In Re:Adoption of E.R. minor, Appeal of: F.J. etc. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF E.R., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: F.J. AND T.R., NATURAL :
PARENTS :
:
:
:
: No. 1084 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order June 21, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Orphans' Court at No(s):
No. 55 ADOPT 2016
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: F.R., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: F.J. AND T.R., NATURAL :
PARENTS :
:
:
: No. 1085 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered June 21, 2017
in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Orphans' Court at No(s):
56 Adopt 2016
BEFORE: BOWES, J., RANSOM, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JANUARY 4, 2018
Appellants, F.J. (“Mother”) and T.R. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”),
appeal from the order dated and entered June 21, 2017, in the Fayette
County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petition of M.W. and R.J.W.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“Maternal Grandparents”)1 and involuntarily terminating their parental
rights to their minor son, E.R., born in January 2014, and minor daughter,
F.R., born in August 2015 (collectively, the “Children”), pursuant to the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b).2 After review, we affirm
the trial court’s order.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history as follows:
The Children were born to Mother and Father, who are not married, in 2014
and 2015, respectively. N.T., 5/26/17, at 6. The Children have resided with
Maternal Grandparents since birth. Id. at 6-8, 77-78. Initially, the Children
and Mother all resided with Maternal Grandparents. Id. However, in January
2016, Mother, who had separated from Father shortly after the birth of F.R.,
left the home to reconcile with Father.3 The Children remained with
Maternal Grandparents.4 Id. at 8-9.
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1
We observe that Maternal Grandmother’s husband, R.J.W., is not Mother’s
biological father and is, therefore, Maternal Step-Grandfather. N.T.,
5/26/17, at 4-5, 37-38. Mother’s biological father, M.J., filed a petition to
intervene and stay the adoption proceedings, which the trial court denied by
order dated and entered April 27, 2017. Petition to Intervene and Stay
Proposed Adoption Proceedings, 3/14/17.
2
Although the trial court did not specifically reference subsections
2511(a)(1) and (b) in its order terminating parental rights, its opinion issued
in conjunction with its order is suggestive of these subsections.
3
Mother and Father have had an “on and off” relationship. Id. at 47, 58-59.
4
While Mother took the Children with her overnight, she brought the
Children back to Maternal Grandparents’ residence the following day, where
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Maternal Grandmother filed for custody with regard to the Children
and, subsequent to mediation, an agreement was reached and adopted as
an order.5 Id. at 10. The order provided Maternal Grandmother with
primary physical custody, and Mother and Father with partial physical
custody for four hours per week at the homes of their respective mothers or,
in the case of Mother, another location with notice, and other times as
agreed, and, in the case of Father, the home of his father or Maternal
Grandmother, or another location with notice, and other times as agreed.6
Id. at 11, 99-100. In addition, the order provided for shared legal custody.
Id. at 99. Maternal Grandmother testified that compliance with the custody
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
they have remained since. Mother, however, has not returned to the
residence. Id. at 9-10, 58. Notably, the Children never resided with Father.
Id. at 77. Mother maintains that she was “kicked out” of the home due to
her relationship with Father. Id. at 48-51. Maternal Grandmother
acknowledged the unhealthy, toxic nature of the relationship and advising
Mother that, in the event of a reconciliation, Mother would need to reconcile
elsewhere. Id. at 9, 24-25. She explained her actions not as an ultimatum,
but as an attempt to encourage Mother with respect to her responsibilities.
Id. at 31. Maternal Grandmother further indicated that she urged Mother to
return to the home to be with the Children. Id. at 10, 24. Mother
expressed that she left the Children with Maternal Grandparents for fear of
involvement of Children & Youth Services (CYS). Id. at 50. She further
related her belief that CYS would have taken the Children from her given her
circumstances. Id. at 75.
5
Said order, dated March 23, 2016, was read into the record prior to the
conclusion of the hearing. Id. at 98-101.
6
Although Maternal Grandmother testified that Mother’s and Father’s partial
physical custody of the Children was supervised, id. at 11, the order as read
into the record does not indicate as such, id. at 98-101.
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order “fizzled out” and Mother and Father spent a total of approximately only
forty-eight hours each with the Children between the time the order was
entered in March 2016 and the eventual filing for termination of parental
rights and adoption in October 2016.7 Id. at 12, 16-17, 32. Maternal
Grandmother took no action to keep Mother and Father from seeing the
Children. Id. at 20-21. In support thereof, Mother admitted that she was
not denied access per the custody order. Id. at 52, 60. She blamed her
lack of visitation on transportation. Id. at 52. Likewise, while Father
asserted that he has not had access to the Children since the filing for
termination and adoption, id. at 81, 85, he admitted that he was never
specifically told that he could not see the Children.8 Id. at 87. Critically,
neither Mother nor Father sought to modify and/or enforce the custody
order.9 Id. at 60, 85. Beyond the limited contact, Mother and Father failed
to provide financial or emotional support to the Children and were not
involved medically or educationally/developmentally. Id. at 17-19.
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7
Maternal Grandmother testified that prior to Mother leaving the home,
Father rarely came over and, at times, would not even come to the door.
Mother would sometimes bring the Children out to the car to see him. Id. at
24.
8
Moreover, Father suggested that his visitation ceased in September 2016
as his family was no longer comfortable with him maintaining visitation. Id.
at 79.
9
Father testified that he did not want to “start anymore trouble or animosity
than there was” or “add more fuel to the fire.” Id. at 85, 87-88.
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Maternal Grandparents provide for the Children in all aspects: physically,
emotionally, financially, medically, and educationally. Id. at 12-14. They
have performed and continue to perform all parental duties. Id. at 19, 21-
22, 40-41.
On October 17, 2016, Maternal Grandparents filed a petition to
involuntarily terminate parental rights.10 After several continuances, the
trial court conducted a hearing on the petition on May 26, 2017. In support
thereof, Maternal Grandparents each testified. Additionally, Mother and
Father, represented by counsel, each testified on their own behalf. Mother’s
friend, S.B., also testified. By order dated and entered June 21, 2017, the
trial court involuntarily terminated the parental rights of both Mother and
Father.11 On July 19, 2017, Mother and Father, through appointed counsel,
filed notices of appeal, along with concise statements of errors complained of
on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). This Court sua
sponte consolidated the appeals on August 16, 2017.
On appeal, Mother and Father raise the following issue for our review:
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10
While Maternal Grandparents did not file for termination pursuant to a
specific subsection of Section 2511, they used language suggestive of
subsection (a)(1).
11
Along with its order, the trial court issued an opinion setting forth its
rationale for the termination of parental rights. On July 20, 2017, the court
issued a Statement in Lieu of Opinion noting the issues raised on appeal
were adequately addressed in its prior opinion and no further opinion would
be issued.
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Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err by abusing its discretion in terminating
the natural parent’s rights as petitioner failed to sustain its
burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence to show that
the parent evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing a settled
claim to the child or refused to perform parental duties?
Parents’ Brief at 6.
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., [616 Pa. 309, 325, 47
A.3d 817, 826 (2012)]. “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court made an
error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be
reversed for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.”
Id. The trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed
merely because the record would support a different result. Id.
at [325-26, 47 A.3d at] 827. We have previously emphasized
our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings. See In
re R.J.T., [608 Pa. 9, 26-27, 9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (2010)].
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013). “The trial court
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise
free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the
evidence.” In re M.G. & J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004)
(citation omitted). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s
findings, we will affirm even if the record could also support the opposite
result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003)
(citation omitted).
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The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis
of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the
child.
Our case law has made clear that under Section 2511, the court
must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating
parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the
parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the
statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a).
Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In
re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter
of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 550 Pa. 595, 601, 708 A.2d 88, 91
(1998)).
In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide
as follows:
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(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not
consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).
We first examine the trial court’s termination of Mother’s and Father’s
parental rights under Section 2511(a)(1). We have explained this Court’s
review of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
involuntary termination of a parent’s rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1)
as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(1), the moving
party must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct,
sustained for at least the six months prior to the filing of the
termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to relinquish
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parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. In addition,
Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to perform
parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights may be
terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) if the parent
either demonstrates a settled purpose of relinquishing
parental claim to a child or fails to perform parental
duties.
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental
duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the
court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s
explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment
contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the
effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to
Section 2511(b).
In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
As it relates to the crucial six-month period prior to the filing of the
petition, this Court has instructed:
[I]t is the six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition that is most critical to our analysis. However, the trial
court must consider the whole history of a given case and not
mechanically apply the six-month statutory provisions, but
instead consider the individual circumstances of each case.
In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa.Super. 1999) (citations omitted). This
requires the Court to “examine the individual circumstances of each case
and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing termination of his
or her parental rights, to determine if the evidence, in light of the totality of
the circumstances, clearly warrants the involuntary termination.” In re B.,
N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
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Further, we have stated:
[T]o be legally significant, the [post-abandonment] contact must
be steady and consistent over a period of time, contribute to the
psychological health of the child, and must demonstrate a
serious intent on the part of the parent to recultivate a parent-
child relationship and must also demonstrate a willingness and
capacity to undertake the parental role. The parent wishing to
reestablish his parental responsibilities bears the burden of proof
on this question.
In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1119 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citation omitted). See
also In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en
banc).
Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated:
There is no simple or easy definition of parental duties. Parental
duty is best understood in relation to the needs of a child. A
child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely
passive interest in the development of the child. Thus, this
Court has held that the parental obligation is a positive duty
which requires affirmative performance.
This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a
genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
the child.
Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental duty
requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a place
of importance in the child’s life.
Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively with good
faith interest and effort, and not yield to every problem, in order
to maintain the parent-child relationship to the best of his or her
ability, even in difficult circumstances. A parent must utilize all
available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and
must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed
in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. Parental
rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one’s parental responsibilities while
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others provide the child with . . . her physical and emotional
needs.
In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 855 (internal citations omitted).
In the instant matter, in finding grounds for termination, the trial court
concluded:
After careful deliberation, the [c]ourt finds that biological
mother’s and biological father’s own testimonies establish that
they have failed to perform their parental duties in providing
love, protection, guidance, and support, needs which cannot be
met with merely a passive interest, but rather require affirmative
performance and require that a parent act with genuine effort to
maintain the parent-child relationship, even in difficult
circumstances, not yielding to every problem. Parental rights
cannot be preserved by waiting for a more suitable or convenient
time to undertake child-rearing responsibilities while others
provide for the [C]hildren’s physical and emotional needs. As
reflected in the record as a whole, neither of the biological
parents undertook any affirmative actions to obtain or maintain
any real parent bond with th[e C]hildren, neither of them
availing themselves of their rights under an existent Custody
Order, not seeking to modify the same to gain more custodial
time, nor speaking with either child by telephone, nor being with
their child while he was in surgery, nor financially supporting the
[C]hildren, nor performing any typical parental duties, and
always presenting a ready excuse for their parental failures. As
an excuse for their inaction and lack of involvement with the
[C]hildren, both biological parents blamed financial difficulties.
Biological mother also sought to excuse herself by citing
problems between herself and biological father, as well as her
lack of transportation. When asked several times to give
examples as to how she provides emotional support for the
[C]hildren, biological mother could say only that she asked
[Maternal Grandmother] about them and played with them
during the few custodial periods she attended.
For his part, biological father blamed both [Maternal
Grandmother] and his own mother for his failure to exercise the
partial custody granted to him by the Custody Order, while
admitting that he took no steps to file a contempt petition or any
other pleading to change the said order. He admitted that he
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paid the legally mandated child support money only sporadically
despite being employed and living with his grandmother in her
residence. Although biological father paid lip service to his
“love” for [C]hildren, nothing in the record demonstrates any
love shown by either of these biological parents to the
[C]hildren. Notwithstanding that both biological mother and
biological father were “put on notice,” so to speak, by the filing
of the termination petition, they still failed to act to enforce their
rights under the Custody Order, or to send any letters or cards
to the [C]hildren or offer gifts on special occasions. This [c]ourt
finds all of the excuses of both Mother and Father to be
insubstantial and unavailing.
Based on the testimony of the witnesses and the record as a
whole, pursuant to the statutory and case law of this jurisdiction,
the [c]ourt finds that Petitioner, Maternal Grandmother, has met
her burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that both
biological parents have utterly failed to perform any parental
duties in the six months preceding the filing of her instant
termination petition. Since Petitioner’s husband, R.J.W., is
willing and able to adopt th[e C]hildren, the [c]ourt has come to
a clear, non-hesitant conviction that the termination of parental
rights would be in the best interests of the [C]hildren, removing
them from an unstable parental situation in which they are at
best merely an after-thought to their biological parents, and
providing th[e C]hildren . . . with a stable, loving, secure home
where to adoptive parents would continue to provide for their
physical, emotional, and medical needs by properly feeding and
clothing the [C]hildren and ensuring that doctor’s appointments
are kept.
The [c]ourt, therefore, finds that Petitioner’s request for the
involuntary termination of their parental rights is warranted, and
has been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The [c]ourt
also finds, in light of the foregoing, that the termination of
biological mother’s and biological father’s parental rights would
be in the [C]hildren’s best interests.[12]
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12
We note that, although the trial court referenced only Maternal
Grandmother as Petitioner, her husband, R.J.W., was named as a petitioner
as well.
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Trial Court Opinion, 6/21/17, at 7-9 (citations omitted) (footnote added).
Mother and Father, however, argue that Maternal Grandparents failed
to meet their burden of proof as to Mother’s and Father’s relinquishment of a
claim to the Children or refusal to perform parental duties. Parents’ Brief at
9. Specifically, Mother and Father assert that Mother’s parenting efforts
were “frustrated” by Maternal Grandmother.13 Id. at 10. We disagree.
Upon review, we find no reason to disturb the trial court’s conclusions
and discern no abuse of discretion. This Court concludes the trial court’s
determination that Mother and Father failed to perform parental duties with
regard to the Children and its termination of their parental rights under
Section 2511(a)(1) is supported by competent, clear, and convincing
evidence in the record.
The record reveals minimal contact between Mother and Father and
the Children since the entry of the custody order in March 2016, with
Maternal Grandmother testifying that Mother and Father each spent a total
of approximately only forty-eight hours with the Children from the time the
order was entered in March 2016 and the eventual filing for termination of
parental rights and adoption in October 2016. N.T., 5/26/17, at 12, 16-17,
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13
We note the analysis presented by Mother and Father in their brief is
limited; however, to the extent we are able to determine the issues, we
have considered them.
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32. Further, neither Mother nor Father sought to modify and/or enforce the
custody order. Id. at 60, 85. Moreover, beyond the limited contact, Mother
and Father failed to provide financial14 or emotional support to the Children
and were not involved medically or educationally/developmentally. 15 Id. at
17-19. Maternal Grandparents provided for the Children in all aspects. Id.
at 12-14, 22, 39-41. As reported by Maternal Grandmother, she and her
husband provide for the Children “in every way. Emotional, financial,
physical, medically -- everything. Educationally and everything.” Id. at 12.
Mother attributed Maternal Grandparents’ assumption of parental
responsibilities to her being “kicked out” of the home. Id. at 71. However,
critically, Maternal Grandmother noted Mother’s lack of appropriate parental
contribution even when she resided in the home with the Children. Maternal
Grandmother stated,
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14
While Father was subject to a support order, he acknowledged the
existence of arrears. Id. at 78. Maternal Grandmother likewise referenced
several contempt proceedings. Id. at 17, 28. Further, although Mother
provided diapers and/or pull-ups and pajamas for the Children, Maternal
Grandmother indicated this was on one occasion. Id. Mother admitted she
never actually gave Maternal Grandparents money. Id. at 61-62. Similarly,
Mother reported only one birthday gift and card for E.R. since Children’s
births, as she did not have the means financially. Id. at 53, 62.
15
Mother signed an authorization for Maternal Grandmother to oversee
E.R.’s early intervention therapy. Id. at 20. Additionally, despite
knowledge, neither Mother nor Father attended E.R.’s surgery or came to
visit him. Id. at 17-18, 33-36. Maternal Grandmother testified that Mother
did not appear for her visitation scheduled the following day and did not
make inquiry until several days later. Id. at 36.
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Well, I mean [Mother] lived with us for a time. She was involved
at that time, physically, but still not the way that she should
have been. I had to wake her up and tell her this one needed
fed and this one needed changed. No. It has been pretty much
my husband and I doing everything since day one.
Id. at 19.
Further, when asked to specifically recount her parental duties from
the time she left Maternal Grandparents’ home until the filing of the instant
petition (January to October 2016) Mother was unable to detail any such
duties performed. Id. at 57. Maternal Grandmother essentially described
Mother’s interactions with the Children during visitation as “play.” Id. at 32.
This was confirmed by Mother. Id. at 74. When asked if she would describe
Mother’s relationship with the Children as a parental relationship, Maternal
Grandmother responded, “Not necessarily. There is a huge difference
between what I do with them and what she would do with them while she
was there.” Id. at 33. As to Father, Maternal Grandmother further
recounted Paternal Grandmother having to prompt Father to respond to F.R.
when she fell during visitation. Id. For instance, she testified that “at one
point [F.R.]-she was leaning on the ride on toy and she went down. She
started to cry and [Paternal Grandmother] had to tell him on the other side
of the room. . . that is your daughter, she is crying. Go get her. His first
instinct was not oh my gosh is she okay.” Id. Significantly, Maternal
Grandmother observed that Mother’s and Father’s involvement “got worse”
after the filing of the instant petition and for adoption. Id. at 20.
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With their position, Mother and Father suggest that the trial court
delay stability and permanency for the Children while Mother and Father
seek to attain their own security. This is both speculative and
unacceptable.16 As this Court has stated, “[A] child’s life cannot be held in
abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to
assume parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate
indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims
of progress and hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d
502, 513 (Pa.Super. 2006). The Children are in a stable and secure
environment with Maternal Grandparents, who have provided for them since
Mother left the home in January 2016, if not their entire lives. As aptly
stated by Maternal Step-Grandfather, “[The Children] don’t need to wait
around for [Mother and Father] to grow up. [The Children] are growing up
and they don’t need to wait for [Mother and Father].” Id. at 41. He
continued, “They need parents now. . . .” Id. at 42. With this, we agree.
Thus, as the trial court’s determinations regarding Section 2511(a)(1) are
supported by competent, clear, and convincing evidence in the record, we
find no abuse of discretion. See In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628, 71 A.3d at
267; In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d at 394.
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16
Mother and Father were moving to Allegheny County the day after the
hearing to be closer to their new job in direct sales, which is commission-
based and keeps them out of the home for long hours. N.T., 5/26/17, at 46,
62, 77, 80, 82, 88-91.
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We next determine whether termination was proper under Section
2511(b). Our Supreme Court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M. [a/k/a E.W.C. & L.M.
a/k/a L.C., Jr.], [533 Pa. 115, 123, 620 A.2d 481, 485
(1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791. However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds
is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 628-29, 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is
no evidence of a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis
necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re
K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
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[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court
can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child,
and should also consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the child might
have with the foster parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015)
(quotation marks, quotation, and citations omitted).
Here, the record likewise corroborates termination of parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(b). The evidence supports that Mother and Father
had minimal contact with the Children, at least, since March 2016. As a
result, no evidence was presented that a parental relationship or bond of any
significance existed between Mother and Father and the Children. In fact,
Mother testified that F.R. does not know who she is. Id. at 52. All evidence
suggests that the parental relationship is instead between Maternal
Grandparents and the Children. Maternal Step-Grandfather indicated that
the Children call him “Pap” and are excited to see him when he gets home
from work. Id. at 38. He further stated that he considers himself a father
figure to the Children. Id. Maternal Grandparents love the Children, who
have resided with them since birth, and desire to provide them with stability
and security. Id. at 22, 38-39, 41. Maternal Grandparents have provided
for the Children’s daily needs, providing for the Children physically,
emotionally, financially, medically, and educationally, when Mother and
Father could not and/or would not. Id. at 12-14.
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Thus, as confirmed by the record, termination of parental rights serves
the Children’s needs and welfare. While Mother and Father may profess to
love the Children, a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child,
alone, will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d
at 1121. As we have stated, a child’s life “simply cannot be put on hold in
the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d at 856. It is
speculative when, if ever, Mother and Father will be able to assume parental
responsibilities for the Children and provide them with the stable
environment they deserve.
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1) and (b). We,
therefore, affirm the order of the trial court.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/4/2018
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