Com. v. Pezzeca, R. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ROBERT PEZZECA,
Appellant No. 664 EDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0004666-1998
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., MUSMANNO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 03, 2018
Appellant, Robert Pezzeca, appeals pro se from the post-conviction
court’s January 23, 2017 order denying, as untimely, his fifth petition under
the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
Briefly, in 1999, Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and
related offenses. On March 17, 1999, he was sentenced to life
imprisonment, without the possibility of parole. This Court affirmed his
judgment of sentence on September 22, 2000, and our Supreme Court
denied his subsequent petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v.
Pezzeca, 749 A.2d 968 (Pa. Super. 2000), appeal denied, 761 A.2d 549(Pa. 2000).
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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On July 3, 2001, Appellant filed his first, pro se PCRA petition and
counsel was appointed. After counsel filed an amended petition and the
court conducted an evidentiary hearing, appellant’s petition was denied on
February 20, 2002. Appellant did not file a direct appeal, but he later filed a
second PCRA petition, seeking reinstatement of his right to appeal nunc pro
tunc from the February 20, 2002 order. The PCRA court granted that
petition, but this Court ultimately quashed Appellant’s appeal.
On December 18, 2002, Appellant filed his third, pro se PCRA petition.
Counsel was appointed to represent him. On May 27, 2003, the PCRA court
again reinstated Appellant’s right to file an appeal nunc pro tunc from the
February 20, 2002 order dismissing his first PCRA petition. However, on
February 10, 2004, this Court quashed Appellant’s appeal, concluding that,
“[b]ecause the PCRA petition [filed on December 18, 2002,] was untimely
filed, … the [PCRA] court was without jurisdiction to grant nunc pro tunc
appeal rights….” Commonwealth v. Pazzeca, No. 1919 EDA 2003,
unpublished memorandum at 1 (Pa. Super. filed Feb. 10, 2004). On
November 24, 2004, our Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for
allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Pazzeca, 863 A.2d 1145 (Pa.
2004).
On March 24, 2016, Appellant filed his fourth, pro se PCRA petition,
which was dismissed by the PCRA court on June 23, 2016. Appellant did not
file an appeal. Instead, on July 13, 2016, Appellant filed his fifth, pro se
PCRA petition, which underlies the present appeal. Therein, Appellant
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contended that on May 12, 2016, he discovered, through an attorney named
Kristine Michael, Esq., that his trial counsel, David Luvara, “had been
committing crimes for another client that he represented during the time of
… [Appellant’s] … trial.” PCRA Petition, 7/13/16, at 3. Appellant further
explained that Luvara had pled guilty to several crimes, including
intimidation of a witness and hindering apprehension or prosecution, and for
those crimes, Luvara was subsequently disbarred. See id. Appellant
essentially contended that Luvara’s criminal conduct constituted newly
discovered evidence that Luvara had ineffectively represented Appellant at
trial.
On December 9, 2016, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907
notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition as being untimely filed.
Appellant filed a pro se response, but on January 24, 2017, the court issued
an order dismissing his petition. Appellant filed a timely, pro se notice of
appeal, and he also complied with the PCRA court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The PCRA
court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on April 11, 2017. Herein, Appellant
raises four issues for our review, which we paraphrase as follows:
I. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s petition,
without an evidentiary hearing, where Appellant has
satisfied the timeliness exception of 42 Pa.C.S. §
95459(b)(1)(ii)?
II. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing Appellant’s PCRA
petition where trial counsel acted ineffectively by
committing crimes while representing Appellant?
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III. Did the Superior Court err in denying Appellant’s
“Application for Correction of the Original Record” in which
Appellant sought to correct erroneous dates and
information regarding David Luvara’s criminal court docket
sheets?
IV. Was trial counsel ineffective for not calling to the stand Dr.
Gerald Cook to testify as an expert witness at trial?
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
This Court’s standard of review regarding an order denying a petition
under the PCRA is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported
by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. Commonwealth v.
Ragan, 923 A.2d 1169, 1170 (Pa. 2007). We must begin by addressing the
timeliness of Appellant’s petition, because the PCRA time limitations
implicate our jurisdiction and may not be altered or disregarded in order to
address the merits of a petition. Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d
1264, 1267 (Pa. 2007). Under the PCRA, any petition for post-conviction
relief, including a second or subsequent one, must be filed within one year of
the date the judgment of sentence becomes final, unless one of the following
exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies:
(b) Time for filing petition.--
(1) Any petition under this subchapter, including a second
or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the
date the judgment becomes final, unless the petition
alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the
result of interference by government officials with
the presentation of the claim in violation of the
Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States;
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that
was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United
States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after
the time period provided in this section and has been
held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). Any petition attempting to invoke one of
these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could
have been presented.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
Here, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on December 21,
2000. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (stating that a judgment of sentence
becomes final at the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time
for seeking the review); Commonwealth v. Owens, 718 A.2d 330, 331
(Pa. Super. 1998) (directing that under the PCRA, petitioner’s judgment of
sentence becomes final ninety days after our Supreme Court rejects his or
her petition for allowance of appeal since petitioner had ninety additional
days to seek review with the United States Supreme Court). Thus, his
current petition filed in July of 2016 is patently untimely, and, for this Court
to have jurisdiction to review the merits thereof, Appellant must prove that
he meets one of the exceptions to the timeliness requirements set forth in
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b).
Instantly, Appellant argues that he meets the after-discovered
evidence exception of section 9545(b)(1)(ii) based on his discovering, from
Kristine Michael, Esq., the criminal conviction and disbarment of his trial
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counsel, David Luvara. While Appellant does not specify the date of Luvara’s
conviction, according to the Commonwealth, Luvara initially pled guilty to
certain offenses in March of 2001, but he was then permitted to withdraw
that plea, and he proceeded to trial in March of 2004, at the close of which
he was again convicted. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 30-31. Luvara was
sentenced in June of 2004 to a term of probation, and he was later disbarred
from the practice of law in 2008. Id. at 31. Appellant claims that Luvara’s
criminal record constitutes new evidence that Luvara acted ineffectively in
representing Appellant at trial, and that because he filed his PCRA petition
within 60 days of discovering this new information, he has satisfied section
9545(b)(1)(ii).
In response, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant has failed to
demonstrate he could not have discovered this information about Luvara
earlier, had he exercised due diligence. The Commonwealth stresses that
Luvara’s “arrest, conviction and subsequent disbarment are matters of public
record, and, thus, are generally presumed ‘knowable’ to a PCRA petitioner.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 30 (citing Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d
520, 523 (Pa. 2006) (concluding that “the fact that trial counsel was
arrested for DUI was a matter of public record and, therefore, cannot be said
to have been ‘unknown’ to [the a]ppellant for purposes of the PCRA’s ‘newly
discovered evidence’ exception to the PCRA’s one year jurisdictional time-
bar”)). Appellant, however, relies on Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d
1063 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc), aff’d 158 A.3d 618 (Pa. 2017), to argue
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that because he is pro se, the presumption that Luvara’s public records were
discoverable by him does not apply. He avers that those documents only
became available when Attorney Michael provided them to him in March of
2016.
Appellant’s argument is unconvincing. In Burton, we recognized the
“Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent holding that publicly available
information cannot predicate a timeliness exception, beyond the 60-day
grace period defined in Section 9545(b)(2). Burton, 121 A.3d at 1071
(citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 67 A.3d 1245, 1248 (Pa. 2013) (“This
Court has found matters of public record are not unknown.”)). However, the
Burton panel held “that the presumption of access to information available
in the public domain does not apply where the untimely PCRA petitioner is
pro se” and is incarcerated. Burton, 121 A.3d at 1073.
Here, while Appellant is currently incarcerated and is proceeding pro
se, he was represented by two different attorneys over years in which the
information regarding Luvara’s conviction and disbarment was publicly
available. Namely, as the Commonwealth summarizes,
Appellant’s counsel in his first PCRA action, Keith Williams,
Esquire, was court-appointed in August of 2001, [and he] filed
amended, counseled claims and represented Appellant at the
PCRA evidentiary hearing in October [of] 2001 and through the
untimely PCRA appeal, subsequently quashed by [the Superior]
Court in October [of] 2002. Thereafter, Appellant was appointed
new counsel in March [of] 2003, Robert Repko, Esquire, in his
second PCRA action. New counsel filed an amended, counseled
petition seeking re-instatement of an appeal from the denial of
Appellant’s first PCRA action, which was granted by the PCRA
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court, but was subsequently quashed by this Court in February
[of] 2004. Attorney Repko continued to represent Appellant
through the denial of the petition for allowance of appeal in
November [of] 2004, after [Luvara] had already been convicted
and sentenced for the second time in the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas.
Commonwealth’s Brief at 32-33.
The PCRA court also concludes that the Burton exception does not
apply in this case, as Appellant was represented at various points after
Luvara’s conviction became public information. See PCRA Court Opinion,
4/11/17, at 7-8. Thus, the PCRA court determined that Appellant failed to
demonstrate he could not have discovered this information about Luvara
sooner, had he (or his prior PCRA attorneys) exercised due diligence.
We ascertain no abuse of discretion or error of law in the court’s
decision. Because Appellant was represented by counsel at various points
after Luvara’s conviction became a matter of public record, we must
presume that he had access to that public information. See Burton, 121
A.3d at 1071; Taylor, 67 A.3d at 1248; Chester, 895 A.2d at 523.
Therefore, Appellant cannot meet the timeliness exception of section
9545(b)(1)(ii), and we do not have jurisdiction to address the substance of
any of the issues he asserts herein.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/3/2018
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