome of his decision to enter a plea of guilty: All that
is required is that [his] decision to plead guilty be knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently made. Moreover, with regard to the
prejudice prong, where an appellant has entered a guilty plea,
the appellant must demonstrate it is reasonably probable that,
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but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have gone to trial.
Commonwealth v. Timchak, 69 A.3d 765, 769-70 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, during Appellant’s oral guilty plea colloquy, the court informed
him of the elements of the charges against him, and Appellant affirmatively
stated that he was guilty of the charges. (See N.T. Guilty Plea, 1/16/13, at
7-8). Additionally, Appellant affirmatively indicated, inter alia, that he
understood the plea agreement and that he was waiving his right to a jury
trial. (See id. at 4-5).
At the sentencing hearing, the court acknowledged that Appellant
made certain statements during his interview for the PSI indicating that he
was not guilty. (See N.T. Sentencing, 5/28/13, at 4; PSI, 5/28/13, at 2).
The court reiterated that Appellant had the right to a trial, and stated that it
could permit him to withdraw his plea. (See N.T. Sentencing, at 4-5). It
advised Appellant that this was his “last chance to say, ‘I’m not guilty; I
don’t want to take the plea[.]’” (Id. at 4). Appellant declined to withdraw
the plea, stated that he did not need additional time to consider this
decision, and indicated that he made it “of [his] own free will[.]” (Id. at 7;
see id. at 5-6).
During the PCRA hearing, Appellant testified regarding Attorney
Young’s May 1, 2013 letter, and indicated that he felt “abandoned” and
“defenseless” after receiving it. (N.T. PCRA Hearing, 8/06/15, at 50; see id.
at 10). He believed Attorney Young pressured him to enter the plea because
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“it felt like he was saying you need to take this [plea] or else[.]” (Id. at
48).
In contrast, Attorney Young testified that, although he initially
prepared to mount an aggressive defense for Appellant, after evaluating the
evidence, he concluded that the Commonwealth’s case was “extremely
overwhelming,” and essentially indefensible. (Id. at 27; see id. at 18, 26,
42-43). The victim, her mother, and her step-brother were prepared to
testify against Appellant, and the Commonwealth also planned to present
evidence of other sexual abuse allegations against Appellant by his niece.5
(See id. at 16, 42; PCRA Ct. Op., at 1). Additionally, if Attorney Young tried
the case, his defense strategy was limited because Appellant had admitted
sexual contact with the victim to him. (See N.T. PCRA Hearing, at 17, 41-
42). He advised Appellant that he could seek different representation if he
wished. (See id. at 42).
Attorney Young further testified that Appellant authorized him to
pursue a plea agreement after they discussed the strong evidence against
him and the possibility that the court would sentence him to what was, in
effect, a life sentence. (See id. at 16, 19). Attorney Young stated that
Appellant was satisfied with the plea and that he “definitely never pressured
[Appellant] to take the plea. If [Appellant] wanted a trial, [he] would have
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5
See Pa.R.E. 404(b).
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tried it, but in [his] professional opinion, this was a very fair and reasonable
negotiated plea.” (Id. at 19; see id. at 20, 22, 43). He testified that he did
not abandon Appellant and that, on the day of sentencing, Appellant
reiterated that he wanted to move forward with sentencing pursuant to the
plea. (See id. at 43-44).
After review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court that
Appellant is not entitled to relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel
claim. Despite his assertions to the contrary, the record does not reflect
that counsel coerced Appellant into entering an involuntary guilty plea.
Rather, it supports the PCRA court’s determination that counsel made a
realistic assessment of Appellant’s likelihood of conviction at a trial and the
resultant lengthy sentence, and recommended that Appellant instead enter
what he considered, based on his extensive experience, a favorable plea.
(See PCRA Ct. Op., at 6-7). While counsel candidly advised, in light of the
Commonwealth’s “overwhelming” evidence and his limited defense
strategies, that he would file a motion to withdraw from representation if
Appellant withdrew the plea, he did not suggest that Appellant could not
proceed with alternate representation.
Moreover, Appellant made statements under oath at the guilty plea
colloquy and sentencing hearing indicating he was guilty of the charges and
that he made the decision to plead guilty of his own free will; “[he] is bound
by these statements, and he may not now assert grounds for withdrawing
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the plea which contradict the statements.” Timchak, supra at 774 (citation
omitted).
In sum, we conclude that Appellant’s underlying claim that his plea
was involuntary lacks arguable merit. See id.; McDermitt, supra at 813.
Accordingly, his sole issue on appeal does not merit relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/21/2016
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