Haynes, T. v. Riverside Presbyterian Apts. ( 2018 )

J-A14027-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
TWILA HAYNES : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
RIVERSIDE PRESBYTERIAN APTS. : No. 2896 EDA 2017
Appeal from the Order Entered September 1, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
No(s): August Term, 2017, No. 2975
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and PLATT*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 17, 2018
Appellant, Twila Haynes, appeals pro se from the order dismissing, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, her complaint filed
against Appellee, Riverside Presbyterian Apartments. We affirm.
The trial court summarized the history of this case as follows:
[Appellant] commenced this action against Riverside
Presbyterian Apartments by Complaint. Plaintiff
contemporaneously filed a Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
(“IFP”), which was assigned to this court. As permitted under
Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1), the court reviewed the IFP Petition and the
Complaint.
The Complaint sets forth a series of allegations regarding
[Appellant’s] employment by [Appellee] as an apartment complex
security guard from 2012 until her termination in 2014. Initially,
the Complaint states:
4. On or about March 17, 2014, [Appellant] went to
the emergency room, where [Appellant] was told she
has a upper respiratory infection and was given
medicine
____________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A14027-18
5. On or about April 3, 2014 [Appellant] was seen by
her doctor and was informed her respiratory infection
has returned and the doctor gave [Appellant] a
medical profile (note)
6. The letter stated, it is medically necessary for
[Appellant] to were [sic] a surgical mask while at work
due to the exposure of other ill individual [sic] for
medical reason
7. On or about April 10, 2014 until June 20, 2014
[Appellee] was fine with [Appellant] wearing a surgical
mask do [sic] to her upper respiratory infection
8. On or about June 20, [Appellant] was asked by
[Appellee] for a doctor’s note
9. On or about August 28, 2014 [Appellant] arrived at
work [at] Riverside Presbyterian Apartments around
4:20 pm, and was called into management office and
was told, by management to [Appellant] she no longer
work here [sic] at Riverside Presbyterian Apartment
10. As a result of Riverside Presbyterian Apartments
plaintiff [sic] breach of contract and violation of ADA
Title 1 (American Disability Act) Plaintiff Civil Rights
was violated
The Complaint also describes injuries that [Appellant]
allegedly sustained during her employment. Specifically, the
Complaint alleges [Appellant] injured her neck, wrist, and
shoulder while performing maintenance of tenants’ heaters, snow
removal, operation of a security gate, and removing a water hose
from a parking lot.
It is unclear which causes of action are being pled. The
Complaint implies, but does not state, that [Appellant] was
unjustly terminated. In terms of [Appellant’s] alleged injuries, the
Complaint states “[Appellant’s] right to seek damages as a result
of negligence while working at [Appellee’s] facility which was not
a part of [Appellant’s] job description, during [Appellant’s] time of
employment through plaintiff [sic] employer.” The Complaint
does not state that [Appellee] caused the alleged injuries, only
that [Appellee] required [Appellant] to perform the services in
question.
The court reviewed the Complaint, in conjunction with the
Petition to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, and dismissed the action
as frivolous. This appeal followed.
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Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/17, at 1-2. The trial court did not order Appellant
to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court filed its Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion on October 23, 2017.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
When the court dismiss[ed Appellant’s] case, were appellant [sic]
rights violated?
Appellant’s Brief at 1.
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that she did not
plead sufficient facts to support her complaint. Appellant’s Brief at 3.
Appellant claims she stated sufficient facts declaring: “These facts were
Breach of Contract, Negligence, Violation of Americans Disability Act.”
Appellant’s Brief at 3. She also claims: “Plaintiff establish[ed], in her
complaint both facts and laws, these facts [a]re respiratory infection which
require plaintiff to wear a mask, which was determined to be a disability by
[Appellant’s] doctor.” Id.
Our review of a decision dismissing an action pursuant to Pa.R.C.P.
240(j) is limited to a determination of whether the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights have been violated and whether the trial court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law. Ocasio v. Prison Health Services, 979 A.2d
352, 354 (Pa. Super. 2009). Rule 240 sets forth the procedure by which a
person who lacks the financial resources to pay the costs of litigation may
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proceed in forma pauperis. Bell v. Mayview State Hospital, 853 A.2d 1058,
1060 (Pa. Super. 2004).
Subsection (j) of Rule 240 describes the obligation of the trial court once
a party seeks to proceed in forma pauperis. The following language from
subsection (j) is relevant herein:
If, simultaneous with the commencement of an action or
proceeding or the taking of an appeal, a party has filed a petition
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the court prior to acting
upon the petition may dismiss the action, proceeding or
appeal if the allegation of poverty is untrue or if it is satisfied
that the action, proceeding or appeal is frivolous.
Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1) (emphases added).
“A frivolous action or proceeding has been defined as one that ‘lacks an
arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Pa.R.C.P. 240(j)(1) Note (quoting
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1990)). Under Rule 240(j), an action is
frivolous “if, on its face, it does not set forth a valid cause of action.” Ocasio,
979 A.2d at 354.
The trial court set forth the following discussion in support of its
reasoning that Appellant’s action is frivolous:
As noted above, it is unclear which causes of action are being pled
here. However, the Complaint makes specific reference to breach
of contract, negligence, and [a] violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. As the Complaint fails to allege facts necessary
to establish any of these causes of action, the Complaint was
properly dismissed.
A cause of action for breach of contract must be established
by pleading: (1) the existence of a contract, including its essential
terms; (2) a breach of a duty imposed by the contract; and (3)
resultant damages. Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. Am. Ash Recycling
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Corp. of Pennsylvania, 895 A.2d 595, 600 (Pa. Super.2006).
Here, there is no allegation of any contract between [Appellant]
and [Appellee], and the Complaint provides no details regarding
the terms of [Appellant’s] employment. Pennsylvania law holds
that employees are at-will, absent a contract, and may be
terminated at any time, for any reason or for no reason. Werner
v. Zazyczny, 545 Pa. 570, 578, 681 A.2d 1331, 1335 (1996). As
the Complaint fails to allege a contract between the parties, let
alone its essential terms, it fails to set forth a claim for breach of
contract.
To establish negligence by a defendant, a plaintiff must
prove four elements: (1) a duty or obligation recognized by law;
(2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection between the
conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damages. Toro
v. Fitness Int’l LLC, 150 A.3d 968, 977 (Pa. Super. 2016). Here,
the Complaint alleges that [Appellant] sustained injuries during
the course of her employment, but there is no allegation that
these injuries were caused by [Appellee’s] breach of a duty or
obligation.1 Without alleging these necessary elements, a cause
of action for negligence cannot be sustained. It is possible that
[Appellant] intended to state a claim under the Workers
Compensation Act. However, this court lacks the jurisdiction to
hear such a claim. See Gillette v. Wurst, 594 Pa. 544, 553, 937
A.2d 430, 435 (2007).
1 Although the date of the alleged negligence is not
provided, it would appear that [Appellant’s] claim
would be barred by the statute of limitations. The
Complaint states [Appellant] was terminated in 2014
and this action was not initiated until September,
2017. An action to recover damages for injuries to a
person caused by the wrongful act or neglect or
unlawful negligence of another must be commenced
within two years. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524.
To state a prima facie case under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he or she is
a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he or she is
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job,
with or without reasonable accommodations by the employer; and
(3) he or she has suffered an otherwise adverse employment
decision as a result of discrimination. Stultz v. Reese Bros.,
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Inc., 835 A.2d 754 (Pa. Super. 2003). Again, the Complaint fails
to make any factual allegations that these elements are met.
Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/17, at 3-5.
Upon careful review of the record, including Appellant’s brief and the
applicable law, and in light of this Court’s scope and standard of review, it is
our determination that the record supports the trial court’s analysis and its
determination that the complaint is frivolous. We agree with the trial court
that the factual matters alleged in Appellant’s complaint do not give rise to a
plausible claim against Appellee and that Appellant’s action has no arguable
basis in law or fact. We discern no violation of Appellant’s constitutional rights,
or abuse of discretion by the trial court in dismissing the complaint under Rule
240(j)(1). Accordingly, Appellant’s issue on appeal does not entitle her to
relief, and we affirm the order that dismissed the complaint.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/17/18
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