Com. v. Strohdach, N. ( 2019 )

J-S43021-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
NORMAN STROHDACH :
:
Appellant : No. 1771 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 26, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-40-CR-0002292-2017
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 25, 2019
Appellant, Norman Strohdach, appeals from the Judgment of Sentence
entered by the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas following his
convictions of Harassment and Defiant Trespass.1 He challenges the
sufficiency of evidence. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts of this case as follows:
On July 8, 2016, [Appellant] was bitten by the [V]ictim’s dog. That
incident started the chain of events eventually leading to his
prosecution. Initially it appeared as though [Appellant] and the
[V]ictim would reach an amicable resolution. However, their
relationship eventually soured and although the [V]ictim
attempted to prohibit [Appellant] from having any contact or
communication with her, he began to engage in conduct resulting
in criminal charges being filed against him.
On January 29, 2017, [Appellant] confronted the [V]ictim as she
approached a bridge leading to her residence. [Appellant] cursed
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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(7) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b)(1)(i), respectively.
____________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S43021-19
at the [V]ictim and made statements that could not be viewed as
legitimate communication. He continued to jog on the road near
the [V]ictim’s residence even after being asked to run a different
route by law enforcement. [Appellant] also sent the [V]ictim text
messages and drove his vehicle at her while she was at a gas
station.
Trial Ct. Op., dated 12/20/18, at 3 (unpaginated). In April 2017, Appellant
was charged with Harassment, Disorderly Conduct, and Defiant Trespass.
A one-day jury trial commenced on September 26, 2018 at which, inter
alia, the Victim, Appellant, and police officers testified. The jury found
Appellant guilty of Harassment. Immediately following the jury trial, the court
found Appellant guilty of summary Defiant Trespass.2 On the same date, the
court sentenced Appellant to one year of probation and a $300 fine. Appellant
did not file a post-sentence motion.
Appellant timely appealed. Appellant and the trial court complied with
Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following question for our review:
Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant’s alleged
communications were comprised entirely of non-legitimate
communications such that it could be concluded that Appellant
repeatedly communicated with the intent to harass, annoy or
alarm the complainant under 18 Pa.C.S.[ ] § 2709(a)(7)?
Appellant’s Br. at 2.
“A claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is a question of
law.” Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 751 (Pa. 2000). “[O]ur
____________________________________________
2 The Commonwealth withdrew the Disorderly Conduct charge.
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standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”
Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 164 A.3d 494, 497 (Pa. Super. 2017).
In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we determine “whether the
evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
are sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. 2005) (citation
omitted). “Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on circumstantial
evidence, and the trier of fact—while passing on the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight of the evidence—is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017).
“In conducting this review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence
and substitute its judgment for the fact-finder.” Id.“A person commits the crime of harassment when, with intent to harass,
annoy or alarm another, the person . . . communicates repeatedly[.]” 18
Pa.C.S. § 2709(a)(7). “An intent to harass may be inferred from the totality
of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 72 A.3d 719, 721 (Pa. Super.
2013) (citations omitted). “[C]ommunicates” is defined by statute to mean,
“[c]onveys a message without intent of legitimate communication or address
by oral, nonverbal, written or electronic means, including telephone, electronic
mail, Internet, facsimile, telex, wireless communication or similar
transmission.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2709(f).
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Appellant argues that the evidence does not support his Harassment
conviction. He asserts that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he acted
with intent to annoy, harass, or alarm the Victim, or that he acted without
intent of legitimate communication. Appellant’s Br. 14-15. He contends that
his communication with the Victim was limited; was for the legitimate purpose
to advise her of his injury and intent to sue; and his communications with the
Victim did not contain any threatening language. Id. at 16-17. We disagree.
After the Victim ceased communication with Appellant in July 2016,
Appellant continued to jog past her house and pace in front of her house. N.T.,
9/26/18, at 31-33. Appellant sent the Victim a text message on September 6,
2016, which stated, inter alia, “[My] connections within the pet industry [] will
strongly SUPPORT ANYONE bitten by dogs. . . . Maybe you want to keep paying
your attorney to continue representing you in a losing case. Your choice.” Id.
at 56-57. On January 29, 2017, the Victim encountered Appellant on a bridge
which led to her residence; Appellant cursed at her and told her that “he’s
going to make [her] pay,” “he’d kill [her],” and “the reptilians are going to get
[her].” Id. at 37-38, 42. Appellant also followed the Victim to a gas station,
and swerved his car near her after she exited her vehicle. Id. at 40-41.
Following our review of the record, we agree with the trial court that,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-
winner, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to reasonably conclude that
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Appellant communicated repeatedly with the Victim with the intent to harass,
annoy, or alarm her.
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient to establish Harassment, and
Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 09/25/2019
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