Com. v. Stiffler, D. ( 2017 )

J-A27026-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
:
DOUGLAS LEROY STIFFLER :
:
Appellant No. 667 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 1, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-16-CR-0000388-2016
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED December 1, 2017
Appellant, Douglas Leroy Stiffler, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered on March 1, 2017. We affirm.
The trial court set forth the factual background of this matter as
follows:
[Appellant] entered [into] a relationship with the victim,
Penny McClaine, in July of 2014. McClaine is a resident of Clarion
County. At the time, McClaine owned a 2001 GMC truck that she
intended to sell. In the fall of 2014, [Appellant] began using the
truck regularly with McClaine’s permission. Eventually,
[Appellant] offered to purchase the truck from McClaine for
$3,000, and she agreed. [Appellant] continued to use the truck
regularly, but did not make any payments.
In January of 2016, McClaine ended her relationship with
[Appellant] and requested payment for the truck, which was still
in [Appellant’s] possession. In the weeks following their break-
up, McClaine attempted to arrange a time to transfer title of the
truck to [Appellant] and collect payment. On at least two
J-A27026-17
occasions, [Appellant] agreed to meet McClaine to complete the
transaction, but failed to appear at the arranged date and time.
In March of 2016, McClaine informed [Appellant] that she
wanted the truck back, and she arranged to meet him and pick
up the truck at his residence in Mahaffey, Clearfield County.
[Appellant] cancelled this meeting shortly before McClaine
arrived to pick up the truck, stating that he had to take the truck
to work. On another occasion, McClaine drove to [Appellant’s]
work place in Altoona, Blair County, to retrieve the vehicle using
her spare set of keys. The truck was not at the site, and after
speaking with [Appellant] on the phone to ask where it was, he
told McClaine that [the truck] was in Huntingdon, Huntingdon
County. [Appellant] again told McClaine that he would return her
truck.
McClaine first spoke with Pennsylvania State Police Trooper
Mark Graf about retrieving her truck on March 13, 2016. Trooper
Graf called [Appellant] on McClaine’s behalf and told him that he
needed to return the truck to McClaine. [Appellant] stated that
he would return the truck as soon as possible, but mentioned
that he was currently working out of state. On April 16, 2016,
Trooper Graf received another call from McClaine, who informed
him that her truck had still not been returned. Trooper Graf left a
voicemail for [Appellant] instructing him to return the truck and
informing him that he may need to start compiling information
for a police report if the truck was not returned promptly.
[Appellant] left a return voicemail for Trooper Graf, again
acknowledging that he needed to return the truck.
Approximately one month later, McClaine again contacted
Trooper Graf to inform him that the truck had not been returned.
Trooper Graf attempted to call [Appellant] but did not get an
answer, so he called [Appellant’s] work place and requested they
have [Appellant] call him. [Appellant] then left another voicemail
for Trooper Graf stating that he knew he had to return the truck.
When the truck was still not returned, Trooper Graf filed the
Criminal Complaint for Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle on
June 14, 2016. State police in Hollidaysburg, Blair County,
executed the arrest warrant on [Appellant] on July 11, 2016, and
secured the truck. [Appellant] was arrested on his way to work
in Altoona, Blair County.
Trial Court Opinion, 4/12/17, at 1-3.
-2-
J-A27026-17
Appellant was charged with one count of unauthorized use of
automobiles and other vehicles.1 On February 6, 2017, following a jury trial,
Appellant was found guilty. On February 8, 2017, Appellant’s motion for
judgment of acquittal was denied. On March 1, 2017, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to a minimum term of nine months to a maximum term
of two years less one day, with credit for time served. On March 2,
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion that was denied on April 12, 2017.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.2
On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue for this Court’s
consideration:
Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence for the
jury to find Appellant guilty of Unauthorized Use of a Motor
Vehicle beyond a reasonable doubt?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
We analyze arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
under the following parameters:
Our standard when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence is whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable
inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, are sufficient
____________________________________________
1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3928(a).
2The trial court’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion incorporated by reference the
April 12, 2017 opinion and order that disposed of Appellant’s post-sentence
motion.
-3-
J-A27026-17
to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our
judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence
at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the
fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant’s
guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a
matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
combined circumstances. When evaluating the credibility and
weight of the evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence. For purposes of our review under these
principles, we must review the entire record and consider all of
the evidence introduced.
Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Emler, 903 A.2d 1273, 1276-1277 (Pa. Super.
2006)).
The crime underlying this appeal is codified as follows:
§ 3928. Unauthorized use of automobiles and other
vehicles
(a) Offense defined.-A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of
the second degree if he operates the automobile, airplane,
motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor-propelled vehicle of
another without consent of the owner.
(b) Defense.-It is a defense to prosecution under this section
that the actor reasonably believed that the owner would have
consented to the operation had he known it.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3928. “A conviction for unauthorized use of a vehicle must be
predicated on proof that the defendant operated the vehicle without the
owner’s consent and that the defendant knew or had reason to know that he
lacked the owner’s permission to operate the vehicle.” Commonwealth v.
Carson, 592 A.2d 1318, 1321 (Pa. Super. 1991).
-4-
J-A27026-17
Our courts have held that whether a person is in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle is determined based on the totality of the
circumstances, including the location of the vehicle, whether the engine was
running, and whether there was other evidence indicating that the defendant
had driven the vehicle at some point prior to the arrival of police on the
scene. Commonwealth v. Wolen, 685 A.2d 1384, 1385 (Pa. 1996). With
respect to the crime of unauthorized use of an automobile, the intent
element is more relaxed because the Commonwealth must establish only
that the defendant was reckless “with respect to the owner’s lack of consent
to the accused’s operation of the vehicle.” Commonwealth v. Dunlap, 505
A.2d 255, 257 (Pa. Super. 1985); see also Commonwealth v. Hogan, 468
A.2d 493, 495-496 (Pa. Super. 1983) (finding recklessness as minimum
standard for mens rea for crime of unauthorized use of automobiles and
other vehicles).
Here, the Commonwealth established that McClaine, the owner of the
vehicle, demanded that Appellant return her truck. N.T., 2/6/17, at 12.
Moreover, McClaine sought the assistance of the Pennsylvania State Police in
retrieving her truck from Appellant. Id. at 13. Pennsylvania State Trooper
Graf contacted Appellant and informed him that he was to return the truck
to McClaine. The evidence reveals that on each occasion McClaine and
Trooper Graf had contact with Appellant, Appellant acknowledged he had to
return McClaine’s truck. Id. at 15, 26, and 28. However, despite multiple
-5-
J-A27026-17
opportunities to return the vehicle, Appellant opted to retain possession and
continued to use the truck.
After review, we conclude that the Commonwealth established
evidence that was sufficient to prove that Appellant recklessly used
McClaine’s truck without her authorization. Dunlap, 505 A.2d at 257.
Accordingly, Appellant’s argument is meritless.
We find that the Commonwealth adduced sufficient evidence to
establish the crime of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Therefore, we
affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/1/2017
-6-