Com. v. Henderson, F. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S20008-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    FRANCEWIA HENDERSON,                       :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 982 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered May 10, 2011,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County,
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0003535-2010.
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., OTT, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                              FILED JUNE 07, 2018
    Francewia Henderson, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    following his convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault, and
    conspiracy to commit aggravated assault and simple assault1 after a non-jury
    trial. Henderson contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim that
    the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Upon review, we affirm
    the trial court’s decision.
    On the evening of June 22, 2010, the Reading Police Department
    conducted a drug investigation that targeted a residence located at 814
    Muhlenberg Street in the City of Reading. Criminal Investigator Christopher
    A. Mayer went to the residence in an undercover capacity, accompanied by a
    ____________________________________________
    118 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(6), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(3), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
    903.
    J-S20008-18
    confidential informant, and attempted to purchase a quantity of crack cocaine
    in exchange for thirty dollars in pre-marked bills.
    When Investigator Mayer and the informant arrived at the residence,
    they saw a man and woman on the porch and three men across the street.
    The informant asked for “Nando”, a/k/a Fernando Martinez. The man on the
    porch, later identified as Leonard Streeter, directed them inside to the kitchen.
    There, they met Martinez, and Investigator Mayer asked to buy three bags of
    crack cocaine.
    Meanwhile, the woman on the porch, Chanessa McClendon, ran across
    the street where Henderson and the two other men were standing.            After
    speaking with them briefly, McClendon ran back into the house. Henderson
    and the two others followed her across the street and into the house. They
    then went back outside and waited on the sidewalk.
    The drug transaction between Investigator Mayer and Martinez was
    interrupted when McClendon came into the kitchen and pulled Martinez aside
    to talk with him in another room.           When Martinez returned, he told
    Investigator Mayer the drugs were no longer for sale, telling him they were
    intended for another buyer.     Sensing trouble, Investigator Mayer and his
    informant attempted to leave. As Investigator Mayer was leaving the house,
    Henderson grabbed him by the shirt and pinned him against a wall. Henderson
    then pulled out a revolver and stuck it in Investigator Mayer’s abdomen, while
    asking him if he was an informant or a police officer. A rescue team from the
    -2-
    J-S20008-18
    Reading Police Department arrived shortly thereafter. Mayer was not hurt.
    Henderson and Martinez fled the scene but were later apprehended.
    Henderson waived his right to a jury trial and was tried on May 4, 2011.
    The trial court convicted Henderson of aggravated assault, simple assault, and
    conspiracy to commit those crimes. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/17, at 4.
    After seeking post-conviction relief for a second time in this case,
    Henderson’s post-sentence and direct appeal rights regarding his weight
    claims were reinstated. By Order dated May 23, 2017, the trial court denied
    Henderson’s post-sentence motion.       This direct appeal followed.      Both
    Henderson and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Henderson sets forth a lengthy list of issues, all of which challenge the
    weight of the evidence. Summarily stated, Henderson claims that, because
    no weapon was ever found, and none of the other law enforcement officers
    actually saw a weapon, there was no credible evidence to support his
    convictions for assaulting Investigator Mayer. Additionally, Henderson claims
    that the various Commonwealth witnesses were not credible. According to
    Henderson, the officers’ testimony was speculative and inconsistent, they
    were not well situated to observe what transpired and, other witnesses, who
    were also involved in the incident, had motivation to lie and/or speculated
    about what actually happened.      For these reasons, Henderson argues his
    convictions were against the weight of the evidence.
    When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, our standard
    of review is as follows:
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    J-S20008-18
    The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie
    in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support.
    Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the
    trial court has acted within the limits of its discretion.
    ***
    A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against
    the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the
    trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere
    conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts
    would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of
    the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts,
    certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them
    or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
    ***
    An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a
    weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review
    applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim
    is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the
    underlying question of whether the verdict is against the
    weight of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Clay, 
    64 A.3d 1049
    , 1054–55 (Pa. 2013) (citations
    omitted) (emphasis added). Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s
    decision will not be disturbed.   See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
    515 A.2d 865
    , 869 (Pa. 1986).     An abuse of discretion “is not merely an error in
    judgement.    Rather, it involves bias, partiality, prejudice, ill-will, manifest
    unreasonableness or a misapplication of the law.” Commonwealth v. West,
    
    937 A.2d 516
    , 521 (Pa. Super. 2007).        By contrast, a proper exercise of
    discretion “conforms to the law and is based on the facts of record.” 
    Id.
    -4-
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    After a careful review of the record and the trial court’s rationale for
    denying Henderson’s post-sentence motion, we conclude that the trial court
    properly exercised its discretion.
    In denying Henderson’s motion, the trial court relied primarily upon
    Investigator Mayer’s testimony about the incident.        Trial Court Opinion,
    7/28/17, at 6. At trial, Investigator Mayer testified that Martinez cancelled
    the drug buy after speaking briefly with McClendon. Upon attempting to leave
    the house after the deal went bad, Henderson grabbed him and slammed him
    against the wall, putting a dark-colored revolver in his side or front. On cross
    examination, Investigator Mayer did not waiver from his testimony about
    Henderson’s actions.
    The trial court further found that Investigator Mayer’s testimony was
    corroborated by the testimony of two other officers conducting surveillance
    during the drug buy and two other eyewitnesses at the scene who were also
    involved in the incident. 
    Id.
     These witnesses observed Henderson pinning
    Investigator Mayer against the wall.      More significantly, both Martinez and
    Streeter testified that they saw Henderson put a gun to Investigator Mayer’s
    stomach, again confirming his testimony.        Several of the witnesses had
    observed McClendon talking with Henderson and the two other men across
    the street shortly before this.      The Commonwealth entered into evidence
    photographs taken by the surveillance officer of the incident that day. The
    photographs were consistent with the witnesses’ testimony.
    -5-
    J-S20008-18
    In further concluding that Henderson’s convictions were not against the
    weight of the evidence, the trial court, acting fact-finder, found the witnesses
    to be credible. Trial Court Opinion, 7/28/17, at 6-7. Henderson now asks us
    to reevaluate the trial court’s determination regarding the credibility of the
    witnesses. “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder of fact
    who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the
    credibility of the witness. An appellate court cannot substitute its judgment
    for that of the finder of fact.” Commonwealth v. Champney, 
    832 A.2d 403
    ,
    408 (2003) (citations omitted). We, therefore, decline to do so.
    Notwithstanding this, as noted by the Commonwealth, Henderson does
    not challenge the credibility of Investigator Mayer in this appeal. As discussed
    above, his testimony clearly supports the trial court’s convictions of
    Henderson. The testimony of the other witnesses is superfluous to that of
    Investigator Mayer, but nonetheless corroborated his testimony as to what
    transpired that day as do the photographs taken by the surveillance officer.
    In conclusion, the trial’s court’s decision that the verdict was not against
    weight of the evidence and its denial of Henderson’s post-sentence motion,
    are well supported by the record.      We, therefore, find that the trial court
    committed no abuse of discretion, and affirm Henderson’s judgment of
    sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    -6-
    J-S20008-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 06/07/2018
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 982 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 6/7/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024