Com. v. Cruz, M. ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • J-S23040-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                         :
    :
    :
    MARIA CRUZ                                :
    :
    Appellant             :   No. 2348 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 19, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-23-CR-0007399-2016
    BEFORE:       SHOGAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                           FILED MAY 29, 2018
    Appellant, Maria Cruz, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, which sitting as finder of
    fact in Appellant’s non-jury trial convicted her of Unauthorized Use of a Motor
    Vehicle, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3928(a). Sentenced to one year of probation, Appellant
    contends the court erred by not granting at the preliminary hearing her motion
    to quash the bill of information for the Commonwealth’s purported failure to
    make out a prima facie case against her. We affirm.
    The trial court aptly sets forth the pertinent facts and procedural history
    as follows:
    On October 12, 2016, Appellant was arrested and charged with
    Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, Receiving Stolen Property,
    Theft by Deception-False Imprisonment, and Theft by Unlawful
    Taking-Movable Property.
    ____________________________________
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S23040-18
    A Preliminary Hearing was held on November 11, 2016, in front of
    the Honorable Judge Leonard V. Tenaglia in Darby, Delaware
    County. At the hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence
    from Mr. William Wilmont and Edward Hurley. Mr. Wilmont
    testified that he is employed by Chester Pike Auto Sales in
    Delaware County, Pennsylvania. N.T. 11/23/17 at 6. Appellant
    had purchased two vehicles, a Town and Country Minivan and a
    Nissan Rogue, from the lot in Philadelphia, South Philly Auto
    Sales; both vehicles were registered to Appellant. N.T. at 9. After
    complications with the Appellant’s payment schedule, she was
    instructed to bring both vehicles back and was told that she would
    be refunded the money she had already paid for vehicles. N.T. at
    7.
    On September 7, 2016, a repossession company repossessed the
    Nissan Rogue and transported it to Chester Pike Auto Repair, in
    Delaware County. N.T. at 12. Appellant and her daughter
    eventually turned in the Minivan and Appellant’s money, in the
    amount of $5,260.00, was refunded to her. N.T. at 6-7. Appellant
    turned in a set of keys for each vehicle. N.T. at 8. The Minivan
    was transported to the lot at Chester Pike Auto Sale, located up
    the street, also in Delaware County. N.T. at 10.
    The following day, both cars were missing from the respective lots.
    N.T. at 8. Mr. Wilmont called the police to report the Minivan
    stolen from the lot. N.T. at 8.
    Mr. Hurley testified that he runs Chester Pike Auto Repair in
    Delaware County, Pennsylvania, working on repairs and towing
    vehicles. N.T. at 16, 20. On September 7, 2016, Mr. Hurley came
    to work and noticed that a Nissan Rogue, which was parked on
    the front of their lot, [and] with the keys hanging on his board,
    was missing. N.T. at 16. Mr. Hurley contacted the Sharon Hill
    Police Department to report the vehicle as stolen. N.T. at 16.
    On October 11, 2016, Mr. Hurley received a phone call from
    Chester Pike Auto Sales relaying a message that the missing
    vehicles were located in a lot in Philadelphia. Mr. Hurley drove to
    the location in Philadelphia and observed the vehicle in a private
    parking lot.     Mr. Hurley contacted the Philadelphia Police
    Department. Upon their arrival, police officers made contact with
    Appellant and her daughter. After about an hour of investigation,
    Appellant turned over keys to the Minivan to the police and began
    removing her belongings from the Minivan. N.T. at 19.
    -2-
    J-S23040-18
    After the Preliminary Hearing, Appellant was bound over to the
    Court of Common Pleas on the following charges: One count of
    Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle, one count of Receiving
    Stolen Property and one count of Theft by Unlawful Taking, all in
    reference to the Minivan.
    On January 19, 2017, counsel for Appellant filed a Motion to Quash
    the Information. On February 27, 2017, after a hearing and a
    review of the Notes of Testimony from the November 23, 2017,
    Preliminary Hearing, [the trial] court denied the Motion.
    After a non-jury trial conducted on June 19, 2017, Appellant was
    found guilty of Unauthorized Use of a Motor Vehicle and not guilty
    of Receiving Stolen Property and Theft by Unlawful Taking.
    Trial Court Opinion, 10/2/17, at 1-3.
    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and, on August 15, 2017, filed
    her Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal raising the
    following issue:   “The Court erred in not granting [Appellant’s] Motion to
    Quash the Information due to the absence of any evidence that Ms. Cruz
    committed any offense in Delaware County.” Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    Statement, filed 8/15/17.
    In Appellant’s brief, she presents the following question for our review:
    DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING THE
    [APPELLANT’S] MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION
    DUE TO THE COMMONWEALTH’S FAILURE TO MAKE A
    PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR ANY OFFENSE AT HER
    PRELIMINARY HEARING AND THE ABSENCE OF ANY
    EVIDENCE THAT MS. CRUZ COMMITTED ANY OFFENSE IN
    DELAWARE COUNTY?
    Appellant’s brief at 5.
    Appellant’s issue on appeal is that the Commonwealth’s evidence at the
    preliminary hearing was insufficient to establish a prima facie case as to the
    -3-
    J-S23040-18
    elements of the charged offenses and with respect to the offenses having
    occurred in Delaware County. Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim,
    however, because, as this Court has held:
    The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to avoid the incarceration
    or trial of a defendant unless there is sufficient evidence to
    establish a crime was committed and the probability the defendant
    could be connected with the crime. Commonwealth v. Wodjak,
    
    502 Pa. 359
    , 
    466 A.2d 991
     (1983). Its purpose is not to prove
    defendant's guilt. Once appellant has gone to trial and been found
    guilty of the crime, any defect in the preliminary hearing is
    rendered immaterial.
    Commonwealth v. Tyler, 
    587 A.2d 326
    , 329 (Pa.Super. 1991) (emphasis in
    original). See also Commonwealth v. Lee, 
    662 A.2d 645
    , 650 (Pa. 1995)
    (holding adjudication of guilt on a charge renders moot any allegation that
    Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case for that charge at the
    preliminary hearing).
    Here, Appellant was found guilty at her non-jury trial of engaging in the
    unauthorized use of a motor vehicle in Delaware County. This guilty verdict
    renders immaterial and moot the defects alleged to have occurred in the
    preliminary hearing. Consequently, we need not address Appellant’s issue, as
    it is confined to the preliminary hearing phase of her case.
    Judgment of sentence is AFFIRMED.
    -4-
    J-S23040-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/29/18
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2348 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 5/29/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/29/2018