In The Interest of: S.P.Z., Appeal of: E.K. mother ( 2018 )

J-S75028-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.P.Z. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.K., NATURAL MOTHER :
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: No. 1043 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order June 16, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 20034 of 2016, O.C.-A.,
3 of 2013 DP
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.A.Z. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.K., NATURAL MOTHER :
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:
:
: No. 1044 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order June 16, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 20033 of 2016 O.C.-A.,
No. 4 of 2013 DP Juv. Div.
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.R.Z. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.K., NATURAL MOTHER :
:
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:
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: No. 1045 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered June 16, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 5 of 2013 DP/ No. 20036 of 201
J-S75028-17
IN THE INTEREST OF: K.E.Z. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: E.K., NATURAL MOTHER :
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: No. 1046 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order June 16, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lawrence County
Orphans' Court at No(s): 20035 of 2016 O.C.-A,
6 OF 2013 DP
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OTT, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JANUARY 10, 2018
E.K. (“Mother”) appeals from the orders entered on June 16, 2017,
changing the placement goals and involuntarily terminating her parental
rights with respect to her son, S.P.Z., born in September of 2009, and her
daughters, S.A.Z., born in April of 2008; K.R.Z., born in March of 2006; and
K.E.Z., born in April of 2005 (collectively, “the Children”). 1 Upon careful
review, we affirm.2
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1
The subject orders also involuntarily terminated the parental rights of the
Children’s father, J.Z. (“Father”). Father did not file notices of appeal.
2
During the subject proceedings, the Children were represented by the
Guardian ad litem, Deborah Shaw, Esquire, and by legal counsel, Adrienne
Langer, Esquire. Ms. Schaw and Ms. Langer filed separate appellee briefs to
this Court in support of the goal change and involuntary termination orders.
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In its opinion that accompanied the subject orders, the orphans’ court
set forth the factual and procedural history of this case, which the
testimonial and documentary evidence supports. As such, we adopt it
herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/17, at 1-12.
On December 22, 2016, Lawrence County Children and Youth Services
(“CYS”) filed petitions to change the Children’s placement goal from
reunification to adoption. CYS simultaneously filed petitions for the
involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(8) and (b).
On April 25, 2017, the first day of the hearing, CYS presented the
testimony of its caseworker, Kayla Gould. Mother testified on her own
behalf. On May 5, 2017, the second day of the hearing, Ms. Langer, the
Children’s legal counsel, presented the testimony of the three female
children, who, along with their brother, S.P.Z., reside in separate foster
homes.3 K.E.Z., then age twelve, testified that she does not want to see
Mother or speak to her. N.T., 5/5/17, at 9-10. She testified that she “really
didn’t like” receiving letters from Mother. Id. at 18. She testified that she is
happy and feels safe in her current foster home. Id. at 8. When asked on
direct examination whether she would prefer to be adopted or to live with
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3
S.P.Z. was seven years old at the time of the hearing. In her appellee
brief, Ms. Langer stated that S.P.Z. did not testify because of his “age and
emotional maturity.” Children’s brief at 8, n. 1.
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her siblings, K.E.Z. testified, “Probably . . . adopted, so I do not start fights
with my siblings.” Id. at 19. She acknowledged that it is difficult to be
around her siblings all the time.4 Id. K.R.Z., then age eleven, testified, “I
do not want to live with my mom. I just want to be adopted.” Id. at 25.
S.A.Z., then age nine, testified that she would not feel safe if she returned to
Mother’s custody. Id. at 31. She testified that she “would feel fine” if she
never again received cards, letters, or gifts from Mother. Id. at 32. S.A.Z.
testified that she wishes to be adopted. Id.
By separate orders dated June 15, 2017, and entered on June 16,
2017, the orphans’ court granted CYS’s request to change the Children’s
placement goals5 and to involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights.
Mother timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal, which this Court consolidated sua sponte.
On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the [orphans’] court erred or committed an abuse of
discretion when it found that [CYS] had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that grounds for termination existed?
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4
Ms. Gould testified that the Children initially were placed with their paternal
grandparents. She testified that they were placed in therapy and then in
separate foster homes because they were acting out with each other, both
physically and sexually. N.T., 4/25/17, Vol. I, at 70-71.
5
By orders entered on June 22, 2017, the court amended the goal change
orders with respect to K.E.Z. and K.R.Z. for the sole purpose of correcting
the docket numbers.
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2. Whether the [orphans’] court erred when it found that the
termination of parental rights was in the best interest of the
minor children?
3. Whether the [orphans’] court erred or committed an abuse of
discretion when it granted [CYS’s] motion for a goal change?
4. Whether the [orphans’] court erred when it found that a goal
change was in the best interests of the minor children?
Mother’s brief at 6.
We first consider Mother’s issues relating to the goal change orders,
which we review for an abuse of discretion. In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179, 1190
(Pa. 2010). Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301-6375,
provides as follows, in relevant part.
(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—
At each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the
following:
(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the
placement.
(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of compliance
with the permanency plan developed for the child.
(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the
circumstances which necessitated the original placement.
(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current placement
goal for the child.
(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the child
might be achieved.
(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the
permanency plan in effect.
(6) Whether the child is safe.
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...
(9) If the child has been in placement for at least 15 of the last
22 months . . . whether the county agency has filed or sought
to join a petition to terminate parental rights and to identify,
recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the child.
...
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)(1)-(6), (9). “These statutory mandates clearly place
the trial court’s focus on the best interests of the child.” In re S.B., 943
A.2d 973, 978 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted). “Safety, permanency,
and well-being of the child must take precedence over all other
considerations.” Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Moreover, the
burden is on the child welfare agency “to prove the change in goal would be
in the child’s best interest.” In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa. Super.
2009).
In her third and fourth issues on appeal, Mother asserts that the court
abused its discretion in changing the Children’s placement goals to adoption.
However, Mother does not support her assertion by legal argument or
citation to relevant legal authority. Therefore, Mother has waived these
issues. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating
that issues are waived if appellate brief fails to provide meaningful
discussion with citation to relevant authority); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b).
Even if Mother’s third and fourth issues were not waived, we would
conclude that they are without merit. Mother claims that the court abused
its discretion in changing the Children’s placement goals because the CYS
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caseworker, Ms. Gould, testified that a bond existed between Mother and the
Children. The court concluded that a bond no longer exists between Mother
and the Children and explained as follows.
[Ms.] Gould testified that during the earlier period of time in
which [Mother] was visiting with the children, there was
evidence that a bond existed between [Mother] and the children.
However, at the time of the hearings, over a year had gone by
since [Mother] had seen the children. Although [Mother] sent
cards and letters to the children, as time passed, the two oldest
children rejected [Mother’s] correspondence. Most tellingly,
K.E.Z., now 12 years old; K.R.Z., now 11 years old; and S.A.Z.,
now 9 years old, testified at the hearing that they did not want
to return to the care of their mother, expressing their desire to
remain with the foster parents. Although some bond with
[Mother] might have existed at an earlier point during
placement, at the time of the hearings, any bond had dissipated.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/17, at 19 (citations to record omitted). The
testimonial evidence supports the court’s findings. With respect to Mother’s
son, S.P.Z., who did not testify, he was seven years old at the time of the
hearing. The record reveals that he was three years old at the time of
placement. Therefore, he had spent the majority of his life in foster care.
There is no testimonial evidence of a bond between him and Mother. In
addition, Ms. Gould testified that the Children continue to suffer from trauma
arising from the physical abuse inflicted upon them by Mother. N.T.,
4/25/17, Vol. I, at 69; Trial Court Opinion, 6/16/17, at 3-4. The Children
receive ongoing counseling and therapy for their trauma. N.T., 4/25/17, at
69-73.
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Further, Ms. Gould testified that Mother failed to satisfy her Family
Service Plan (“FSP”) goals requiring her to comply with the
recommendations of the psychological and psychiatric evaluations; complete
the Time Limited Family Reunification program; maintain consistent visits
with the Children and demonstrate appropriate parenting skills; and
maintain a safe and stable home environment for the Children. Trial Court
Opinion, 6/16/17, at 9-12. As such, the testimonial evidence
overwhelmingly supports the goal change orders as being in the Children’s
best interests.
In her first and second issues on appeal, Mother argues that the record
evidence does not support the involuntary termination of her parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8) and (b). Specifically, Mother claims
that the conditions that led to the Children’s placement no longer exist.
Mother acknowledges that the Children desire adoption. However, she
speculates that the Children “had other influences over the last several years
that may not have encouraged a healthy relationship between herself and
her children.” Mother’s brief at 21. Mother baldly asserts that the orphans’
court erred in terminating her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(b)
because it disregarded the “other influences” affecting her relationship with
the Children.
We consider Mother’s issues according to the following standard.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
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credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely
because the record would support a different result. We have
previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that often
have first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple
hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
In this case, the relevant provisions of Section 2511 are as follows.
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
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...
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
...
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the
child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,
furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall
not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the
giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(8), (b).
“Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to
remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In
re A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa. Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period
has been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions
that led to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good
faith efforts of CYS supplied over a realistic time period. Id. Termination
under Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s
current willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused
placement or the availability or efficacy of CYS services. In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 396 (Pa. Super. 2003); In re Adoption of M.E.P.,
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825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa. Super. 2003). The “relevant inquiry in this
regard is whether the conditions that led to removal have been remedied
and thus whether reunification of parent and child is imminent at the time of
the hearing.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).
With respect to the “needs and welfare” analysis pertinent to Sections
2511(a)(8) and (b), we have observed:
[I]nitially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the
parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section
2511(b) is on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly
requires an evaluation of the “needs and welfare of the child”
prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the
“developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child.” Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8)
accounts for the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of
the parent. Moreover, only if a court determines that the
parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental
rights, pursuant to Section 2511(a), does a court “engage in the
second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child.” Accordingly, while both
Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate
the “needs and welfare of the child,” we are required to resolve
the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing
the “needs and welfare” of [the child], as proscribed by Section
2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address
Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).
In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc)
(citations omitted).
With respect to Section 2511(b), this Court has stated that,
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in
the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d
1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court
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“must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with
utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that
bond.” Id. (citation omitted). However, “[i]n cases where there is no
evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily
depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946
A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
Instantly, we discern no abuse of discretion by the court in terminating
Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). The court found
that the Children have been in placement since January of 2013, far in
excess of the statutory minimum. The court found that the conditions that
led to the Children’s removal and placement continue to exist. Trial Court
Opinion, 6/16/17, at 15-17. Importantly, the court found that the Children
“could not now safely be reunited with” Mother. Id. at 17. In addition, the
court found that terminating Mother’s parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the Children. Specifically, the court stated:
The three oldest children testified that they do not to desire a
return to their mother, and prefer to remain with foster parents.
All of the children are progressing in foster care. The three
oldest children appeared to be progressing more rapidly in foster
care with counseling, while the youngest child, S.P.Z., although
showing progress, still exhibits mental and behavioral issues that
require more intensive therapy. The children are in need of
permanence, a stable home life and the certainty afforded by the
expectation of long[-]term residence with possible adoption.
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Id. at 18. Upon thorough review, the termination of Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) is supported by clear and convincing
evidence. See In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations
omitted) (stating, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent
is unable to perform the actions necessary to assume parenting
responsibilities”).
Likewise, the record supports the termination of Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to Section 2511(b). As discussed above, the testimonial
evidence supports the court’s finding that, although a bond may have
existed between Mother and the Children at an earlier time after their
adjudication, that bond “had dissipated” by the time of the hearing. The
court stated:
The children have been in foster care for over four years. Each
of the children has experienced a severe trauma, and each has
demonstrated serious behavioral issues that have required
extensive therapy and counseling. That need for treatment and
counseling has been, and continues to be, met by the foster
homes. . . . Although the behaviors exhibited by the children
have necessitated placement in separate foster homes, the
children enjoy regular visits together.
Id. at 20. We discern no abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the
orders terminating Mother’s parental rights.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
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Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/10/2018
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