McVey, M. v. Pottstown Hospital Company ( 2018 )


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  • J-A03034-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    MATTHEW J. MCVEY, III, LEA BULLOCK            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
    AND ESTATE OF TREVAUGHN MCVEY,                          OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellants
    v.
    POTTSTOWN HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC,
    INDIVIDUALLY AND/OR D/B/A
    POTTSTOWN MEMORIAL MEDICAL
    CENTER AND/OR D/B/A POTTSTOWN
    EMERGENCY MEDICINE ASSOCIATES,
    POTTSTOWN MEMORIAL MEDICAL
    CENTER, POTTSTOWN EMERGENCY
    MEDICINE ASSOCIATES, TODAY’S KID’S
    PEDIATRICS, P.C., ESTATE OF THOMAS
    J. BELL, D.O., DECEASED, MARVIN H.
    KROMASH, M.D., K. CONRAD, PA-C AND
    TRI-COUNTY EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS,
    INC.,
    Appellees               No. 1148 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 12, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Civil Division at No.: 2009-43943
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                             FILED MARCH 15, 2018
    Appellants, Matthew J. McVey, III, and Lea Bullock, and the estate of
    their late son TreVaughn McVey, purport to appeal from the denial of their
    ____________________________________________
    *   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A03034-18
    post-trial motion in this wrongful death and survival action alleging medical
    malpractice.1, 2 TreVaughn died of the flu at age four. Appellants claim the
    physician’s assistant (P.A.) failed to offer a flu shot for TreVaughn to his
    mother, Ms. Bullock, at his annual physical examination a month or so earlier.
    The P.A. claimed she did. There is no dispute that the P.A. did not record
    either an offer or a refusal on TreVaughn’s medical chart. The jury rendered
    a verdict for the defendants. The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether
    the trial court erred in excluding testimony from Appellants’ expert witness
    about the standard of care for omission of information on TreVaughn’s chart,
    as beyond the scope of his expert’s report. Appellants maintain the ruling
    prevented their expert from testifying that the failure to document a refusal
    of a flu vaccination was a deviation from the relevant standard of care. We
    affirm.
    ____________________________________________
    1 Although counsel purports to appeal from the denial of the post-trial motion,
    appeals are properly taken from the entry of judgment after the denial of the
    post-trial motion. See Pa.R.A.P. 301; Pa.R.C.P. 227.4; Eichman v. McKeon,
    
    824 A.2d 305
    , 310 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 
    839 A.2d 352
     (Pa.
    2003) (appeal to Superior Court properly taken from judgment entered after
    trial court has ruled on post-trial motions), see also Johnston the Florist,
    Inc. v. TEDCO Const. Corp., 
    657 A.2d 511
    , 512 (Pa. Super. 1995). We have
    amended the caption accordingly.
    2Appellants sued numerous defendants, but the case proceeded to trial only
    against Today’s Kids Pediatrics, P.C., the estate of Thomas J. Bell, D.O., (who
    was deceased by time of trial, see N.T. Trial, 7/15/16, at 827), and P.A. Kristie
    Conrad. (See Trial Court Opinion, 6/13/17, at 1 n.1). The estate of Dr. Bell,
    and his practice group, were later dismissed from the case. (See Order,
    4/12/17).
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    J-A03034-18
    As noted, TreVaughn, then age four, died of the flu on February 29,
    2008, about five weeks after his annual physical examination on January 17,
    2008. At trial, Appellants asserted that P.A. Kristie Conrad failed to offer a flu
    shot for TreVaughn at his January visit. Ms. Bullock testified that she would
    have agreed to one if it had been recommended. P.A. Conrad testified that
    she could not remember whether she offered, and Ms. Bullock refused, a flu
    shot for TreVaughn. She nevertheless claimed, based on her general practice,
    that she did offer (and always recommended) a flu shot.3            P.A. Conrad
    conceded that she did not record either her offer of a flu shot or Ms. Bullock’s
    declination on TreVaughn’s chart. (See N.T. Trial, 7/15/16, at 786-87).
    P.A. Conrad also acknowledged on cross-examination that she was
    taught in her P.A. training “if it isn’t documented, it didn’t happen[.]” (Id. at
    791; see also Trial Ct. Op., at 7). However, P.A. Conrad added her personal
    observation that “you can’t always document every single thing that takes
    place during a visit. It is just not physically possible.” (N.T. Trial, 7/15/16,
    at 804; see also Trial Ct. Op. at 8).
    ____________________________________________
    3 P.A. Conrad testified that she believed in flu shots, got them for herself and
    her own children and recommended them for all her patients. She added that
    TreVaughn would have had to return to the office for a flu shot, because on
    the day of his annual examination he had a low-grade fever and cold
    symptoms. (See Trial Ct. Op., 6/13/17 at 6 (citing N.T. Trial, 7/15/16, at
    790-92)). At his examination, TreVaughn did receive vaccinations for
    diphtheria, tetanus, pertussis, and polio. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 1-2). Posters
    in the medical center and office handout literature recommended flu shots for
    the patients.
    -3-
    J-A03034-18
    Appellants sought to have their expert, Dr. Bennett Kaye, testify that
    P.A. Conrad should have documented that the flu vaccine was recommended
    and refused. (See Trial Ct. Op. at 8; see also N.T. Trial, 7/12/16, at 144).
    However, after Dr. Kaye made this statement (based on a similar
    recommendation and refusal involving a certified pediatric nurse practitioner
    the year before), defense counsel objected on the ground that the assertion
    (that the failure to document is a deviation from the standard of care) was
    beyond the scope of Dr. Kaye’s written expert report.         (See N.T. Trial,
    7/12/16, at 146).
    After protracted discussion and argument, the trial court sustained the
    objection, and directed counsel to begin a new question. (See 
    id.
     at 146-
    154). The jury rendered a verdict for the defendants. Counsel for Appellants
    filed a notice of appeal after the trial court denied the motion for post-trial
    relief.4
    Appellants raise one question on appeal, which we reproduce verbatim
    except for the bracketed identification of the parties and the final question
    mark:
    Upon below [Appellants’] trial objection, did the Court of
    Common Pleas’ err in sustaining that objection to Dr. Bennett
    ____________________________________________
    4 As already noted, counsel’s notice of appeal, taken from the denial of the
    post-trial motion, was premature. But see Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (notice of
    appeal filed after announcement of determination but before entry of
    appealable order treated as filed after such entry and on day thereof); (see
    also *1 n.1 supra). Both Appellants and the trial court complied with
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -4-
    J-A03034-18
    Kaye’s anticipated testimony regarding the requisite practice to
    document (i.e., “chart”) [sic] whether flu shots were discussed
    with Appellants − which claimed refusal of the shot was
    dispositively argued by below [Appellees] (without documented
    support)[?].
    (Appellants’ Brief, at 10).
    Our standard of review is well-settled:
    When we review a ruling on the admission or exclusion of
    evidence, including the testimony of an expert witness, our
    standard is well-established and very narrow. These matters are
    within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we may reverse
    only upon a showing of abuse of discretion or error of law. An
    abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate
    court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a
    result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias,
    or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous. In
    addition, [t]o constitute reversible error, an evidentiary ruling
    must not only be erroneous, but also harmful or prejudicial to the
    complaining party.
    Jacobs v. Chatwani, 
    922 A.2d 950
    , 960 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied,
    
    938 A.2d 1053
     (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
    In this case, our independent review of the record confirms that
    Appellants were not prejudiced. It bears noting that even though the trial
    court excluded further testimony about the standard of care, the jury was
    permitted to hear Dr. Kaye’s testimony that the recommendation of a flu
    vaccination on January 9, 2007 (at the preceding annual visit), and any
    refusal, was not recorded on TreVaughn’s chart, and should have been. (See
    N.T. Trial, 7/12/16, at 144).
    -5-
    J-A03034-18
    Additionally, we agree with the trial court that there is no cognizable
    cause of action in Pennsylvania for negligent record keeping without any
    accompanying evidence of causation. (See Trial Ct. Op., at 10).
    Here, there is no evidence of causation. Nor could there be. The failure
    to document a recommendation of a flu shot, and its refusal, did not cause,
    and could not cause, TreVaughn’s death from influenza. Appellants offer no
    authority to the contrary.
    Instead, they point us to the previously noted training maxim that “if it
    is not documented then it did not happen.”           (Appellants’ Brief, at 18).
    However, this mere bald assertion is not a legal principle, and cannot
    substitute for one. Whatever value it may have as a teaching tool, it is not,
    contrary to Appellants’ assertion, proof that an event did or did not occur.
    P.A.   Conrad    conceded    she   had   not   documented    a   flu   shot
    recommendation (and refusal) on TreVaughn’s chart.           Nevertheless, she
    maintained that she offered one. The entire question of whether P.A. Conrad
    recommended a flu shot and Ms. Bullock refused it (or not), is really an issue
    of credibility.   Weighing credibility was the province of the jury sitting as
    factfinder. By its verdict, the jury obviously weighed the conflicting testimony
    and found for the Appellees. We discern no basis to disturb the credibility
    determination of the jury.
    Appellants also assert that the purported omission entitles them to a
    new trial. This argument does not merit relief either.    “[W]e will not reverse
    -6-
    J-A03034-18
    the denial of a motion for a new trial absent a gross abuse of discretion or
    error of law by the trial court.” Jacobs, supra at 96 (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). For the reasons already discussed, we conclude
    that Appellants have failed to meet their burden to persuade this Court that
    they were prejudiced in such a way as to merit a new trial.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/15/18
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1148 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 3/15/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/15/2018