Com. v. Williams, A. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S03044-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF                         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    AZAIAH TAHIR WILLIAMS                   :
    :   No. 1877 EDA 2017
    Appellant
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 13, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-64-CR-0000384-2015
    BEFORE:    BENDER, P.J.E., PANELLA, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                      FILED MARCH 01, 2018
    Appellant Azaiah Tahir Williams appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County after Appellant was
    charged as an adult and plead guilty to attempted murder and sexual assault
    for crimes he committed at the age of fifteen. Appellant claims the trial court
    erred in denying his motion to decertify the case to juvenile court and abused
    its discretion in imposing an overly harsh and excessive sentence.
    The trial court aptly summarized the factual background of the case as
    follows:
    In the late afternoon and early evening hours on the twenty-
    fourth (24th) day of September, [Appellant] was harassing
    residents by knocking on their doors. One of the doors [Appellant]
    knocked on belonged to the victim, Dorothy Krasley. Ms. Krasley
    was home alone and up until that day managed to care for herself
    quite capably. [Appellant] entered Ms. Krasley’s home uninvited
    and stabbed the eighty-three (83) year old woman in her neck,
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S03044-18
    back, and arm with a steak knife. While Ms. Krasley was lying and
    bleeding on the floor of her home, [Appellant] admitted that he
    went through her home and took possession of deposit slips and
    credit cards. To make an already horrific event worse, [Appellant]
    returned to where Ms. Krasley had been lying and according to his
    words “removed her clothes and raped her.” He then left the
    bleeding Ms. Krasley alone.
    When police arrived, they found a bloodied Ms. Krasley
    wearing only a white sweater and underpants. Medical personnel
    determined that she endured two (2) stab wounds to the back,
    one (1) stab wound to the throat, two (2) stab wounds to the
    abdomen, and numerous “slice type” wounds to various parts of
    her body, including her head, arms, and rib area. While at the
    scene, Ms. Krasley managed to inform police that [Appellant]
    entered her residence and stabbed her after she told [Appellant]
    that he could not use her phonebook or phone. Ms. Krasley made
    the same statement to three (3) separate people. Since that day,
    however, Ms. Krasley has been so traumatized by the sexual
    assault that she will not speak of it. As a result of her injuries,
    Ms. Krasley underwent a medically induced coma. Ms. Krasley
    suffered two punctured lungs and required surgery to reconstruct
    her bowel. When a sexual assault exam was performed, evidence
    of [Appellant’s] semen was found in the underpants of Ms.
    Krasley. After four (4) weeks in the hospital and extensive
    rehabilitation, Ms. Krasley continues to suffer deficits as a result
    of the attack and her ability to live alone has been greatly
    compromised.
    After [Appellant] left Ms. Krasley alone and bloodied, he
    returned home to his legal guardians. On the thirtieth (30 th) day
    of September, six (6) days after the incident, [Appellant’s] legal
    guardians contacted police after finding Ms. Krasley’s credit card
    in [Appellant’s] bedroom. [Appellant’s] guardians informed police
    about [Appellant’s] history of stealing and arranged to meet at the
    PSP barracks for an interview. The legal guardians informed police
    that they search [Appellant’s] bedroom daily because of his
    history of stealing and found Ms. Krasley’s credit card under
    [Appellant’s] mattress and her deposit slips in [Appellant’s]
    backpack.
    Initially, when asked by police how he came to have Ms.
    Krasley’s credit card, [Appellant] informed them that he found it
    on a road. [Appellant] further lied to police by informing them
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    J-S03044-18
    that he was serving detention at school on the day in question and
    did not know Ms. Krasley and that she was assaulted. After
    further questioning, [Appellant] said that Ms. Krasley had a knife
    in her hand when she answered his knock on the door. [Appellant]
    stated that he let himself in and disarmed Ms. Krasley after she
    informed him that he could not enter her home. According to
    [Appellant], he stabbed Ms. Krasley five (5) times when she tried
    to push him out of her home because he was afraid that she would
    take the knife from him and stab him. After stabbing Ms. Krasley,
    [Appellant] admitted that he went through Ms. Krasley’s home and
    took deposit slips and a credit card from her purse before he
    removed her clothes and “raped her.” When questioned by a
    Probation Officer in regards to his statement that he “raped her,”
    [Appellant] stated that he was almost ninety percent (90%)
    positive that he didn’t rape her; however, he felt angry and
    wanted to desecrate her so he pulled down her pants and
    underwear and masturbated over top of her until he ejaculated.
    When asked whether he thought Ms. Krasley was dead when he
    left her home, [Appellant] replied “no.”
    With respect to [Appellant’s] criminal background,
    [Appellant] has an extensive juvenile history.       [Appellant]
    received an informal adjustment for Possession of a Weapon on
    School Property, a summary harassment, and an adjudication just
    days before the assault in the present case. The informal
    adjustment involved [Appellant] bringing a three inch saw blade
    to school and rubbing it on a student’s arm. The summary
    harassment involved [Appellant] hitting and kicking an autistic
    student, taking his glasses and breaking them. The charge which
    resulted in an adjudication was an incident where [Appellant]
    allegedly entered an apartment and when apprehended was found
    to have a hatchet and a small Samurai sword.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/15/17, at 2-4.
    In connection with his assault of Ms. Krasley, Appellant was charged as
    an adult with attempted homicide, rape (forcible compulsion), burglary
    (overnight accommodations, person present), robbery (inflict serious bodily
    injury), aggravated assault, and sexual assault. Appellant filed a Petition for
    Decertification to the juvenile court. The defense presented the report of Dr.
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    Frank M. Dattilio, Ph.D., ABPP, who offered expert opinion in support of
    decertification. In response, the Commonwealth presented the report of Dr.
    John O’Brien, M.D., J.D., who offered expert opinion against decertification.
    After a hearing at which both experts testified, the lower court denied the
    defense’s motion for decertification.
    On December 19, 2016, Appellant entered a guilty plea to attempted
    homicide and sexual assault. On April 13, 2017, the lower court imposed an
    aggregate term of twenty-five to fifty years’ imprisonment in a State
    Correctional Institution. Appellant filed post-sentence motions, which were
    subsequently denied. This timely appeal followed. Appellant complied with
    the lower court’s direction to file a concise statement of errors complained of
    on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
    Appellant raises the following issues for our review on appeal:
    I.    Whether the trial court, sitting as the decertification court,
    committed a gross abuse of discretion in denying Appellant’s
    Motion for Decertification?
    II.   Whether the trial court abused its discretionary sentencing
    powers in sentencing a 17 year old juvenile with a zero Prior
    Record Score to 25 to 50 years imprisonment constituting
    an overly harsh and excessive sentence and abusing its
    sentencing discretion?
    Appellant’s Brief, at 7.
    First, we review Appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s denial of his
    request to decertify the case to juvenile court. As an initial matter, we note
    that Appellant did not waive his right to challenge the trial court's decision to
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    J-S03044-18
    deny his decertification request when he entered a guilty plea. Our Supreme
    Court has further explained:
    Absent unusual circumstances, a guilty plea constitutes a
    waiver of any non-jurisdictional defects or defenses. However,
    since one of the prime purposes of the Juvenile Act is to spare
    from adult punishment certain youths whose behavior would
    necessarily render them guilty of adult crimes ... and since the
    decision to, or not to transfer is interlocutory and thus only
    appealable after sentencing[,] we find the instant challenge to be
    properly preserved.
    Commonwealth v. Pyle, 
    462 Pa. 613
    , 617, 
    342 A.2d 101
    , 103 n. 4 (1975)
    (citations omitted).
    In reviewing the trial court’s denial of a motion for decertification, this
    Court has provided the following:
    The Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301 et seq., is designed to
    effectuate the protection of the public by providing children who
    commit ‘delinquent acts’ with supervision, rehabilitation, and care
    while promoting responsibility and the ability to become a
    productive member of the community.              42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    6301(b)(2). The Juvenile Act defines a ‘child’ as a person who is
    under eighteen years of age. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302. Typically,
    most crimes involving juveniles are tried in the juvenile court of
    the Court of Common Pleas.
    Our legislature, however, has deemed some crimes so heinous
    that they are excluded from the definition of ‘a delinquent act.’
    Pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a) and § 6355(e), when a
    juvenile is charged with a crime, including murder or any of the
    other offenses excluded from the definition of ‘delinquent act’ in
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302, the criminal division of the Court of Common
    Pleas is vested with jurisdiction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302.[1]
    ____________________________________________
    1Section 6302 of the Juvenile Act excludes rape, aggravated assault, robbery,
    and attempted murder from the definition of a “delinquent act” where a deadly
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    When a case involving a juvenile goes directly to the criminal
    division, the juvenile can request treatment within the juvenile
    system through a transfer process called ‘decertification.’ To
    obtain decertification, it is the juvenile's burden to prove, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that transfer to the juvenile court
    system best serves the public interest. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6322(a).
    Pursuant to § 6322(a), the decertification court shall
    consider the factors contained in § 6355(a)(4)(iii) in
    determining whether the child has established that the
    transfer will serve the public interest. These factors are as
    follows:
    (A)      the impact of the offense on the victim or
    victims;
    (B)      the impact of the offense on the community;
    (C)      the threat to the safety of the public or any
    individual posed by the child;
    (D)      the nature and circumstances of the offense
    allegedly committed by the child;
    (E)      the degree of the child's culpability;
    (F)      the adequacy and duration of dispositional
    alternatives available under this chapter and in
    the adult criminal justice system; and
    (G)      whether the child is amenable to treatment,
    supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by
    considering the following factors:
    (I) age;
    ____________________________________________
    weapon was used during the commission of the offense. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6302,
    “Delinquent Act” (2)(ii)(A), (2)(ii)(C), (2)(ii)(D), and (2)(ii)(I). As a result,
    pursuant to Section 6322, it was proper to commence prosecution of
    Appellant's offenses in the court of common pleas criminal division rather than
    in juvenile court. 42 Pa.C.S.A. 6322(a).
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    J-S03044-18
    (II) mental capacity;
    (III) maturity;
    (IV) the degree of criminal         sophistication
    exhibited by the child;
    (V) previous records, if any;
    (VI) the nature and extent of any prior
    delinquent history, including the success or
    failure of any previous attempts by the juvenile
    court to rehabilitate the child;
    (VII) whether the child can be rehabilitated prior
    to the expiration of the juvenile court
    jurisdiction;
    (VIII) probation or institutional reports, if any;
    (IX) any other relevant factors.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6355(a)(4)(iii).
    While the Juvenile Act requires that a decertification court
    consider all of these factors, it is silent as to the weight assessed
    to each by the court. However, when a juvenile seeks to have his
    case transferred from the criminal division to the juvenile division,
    he must show that he is in need of and amenable to treatment,
    supervision or rehabilitation in the juvenile system.          If the
    evidence presented fails to establish that the youth would benefit
    from the special features and programs of the juvenile system and
    there is no special reason for sparing the youth from adult
    prosecution, the petition must be denied and jurisdiction remains
    with the criminal division.
    The ultimate decision of whether to certify a minor to stand trial
    as an adult is within the sole discretion of a decertification court.
    This Court will not overturn a decision to grant or deny
    decertification absent a gross abuse of discretion. An abuse of
    discretion is not merely an error of judgment but involves the
    misapplication or overriding of the law or the exercise of a
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    manifestly unreasonable          judgment   based    upon    partiality,
    prejudice or ill will.
    Commonwealth v. Thomas, 
    67 A.3d 838
    , 841–43 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    (quoting    Commonwealth          v.     Brown,    
    26 A.3d 485
    ,   491–493
    (Pa.Super.2011)) (quotation marks and footnote omitted).              Further, our
    Supreme Court has clarified that “[a] juvenile court must consider all of the
    factors set forth in Section 6355 of the Juvenile Act, but it need not address,
    seriatim, the applicability and importance of each factor and fact in reaching
    its final determination.” Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    555 Pa. 37
    , 46, 
    722 A.2d 1030
    , 1034 (1999).
    In this case, Appellant admits that the trial court did address each of
    the factors set forth in Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) in its opinion supporting its
    decision to deny decertification. However, Appellant argues that the trial court
    unfairly emphasized the severity of the crime and did not give sufficient weight
    to his “age, intellect, upbringing, lack of family, lack of criminal sophistication,
    unremarkable     criminal   history,   potential rehabilitation,   amenability   to
    treatment, mental health, and substance abuse.”           Appellant’s Brief, at 21.
    Appellant also suggests that the trial court dismissed the testimony of defense
    expert Dr. Dattilio and unfairly favored the expert opinion of Commonwealth
    expert Dr. O’Brien.
    In this case, the trial court’s November 22, 2016 opinion thoroughly and
    thoughtfully addresses its considerations of the factors set forth in Section
    6355 that it made in reaching its decision to deny Appellant’s request for
    decertification. As we find the trial court did not commit a gross abuse of
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    J-S03044-18
    discretion in reaching its conclusion, which is supported by the record, we find
    Appellant’s challenge to be meritless.
    Second, we review Appellant’s claim that the lower court abused its
    discretion in imposing an “overly harsh and excessive sentence.” Appellant’s
    Brief, at 7. While Appellant concedes that all of his sentences fall within the
    standard range of the sentencing guidelines, Appellant specifically argues that
    “the consecutive nature of the sentences and the resulting aggregate sentence
    are excessive even in light of [Appellant’s] loathsome and abhorrent criminal
    conduct.” Appellant’s Brief, at 25.
    Appellant has raised a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence. It is well established that:
    Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
    entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging
    the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's
    jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
    We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
    appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
    and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
    sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether appellant's brief has a fatal defect,
    Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question
    that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
    Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
    Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally
    waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a
    motion to modify the sentence imposed.
    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    137 A.3d 611
    , 618 (Pa.Super. 2016)
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    Upon review of the record, we note that Appellant failed to preserve his
    challenge to the consecutive nature of his sentences in the lower court at
    sentencing or in his post-sentence motion.         See Taylor, supra.   Rather,
    Appellant claimed that the lower court abused its discretion in (1) failing to
    consider various mitigating factors, such as his troubled upbringing and his
    lack of a criminal record, and (2) in improperly considering facts related to
    charged offenses to which Appellant did not enter a guilty plea. Post Sentence
    Motion, 4/21/17, at 2.2 Therefore, Appellant has waived his challenge to the
    consecutive nature of his sentences by failing to properly preserve it before
    the trial court.
    Moreover, Appellant also failed to include his specific challenge to the
    consecutive nature of his sentences in his statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b). The trial court’s order filed June 15, 2017 informed Appellant that
    “any issue not properly included in the [Rule 1925(b)] Statement timely filed
    and served shall be deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues
    not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the
    provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived”). As Appellant did not include
    this particular sentencing challenge in his Rule 1925(b) statement, his claim
    is waived on this basis as well.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    2Appellant does not raise or develop these claims on appeal. As a result, we
    need not review them further.
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    J-S03044-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/1/18
    - 11 -
    Circulated 02/09/2018 10:11 AM
    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
    COUNTY OF WAYNE
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, :
    vs.
    AZAIAH TAHIR WILLIAMS,
    Defendant                                                       NO. 384-CRIMINAL-2015
    OPINION
    In the above captioned case, Defendant is charged with Rape by Forcible Compulsion (Fl);
    Burglary- Overnight Accommodation, Person Present (Fl); Robbery with Serious Bodily Injury
    to Another (Fl); Attempted Criminal Homicide (Fl); Aggravated Assault-Deadly Weapon (F2);
    and Aggravated Assault - Serious Bodily Injury (Fl). Defendant was sixteen (16) days away from
    his sixteenth (161h) birthday when the alleged crimes were committed. On December 31, 2015,
    Defendant filed a Motion for Decertification. This Court held a Decertification Hearing on October
    19, 2016. Defendant's Motion was denied at the conclusion of said hearing. This Court issues the
    following written opinion in support of its October 19, 2016 Decision.
    Decertification
    Pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6322(a), when a juvenile has committed a crime, which
    includes murder, or any of the other offenses listed under paragraph 2(ii) or (iii) of the definition
    of "delinquent act" in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6302, the criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas
    is vested with jurisdiction. Likewise, 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6355(e) explains that charges of murder, or
    any of the other offenses listed under paragraph (2)(ii) or (iii) of the definition of "delinquent act"
    in 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6302, requir� I� tjj� offense be prosecuted in the criminal division. When a
    .
    '724 A.2d 371
    ,
    373 (Pa. Super. 1999). In determining whether to transfer such a case from criminal division to
    juvenile division, "the child shall be required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
    the transfer will serve the public interest." 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6322(a).
    Pursuant to Section 6322(a), the decertification court shall consider the factors contained
    in Section 6355(a)(4)(iii) in determining whether the child has established that the transfer will
    serve the public interest. The statutorily set factors to be considered are as follows.
    (A) The impact of the offense on the victim or victims;
    (B)    The impact of the offense on the community;
    (C) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child;
    (D) The nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly committed by the child;
    (E)    The degree of the child's culpability;
    (F)    The adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives available under this chapter and
    in the adult criminal justice system; and
    (G) Whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a juvenile by
    considering the following factors:
    I.   Age;
    II.   Mental capacity;
    III.   Maturity;
    IV.    The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the child;
    V.    Previous records, if any;
    Page 2 of8
    VI.    The nature and extent of any prior delinquent history, including the success or
    failure of any previous attempts by the juvenile court to rehabilitate the child;
    VII.    Whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile
    court jurisdiction;
    VIII.   Probation or institutional reports, if any;
    IX.    Any other relevant factors
    42 Pa. C.S.A. § 6355(a)( 4)(iii). The ultimate decision of whether to certify a minor to stand trial
    as an adult is within the sole discretion of a decertification court. Com. v. Jackson, 
    722 A.2d 1030
    ,
    1034 (Pa. 1999). A decertification court must consider all of the factors set forth in Section 6355
    of the Juvenile Act, but it need not address, seriatim, the applicability and importance of each
    factor and fact in reaching its final determination. 
    Id.
    A.      The impact of the offense on the victim or victims
    The impact of the offense on the victim, Dorothy Krasley, is profound. Ms. Krasley was
    eight-three (83) years old when the Defendant allegedly entered her home and stabbed her in the
    neck, chest and back with a steak knife. After being repeatedly stabbed, the Defendant allegedly
    raped a profusely bleeding Ms. Krasley. The physical and emotional impact of these heinous
    crimes is immeasurable.
    B.      The impact of the offense on the community
    The impact of the offense on the community is also profound. A lot of unease is created
    when an eighty-three (83) year old women is brutally victimized in her own home by a complete
    stranger.
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    C.       The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child
    The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the child is high. Since
    early childhood, the Defendant has committed various violent acts. The various acts include
    kicking his foster family's dog, stabbing a classmate with a compass, and threatening a classmate
    with a sawblade. All of these incidents occurred while the Defendant was receiving medication
    and therapy for his mental health issues. Despite mental treatment, the Defendant has not shown
    any improvement; in fact, the record shows a progression in Defendant's violent behavior. This
    progression is alarming and unpredictable.
    D.       The nature and circumstances of the offense allegedly committed by the child
    The nature and circumstances of the offenses allegedly committed by the child are
    appalling. On September 24, 2015, the Defendant allegedly proposed to two (2) companions that
    they should go house to house, knocking on people's doors, asking for money. When the Defendant
    knocked on the door to Ms. Krasley's residence, an eighty-three (83) year old woman confronted
    him. The Defendant allegedly pushed his way into Ms. Krasley's home and stabbed her in the
    neck, chest and back with a steak knife. While Ms. Krasley was lying and bleeding on the floor,
    the Defendant allegedly went through her belongings and took various items, including credit
    cards. Before leaving Ms. Krasley's residence, the Defendant allegedly raped her or at least
    denigrated Ms. Krasley by ejaculating onto her.
    E.       The degree of the child's culpability
    The degree of the child's alleged culpability is high. The Defendant not only created a plan
    to steal from unsuspected victims, but also acted consistent with that plan by knocking on the door
    Page 4 of8
    to Ms. Krasley's residence. Although Defendant informed Dr. Dattilio and Dr. O'Brien that he
    was under the influence of hallucinogens and ecstasy when the crimes were committed, this Court
    is not persuaded that Defendant's actions were influenced by drugs; the Defendant never reported
    his drug use to police and was able to clearly recall the events of September 24, 2015.
    F.       The adequacy and duration of dispositional alternatives available under this
    chapter and in the adult criminal justice system
    Dr. Dattilio recommended that the Defendant be placed in Danville Juvenile Detention
    Center. This Court is not persuaded by Dr. Dattilio's testimony. Despite having access to
    medication and therapy for mental health issues since early childhood, the record shows a
    progression in Defendant's violent behavior.
    G.      Whether the child is amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation as a
    juvenile.
    This Court does not find the child to be amenable to treatment, supervision or rehabilitation
    as a juvenile.
    I.   Age: The Defendant is currently seventeen (17) years old.
    II.   Mental capacity: According to Dr. Dattilio and Dr. O'Brien, the Defendant
    has an average IQ. However, the Defendant scored well above average on
    the Verbal Comprehension Index.
    III.   Maturity: This Court perceives the Defendant to be a mature young adult;
    there was no evidence indicating otherwise.
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    IV.   The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the child: The degree
    of criminal sophistication exhibited by the child is high. The Defendant not
    only created a plan to steal from unsuspected victims, but also acted
    consistent with that plan by knocking on the door to Ms. Krasley's
    residence. A high degree of criminal sophistication is also exhibited by
    evidence that the Defendant hid credit cards stolen from Ms. Krasley under
    his mattress.
    V.   Previous records, if any: The Defendant has been in the Juvenile System
    as a dependent child since the age of two (2). Since early childhood, the
    Defendant has committed various violent acts. The various acts include
    kicking his foster family's dog, stabbing a classmate with a compass, and
    threatening a classmate with a sawblade. In July of 2015, two (2) short
    months prior to the current incident, the Defendant was found by law
    enforcement living on the streets in Scranton, Pennsylvania with a hatchet
    and knife in his possession. In connection with the Scranton incident, the
    Defendant was adjudicated delinquent on September 20, 2015 and
    identified as a juvenile in need of treatment, supervision and rehabilitation.
    VI.   The nature and extent of any prior delinquent history, including the
    success or failure of any previous attempts by the juvenile court to
    rehabilitate the child: At the age of ten (10), the Defendant went through
    the Lehigh County Juvenile System when he brought a sawblade to school
    and threatened a classmate with it. The Defendant received a consent decree
    Page 6 of8
    as a result of this offense. Despite going through the Lehigh County Juvenile
    System, the Defendant continued to be defiant and violent.
    VII.   Whether the child can be rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the
    juvenile court jurisdiction: This Court does not find that the child can be
    rehabilitated prior to the expiration of the juvenile court jurisdiction.
    According to Dr. O'Brien, the Defendant has behavioral problems that do
    not respond to treatment. This Court finds Dr. O'Brien's assessment to be
    more accurate and worthy of weight than Dr. Dattilio's assessment owing
    in part, but not entirely, to Dr. Dattilio's failure to disclose the results of the
    MMPI and the consent decree received by the Defendant when he was ten
    (10) years of age.
    VIII.   Probation or institutional reports, if any: Reports from the Wayne
    County Correctional Facility, where the Defendant is currently being
    detained, advises that the Defendant has made plans to escape, plans to kill
    others, and plans to hang himself with shoelaces. According to Dr. Dattilio,
    the Defendant informed him that he did not intend to act on any of those
    plans. Other reports from the Wayne County Correctional Facility indicate
    that the Defendant argues with Correctional Officers and refuses to follow
    orders.
    IX.    Any other relevant factors: The Defendant demonstrated a callousness for
    the value of human life when he left Ms. Krasley profusely bleeding without
    contacting someone for help. The Defendant's flat demeanor during the
    Decertification Hearing also demonstrated to this Court a lack of remorse.
    Page 7 of8
    ----��------ ----------------------------------------
    Conclusion
    The Defendant has failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the transfer
    from criminal division to juvenile division will serve the public interest.
    BY THE COURT
    cc: �hard
    ._..--; .
    B. Henry, Esq .
    District Attorney
    KW
    /I -    Z3 � /�
    Page 8 of8