Claypool, L. v. Claypool, O. ( 2017 )


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  • J-A27037-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    LEE E. CLAYPOOL                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    OLIVER H. CLAYPOOL, JR.,                   :
    :
    Appellant                :       No. 616 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment entered on March 14, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County
    Civil Division at No(s): 894 CD 2014
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                         FILED DECEMBER 12, 2017
    Oliver H. Claypool, Jr. (“Oliver”), appeals, pro se, from the Judgment
    entered against him and in favor of the plaintiff in the underlying action, Lee
    E. Claypool (“Lee”).1 We affirm.
    The trial court set forth the relevant history underlying this appeal as
    follows:
    In 2011, [Oliver] filed a quiet title action against [Lee, Oliver’s
    brother,] at case number 566 CD 2011 (hereinafter the “2011
    Case”). In this action, [Oliver] attempted to gain title [to] a
    parcel of land in Clarion County that he and his ex-wife[,
    Elizabeth J. Claypool (“Elizabeth”),] had conveyed to “Lee E.
    Claypool” in 1980 [(hereinafter the “Property”)]. [Oliver] argued
    that he had been using the pseudonym Lee Edward Claypool,
    and that the 1980 deed conveyed the [P]roperty to himself
    under this name. [Lee] … maintained that the 1980 deed
    transferred the [P]roperty from [Oliver] to [Lee]. The 2011 Case
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Relevant to this case, Lee’s middle name is Emerson.
    J-A27037-17
    terminated by summary judgment in favor of [Lee] on January
    4, 2013. [Lee] then filed the above-captioned action [against
    Oliver] for wrongful use of civil proceedings under the Dragonetti
    Act, seeking to recover for the attorney’s fees [that Lee]
    expended in defending against the 2011 Case. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 8351, et seq.
    At a hearing in chambers before the trial began, [Oliver,
    proceeding pro se,] offered as exhibits two court opinions in
    support of his defense that he brought the 2011 Case in good
    faith [(hereinafter the “Opinions”)]. [The trial court] allowed
    [Oliver] to read portions of the [O]pinions to the jury and to
    explain why he thought the 2011 Case was justified based on
    those [O]pinions. [Notably, the trial court] did not allow the jury
    to have copies of the [Opinions] during its deliberations.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/17, at 1-2.
    At the close of trial, the jury entered a verdict against Oliver in the
    amount of Lee’s legal fees incurred in the 2011 Case, $12,841.14.            Oliver
    then filed a pro se Motion for Post-Trial relief, which the trial court denied by
    an Order entered on March 13, 2017.              On March 14, 2017, Lee filed a
    Praecipe seeking entry of judgment in his favor.         On the same date, the
    Prothonotary entered judgment against Oliver in the amount of $12,841.14.
    Oliver timely filed a Notice of Appeal,2 in response to which the trial
    court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    ____________________________________________
    2
    Though Oliver purported to appeal from the March 13, 2017 Order denying
    his Motion for Post-Trial relief, it is settled that, “[u]nder our Appellate Rules,
    an appeal in a civil case in which post-trial motions are filed lies from the
    entry of judgment.” K.H. v. J.R., 
    826 A.2d 863
    , 871 (Pa. 2003) (citing
    Pa.R.A.P. 301). We have altered the caption accordingly.
    -2-
    J-A27037-17
    complained of on appeal. Oliver filed a timely Concise Statement, and the
    trial court then issued a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.
    Oliver now presents the following issues for our review:
    1. Whether the trial court erred when[,] although allowing
    [Oliver] to read excerpts from [the O]pinions … to show that
    [Oliver] acted appropriately in filing his action [], [the trial
    court] refus[ed] to admit into evidence the actual true copies
    of the [] [O]pinions?
    2. Whether the absence of an indispensable party[, Elizabeth,]
    in the underlying action resulted in the decision therein being
    void and due no respect[,] and therefore[,] as a matter of
    law[,] not a determination in favor of [Lee,] so that [Lee]
    may not prevail in his action for improper use of civil
    proceedings?
    Brief for Appellant at 5.
    In his first issue, Oliver argues that the trial court erred by denying his
    request to permit the jury to have copies of the Opinions during
    deliberations.   See id. at 15-17.     Oliver contends that “where [Lee] was
    allowed to introduce into evidence [at trial] … the [trial c]ourt Order in [the
    2011] Case …, in its written form, in its entirety, it is patently unfair for the
    court not to allow the jury to have the [] [O]pinions offered by [Oliver].” Id.
    at 15; see also id. at 16 (asserting that, therefore, “the jury only had the
    opportunity to consider one side of the story.”). However, Oliver concedes
    that “[w]hile the court may make exhibits available to the jury during its
    deliberations, it is not required to do so.”   Id. at 15.
    It is settled law that “[t]he determination of what documents should
    go out with the jury is within the discretion of the trial judge.”      Ratti v.
    -3-
    J-A27037-17
    Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 
    758 A.2d 695
    , 710 (Pa. Super. 2000);
    see also Williams v. Lumbermen’s Ins. Co., 
    1 A.2d 658
    , 662 (Pa. 1938)
    (same).   Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 223.1, Conduct of the Trial,
    provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he court may … make exhibits available
    to the jury during its deliberations[.]” Pa.R.C.P. 223.1(d)(3) (emphasis
    added).
    In its Rule 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court explained its reasons for
    not allowing the jury to take copies of the Opinions into its deliberations,
    stating as follows:
    I determined that reading and interpreting case law was beyond
    the ken of a jury of laypeople, and allowing the jury to view the
    full [O]pinions during its deliberations had potential to create
    confusion. The jury’s role was properly limited to making a
    factual determination as to [Oliver’s] motive in filing the 2011
    Case. Therefore, this complaint of error is without merit.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/17, at 2. As we discern no error or abuse of the
    trial court’s discretion in this regard, and agree with its rationale and
    determination, Oliver’s first issue thus fails.   See, e.g., Kearns v. Clark,
    
    493 A.2d 1358
    , 1362 (Pa. Super. 1985) (holding that the trial court acted
    within its discretion in not permitting certain exhibits, i.e., “the curriculum
    vitae of two defense expert witnesses, an expert witness’[s] report, and [a
    physician’s] patient records of [plaintiff,]” to go out with the jury during
    deliberations, where the substance of some of these exhibits was already
    presented to the jury via testimony, and some of the exhibits could be
    “subject to misinterpretation in the absence of explanation.”).
    -4-
    J-A27037-17
    In his second issue, Oliver argues that the jury’s verdict in favor of Lee
    in this case is void as a matter of law, due to Lee’s failure to join an
    indispensable party to the underlying 2011 Case, i.e., Elizabeth. See Brief
    for Appellant at 17-23. Oliver avers that “in actions intended to affect the
    title to property which is either held or claimed by tenants by the entireties,
    both spouses are indispensable parties and must be joined.”            Id. at 23.
    Oliver contends that “[c]learly, Elizabeth … has an interest in the issue of
    whether ‘Lee E. Claypool’ is [Lee] or [Oliver].” Id. at 19; see also Reply
    Brief for Appellant at 28 (protesting that “for the [trial c]ourt to rule to the
    effect that [Elizabeth] has no interest, without her ever having a chance to
    be heard, would violate her rights to due process of law.”). Therefore, Oliver
    maintains, the entry of summary judgment for Lee in the 2011 Case is not a
    valid determination in favor of Lee, and Lee thus could not prevail in a
    subsequent action for improper use of civil proceedings. Brief for Appellant
    at 17.
    The trial court addressed this claim in its Opinion, and set forth the
    applicable law, as follows:
    To succeed on a claim for Wrongful Use of Civil Proceedings, the
    [p]laintiff must establish that the proceedings he contends were
    wrongfully initiated were “terminated in favor of the person
    against whom they [were) brought.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351(a)(2).
    Here, [Oliver] claims that the court’s grant of summary
    judgment in favor of [Lee] in the 2011 Case was void for want of
    jurisdiction; therefore, the 2011 Case was not validly terminated
    in [Lee’s] favor.      [Oliver] claims that [Elizabeth] was an
    indispensable party to the 2011 Case. In the first of several
    [A]mended [C]omplaints in the 2011 Case, [Oliver] joined
    -5-
    J-A27037-17
    [Elizabeth] as a defendant. However, in response to
    [P]reliminary [O]bjections by [Lee], [Oliver] voluntarily removed
    [Elizabeth] as a party in his subsequent [A]mended [C]omplaint.
    Failure to join an indispensable party “implicates the trial
    court’s subject matter jurisdiction,” Orman v. Mortgage I.T.,
    
    118 A.3d 403
    , 406 (Pa. Super. 2015), and a judgment may be
    collaterally attacked in any case and in any court for want of
    subject matter jurisdiction, Barnes v. McKellar, 
    644 A.2d 770
    ,
    773 (Pa. Super. 1994). “[A] party is indispensable when his or
    her rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants that
    no decree can be made without impairing those rights. If no
    redress is sought against a party, and its rights would not be
    prejudiced by any decision in the case, it is not indispensable
    with respect to the litigation.”     Orman, 118 A.3d at 406
    (internal quotations omitted). Here, [Elizabeth] was not an
    indispensable party to the 2011 Case. The deed contested in the
    2011 Case was signed in 1980[,] and conveyed [P]roperty from
    [Oliver] and [Elizabeth], as grantors, to “Lee E. Claypool,” as
    grantee. [Oliver] and [Elizabeth] were legally divorced in 1981.
    The factual issue in the 2011 Case thus revolved around whether
    “Lee E. Claypool” was [Lee] or [Oliver]. By virtue of both the
    deed and the[] divorce shortly after the 1980 conveyance,
    [Elizabeth] had no remaining rights to the contested [P]roperty.
    Since [Elizabeth] had no rights that could have been impaired by
    the 2011 Case, she cannot be considered an indispensable party.
    As a matter of law, the 2011 Case terminated in favor of
    [Lee] through the January 14, 2013 [O]rder granting summary
    judgment to [Lee].        This [O]rder was a final judgment
    adjudicating all issues raised in the Complaint. “[E]ntry of
    summary judgment does not constitute a ‘favorable termination’
    as understood in the context of a wrongful use of civil
    proceedings suit until the summary judgment is final, meaning
    that it has been upheld by the highest appellate court having
    jurisdiction over the case or that the summary judgment has not
    been appealed.” D’Ella v. Folino, 
    933 A.2d 117
    , 122 (Pa.
    Super. 2007). For the 2011 Case, the time for filing an appeal of
    the court’s summary judgment [O]rder has long since passed,
    and [Oliver] did not appeal that [O]rder. Therefore, it was
    properly considered a final order for the purposes of the
    Dragonetti Act, and [Oliver’s] second claim of error is meritless.
    -6-
    J-A27037-17
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/18/17, at 2-4.            The trial court’s sound analysis is
    supported by the law and the record, and we agree with its legal
    determination. We therefore affirm on this basis in rejecting Oliver’s second
    issue. See 
    id.
    Finally, to the extent that Oliver presents issues in his brief that he did
    not raise in the trial court, or preserve in his court-ordered Concise
    Statement,3 these issues are waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that a
    claim    cannot    be    raised    for   the   first   time   on   appeal);   Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b)(4)(vii) (stating that issues not included in a court-ordered concise
    statement are waived).
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/12/2017
    ____________________________________________
    3
    See, e.g., Brief for Appellant at 19-20 (asserting that the deed to the
    Property was invalid because the signatures were not witnessed), 21
    (complaining that “[t]he January 14, 2013 Order granting summary
    judgment did not consider all of the issues raised in the 2011 Complaint, and
    it makes no mention of a ruling on [Oliver’s] New Matter and
    Counterclaim[.] Thus, the … Order was interlocutory ….”).
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 616 WDA 2017

Filed Date: 12/12/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024