In the Interest of: C.M.R., Minor, Appeal of: T.R. ( 2018 )

J. S18045/18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: C.M.R., : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.R. AND T.R.R., : No. 54 WDA 2018
NATURAL PARENTS :
Appeal from the Decree, November 8, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court Division at No. CP-02-AP-0000056-2016
BEFORE: STABILE, J., MUSMANNO, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 21, 2018
T.R. (“Mother”) and T.R.R. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal
from the November 8, 2017 decree entered in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County, Orphans’ Court Division, granting the petition of the
Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) and
involuntarily terminating their parental rights to their dependent child,
C.M.R., male child, born in June of 2004, pursuant to the Adoption Act,
23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). After careful review, we
affirm.
The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history
as follows:
[C.M.R.], born [to Mother and Father], initially came
to the attention of CYF in March, 2008. However,
beginning in 2004, prior to CYF involvement,
[C.M.R.]’s family had already begun to receive
in-home assistance from numerous health service
J. S18045/18
providers at the recommendation of the children’s
pediatrician, out of concern that [C.M.R.] and his
older brother J.R ([born in August] 2002) suffered
developmental delays.
CYF’s first interaction with [C.M.R.]’s family began
[on] March 13, 2008, after CYF received a report
that J.R., age five at the time, had appeared at
school with bite marks and scratches and stated that
[C.M.R.], his younger brother, had caused them. CYF
conducted an investigation but did not accept the
family into its program at that time as the family was
already receiving multiple services including
Wraparound, home health nurses, and skilled
nursing care for the children who received between
two to ten hours [of] care every day. CYF did
however note some concern with the family’s
circumstances including the fact that J.R. and
[C.M.R.] were unable to dress themselves, and were
not toilet trained.
CYF next interacted with the family on September 7,
2008, when CYF received a second childline report
alleging that Father had kicked 4-year-old [C.M.R.]
Additionally, Mother reported that Father was
physically abusive towards her. A CYF visit to the
home revealed excessive clutter in the home and
indications that the family suffered from a tendency
to hoard. CYF also received reports of ongoing
conflict and physical confrontations between the
family members, and subsequently received
additional reports of injuries to J.R.
On September 29, 2008, CYF received another
childline report alleging that 4-year-old [C.M.R.] had
hit J.R. leaving bruises, and that J.R. continued to
arrive at school with bite marks and scratches
caused by [C.M.R.] CYF conducted an investigation
and provided the family with a behavioral specialist
consultant.
In November 2008, CYF accepted the family for
services as a result of repeated childline reports, and
after Father admitted to hitting [C.M.R.] in the face.
-2-
J. S18045/18
CYF instituted a safety plan instructing Father not to
use physical discipline. CYF provided the family with
in-home services to help manage the excessive
clutter in the home and address the family’s reported
problems with hoarding. The services continued until
2009 when they were reduced after service providers
reported that Parents had made only minimal
progress and failed to follow through with service
provider’s instructions unless staff were present in
the home.
In March and April 2009, CYF received additional
reports of injuries to J.R., and subsequent reports of
failure by Parents to adequately supervise the
children. In addition, CYF received multiple reports of
physical aggression between the children, reports of
the children playing in the street unsupervised, and
reports that the children displayed bite marks,
bruises, and scratches. The children were removed
from the home on multiple occasions. In May and
June 2011, CYF received two additional childline
reports concerning the family. On February 15,
2012, [C.M.R.], along with his brother J.R. and sister
A.R. were adjudicated dependent on grounds that
the children suffered from a lack of supervision, and
Parents displayed a lack of improvement in their
ability to parent their children despite the provision
of various services to aid them.
Because of [C.M.R.]’s developmental and behavioral
problems, [C.M.R.] has been removed repeatedly
from his [P]arents’ care beginning in July [] 2008
when, at four years of age, he was admitted to
Western Psychiatric Institute and Clinic (WPIC) after
escalating displays of physical aggression. [C.M.R.]
subsequently returned home on August 11, 2008,
and during that time also resided with his maternal
grandmother, until December 15, 2009 when he
returned to WPIC after increasingly physically
aggressive behavior. In January 2010, [C.M.R.]
returned to the care of his maternal grandmother
before moving to Residential Enhancement Services,
Planning Opportunities for New Directions
(RESPOND), a mental health facility for intensive
-3-
J. S18045/18
treatment of children with mental health disorders
who have not succeeded at other facilities. He
remained at RESPOND until October 14, 2011, when
he returned home.
In September 2012, Mother admitted [C.M.R.] to the
Mercy Behavioral Health Diversion and Acute
Stabilization (DAS) program because of his increased
aggression and destruction of property. He
subsequently moved to a treatment foster home
until December 3, 2012 when he moved to Auberle
Shelter after incidents of physical aggression and
threats to kill his foster family. [C.M.R.] then
returned to his parents[’] care for two days before
readmission to WPIC after an emotional outburst
while attending a psychological evaluation in the
office of Dr. Patricia Pepe, a licensed psychologist.
Following his release from WPIC, [C.M.R.] resided at
Auberle shelter and then Pressley Ridge crisis home
until September 26, 2014. After a period in foster
care from August 26, 2014 to December 28, 2014,
he returned to WPIC after displays of aggression and
homicidal and suicidal ideations. He returned to
foster care until November, 2014, but after repeated
threats of harm to his foster family, he was
transferred to Southwood, then Auberle Shelter and
the RESPOND program. After his behavior improved
while at RESPOND, [C.M.R.] moved to a foster home
on July 9, 2016, where he currently resides and
where he continues to enjoy notable improvement in
his behavior and functioning. His sister A.R. ([born
in November] 2007) currently resides at the
RESPOND facility. His brother J.R. currently resides
in foster care.
Between 2011 and 2016, the children have
undergone numerous psychological evaluations. In
2011 and 2012, Dr. Patricia Pepe, a licensed
psychologist, evaluated [C.M.R.], his siblings J.R.
and A.R., and Parents. Dr. Pepe diagnosed the three
children as suffering from various mental health
conditions and diagnosed Mother and Father as
suffering from mental health problems as well. With
-4-
J. S18045/18
respect to [C.M.R.] in particular, Dr. Pepe diagnosed
him with Pervasive Developmental Disorder, Mild
Mental Retardation, Seizure Disorder, Mixed
Receptive Expressive Language Disorder, and
Cognitive Disorder.
In 2013, Dr. Pepe conducted evaluations of the
family and noted an increase in the severity [of]
[C.M.R.]’s “out of control” aggressive behaviors. In
2014, Dr. Pepe attempted to conduct another round
of psychological evaluations of the family but was
unable to do so after [C.M.R.]’s older brother J.R.
physically attacked her. Thereafter, Dr. Pepe
declined to conduct further evaluations of the family.
In the interim, Dr. Neil Rosenblum, a licensed
psychologist, was assigned to evaluate the family,
and conducted several psychological evaluations
between 2014 and 2015. Dr. Rosenblum diagnosed
[C.M.R.] with Pervasive Developmental Disorder
NOS, Attention Deficit Disorder, Expressive-
Receptive Language Disorder, Articulation Disorder,
R/O Intermittent Explosive Disorder, Parent Child
Relational Problem, Sibling Relational Problem, Mild
Mental Retardation, and Seizure Disorder. He noted
that [C.M.R.] suffered from a severity of
psychosocial stressors, including removal from
parents’ care, multiple foster and group home
placements, and recent psychiatric hospitalizations.
In 2016, Dr. Rosenblum declined to conduct further
evaluations of the family, testifying at the TPR
hearing that he felt his views as to the family were
not consistent with the outcome CYF was seeking.
Because of the difference of opinion in how he and
CYF viewed the case, he declined to conduct any
further psychological evaluations of the family.
Dr. Pepe therefore resumed working with the family,
and conducted final psychological evaluations of
Parents and the three children 2016.
On March 28, 2016, CYF filed petitions for
termination of the parental rights of Mother and
Father. This Court initially conducted hearings on
-5-
J. S18045/18
the [termination of parental rights (“TPR”)] petitions
on April 8, 2016, July 1, 2016, October 7 2016,
January 17, 2017 and April 21, 2017. However,
following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision
in In [r]e[ Adoption of] L.B.M[, 161 A.3d 172 (Pa.
2017),] this Court appointed new counsel for each
one of [the] three children, and de novo hearings on
the TPR petitions commenced on September 8,
2017, September 14, 2017, September 25, 2017 and
October 12, 2017. On November 8, 2017, this court
entered an order terminating the parental rights of
Mother and Father to [C.M.R.][Footnote 1] Parents
filed a notice of appeal on December 5, 2017 . . . .
Trial court opinion, 1/8/17 at 2-8 (footnote omitted).
The record reflects that simultaneous with the filing of their notice of
appeal to this court, Parents filed a statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court then filed its
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Parents raise the following issues for our review:
[1. Whether] the trial court erred in finding that
[CYF] had proved grounds for termination
under [23] Pa[.]C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2), (5) and
(8)?
[2. Whether] the trial court erred in finding that
[CYF] had proved by clear and convincing
evidence that the conditions which led to the
removal of [C.M.R.] had not or could not be
remedied within a reasonable period of time[?]
[3. Whether] the trial court erred in finding that
[CYF] had proved by clear and convincing
evidence that termination of [Parents’]
parental rights would best serve the
developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of [C.M.R.] as required by
[23] Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b)[?]
-6-
J. S18045/18
Parents’ brief at 6 (full capitalization omitted).1
In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our
standard of review is as follows:
The standard of review in termination of parental
rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the
trial court if they are supported by the record.”
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa.
2012). “If the factual findings are supported,
appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id.“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of
discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or
ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however,
should not be reversed merely because the record
would support a different result. Id. at 827. We
have previously emphasized our deference to trial
courts that often have first-hand observations of the
parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re
R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”
In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f
1 We note that in the argument section of their brief, Parents have
abandoned their second issue on appeal and have only advanced arguments
with respect to termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and
(b).
-7-
J. S18045/18
competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if
the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of
T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, guides
the termination of parental rights and requires a bifurcated analysis of the
grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.
Our case law has made clear that under
Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated
process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially,
the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct
satisfies the statutory grounds for termination
delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the
court engage in the second part of the analysis
pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of
best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and
status of the emotional bond between parent and
child, with close attention paid to the effect on the
child of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We
have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct,
weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting
Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).
-8-
J. S18045/18
In this case, the trial court terminated Parents’ parental rights
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We
have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we
need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,
384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc).
Here, we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to
Subsections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in
regard to a child may be terminated after a
petition filed on any of the following grounds:
....
(2) The repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal of the parent has caused
the child to be without essential
parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his
physical or mental well-being and
the conditions and causes of the
incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
(b) Other considerations.--The court in
terminating the rights of a parent shall give
primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of
the child. The rights of a parent shall not be
terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control
of the parent. With respect to any petition
-9-
J. S18045/18
filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8),
the court shall not consider any efforts by the
parent to remedy the conditions described
therein which are first initiated subsequent to
the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by
terminating Parents’ parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), the following three
elements must be met: (1) repeated and continued
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) such
incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the
child to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that
cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the
contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to
perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216
(Pa.Super. 2015), quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super.
2002). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts towards the
reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities. . . .
[A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness
regarding the necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected
- 10 -
J. S18045/18
as untimely or disingenuous.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, in finding grounds for termination pursuant to
Section 2511(a)(2), the trial court concluded that CYF presented clear and
convincing evidence. After summarizing the testimony from the termination
hearing, the trial court concluded:
After careful review of the foregoing, this Court
concludes that CYF presented credible testimony
that, over the course of time during which Parents
have been provided with assistance to address
[C.M.R.]’s complex developmental, psychological
needs and parent him effectively, they have enjoyed
very limited success. Rather, despite the services
provided to them to help them parent [C.M.R.],
Mother and Father have been unable to remedy the
circumstances that have rendered them unable to
provide for [C.M.R.]’s wellbeing. Despite Parents’
efforts over many years to provide for their child’s
needs, [C.M.R.] failed to display significant
improvement in his behavior and ability to function
until his most recent placements at the RESPOND
home and subsequent move to a supportive foster
care environment in the past year, where he is
thriving. The improvements in [C.M.R.]’s capacity to
function are described as “remarkable” especially
when viewed in light of the extreme delays and
behavioral health problems that he has suffered.
While this Court has no doubt that a bond exists
between Parents and [C.M.R.], the evidence and
testimony presented at the TPR hearings indicates
that despite many years of their efforts, Parents
have been unable to provide the essential parental
control and care necessary for [C.M.R.]’s well-being.
This Court cannot wait indefinitely for Parents to
develop the skills necessary to meet [C.M.R.]’s
particular and individualized needs. Rather, this
Court recognizes [C.M.R.]’s individual right to the
[sic] have proper parenting and fulfillment of his
- 11 -
J. S18045/18
potential in a permanent, healthy, safe environment
which Parents, unfortunately, have been unable to
provide. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
507 ([Pa.Super.] 2006). Given that [C.M.R.] now
resides in a foster home in which he has developed a
bond with his foster parents, where his psychological
and behavioral health problems are well-managed,
and where he is thriving, this Court concludes that
[C.M.R.]’s developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare will be best served by the
termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights.
Trial court opinion, 1/8/17 at 23-24.
In their brief, Parents contend that “they have substantially remedied
the conditions which led to the child being removed.” (Parents’ brief at 15.)
Parents then set forth testimony from the termination hearings to support
their position. (Id. at 16-18.) Our standard of review, however, requires us
to accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations
where they are supported by the record. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Here, the record supports the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations. Moreover, we have reviewed the record and find no error of
law or abuse of discretion. We must, therefore, defer to the trial court. Id.
As noted above, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we
need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of
Section 2511(a) before assessing the determination under Section 2511(b).
In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384. We, therefore, need not address any further
subsection of Section 2511(a) and turn to whether termination was proper
under Section 2511(b).
- 12 -
J. S18045/18
As to Section 2511(b), our supreme court has stated as follows:
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a)
are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to
the developmental, physical and emotional needs
and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 2511(b).
The emotional needs and welfare of the child have
been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability.”
In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In
In re E.M., 620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this
Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the
emotional bonds between the parent and child. The
“utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the
parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
However, as discussed below, evaluation of a child’s
bonds is not always an easy task.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any
bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond
exists. The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on
the circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,
762-763 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use
expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as
well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding
evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (internal citations omitted).
Moreover,
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b)
best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of
- 13 -
J. S18045/18
many factors to be considered by the court when
determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the
trial court can equally emphasize the
safety needs of the child, and should also
consider the intangibles, such as the
love, comfort, security, and stability the
child might have with the foster
parent. . . .
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d at 1219, quoting In re N.A.M., 33
A.3d 95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
Our supreme court has stated that, “[c]ommon sense dictates that
courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are
in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster
parents.” T.S.M., supra at 268. The court directed that, in weighing the
bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the
ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The T.S.M. court
observed, “[c]hildren are young for a scant number of years, and we have
an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail
. . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.
Here, in determining that termination of Parents’ parental rights
favored C.M.R.’s needs and welfare, the trial court reasoned that C.M.R. has
developed a bond with his foster parents, his psychological and behavioral
problems are being well-managed, and that he is thriving. (Trial court
opinion, 1/18/17 at 23-24.)
- 14 -
J. S18045/18
In their argument on this issue, Parents set forth select testimony of
Dr. Neil Rosenblum in an effort to convince this court to reach a different
result. (Appellant’s brief at 21-23.) The trial court, however, was free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and was likewise free to
determine witness credibility and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. See
In re M.G., 855 A.2d at 73-74 (citation omitted). Once again, our standard
of review requires us to accept the trial court’s factual findings and credibility
determinations where, as here, they are supported by the record. See
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.
Upon review, we again discern no abuse of discretion. The record
supports the trial court’s finding that C.M.R.’s developmental, physical, and
emotional needs and welfare favor termination of Parents’ parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(b). There was sufficient evidence to allow the trial
court to make a determination of C.M.R.’s needs and welfare, and as to the
existence of a bond between Parents and C.M.R. that, if severed, would not
have a detrimental impact on C.M.R. Therefore, as confirmed by the record,
termination of Parents’ parental rights serves C.M.R.’s developmental,
physical, and emotional needs and welfare and was proper pursuant to
Section 2511(b). While Parents profess to love C.M.R., a parent’s own
feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, will not preclude termination
of parental rights. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. As we stated, a child’s life
“simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the
- 15 -
J. S18045/18
ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a
parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his [or her]
child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the
child’s right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in
a permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847,
856 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of
discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Parents’
parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).
Decree affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/21/2018
- 16 -