Com. v. Schrock, J. ( 2018 )


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  • J-A32004-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant                     :
    :
    :
    v.                                   :
    :
    :
    JASON PAUL SCHROCK                         :   No. 841 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-28-CR-0000775-2016
    BEFORE:        OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:                                FILED JANUARY 10, 2018
    The Commonwealth appeals from the order entered May 10, 2017, and
    clarified on May 11, 2017,1 in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
    which granted, in part, Jason Paul Schrock’s pretrial motion in limine, and
    prohibited a state trooper from offering lay opinion testimony based on
    “scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of
    Pa.R.Evid. 702.” Order, 5/11/2017. On appeal, the Commonwealth contends
    the trial court’s ruling was erroneous, and the trooper should be permitted to
    testify regarding his observations as a lay witness. For the reasons below, we
    affirm.
    ____________________________________________
       Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1 The Commonwealth has properly certified in its notice of appeal that the
    order will “substantially handicap the prosecution” pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    311(d). Notice of Appeal, 5/24/2017.
    J-A32004-17
    The following facts were developed during a pretrial suppression
    hearing, and summarized by the trial court in its opinion disposing of the
    motion:
    Robert Adams lives at 2102 Stillhouse Road, Shippensburg,
    Franklin County, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He owns the
    property at that address, and resides there with his son Tim
    Adams and Judy.10 During the overnight hours of April 8, 2016 -
    April 9, 2016, [Schrock] and his then girlfriend, Katelyn Rock,
    arrived at Mr. Adams’ residence. They went into the room above
    a shed on the property; at approximately 8:00 p.m., [Schrock]
    snorted heroin and Ms. Rock injected heroin. At some point that
    same evening, Mr. Adams learned that his grandson, [Schrock],
    was present on the property with Ms. Rock. Mr. Adams had
    previously advised [Schrock] that he was not permitted upon the
    property.
    __________
    It was not clear from Mr. Adams’ testimony whether Judy
    10
    is a relative of his, wife/paramour of himself or his son, or
    just a tenant.
    __________
    Upon learning of the presence of [Schrock], Mr. Adams
    contacted the Pennsylvania State Police (hereinafter "PSP") for
    assistance. He advised PSP that there were unwanted individuals
    on his property and that one or both of them may have warrants
    for their arrest. Trooper Benjamin Frantz11 was dispatched to Mr.
    Adams’ residence.
    __________
    Trooper Frantz has been employed by PSP since January
    11
    21, 2007, and has extensive training in detecting the effects
    of an individual under the influence of controlled substances
    or alcohol. Specifically, he received training at the PSP
    Academy, completed Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving
    Enforcement training, and is certified as a Drug Recognition
    Expert by the Pennsylvania Chief’s Association and the
    United States Department of Transportation. In his career
    he has interacted with hundreds of individuals under the
    influence of a controlled substance.
    __________
    -2-
    J-A32004-17
    At the time he was dispatched, Trooper Frantz was advised
    that there was a report of two (2) unwanted individuals who were
    trespassing and were possibly wanted by law enforcement
    authorities. Upon arrival at Mr. Adams’ residence, Trooper Frantz
    spoke with Mr. Adams. Mr. Adams advised him that [Schrock]
    and Ms. Rock were in a shed on the property and that Mr. Adams
    wanted them removed. Mr. Adams told Trooper Frantz that his
    grandson's name was “Jason.”
    Trooper Frantz asked Mr. Adams if he could come onto the
    property to search for [Schrock] and Ms. Rock; Mr. Adams advised
    him that he could. In fact, Mr. Adams showed Trooper Frantz the
    location of the shed. [Schrock] and Ms. Rock were located in the
    upstairs room above the shed, which was accessed by an exterior
    staircase.
    Trooper Frantz opened the door to the room and
    immediately observed [Schrock] seated in a chair inside the door.
    Trooper Frantz also observed Ms. Rock move immediately to a
    love seat and sit down. Trooper Frantz noticed a cloud of smoke
    which had an odor consistent with recent narcotic use. He
    observed fresh “track marks” on Ms. Rock’s arms, so recent that
    they were still bleeding. He did not observe track marks on
    [Schrock’s] arms. Both [Schrock] and Ms. Rock had droopy
    eyelids, which Trooper Frantz noted is consistent with recent
    opiate use.
    Trooper Frantz engaged [Schrock] and questioned why he
    was there. [Schrock] advised him that he had the permission of
    his father (Mr. Adams’ son, Tim) to be present on the property.
    While talking to the [Schrock], Trooper Frantz noted that
    [Schrock’s] responses were lethargic, which is consistent with
    recent narcotic use.       Trooper Frantz obtained identifying
    information for both [Schrock] and Ms. Rock and ran12 their names
    for wants/warrants. Ms. Rock provided a false name to Trooper
    Frantz.
    __________
    12 Trooper Frantz could not recall if he ran the names
    himself, or whether another Trooper did.
    __________
    During his investigation, Trooper Frantz asked Ms. Rock
    where her “kit” was; as explained by Trooper Frantz, a “kit” is
    typically a small bag or container where a drug abuser keeps their
    -3-
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    drug delivery devices and other drug-use paraphernalia, as well
    as controlled substances. She advised him that it was in her purse.
    Trooper Frantz observed the purse on the floor and
    approached it. The purse was open and, without touching or
    otherwise manipulating the purse, Trooper Frantz observed used
    hypodermic needles, a tourniquet, cotton, and burnt spoons in an
    open bag inside the purse.13 Upon retrieving the kit for closer
    examination, Trooper Frantz also observed capsules containing a
    brown/off-white substance. The substance’s characteristics were
    consistent with heroin.
    __________
    13The Court notes that these items are commonly used for
    ingesting controlled substances, particularly heroin.
    __________
    At some point, Trooper Frantz took both [Schrock] and Ms.
    Rock into custody14 for the instant offenses.15 Trooper Frantz then
    conducted an immediate search of the area within arms’ reach16
    of [Schrock] and Ms. Rock. He located a jacket which appeared
    to belong to a male; when he questioned [Schrock] regarding
    ownership of the jacket, [Schrock] said it was his. Upon searching
    the jacket, Trooper Frantz located a bag of marijuana.
    __________
    It is not clear from the testimony at what precise point
    14
    Trooper Frantz placed [Schrock] and Ms. Rock under arrest.
    Ms. Rock was charged similarly to [Schrock]; however,
    15
    she was additionally charged with providing false
    identification to law enforcement. Trooper Frantz was also
    aware by this time that [Schrock] was under the supervision
    of state parole.
    16Mr. Adams testified that the room in question is
    approximately 10 feet by 10 feet; Trooper Frantz opined
    that it was a bit larger in dimensions. Suffice it to say, the
    room was not large.
    Trial Court Opinion, 3/29/2017, at 5-7.
    Schrock was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled
    substance, possession of drug paraphernalia (three counts), and possession
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    of marijuana for personal use.2 Although counsel was initially appointed, the
    trial court later granted Schrock’s request to proceed pro se following a
    Grazier3 hearing conducted on October 12, 2016. Thereafter, Schrock filed
    several pretrial motions including an omnibus motion for pretrial relief, which
    the trial court granted in part, and denied in part, on March 29, 2017.4
    Relevant to this appeal, Schrock filed a motion in limine on April 28,
    2017, seeking, inter alia, to prohibit Trooper Frantz from offering “expert”
    testimony and referring to his training as a “drug recognition expert.” Motion
    in Limine, 4/28/2017, at unnumbered 5-6. In response, the Commonwealth
    filed an answer, asserting Trooper Frantz “will not be tendered as an
    expert at trial,” but rather, would be “offering testimony as a lay witness
    based on his training, to include his training as a DRE, and experience and
    perception of the events on the evening in question as to whether [Schrock]
    appeared to be high and/or under the influence” of drugs. Commonwealth’s
    Answer, 5/4/2017, at unnumbered 4 (emphasis supplied).
    On May 10, 2017, the trial court entered an order granting, in part, and
    denying, in part, Schrock’s motion. For purposes of this appeal, the court
    ____________________________________________
    2   See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (a)(31)(i), and (a)(32), respectively.
    3   See Commonwealth v. Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
    (Pa. 1998).
    4 The trial court granted Schrock’s motion to suppress a statement he made
    to Trooper Frantz admitting that he uses heroin and marijuana. See Order,
    3/29/2017. However, the court denied Schrock’s motion to suppress the
    evidence recovered from the purse and jacket, as well as a motion for writ of
    habeas corpus. See 
    id. -5- J-A32004-17
    directed: “Trooper Benjamin Frantz is prohibited from testifying as an expert
    witness or offering an opinion that would fall within the parameters of
    Pa.R.Evid. 702.” Order, 5/10/2017, at ¶ 6. The next day, the Commonwealth
    filed a motion for clarification. In an order dated May 11, 2017, the court
    denied the motion, but explained:
    In granting [Schrock’s] Motion in Limine on this point, the Court
    relied exclusively upon the Commonwealth’s assertion that it
    would not be calling Trooper Frantz as an expert witness. Since
    the Commonwealth is not tendering Trooper Frantz as an expert,
    ip so facto his testimony in the manner of any opinion is limited
    by Pa.R.Evid. 701. In other words, if Trooper Frantz’s opinion
    sought to be introduced by the Commonwealth is based on
    scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the
    scope of Pa.R.Evid. 702, it is not admissible since he is not being
    offered as an expert witness.
    Order, 5/11/2017 (emphasis in original). This Commonwealth appeal follows.5
    The Commonwealth’s sole issue on appeal6 asserts the trial court abused
    its discretion in prohibiting Trooper Frantz from offering lay opinion testimony
    that based upon his experience as a DRE, he believed Schrock was under the
    ____________________________________________
    5 On May 30, 2017, the trial court ordered the Commonwealth to file a concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    The Commonwealth complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise
    statement on June 19, 2017.
    We note, too, that in July of 2017, Schrock requested, and was granted,
    appointment of counsel to assist him on appeal. See Order, 7/5/2017. After
    counsel filed Schrock’s appellee brief, he requested permission to withdraw in
    the trial court. By order entered November 21, 2017, the trial court held
    counsel’s motion in abeyance until after a ruling from this Court, in order to
    “avoid undue prejudice” to Schrock. Order, 11/21/2017.
    6 Although the Commonwealth lists two issues in its brief, we have
    consolidated them for ease of disposition.
    -6-
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    influence of narcotics on the night in question. See Commonwealth’s Brief at
    19.
    Our review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion in limine is well-
    established:
    When ruling on a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion
    in limine, we apply an evidentiary abuse of discretion standard of
    review. “A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether
    evidence is admissible,” and a trial court’s ruling regarding the
    admission of evidence “will not be disturbed on appeal unless that
    ruling reflects manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice,
    bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.”
    Commonwealth v. Belani, 
    101 A.3d 1156
    , 1160 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal
    citations omitted).
    With regard to the specific issue presented sub judice, we note
    Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701 provides that a lay witness may offer
    opinion testimony so long as it is:
    (a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
    (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
    determining a fact in issue; and
    (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
    knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
    Pa.R.E. 701.    Rule 702 sets forth the qualifications for expert opinion
    testimony, including, inter alia, that the expert have “scientific, technical, or
    other specialized knowledge [] beyond that possessed by the average
    layperson[.]” Pa.R.E. 702(a).
    Here, the Commonwealth insists Trooper Frantz should be permitted to
    provide lay opinion testimony that: (1) Schrock was under the influence of
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    narcotics on the night in question; (2) the odor in the room was consistent
    with recent narcotic/heroin use; and (3) the drug paraphernalia found at the
    scene was a “drug kit” commonly possessed by drug users.                      See
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 20-28.                 The Commonwealth maintains these
    opinions were based solely upon Trooper Frantz’s observations, coupled with
    his experience as a DRE. See 
    id. at 23-24.
    Specifically, the Commonwealth
    argues the trooper’s observations of Schrock’s behavior and demeanor were
    “‘typical and obvious’ indicia of recent narcotic use which make the admission
    of a lay witness opinion on the issue appropriate[.]”          
    Id. at 24
    (citation
    omitted). Moreover, it contends the trooper’s opinion that the odor in the
    room was consistent with recent narcotic use was not based on specialized
    knowledge because “the average layperson understands how ones (sic) sense
    of smell works[.]” 
    Id. at 26.
    Further, the Commonwealth argues “a layperson
    could quite easily comprehend what a drug kit is … without the necessity of
    expert testimony.” 
    Id. at 27.
    The trial court addressed the Commonwealth’s arguments as follows:
    [T]he Commonwealth rather bizarrely asserts that Trooper Frantz
    will not be offered as an expert witness,[7] but will “be offering
    testimony as a lay witness based on his training, to include his
    training as a DRE, and experience and perception of the events on
    the evening in question as to whether [Schrock] appeared to be
    high and/or under the influence of an intoxicating substance.” The
    ____________________________________________
    7 The Commonwealth has provided no explanation as to why it will not offer
    Trooper Frantz as an expert witness, particularly considering his training as a
    DRE.
    -8-
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    Commonwealth further argues that the issues raised by [Schrock]
    go to the weight of Trooper Frantz’s testimony, and not its
    admissibility.    Finally, the Commonwealth points out that
    [Schrock] will have the opportunity to cross-examine Trooper
    Frantz during trial on the issues raised.
    The Commonwealth avers that the observations and
    conclusions of Trooper Frantz are admissible under Pa.R.Evid.
    701. … In the Court’s mind, it defies logic to suggest, as the
    Commonwealth does, that Trooper Frantz’s testimony falls within
    Pa.R.Evid. 701 and not Pa.R.Evid. 702. While Trooper Frantz can
    certainly testify under Pa.R.Evid. 701 regarding his observations
    and perceptions, any conclusion derived therefrom that [Schrock]
    was under the influence of heroin inexorably originates from the
    Trooper’s training, education and experience.
    Since the Commonwealth has indicated that Trooper Frantz
    will not be offered as an expert witness, he will be permitted to
    testify as to what he observed; however, because he is not offered
    as an expert witness under Pa.R.Evid. 702, he is prohibited from
    testifying to any conclusion based upon his training, education or
    experience, i.e., any conclusion that would fall within the gambit
    of Pa.R.Evid. 702. See Pa.R.Evid. 701(c).
    ****
    As a result of the Commonwealth’s decision not to have
    Trooper Frantz testify as an expert, his status as a Drug
    Recognition Expert7 becomes irrelevant.
    __________
    7 It should not be lost on either party that the word “expert”
    is in the very title of Trooper Frantz’s status as a DRE.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/10/2017, at 5-6 (some internal citations and footnote
    omitted). The trial court also provided several examples of permissible and
    impermissible testimony under its ruling.     See 
    id. at 6-7
    (explaining the
    trooper could (a) testify he smelled an odor when he entered the room, (b)
    identify the objects in Rock’s purse, and (c) describe Schock’s physical
    behavior; but could not (a) identify the odor as recent heroin use, (b) identify
    -9-
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    the items in Rock’s purse as a “drug kit” and explain possession of such a kit
    was indicative of recent drug use, and (c) testify that Schrock’s physical
    appearance was indicative of recent heroin use).
    We agree with the trial court’s ruling, and find this Court’s recent en
    banc decision in Commonwealth v. Gause, 
    164 A.3d 532
    (Pa. Super. 2017),
    appeal denied, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa. Oct. 26, 2017), instructive. In Gause, a
    police officer conducted a stop of the defendant’s vehicle for a minor traffic
    violation. Although the defendant did not immediately appear to be under the
    influence of drugs or alcohol, the officer smelled alcohol and the defendant
    acknowledged he had one beer at a friend’s house. See 
    id. at 535.
    The officer
    then conducted several field sobriety tests, and based on the results, the
    defendant was arrested and charged with, inter alia, driving under the
    influence of a controlled substance. See 
    id. at 534-535.
    Relevant herein, the arresting officer testified at trial that, in her opinion,
    the defendant was under the influence of marijuana at the time of the traffic
    stop based on body and eyelid tremors he displayed during one of the field
    sobriety tests.   See id at 536.       After he was convicted, the defendant
    appealed. A panel of this Court vacated the judgment of sentence, concluding
    the trial court erred in permitting the officer’s opinion testimony. The panel
    opined:
    Although Officer Eiker could testify as to her observations of an
    apparent physical condition, a qualified expert is required to
    provide the connection between the symptoms observed and the
    drug allegedly influencing the defendant’s driving.          See
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    [Commonwealth v.] DiPanfilo, [
    993 A.2d 1262
    (Pa. Super.
    2010)]; see also Commonwealth v. Allison, 
    550 Pa. 4
    , 
    703 A.2d 16
    (1997) (lay witness could not testify regarding “split and
    opened” condition of complainant’s hymen in absence of qualified
    expert testimony to explain significance of these personal
    observations); Commonwealth v. Yanoff, 456 Pa.Super. 222,
    
    690 A.2d 260
    (1997) (murder defendant attempted to elicit
    objectionable opinion by asking police officer whether victim had
    appeared to be under influence of drugs; officer had not been
    qualified to     render    such opinion); Commonwealth v.
    Yedinak, 450 Pa.Super. 352, 
    676 A.2d 1217
    , 1222 (1996) (Beck,
    J., dissenting) (“[A]fter a proper foundation has been laid, a lay
    witness may testify as to his or her observations. However, a
    qualified expert is required to provide the connection between the
    symptoms observed and the drug allegedly influencing the
    defendant’s driving.”).
    It is clear to this Court that Officer Eiker’s observation of
    “eyelid tremors” is not the typical and obvious indicia of marijuana
    use, such as the distinct odor of burnt marijuana emanating from
    the person or the vehicle. Further, it is eminently clear that
    attributing body or eyelid tremors to marijuana use requires
    specialized knowledge within the scope of Pa.R.E. 702. Unlike
    staggering, stumbling, glassy or bloodshot eyes, and slurred
    speech, the “ordinary signs of intoxication discernable by a
    layperson,” eye tremors are not an ordinary sign of ingestion of a
    controlled substance, in particular, marijuana. As the trial court
    acknowledged,      Officer    Eiker’s     testimony   as    to   her
    observations did not obviate the necessity of an expert to
    explain whether “eye tremors,” or “body tremors,” would indicate
    that someone was under the influence of marijuana and that this
    impaired his ability to safely drive, in violation of section
    3802(d)(2). See 
    DiPanfilo, supra
    ; cf. Commonwealth v.
    Jones, 
    121 A.3d 524
    (Pa. Super. 2015) (as matter of first
    impression, police officer’s smelling strong, distinct odor of burnt
    marijuana emanating from vehicle during traffic stop provided
    reasonable     grounds,     by    itself,    to  request    chemical
    testing); Commonwealth v. Etchison, 
    916 A.2d 1169
    (Pa.
    Super. 2007). Because it required specialized knowledge, Officer
    Eiker’s testimony was inadmissible as “lay opinion.” See Pa.R.E.
    701.
    - 11 -
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    Id. at 539
    (footnotes omitted). Furthermore, the panel disagreed with the
    trial court’s ruling that the error was harmless. The panel explained: “Without
    expert testimony to explain a connection, if any, the jury was permitted to
    engage in speculation that the observation of eye tremors indicates marijuana
    impairment, or, at the least, ingestion.” 
    Id. at 540.
    We find Trooper Frantz’s opinion testimony in the present case to be
    similarly flawed. At the suppression hearing, the trooper described Schrock
    and Rock as both having a pale complexion and droopy eyelids – proper lay
    witness testimony - but then he inappropriately testified that their appearance
    was “indicative in [his] expertise that they had recently used some type of
    drug, specifically an opiate.”   N.T., 2/6/2017, at 21 (emphasis supplied).
    Similarly, the trooper’s testimony that there was a “chemical odor” in the air
    was proper; however, his follow-up statement that the odor was indicative of
    recent narcotic use was based on his DRE training, and, thus, represented
    expert testimony. See 
    id. Lastly, with
    respect to Rock’s “drug kit,” Trooper
    Frantz’s description of the paraphernalia observed in the purse was proper,
    but his conclusion, based on his “training and experience,” that the items
    constituted “a heroin kit used to inject the drug” was improper expert
    testimony. 
    Id. at 23.
    Accordingly, because we agree Trooper Frantz should not be permitted
    to provide expert opinion testimony when he is not being offered as an expert
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    J-A32004-17
    witness, we affirm the trial court’s order granting, in part, Schrock’s motion in
    limine.
    Order affirmed. Case remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction
    relinquished. Schrock’s pro se petition for leave to file supplemental appellee
    brief is denied as moot.
    Judge Dubow joins this memorandum.
    Judge Strassburger files a concurring and dissenting memorandum.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 1/10/2018
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