Com. v. Miller, J. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S27014-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    JARED LEE MILLER,
    Appellee                  No. 1696 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order Entered September 3, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0002059-2014
    BEFORE: SHOGAN and DUBOW, JJ., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                                FILED MAY 13, 2016
    The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appeals from the September 3,
    2015 order dismissing charges filed against Jared Lee Miller (“Appellee”).
    We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    The trial court provided the following factual history:
    On October 13, 2014, [at approximately 9:30 a.m.]
    Corporal Robert Ligon observed a vehicle driving erratically
    through Tower City and performed a traffic stop. [Appellee] was
    a passenger. Corporal Ligon quickly discerned that the driver
    was under the influence of drugs and arrested her for driving
    under the influence. While performing a custodial inventory
    search, 48 packets of heroin were discovered under [Appellee’s]
    seat and 52 bags of heroin were found in the driver’s purse.
    Other drug paraphernalia was also found in the purse.
    [Appellee] was arrested and charged with possession with the
    intent to deliver a controlled substance, possession of a
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S27014-16
    controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and
    public drunkenness under docket number CR-1880-2014. After
    his arrest, he was arraigned and then committed to Schuylkill
    County Prison. During intake at the prison [around 5:00 p.m.],
    [Appellee] was warned about bringing contraband inside, but he
    denied having any. A subsequent search by prison guards at
    intake produced a hypodermic needle containing heroin found
    inside his underwear. This led to the current contested charges
    under docket number CR-2059-2014.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/15, at 1–2.           The charges at CR-1880-2014 were
    filed in Schuylkill County District Court 21-3-04.        Appellee was charged at
    CR-2059-2014 with possession of a controlled substance by an inmate,
    possession of drug paraphernalia, and contraband other than a controlled
    substance.1 Those charges were filed in Schuylkill County District Court 21-
    3-07.
    Appellee was tried by jury at CR-1880-2014 on April 6, 2014, and
    found guilty of all charges except possession with intent to deliver a
    controlled substance. He began serving his sentence on October 13, 2014,
    and was paroled on June 15, 2015.              Three weeks later, on July 7, 2015,
    Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the charges at CR-2059-2014, raising
    defenses of double jeopardy and joinder. Motion for Reduction of Bail and
    Dismissal of Charges, 7/7/15, at ¶¶ 13, 14.            The trial court conducted a
    hearing on July 20, 2015, and accepted supplemental briefs. Thereafter, the
    trial court granted Appellee’s motion to dismiss on September 3, 2015,
    ____________________________________________
    1
    18 Pa.C.S. § 5123(a)(2), 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S. §
    5123(c), respectively.
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    finding that the two incidents were part of a single criminal episode. Trial
    Court Opinion, 9/3/15, at 5.
    This appeal followed. The Commonwealth presents a single question
    for our consideration: “Did the Trial Court err in determining that the facts
    in the instant matter constituted the ‘same criminal episode’ as those found
    in docket # 1880-2014 and subsequently granting [Appellee’s] Motion for
    Dismissal.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4.
    The Commonwealth argues that trying Appellee at CR-2059-2014 does
    not violate the federal or state constitutional guarantee against double
    jeopardy2 or Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder rule, 18 Pa.C.S. § 110.
    According to the Commonwealth, because “the two incidents occurred at
    different times, at difference places, following a clear break in criminal
    activity and involved different facts and witnesses they were not of the same
    criminal episode.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 7. We agree.
    The double jeopardy guarantee requires a prosecutor to bring all
    known charges against a defendant arising from a “single criminal episode”
    in a single proceeding. Commonwealth v. Campana, 
    304 A.2d 432
    , 441
    ____________________________________________
    2
    See U.S. Const. amend. V (“nor shall any person be subject for the same
    offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”); Pa. Const. art. I, § 10
    (“No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or
    limb”). “The double jeopardy protections afforded by the United States and
    Pennsylvania Constitutions are coextensive and prohibit successive
    prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense.”
    Commonwealth v. States, 
    891 A.2d 737
    , 741 (Pa. Super. 2005).
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    (Pa. 1973), vacated and remanded, 
    414 U.S. 808
    , (1973), reinstated, 
    314 A.2d 854
     (Pa. 1974), cert. denied, 
    417 U.S. 969
     (1974). “The compulsory
    joinder statute[3] is a legislative mandate that a subsequent prosecution for a
    violation of a provision of a statute that is different from a former
    prosecution, or is based on different facts, will be barred in certain
    circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Fithian, 
    961 A.2d 66
    , 71 (Pa. 2008).
    As our Supreme Court has explained:
    The compulsory joinder rule bars a subsequent prosecution if
    each prong of the following test is met:
    (1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or conviction;
    (2) the current prosecution was based on the same criminal
    conduct or arose from the same criminal episode; (3) the
    prosecutor in the subsequent trial was aware of the charges
    before the first trial; and (4) all charges [are] within the same
    judicial district as the former prosecution.
    Commonwealth v. Nolan, 
    855 A.2d 834
    , 839 (Pa. 2004) (footnote and
    citations omitted); 18 Pa.C.S. § 110(1). “Each prong of this test must be
    met for compulsory joinder to apply.”            Fithian, 961 A.2d at 72.   Our
    Supreme Court has further stated, “Pennsylvania’s compulsory joinder rule
    . . . is designed to protect a defendant’s double-jeopardy interests where the
    Commonwealth initially declines to prosecute him for the present offense,
    electing to proceed on different charges stemming from the same criminal
    ____________________________________________
    3
    18 Pa.C.S. section 110 is a codification of the rule announced by our
    Supreme Court in Campana. Commonwealth v. Gimbara, 
    835 A.2d 371
    ,
    374 (Pa. Super. 2003).
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    episode.”   Commonwealth v. Laird, 
    988 A.2d 618
    , 628 (Pa. 2010)
    (citations omitted).
    Because the constitutional and statutory claims asserted herein are
    purely matters of law, our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v.
    Barber, 
    940 A.2d 369
    , 376 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). As with all
    questions   of   law,   the   appellate   standard   of   review   is   de   novo[.]”
    Commonwealth v. Vargas, 
    947 A.2d 777
    , 780 (Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting
    Commonwealth v. Kositi, 
    880 A.2d 648
    , 652 (Pa. Super. 2005)).
    The case at hand involves the second prong of section 110, known as
    the logical relationship prong.      We have addressed a logical relationship
    analysis as follows:
    In the seminal case of Commonwealth v. Hude, 
    500 Pa. 482
    , 
    458 A.2d 177
     (1983), we instructed courts considering the
    logical relationship prong to look at the “temporal” and “logical”
    relationship between the charges to determine whether they
    arose from a “single criminal episode.” Id., at 181. To this end,
    we noted:
    Generally, charges against a defendant are clearly
    related in time and require little analysis to
    determine that a single criminal episode exists.
    However, in defining what acts constitute a single
    criminal episode, not only is the temporal sequence
    of events important, but also the logical relationship
    between the acts must be considered.
    Id.
    With regard to the logical relationship, we noted:
    In ascertaining whether a number of statutory
    offenses are “logically related” to one another, the
    court should initially inquire as to whether there is a
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    substantial duplication of factual, and/or legal issues
    presented by the offenses. If there is duplication,
    then the offenses are logically related and must be
    prosecuted at one trial. The mere fact that the
    additional statutory offenses involve additional issues
    of law or fact is not sufficient to create a separate
    criminal episode since the logical relationship test
    does not require “an absolute identity of factual
    backgrounds.”
    Id. (quoting Paul Jerome Richey, Comment, Commonwealth v.
    Campana and Section 110 of the Crimes Code: Fraternal Twins,
    35 U. Pitt. L.Rev. 275, 286–87 (1973)).
    In Commonwealth v. Bracalielly, 
    540 Pa. 460
    , 
    658 A.2d 755
     (1995), we interpreted Hude’s guidance on the logical
    relationship determination as follows:
    In determining if the “logical relationship” prong of
    the test has been met, we must ... be aware that a
    mere de minimis duplication of factual and legal
    issues is insufficient to establish a logical relationship
    between offenses. Rather, what is required is a
    substantial duplication of issues of law and fact. In
    Hude, we found that such substantial duplication
    had occurred. We did not, however, reach this
    conclusion by merely cataloguing simple factual
    similarities or differences between the various
    offenses with which the defendant was charged.
    Rather, we found that these offenses presented
    substantial duplication of issues of law and fact
    because the case did not involve “a situation where
    different evidence was required to be introduced to
    establish the alleged individual instances of
    possession and delivery”, but rather, involved a
    situation in which the Commonwealth’s case in both
    the first and second drug trials rested solely upon
    the credibility of a single witness. Thus, we
    concluded that the drug charges brought against the
    defendant were not only temporally related but also
    logically related, and thus constituted a single
    criminal episode.
    
    Id.,
     at 761–62 (internal citations and footnote omitted).
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    Commonwealth v. Reid, 
    77 A.3d 579
    , 582–583 (Pa. 2013). “There is no
    substantial duplication, for example, if “proof of each individual instance of
    [crimes committed] . . . require[s] the introduction of the testimony of
    completely different police officers and expert witnesses as well as the
    establishment of separate chains of custody.”           Id. at 585 (quoting
    Bracalielly, 
    658 A.2d at 762
    ).
    Here, relying on Commonwealth v. Edwards, 
    399 A.2d 747
    , 748
    (Pa. Super. 1979), the trial court conducted a logical relationship analysis
    and concluded that a single criminal episode existed:
    [Appellee] provided case law to support his position that
    the offenses were from a single criminal episode, but all were
    distinguishable    from     the    present   facts.    However,
    Commonwealth v. Edwards, 
    264 Pa. Super. 223
    , 225, 
    399 A.2d 747
    , 748 (1979) is analogous to the facts presented here.
    In Edwards, a witness saw the defendant and three co-
    defendants take packages from a United Parcel Services truck
    and speed off in a car. The witness provided a license plate
    number to police and soon after an officer stopped the vehicle
    and discovered one of the packages inside. 
    Id.
     The defendant
    was an occupant of the vehicle and repeatedly gave false
    identification. Id. at 225, 749. His true identity was not
    determined until he was fingerprinted. Id. The defendant was
    then separately charged with unsworn falsification to authorities
    and he pled guilty to this charge. Id. Several months later, he
    was tried by jury with his co-defendants on the theft charges
    which resulted in a mistrial.     Id.   When a new trial was
    scheduled, the defendant appealed, raising the double jeopardy
    issue. Id. The court found that in many situations, unlawful
    conduct committed at the time of arrest is part of the same
    episode as the original crime. Id. at 228, 750. The court cited
    the Model Penal Code, explaining,
    in many instances one offense is a necessary step in
    the accomplishment of a given criminal objective; in
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    other instances the commission of an additional
    offense may result from the attempt to secure the
    benefit of a previous offense or to conceal its
    commission. . . such offenses should be adjudicated
    in a single trial.
    Id.    The court concluded that by hiding his identity, the
    defendant was attempting to avoid prosecution for the theft
    offenses. It is also noted that the attempts to mislead police
    occurred within thirty minutes of the alleged offenses and his
    actions were relevant evidence in his theft trial, reflecting a
    guilty state of mind. Id. The court concluded that the charges
    should have been consolidated. Id.
    Here, [Appellee] was charged with numerous drug offenses
    relating to heroin and was arrested and being processed for
    intake into the prison when more heroin in a syringe was found
    on his person. His separate offenses were all drug related and
    occurred within hours of each other. Since [Appellee] never left
    police custody, [Appellee] must have had the heroin on his
    person during the initial traffic stop but it went undiscovered by
    police. Like Edwards, [Appellee’s] continued concealment of
    the syringe of heroin on his person was an attempt to conceal
    another offense and to avoid adding even more drug charges to
    his case. His possession of the heroin on his person could even
    have been used as evidence of intent for personal use, rather
    than to sell. There is a substantial duplication of law and fact.
    This Court concludes that [Appellee’s] possession of the syringe
    was part of the same criminal episode as the charges for which
    he was originally prosecuted and should have been consolidated
    with those charges for trial.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/3/15, at 4–5.
    We reiterate that “the determination of whether . . . the offenses
    present a substantial duplication of issues of fact and law . . . depends
    ultimately on how and what the Commonwealth must prove in the
    subsequent prosecution.”   Reid, 77 A.2d at 585. Here, different evidence
    was required to establish the offenses alleged in each case.
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    The first incident occurred at 9:30 a.m. and involved a traffic stop
    where Appellee was a passenger. The second incident occurred seven hours
    later at 5:00 p.m. and involved Appellee’s intake at the Schuylkill County
    Prison. The first incident involved forty-eight bags of heroin stashed under
    Appellee’s seat, and fifty-two bags of heroin and syringes in the driver’s
    purse.      The second incident involved a hypodermic needle containing
    heroin—not a syringe—found in Appellee’s underwear.4                       The evidence
    supports a reasonable inference that Appellee possessed the hypodermic
    needle at the time of his arrest; however, its presence on his person did not
    give     rise    to   criminal   charges   until   its    discovery   at   intake.    Cf.
    Commonwealth v. Stewart, 
    425 A.2d 346
    , 348 (Pa. 1981) (holding single
    criminal episode existed where firearm and drugs were found on defendant
    “at precisely the same time”).             Although Appellee remained in custody
    throughout the day, the Commonwealth’s witness for the first incident was
    Corporal        Ligon.    The    second    incident      involved   completely   different
    Commonwealth witnesses—the prison guards. Accord Commonwealth v.
    Purnell, 
    516 A.2d 1203
    , 1207 (Pa. Super. 1986) (rejecting compulsory
    joinder argument where defendant was arrested by an officer for disorderly
    conduct then charged with assaulting a different officer upon arrival at the
    ____________________________________________
    4
    Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/3/14. The police overlooking a single
    needle in Appellee’s underwear upon searching him incident to arrest is a
    more plausible scenario than failing to detect a syringe on his person.
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    police station). Nothing in the record indicates that Appellee was asked if he
    had drugs or paraphernalia on his person at the time of arrest. However, at
    intake, Appellee was asked and denied having contraband.       Although both
    incidents involved possession charges, the first incident also included a
    charge of public drunkenness, and the second incident involved charges
    specific to Appellee’s status as an inmate.
    In light of the foregoing, we conclude there was no substantial
    duplication of issues of fact or law. Thus, the two prosecutions did not arise
    from the same criminal episode.          Furthermore, we agree with the
    Commonwealth that Edwards is distinguishable:
    In finding [that the two sets of charges were based upon conduct
    that constituted the same criminal episode], the [Edwards] Court
    noted that the false identification was “an effort to avoid
    prosecutions for the [theft] offenses, much as resisting arrest
    would be.” [Edwards], at 750. Further, the giving of false
    identification “occurred within one-half hour of the alleged
    offenses, and while [the defendant] was still in the company of
    his accomplices making their ‘getaway.’” 
    Id.
     Lastly, the opinion
    noted that the “false statements were relevant evidence against
    him in his trial for the principal offenses”. 
    Id.
    None of the facts that this Honorable Court found pertinent
    in Edwards are true in this case. [Appellee] was not still in the
    company of his accomplice. He was not in the process of making
    a getaway from the initial charges. In taking contraband into
    the prison he was not trying to avoid prosecution for the initial
    charges. The taking of contraband into the prison did not
    happen within one-half hour of the initial charges, but seven and
    one-half hours. Finally, the taking of contraband into the prison
    was not relevant to prove that he initially possessed heroin with
    the intent to distribute it.
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    Commonwealth’s Brief at 17.       Here, neither Appellee’s possession of a
    hypodermic needle in his underpants while being processed at the county
    prison nor his possession of controlled substances and syringes seven hours
    earlier while a passenger in a vehicle was relevant to proving the other
    offense.   Accord Commonwealth v. Walton, 
    592 A.2d 335
    , 338 (Pa.
    Super. 1991) (holding that neither illegally possessing a firearm nor making
    a false report to police was necessary to prove the other offense and,
    therefore, the offenses did not occur as a part of the same criminal episode).
    The trial court erred in ruling otherwise and in dismissing the charges
    against Appellee. Accordingly, we reverse.
    Order reversed. Case remanded for trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/13/2016
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