In the Interest of: S.G., a Minor ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.G., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: F.J.T., III, FATHER : No. 1189 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered March 24, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County
Domestic Relations Division at No. CP-13-DP-0000002-2017
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 28, 2017
F.J.T., III (“Father”), appeals from the permanency review order
entered March 24, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Carbon County by
the Honorable Joseph J. Matika, which continued placement of his minor
child, S.G. (“the Child”), a female born in April of 2003.1 After careful
review, we affirm.
By way of background, on October 7, 2016, the Child was evaluated at
Gnaden Huetten Memorial Hospital due to injuries to her face and suicidal
ideation. The Child told hospital staff that Father caused the injuries, and
alleged child abuse report was made to Childline. A psychiatrist evaluated
the Child, and determined the Child needed inpatient psychiatric care, but no
beds were available at the time. The Child remained in the emergency
1 F.P. (“Mother”) was incarcerated at the time of the permanency review
hearing. In the instant appeal, Mother, through counsel, filed a joint brief
with CYS and the guardian ad litem for the Child.
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department until she was discharged to Mother on October 11, 2016
because CYS requested the Child not be discharged to Father. The Child
remained in Mother’s care until January 9, 2017, when there was a physical
altercation between the Child and Mother, which led to Mother’s
incarceration. The Child was removed from Mother’s home, at Mother’s
request, and placed with a friend in Coaldale until CYS took custody of the
Child on January 17, 2017. The trial court summarized the relevant
procedural and/or factual history from the time CYS took custody of the
Child as follows:
On January 17, 2017, the Carbon County Office of
Children and Youth Services [“CYS”] sought and was
granted an [“]Order of Court to take the Child into
Emergency Shelter Care[”] based upon a call from
Father that he believed the Child needed to be
placed into a diagnostic facility for treatment of a
mental health issue. That [o]rder placed the Child at
Youth Services Agency [“CYA”,] pending an
Emergency Shelter Care Hearing which eventually
occurred on January 18, 2017. At that hearing, it
was determined that the Child be continued in
Emergency Shelter Care at [CYA,] pending an
acceptance and placement into a diagnostic setting.
Thereafter, [CYS] sought placement for the Child in
such a setting while filing a Dependency Petition on
January 19, 2017, alleging that the Child was
“without proper parental care or control” as that
term is defined.
On February 27, 2017, this [c]ourt conducted a
Dependency Hearing and[,] after taking testimony,
adjudicated the Child a dependent child on the basis
that the Child was “without proper care or control,
subsistence, education as required by law, or other
care or control necessary for [her] physical, mental
or emotional health, or morals.” This [c]ourt further
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ordered that the Child remain in a residential facility.
However, it directed [CYS] to schedule an “early”
Dependency Review Hearing after both sides had an
opportunity to review a psychological report from
Dr. Abdo G. Saba, M.D., which was referenced in the
dependency hearing, but had not yet been obtained
by Counsel for [CYS].
As a result, a Dependency Review Petition was filed
on March 7, 2017. The basis for this was to review
the placement of the Child, consider the report of
Dr. Saba and determine an appropriate disposition of
the Child’s placement going forward.
Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 1-3 (footnotes omitted).
On March 24, 2017, the trial court held an initial permanency review
hearing. At that hearing, the trial court heard testimony from Jill Geissinger,
who is a CYS case supervisor, and the Child. Father also testified on his own
behalf. That same day, the trial court entered an order continuing the
Child’s dependency. Father timely filed a notice of appeal and a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion
on May 10, 2017.
Father now raises the following issues for our review, which we have
re-ordered for ease of disposition.
[1.] Whether the trial court erred by not returning
the Child to Father’s custody when [CYS]
provided no evidence of [Father’s] unfitness or
that the Child remained “without proper
parental care and control” and finding that
placement continued to be “necessary and
appropriate[?]”
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[2.] Whether the [trial] court erred in finding that
the Child’s placement was appropriate when
[CYS] failed in its duty to ensure that the
Child’s educational, behavioral[,] and mental
health needs are met[?]
[3.] Whether the trial court erred by not returning
the Child to Father’s custody when it was the
least restrictive means of providing protection
for the minor Child, contrary to the mandates
of the Child Protective Services Law[,
]23 Pa.C.S.[A] § 6301 et seq.[,] and the
Juvenile Act[, ]42 Pa.C.S.[A]. § 6301
et seq.[?]
[4.] Whether the [trial] court erred in granting the
recommendations of [CYS] in that the
recommendations are contrary to the Juvenile
Act[, ]42 Pa.C.S.[A] § 6301[,] and specifically
[S]ection 6301(b)(1)[,] in that one of the
purposes of the [Juvenile] Act is to preserve
the unity of the family whenever possible[?]
[5.] Whether the trial court erred by finding that
[CYS] exercised reasonable efforts to preserve
or reunify the family when there was
undisputed evidence that no services were
made available nor were reunification efforts
made by [CYS?]
[6.] Whether the trial court erred in finding Father
made minimal progress toward alleviating the
circumstances[,] which necessitated placement
because he cannot complete his goals without
insurance when there are no goals requiring
Father to have insurance on himself, the Child
has coverage[,] and lack of insurance is not a
basis for maintaining placement or finding
continued dependency[?]
[7.] Whether the [trial] court erred by not making a
finding regarding the likely date for which the
goal of return to parent might be achieved as
required by the Juvenile Act[?]
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Father’s brief at 6-7 (capitalization omitted).
We must first determine whether Father’s appeal is properly before
this court. Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 742, this court has jurisdiction over
appeals from final orders. With respect to dependency proceedings, an
order granting or denying a goal change shall be deemed a final order when
entered. See In re H.S.W.C.-B, 836 A.2d 908, 911 (Pa. 2003). In
reversing the order of this court that quashed an appeal from an order
denying a goal change on the basis that it maintained the status quo and
was not a final order, our supreme court explained,
Maintaining the status quo could put the needs and
welfare of a child at risk. . . . [T]he denial of goal
changes which are in the best interest of the child
should not be sheltered, permanently, from
independent review: [As a practical matter], these
petitions go to the same trial judge. If a trial judge
erroneously denies these motions and improperly
maintains the status quo, and keeps doing that on
periodic review, such an improper order will never
be subject to appellate review.
Id. at 910 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Instantly, the trial court, while maintaining the status quo by
continuing the Child’s dependency status, was acting for the Child’s needs
and welfare by moving her from her placement at CYA to a foster home.
Father argues that the continuation of the dependency and the Child’s
placement interferes with the Child’s education, behavioral, and mental
health needs. As such, we find that the trial court’s order is final and
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appealable pursuant to In re H.S.W.C.-B. We now turn to the merits of
Father’s appeal.
Our standard of review for dependency cases is as follows:
[T]he standard of review in dependency cases
requires an appellate court to accept the findings of
fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record, but does not
require the appellate court to accept the lower
court’s inferences or conclusions of law. Accordingly,
we review for an abuse of discretion.
In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010) (citations omitted); see also
In re L.Z., 111 A.3d 1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015). “The trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented, and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004), quoting In re Diaz, 669
A.2d 372, 375 (Pa.Super. 1995).
Father first argues the trial court erred by not returning the Child to
Father’s custody as CYS provided no evidence of Father’s unfitness or that
the Child remained “without proper parental care and control” and finding
that placement continued to be “necessary and appropriate.” (Father’s brief
at 17.) Father maintains that the Child’s initial dependency determination
was based on Father’s alleged abuse of the Child, and Mother’s
incarceration. (Id. at 19.)
Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act, in pertinent part, defines a
“dependent child” as one who is:
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without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
education as required by law, or other care or control
necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional
health, or morals. A determination that there is a
lack of proper parental care or control may be based
upon evidence of conduct by the parent, guardian or
other custodian that places the health, safety or
welfare of the child at risk, including evidence of the
parent’s, guardian’s or other custodian’s use of
alcohol or a controlled substance that places the
health, safety or welfare of the child at risk[.]
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302
In order to adjudicate a child dependent under the Juvenile Act, a
court must determine that the statutory definition of “dependent child” has
been met by clear and convincing evidence. In re L.V., 127 A.3d 831(Pa.Super. 2015). To meet the clear and convincing standard, the court
must determine whether the child is presently without proper parental care
or control and if this care and control is immediately available to the child.
In re J.J., 69 A.3d 724 (Pa.Super 2013).
In its opinion, the trial court stated:
For purposes of this case, only the first sentence of
this definition is applicable.
In accordance with 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6351(a)(2)(iii),
upon finding on February 27, 2017 that the Child
was in fact “dependent,” this [c]ourt directed that
the Child be placed with “a public agency authorized
by law to receive and provide care for the child,” i.e.,
[CYS] [c]ustody for placement in a residential
facility. That [o]rder was subject to an early review
which occurred on March 24, 2017. It is at this
hearing Father is claiming the [c]ourt erred
regarding continuing the Child in dependency status
and keeping her in a placement outside of his home.
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Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 8-9.
The trial court acknowledged that CYS failed to present evidence of
Father’s unfitness, but that it ultimately found the Child dependent because
the Child was without proper parental care or control. (Id. at 15.) The trial
court further stated:
there was testimony from the Father that[,] while
the Child was in his care and control, he recognized
that the Child was suffering from mental health
issues as far back as July 2016. As a result, Father
testified that he had the Child hospitalized on two (2)
occasions and also turned to [Carbon-Monroe-Pike
Mental Health and Development Services,] but was
unsuccessful in obtaining help through that agency
due to insurance issues. Unfortunately, these efforts
failed to address the Child’s mental health issues,
prompting a removal of the Child from his home for
placement in the Child’s Mother’s home on
October 7, 2016. From that date until the Child was
taken into Emergency Shelter Care, there apparently
were little, if any, services provided to the Child to
address her mental health needs. Accordingly, this
[c]ourt’s initial determination[,] finding the Child
dependent and continuing such dependency status
as a result of the March 24, 2017 permanency
review hearing[,] was grounded in the failure of the
Father to provide adequate and appropriate care for
the Child to address her mental health needs at a
time when those services were clearly available.
Additionally, based upon Dr. Saba’s report, the Child
was in need of some type of psychotherapy to assist
in addressing her diagnosis of dysthymic disorder
and reactive attachment disorder. This further
evidences a need for help, which was not previously
nor adequately provided by Father nor[sic] Mother.
Id. at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
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Ms. Geissinger testified that the Child is unsafe in Father’s home, and
that the Child’s relationship with Father is not good. (Notes of testimony,
3/24/17 at 22.) Ms. Geissinger stated the Child has threatened to run away
and self-harm if she were to be returned to Father’s home. (Id.)
Ms. Geissinger further testified that Father told her that he has had trouble
managing the Child at home without services. (Id.) Ms. Geissinger added
that Father works outside the home, Father’s girlfriend would be the
caregiver for the Child, and that Father’s girlfriend is in need of drug and
alcohol services. (Id.) Additionally, the Child testified that she was not
getting regular medical and dental care while she was living with Father.
(Id. at 29.)
After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the
trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by
competent evidence in the record. See In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68 at 73-74
(Pa.Super. 2004). Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s order directing
continuing dependency is supported by sufficient, competent evidence in the
record.
Next Father argues the trial court erred in finding that the Child’s
placement was appropriate when CYS failed in its duty to ensure that the
Child’s educational, behavioral, and mental health needs were met.
(Father’s brief at 22.)
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At the March 24, 2017 hearing, Ms. Geissinger testified that CYS is
looking to find a therapeutic program for the Child and Father that would
help them reunite. (Notes of testimony, 3/24/17 at 7.) Ms. Geissinger
continued that the Child is afraid of Father, and has refused visits with him
at CYA. (Id.) Ms. Geissinger further testified she was able to find a foster
home for the Child, which would be able to do outpatient counseling, as
recommended by Dr. Saba. (Id.) Ms. Geissinger opined that she would not
recommend that the Child return to Father’s home because of the Child’s
fear, and that Child would not be safe if she returned to Father’s home.
(Id.) Ms. Geissinger outlined the Child’s permanency plan as follows:
[T]he goals in the plan are to have frequent and
positive visitation with [the Child], that [the Child]
attend a mental health evaluation and participate in
any treatment that is needed, to demonstrate stable
mental health and attend and pass her cases, and to
participate in drug and alcohol [counseling] as
needed because there were reports of marijuana
use, and to not self-harm herself [sic].
Id. at 9.
Ms. Geissinger concluded that the CYS recommendation was to
continue the Child’s dependency, and for the Child to remain in CYS custody
for placement in a residential setting, pending an opening in foster care.
This recommendation was based on the Child’s refusal to return home, fear
of Father, and the Child has not completed proper therapy that would allow
her to return home. (Id. at 11.)
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After our careful review of the record in this matter, we find that the
trial court’s credibility and weight determinations are supported by
competent evidence in the record. In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74.
Accordingly, we find that the trial court’s finding that the Child’s placement is
proper is supported by sufficient, competent evidence in the record.
For his third issue, Father argues the trial court erred by not returning
the Child to Father’s custody when it was the least restrictive means of
providing protection for the minor Child, contrary to the mandates of the
Child Protective Services Law and the Juvenile Act.2 (Father’s brief at 26.)
Father maintains that no evidence was presented at the permanency review
hearing establishing that it would be unfeasible to return the Child to
Father’s care with in-home and/or outpatient mental health and family
therapy in place. (Id. at 28.) Father also asserts that the trial court failed
to consider any alternative disposition as required, or provide any reasoning
for rejecting that possibility. (Id.)
Section 6301 of the Juvenile Act sets forth the purpose of the Act, in
relevant part, as:
(b) Purposes.--This chapter shall be interpreted
and construed as to effectuate the following
purposes:
(1) To preserve the unity of the family
whenever possible or to provide
2 In his brief, Father cites that the purpose of the Juvenile Act is set forth in
Section 6302(b)(1) of the Juvenile Act, which appears to be a typographical
error.
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another alternative permanent
family when the unity of the family
cannot be maintained.
(1.1) To provide for the care, protection,
safety and wholesome mental and
physical development of children
coming within the provisions of this
chapter.
....
(3) To achieve the foregoing purposes
in a family environment whenever
possible, separating the child from
parents only when necessary for
his welfare, safety or health or in
the interests of public safety, by
doing all of the following:
(i) employing evidence-based
practices whenever possible
and, in the case of a
delinquent child, by using
the least restrictive
intervention that is
consistent with the
protection of the
community, the imposition
of accountability for
offenses committed and the
rehabilitation, supervision
and treatment needs of the
child; . . .
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1), (b)(1.1), (b)(3)(i).
The Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) charges county agencies
with providing services consistent with the goals of the agency as follows:
(a) Program objectives.--Each county agency is
responsible for administering a program of
general protective services to children and
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youth that is consistent with the agency’s
objectives to:
(1) Keep children in their own homes,
whenever possible.
(2) Prevent abuse, neglect and
exploitation.
(3) Overcome problems that result in
dependency.
(4) Provide temporary, substitute
placement in a foster family home
or residential child-care facility for
a child in need of care.
(5) Reunite children and their families
whenever possible when children
are in temporary, substitute
placement.
(6) Provide a permanent, legally
assured family for a child in
temporary, substitute care who
cannot be returned to his own
home.
(7) Provide services and care ordered
by the court for children who have
been adjudicated dependent.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6373(a).
The trial court opined:
This [c]ourt believes it is [the least restrictive
placement] for several reasons. First, the Child is in
need of psychotherapy which she has not adequately
received while living with either parent. Secondly,
the Child refuses to return to Father’s residence.
Since neither parent has provided the mental health
help the Child needs[,] and the Child refused to
return to her Father, returning the Child home would
not serve the purposes of the Juvenile Act insofar as
placing her in a setting that addresses her mental,
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emotional, and physical well-being. Further, since
the Child is in need of therapy, therapeutic foster
care is the least restrictive [placement].
Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 17.
At the hearing, Ms. Geissinger testified that residential placement
would be the least restrictive placement for Child at the time of the hearing.
(Notes of testimony, 3/24/17 at 11.) Ms. Geissinger continued, “pending an
opening in the foster home through NHS, that would be the least restrictive
until possibly a family member would come forward.” (Id.)
We note that this court stated, “it is not for this [C]ourt, but for the
trial court as fact finder, to determine whether [a child’s] removal from
[his/]her family was clearly necessary.” A.N. v. A.N., 39 A.3d 326(Pa.Super. 2012), quoting In the Interest of S.S., 651 A.2d 174, 177
(Pa.Super. 1994). Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding
that Child’s placement in therapeutic foster care is the least restrictive
means to meet her needs. We find that there was sufficient evidence to
allow the trial court to make a determination of Child’s needs and
appropriateness of placement.
Father’s fourth issue is whether the trial court erred in granting the
recommendations of CYS in that the recommendations are contrary to the
Juvenile Act, Section 6301(b)(1), which states that one of the purposes is to
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preserve the unity of the family whenever possible.3 (Father’s brief at 38.)
Father argues that there is overwhelming evidence in the record showing
that CYS has not provided reunification services as required by statute. (Id.
at 39.)
The relevant portion of the Juvenile Act specifies the purpose of the
Act is “[t]o preserve the unity of the family whenever possible or to provide
another alternative permanent family when the unity of the family cannot be
maintained.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301(b)(1). This court has held “[t]he state’s
interest in preserving family unity must be weighed along with the state’s
interest in protecting children, and a child’s right to a healthy and stable
environment.” In Re: M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa.Super.2010)
(internal citation omitted).
The trial court found that CYS attempted to reunify the family by
encouraging the Child to visit with Father while she was in placement during
the period of time between the dependency adjudication and the
permanency review hearing. (Trial court opinion, 5/10/17, 18-19.) The trial
court also found CYS encouraged the Child to participate in counseling with
Father in an attempt to mend the relationship, but that the Child refused to
participate. (Id.) The trial court concluded that to force the Child to live
with Father and engage in counseling with him would be counterproductive.
3 We again note that Father appears to have made a typographical error in
his brief, and defer to heading of Father’s argument, rather than the body to
determine the appropriate Section of the Juvenile Act.
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(Id. at 19.) The trial court maintained that all attempts and efforts to
preserve the family unit were exhausted through October 7, 2016, when the
Child was initially removed from Father’s care. (Id. at 21.)
At the hearing, the Child testified that she thinks she will do well in a
foster placement. (Id. at 26.) The Child further testified that she does not
have a good relationship with Father, and does not think she can forgive him
for “what he has done.” (Id. at 28.) The Child stated that CYS has told her
she should try to repair her relationship with Father, but that she does not
think that would be possible. (Id. at 29.) Ms. Geissinger testified that the
Child is “working with Victims’ Resource Center with an advocate and is
having a hard time talking about things and trying to reunite with [Father].”
(Id. at 8.)
Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s finding that
reunification at the time of the permanency review hearing would be
counterproductive, and that continued dependency was appropriate.
Next, Father asks this court to determine whether the trial court erred
by finding that CYS exercised reasonable efforts to preserve or reunify the
family when there was undisputed evidence that no services were made
available and no reunification efforts were made by CYS. Father argues that
CYS failed to present any evidence that it provided the statutorily mandated
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services required by Section 6374(f) of the CPSL to reunify the family.4
(Father’s brief at 15.)
The CPSL Section 6373(b) states:
(b) Efforts to prevent need for removal from
home.--In its effort to assist the child and the
child’s parents, pursuant to Federal
regulations, the county agency will make
reasonable efforts prior to the placement of a
child in foster care to prevent or eliminate the
need for removal of the child from his home
and to make it possible for the child to return
to home.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6373(b).
In its opinion, the trial court reiterated its rationale for finding that the
Child’s placement in therapeutic foster care was the least restrictive
placement to meet the Child’s needs. (Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 18.)
The trial court concluded that reunification is premature. (Id.)
Upon review, the record supports the trial court’s decision not to
reunite Father and the Child, and we do not find that the trial court violated
the CPSL. There was sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to make a
determination of the Child’s needs and inappropriateness of reunification.
Father’s sixth issue asserts that the trial court erred in finding that
Father had made minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances that
4 In his brief, Father cites that the requirements of the CPSL can be found at
Section 6374(f) which appears to be a typographical error. We defer to the
trial court’s decision to analyze Father’s argument pursuant to
Section 6373(b) of the CPSL.
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necessitated the Child’s placement because Father is unable to complete his
goals without health insurance. (Father’s brief at 15.) Father maintains that
he was willing and able to pay for treatment out-of-pocket until the
insurance for the Child can be resolved. (Id. at 34.) Father continues that
it is improper to hold Father accountable for CYS’ failure to assist Father in
obtaining medical assistance for the Child as required by Section 6373(c) of
the CPSL. (Id. at 35-36.)
At the hearing, Ms. Geissinger testified that Father’s goals were to
participate in visitation with the Child, demonstrate proper parenting in the
home and with the Child, demonstrate sober caretaking and counseling,
positive coping skills due to the reports of violence, and to cooperate with
CYS. (Notes of testimony, 3/24/17 at 9-10.) Ms. Geissinger continued that
there has been minimal compliance with the Child’s permanency plan
because the Child refuses to do anything to rebuild her relationship with
Father. (Id. at 10.)
Father testified he lost his insurance in July of 2016. (Id. at 44.)
Father stated he reapplied for Medicaid, but his application was denied
because of incomplete financial documents. (Id.) Yet Father maintains that
he had the financial documents and must reapply again. (Id. at 44-45.)
Father predicted that it will take a while before he has Medicaid. (Id. at 45.)
Father further testified that he will do whatever it takes, even going
out-of-pocket to pay for counseling. (Id.)
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The trial court found that Father did not arrange to get the Child
counseling while the Child was living with Father, nor was he able to secure
therapy for the Child by the time of the dependency hearing. (Trial court
opinion, 3/24/17 at 19.) The trial court states that one of the reasons
Father was unable to secure therapy for the Child was his lack of insurance.
(Id.) The trial court continues that the more important reason why it found
Father’s compliance to be minimal is that the Child is refusing contact with
Father. (Id.) The trial court maintained that, perhaps through no fault of
his own, Father cannot make progress in having the Child returned to his
care when the Child has no desire to return home, and that progress is
minimal in alleviating the circumstances of the Child’s removal, which is the
lack of a relationship with Father. (Id. at 19-20.)
Finally, Father argues that the trial court erred by not determining a
likely date for reunification of Father and the Child as required by the
Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(1). (Father’s brief at 16.) Father
maintains the permanency review order of March 24, 2017, contains no date
by which the goal of reunification of the Child with Father might be achieved.
(Id. at 37.) Father contends that the omission of this date is not a
“harmless error,” but actually constitutes a goal change from reunification
without the benefit of a hearing. (Id. at 38.)
In relevant part, the Juvenile Act reads
(f.1) Additional determination.--Based upon the
determinations made under subsection (f) and
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all relevant evidence presented at the hearing,
the court shall determine one of the following:
(1) If and when the child will be
returned to the child’s parent,
guardian or custodian in cases
where the return of the child is
best suited to the safety,
protection and physical, mental
and moral welfare of the child.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f.1)(1).
In its opinion, the trial court stated:
Father is correct that this [c]ourt did not identify a
date by which the Child might be returned home to a
parent. This [c]ourt agrees that both 42 Pa. C.S.A.
§ 6351(f)(5) and Pa. R.J.C.P. 1608(D)(1)(d) require
it. However, this [c]ourt finds that the failure to do
so is justified. Conversely, if it is not justified, it is a
harmless error under the circumstances.
This [c]ourt has identified a likely return date as
“unknown.” The basis for this is clear: it is totally
unpredictable as to when this Child, wrought with a
mental health diagnosis and refusing to return to
either parent, may in fact return to a parent. No one
can project when the psychotherapy may get to the
point where the Child begins family counselling with
either or both parties and when she may want to
return and feel comfortable returning to a parent.
Further, despite 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6351(e)(3) requiring
permanency hearings at least every six (6) months,
[CYS] conducts them every three (3) months. This
“likely goal” date was implemented and designed to
maintain constant vigilance over a Child’s progress
and attain the goals recommended. Having
three (3) month review hearings provides the same
oversight.
Trial court opinion, 5/10/17 at 20-21.
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J. S53031/17
This court has said: “[t]o hold the trial court abused its discretion, we
must determine its judgment was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the court
disregarded the law, or that its action was “a result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill will.” In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citations
omitted). Consequently, we find Father’s argument to be without merit.
The trial court’s decision was reasonable and appropriate under the
circumstance.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s
permanency review order, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/28/2017
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