Com. v. Rivera, D. ( 2017 )

J-S02020-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
DAVID RIVERA
Appellant No. 3732 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 30, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0010239-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and MOULTON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2017
Appellant, David Rivera, appeals from the October 30, 2015 judgment
of sentence imposing three to ten years of incarceration for possession with
intent to deliver a controlled substance1 (“PWID”) and conspiracy.2 Counsel
has filed a brief and petition to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967) and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.
2009). We affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to
withdraw.
The trial court summarized the facts in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:
____________________________________________
1
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
2
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903.
J-S02020-17
On July 8, 2014, at about 7:00 p.m., Philadelphia Police
Officer John Seigafuse, a member of the 25th Police District’s
Narcotics Enforcement Team, was assigned with other team
members to conduct a drug investigation in the 3300 block of N.
5th Street. Seigafuse and his partner, Officer Eric Crawford,
commenced a surveillance of the 3300 block from inside their
vehicle. Upon doing so, Officer Seigafuse observed Appellant
speaking to a male later identified as Ronald Burke on the 3300
block of N. 5th Street. During the conversation, Appellant and
Burke were approached by one Carl Paris after which both
Appellant and Burke removed United States currency from their
pockets and handed it to Paris, who put the money into his
pants. Paris then walked to a gold Chevy Tahoe parked on the
500 block of Westmoreland Street.
Paris stayed in the car for a short while before returning to
the 3300 block of N. 5th Street where he handed Appellant a
small object. Officer Seigafuse saw Appellant ball his hand
around the object, cross the street, and then place the object
behind steps along a wall of a residence situated on the east side
of the street. Appellant then sat on the steps of that residence
as Paris walked up and down the block. After approximately ten
minutes, Burke was approached by another male identified as
Juan Ramos, who handed him money. Burke put the money in
his pants’ pocket, walked to a nearby abandoned property and
retrieved small objects from a blue packet located in a pile of
trash. Burke handed the objects to Ramos and then returned
the blue packet to the trash pile. Ramos walked away and was
stopped by members of the back-up team assisting Officer
Seigafuse and his partner. From Ramos police recovered an
orange-tinted Ziploc packet filled with what later testing revealed
to be crack cocaine.
About five minutes after Ramos engaged in the transaction
with Burke a man named Hector Torres engaged Burke in a
similar transaction after which he was stopped. Recovered from
Torres was one orange-tinted crack filled packet.
Shortly thereafter, a man named Angel Burros approached
Appellant and began a short conversation during which Burgos
handed Appellant money. After taking the money from Burgos,
Appellant proceeded to the location where he earlier placed the
object he received from Paris, picked up a clear plastic bag, and
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J-S02020-17
removed an item handing it to Burgos. Buros was stopped by
police who recovered a clear packet filled with powdered cocaine.
After observing this third transaction, Officer Seigafuse
directed members of his back-up team to stop Appellant, Burke,
and Paris. Police recovered $83.00 from Appellant. Police
recovered $599.00 from Paris. Sergeant Wali Shabazz, who
apprehended Appellant, then, proceeded, at Officer Seigafuse’s
behest, to the location where Officer Seigafuse saw Appellant
place the object he received from Paris. Shabazz recovered a
clear plastic bag filled with eleven packets containing powdered
cocaine. In addition, Officer Seigafuse directed Officer Czapor to
the location of the trash pile where Burke was observed
obtaining small objects that he gave to Ramos and Torres.
Officer Czapor recovered a blue aluminum foil packet that, inter
alia, contained two orange-tinted Ziploc packets of crack cocaine
that were identical to the packets recovered from Torres and
Ramos. All of the items collected by police were placed on
property receipts.
Following the apprehension of Appellant, Burke, and
Torres, police obtained a search warrant to search the gold
Tahoe. Upon executing the warrant, police seized $3,410 and a
bag filled with seven bundles containing twelve clear packets of
powdered cocaine, identical to the eleven clear packets
recovered on 5th Street from behind the steps. In addition,
Officer Seigafuse identified each of the males apprehended by
his back-up officers.
Trial Court Opinion, 6/20/2016, at 2-4 (record citations omitted).
A jury found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned offenses after an
August 2015 trial. The trial court imposed the aforementioned sentence on
October 30, 2015. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion. The trial
court denied the post-sentence motion on November 24, 2015. This timely
appeal followed.
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J-S02020-17
Before we address the merits, we consider whether counsel’s brief and
petition to withdraw comply with these requirements of Anders and
Santiago:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to
the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
Counsel must also advise the defendant of his rights to “(1) retain new
counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any
points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s attention in addition to
the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.” Commonwealth v.
Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 936 A.2d 40
(Pa. 2007). We have reviewed counsel’s filings and found them in
compliance with the foregoing. We will now consider the merits.
The Anders brief addresses the sufficiency of the evidence in support
of Appellant’s PWID and conspiracy convictions. In particular, the Anders
brief addresses whether the Commonwealth proved that Appellant was in
constructive possession of any controlled substances, and whether the
Commonwealth proved that Appellant formed an agreement with another
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J-S02020-17
person to distribute controlled substances. These are the same issues
Appellant raised in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925 concise statement of errors.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as follows:
When evaluating a sufficiency claim, our standard is
whether, viewing all the evidence and reasonable inferences in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the factfinder
reasonably could have determined that each element of the
crime was established beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court
considers all the evidence admitted, without regard to any claim
that some of the evidence was wrongly allowed. We do not
weigh the evidence or make credibility determinations.
Moreover, any doubts concerning a defendant's guilt were to be
resolved by the factfinder unless the evidence was so weak and
inconclusive that no probability of fact could be drawn from that
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 332 (Pa. Super. 2010), appeal
denied, 29 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2011).
To sustain a conviction for PWID, “the Commonwealth must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt only that, on a specific occasion, the defendant
possessed a controlled substance he was not licensed to possess, and that
he did so under circumstances demonstrating an intent to deliver that
substance.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 15 (Pa. Super. 2002),
appeal denied, 868 A.2d 1198 (Pa. 2005). “Intent may be inferred from an
examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.” Id.
Likewise, to sustain a conspiracy conviction, the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant: “(1) entered into an
agreement to commit or aid in an a criminal act with another person or
persons (2) with a shared criminal intent and that (3) an overt act was done
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J-S02020-17
in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d
543, 560 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009).
We have reviewed the Anders brief, the Commonwealth’s brief, the
record, and the trial court’s opinion. Appellant did not file a response to
counsel’s petition to withdraw. We conclude the trial court’s June 20, 2016
opinion thoroughly and accurately addresses the sufficiency of the evidence,
and we adopt the trial court’s analysis as our own. Our independent review
of the record reveals no other issues of arguable merit. We therefore affirm
the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/13/2017
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Circulated 03/22/2017 04:05 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRIAL DIVISION-CRIMINAL SECTION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : PHILADELPIDA COURT
: OF COMMON PLEAS
: CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
v. : CP·Sl·CR-0010239-2014
CP·51·CR·0010239-2014 Comm. v. Rivera. David
Opinion
DAVID RIVERA
I
II I I II Ill 111111111111111
7462612061
FILED
JUN 2 0 2016
OPINION
Criminal Appeals Unit
First Judicial District 01 PA
MCCAFFERY, J
David Rivera (hereinafter "Appellant") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed
by this Court on October 30, 2015. For the reasons set forth below, it is suggested that the
judgment of sentence be affirmed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August, 2015, Appellant was tried by a jury and found guilty of Manufacture,
Delivery, or Possession With Intent to Manufacture or Deliver a Controlled Substance
(hereinafter "PWID"), 35 P.S. § 780-113 § (A)(30), and Conspiracy to commit PWID, 18
Pa.C.S. § 903. On October 30, 2015, this Court imposed concurrent sentences of three to ten
years' incarceration upon Appellant.
Following the imposition of sentence, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion which this
Court denied on November 24, 2015. Appellant thereafter filed a notice of appeal and a court
ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. In his 1925(b) statement, Appellant asserts that the
evidence is insufficient to sustain the PWID and Conspiracy convictions.
1
FACTUAL HISTORY
On July 8, 2014, at about 7:00 p.m., Philadelphia Police Officer John Seigafuse, a
member of the 25th Police District's Narcotics Enforcement Team, was assigned with other team
members to conduct a drug investigation in the 3300 block of N. 5th Street. Seigafuse and his
partner, Officer Eric Crawford, commenced a surveillance of the 3300 block from inside their
vehicle. (N.T. 8/12/15, 52-53). Upon doing so, Officer Seigafuse observed Appellant speaking
to a male later identified as Ronald Burke on the 3300 block of N.5Lh Street. (N.T. 8/12/15, 57).
During the conversation, Appellant and Burke were approached by one Carl Paris after which
both Appellant and Burke removed United States currency from their pockets and handed it to
Paris, who put the money into his pants. (N.T. 8/12/15, 57-58, 62-63). Paris then walked to a
gold Chevy Tahoe parked on the 500 block of Westmoreland Street. (N.T. 8/12/15, 58).1
Paris stayed in the car for a short while before returning to the 3300 block of N.51h Street
where he handed Appellant a small object. (N.T. 8/12/15, 59). Officer Seigafuse saw Appellant
ball his hand around the object, cross the street, and then place the object behind steps along a
wall of a residence situated on the east side of the street. (Jg). Appellant then sat on the steps of
that residence as Paris walked up and down the block. (N.T. 8/12/15, 60, 63).
After approximately ten minutes, Burke was approached by another male identified as
Juan Ramos, who handed him money. (N.T. 8/12/15, 64). Burke put the money in his pants'
pocket, walked to a nearby abandoned property and retrieved small objects from a blue packet
located in a pile of trash. (N.T. 8/12/15, 64). Burke handed the objects to Ramos and then
returned the blue packet to the trash pile. (N.T. 8/12/15, 64). Ramos walked away and was
stopped by members of the back-up team assisting Officer Seigafuse and his partner. (N.T.
I
When Paris walked to the Tahoe, he went out of Officer Seigafuse's view and was then observed by Officer
Osvaldo Toribo, a member of the back-up team. (N.T. 8/12/15, 126).
2
8/12/15, 64, 130-131). From Ramos police recovered an orange-tinted Ziploc packet filled with
what later testing revealed to be crack cocaine. (N.T. 8/12/15, 64-65).
About five minutes after Ramos engaged in the transaction with Burke a man named
Hector Torres engaged Burke in a similar transaction after which he was stopped. (N.T. 8/12/15,
67-68). Recovered from Torres was one orange-tinted crack filled packet (N.T. 8/12/15, 68,
139).
Shortly thereafter, a man named Angel Burgos approached Appellant and began a short
conversation during which Burgos handed Appellant money.' (N.T. 8/12/15, 68-69, 80). After
taking the money from Burgos, Appellant proceeded to the location where he earlier placed the
object he received from Paris, picked up a clear plastic bag, and removed an item handing it to
Burgos. (N.T. 8/12/15, 69). Burgos was stopped by police who recovered a clear packet filled
with powdered cocaine. (N.T. 8/12/15, 69-70, 146).
After observing this third transaction, Officer Seigafuse directed members of his back-up
team to stop Appellant, Burke, and Paris. (N.T. 8/12/15, 70). Police recovered $83.00 from
Appellant. (N.T. 8/12/15, 72, 195). Police recovered $599.00 from Paris. (N.T. 8/12/15, 164).
Sergeant Wali Shabazz, who apprehended Appellant, then, proceeded, at Officer Seigafuse's
behest, to the location where Officer Seigafuse saw Appellant place the object he received from
Paris. Shabazz recovered a clear plastic bag filled with eleven packets containing powdered
cocaine. (N.T. 8/12/15, 73, 192-193, 200). In addition, Officer Seigafuse directed Officer
Czapor to the location of the trash pile where Burke was observed obtaining small objects that he
gave to Ramos and Torres. (N.T. 8/12/15, 73). Officer Czapor recovered a blue aluminum foil
packet that, inter alia, contained two orange-tinted Ziploc packets of crack cocaine that were
identical to the packets recovered from Torres and Ramos. (N.T. 8/12/15, 73- 75, 177). All of the
2
Burgos was also referred to by the first name of Anthony.
3
items collected by police were placed on property receipts.
Following the apprehension of Appellant, Burke, and Torres, police obtained a search
warrant to search the gold Tahoe. (N.T. 8/12115, 83). Upon executing the warrant, police seized
$3,410 and a bag filled with seven bundles containing twelve clear packets of powdered cocaine,
identical to the eleven clear packets recovered on 5th Street from behind the steps. (N.T. 8112115,
84; 8/13/15, 21, 33). In addition, Officer Seigafuse identified each of the males apprehended by
his back-up officers. (N.T. 8/12/15, 115, 188).
Appellant's mother, Iccia Estrella, testified that on the morning of his arrest she gave
Appellant $100.00 to buy sneakers. (N .T. 8/13/15, 64-65). Ms. Estrella conceded that she did
not know what Appellant did for the rest of the day. (N .T. 8/13/15, 66).
DISCUSSION
In his 1925(b) statement, Appellant raises the following claims:
1. WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
APPELLANT'S DRUG CONVICTION BECAUSE
THE APPELLANT WAS MERELY PRESENT AND
THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO PROVE
BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
APPELLANT POSSESSED ANY DRUGS WITH
INTENT TO DELIVER THEM EITHER DIRECTLY
OR CONSTRUCTIVELYOR THAT HE WAS AS AN
ACCOMPLICE OR CO-CONSPIRATOR OF THE
POSSESSORS OF THE DRUGS OR THAT HE
AGREED WITH ANYONE TO POSSESS THE
DRUGS?
2. WAS THE EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
APPELLANT'S CONSPIRACY CONVICTION
BECAUSE THE COMMONWEALTH FAILED TO
PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
DEFENDANT FORMED AN AGREEMENT WITH
ANOTHER PERSON THE OBJECT OF WHICH WAS
TO POSSESS OR DISTRIBUTE ILLEGAL DRUGS?
Appellant's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement.
4
Appellant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his PWID conviction
because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he possessed drugs or was an accomplice or co-
conspirator. He also claims that the evidence was insufficient because it established only that he
was merely present in the area where the investigation took place. His second issue challenges
the sufficiency of the Conspiracy conviction claiming that the Commonwealth failed to prove
that he entered an agreement with any other person the object of which was to possess illegal
drugs.
In reviewing a claim that alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support a verdict,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court provided the following standard of review:
[Tjhe critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction ... does not require a
court to 'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it must
determine simply whether the evidence believed by the fact-finder
was sufficient to support the verdict ... [A]ll of the evidence and
any inferences drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner.
Commonwealth v. Ratsamy, 934 A.2d 1233, 1235-1236 (Pa. 2007) (emphasis in original).
The Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical certainty, and it may
sustain its burden by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 932
A.2d 226, 231 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted). A reviewing court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the fact finder, and where the record contains support for the convictions,
they may not be disturbed. Id. Lastly, the finder of fact is free to believe some, all, or none of the
evidence presented. Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 804 (Pa. Super. 2006).
With regard to the PWID conviction our General Assembly has defined PWID as
follows:
5
[T]he manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to
manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person
not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered
or licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly
creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a
counterfeit controlled substance.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30).
· [T]o sustain a conviction [for PWID] the Commonwealth must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt only that, on a specific occasion,
the defendant possessed a controlled substance he was not licensed
to possess, and that he did so under circumstances demonstrating
an intent to deliver that substance. Intent may be inferred from an
examination of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
Factors which may be relevant in establishing that drugs were
possessed with the intent to deliver include the particular method
of packaging, the form of the drug, and the behavior of the
defendant.
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 15 (Pa. Super. 2002).
A "delivery" is "the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer from one person to another
of a controlled substance, other drug, device or cosmetic whether or not there is an agency
relationship." 35 P.S. § 780-102. To prove that a delivery occurred, the Commonwealth must
prove that the defendant knowingly made an actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a
controlled substance to another person without the legal authority to do so. Conunonwealth v.
Murphy, 844 A.2d 1228, 1234 (Pa.2004). PWID may be inferred from the facts and
circumstances surrounding the case. Commonwealth v. Daniels, 999 A.2d 590, 595
(Pa.Super.2010). Factors that may be relevant to establish PWID include packaging, the form of
the drug, and the defendant's behavior. Id.
Here, because the drugs were not found on Appellant's person, the Commonwealth was
required to prove that he had constructive possession over them. Commonwealth v. Macolino,
469 A.2d 132, 134 (Pa. 1983). To prove constructive possession, the Commonwealth must show
6
that the accused "exercise] d] a conscious dominion over the illegal [ contraband.]"
Commonwealth v. Valette, 613 A.2d 548, 550 (Pa. 1992). Conscious dominion is the "power to
control the contraband and the intent to exercise that control." Id., citing Commonwealth v.
Mudrick, 507 A.2d 1212, 1213 (Pa. 1986).
Constructive possession can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances. Id, In
Commonwealth v. Macolino, 469 A.2d 132, (Pa. 1983), the court held that "it was reasonable for
the fact-finder to conclude that the appellee maintained a conscious dominion over the cocaine
found in the bedroom closet which he shared solely with his wife." Id. at 136. The Court also
noted that the law prohibiting possession of contraband would not make sense if a person could
store the contraband in a shared space to avoid prosecution. Id. Regardless, "the fact that another
person may also have control and access does not eliminate the defendant's constructive
possession; two actors may have joint control and equal access and thus both may constructively
possess the contraband." Commonwealth v. Haskins, 677 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa. Super. 1996)
(citing Mudrick, 507 A.2d at 1213-14).
Drawing all inferences in favor of the Commonwealth as the law requires, it is clear that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the verdict finding Appellant guilty of the charge of PWID.
Here, the eleven packets of powdered cocaine were inside a bag Appellant received from Paris.
Appellant was then observed placing the drugs against a building behind its stairs. Thus the jury
concluded that he had actual possession of the cocaine packets, which was immediately
accessible to Appellant and, in fact, was accessed by Appellant during his interaction with
Burgos, who later was found in possession of a packet identical to those found inside the bag.
The jury thus properly rejected the mere presence argument.
The evidence was more than sufficient to sustain Appellant's drug conviction because
7
Appellant had constructive possession of the bag and its eleven packets of cocaine. In addition,
because the evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant
possessed the drugs, his claim that he was not an accomplice or co-conspirator with the person or
persons who possessed the drugs lacks merit. Because Appellant engaged in drug sales, there
clearly was sufficient evidence that he possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver regardless of
the existence of a conspiracy. Appellant's PWID conviction rests solely on his actions on the day
of the police investigation and was not predicated on a theory of vicarious liability.
Accordingly, it is respectfully suggested that the instant claim be deemed lacking in
merit.
In his second and final claim, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his Conspiracy to commit PWID conviction because the Commonwealth did not prove
that Appellant entered into an agreement the object of which was to possess or distribute illegal
drugs. "To sustain a conviction for Criminal Conspiracy, the Commonwealth must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the defendant (1) entered into an agreement to commit or aid in an a [sic)
criminal act with another person or persons (2) with a shared criminal intent and that (3) an overt
act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Commonwealth v. Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 560
(Pa. Super. 2008) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 920 A.2d 873, 878 (Pa.Super.
2007)).
The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving a conspiracy wholly by means of
circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703, 708 (Pa. Super. 2007).
An agreement to commit a criminal act may be proven by
reasonable inferences, but not by suspicion or speculation. Id. An
agreement can be inferred from a variety of circumstances
including, but not limited to, the relation between the parties,
knowledge of and participation in the crime, and the circumstances
and conduct of the parties surrounding the criminal episode. These
8
factors may coalesce to establish a .conspiratorial agreement
beyond a reasonable doubt where one factor alone might fail.
***
Circumstances like an association between alleged conspirators,
knowledge of the commission of the crime, presence at the scene
of the crime, and/or participation in the object of the conspiracy,
are relevant when taken together in context, but individually each
is insufficient to prove a conspiracy.
Applying the foregoing to the evidence presented at trial leads ineluctably to the
conclusion that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of proving that Appellant conspired
with, inter alia, Paris to sell cocaine. Appellant was observed giving United States currency to
Paris who thereafter gave Appellant a bag that upon recovery by police contained eleven packets
of cocaine. Paris remained in the area where Burke and Appellant were selling drugs acting as an
overseer. Moreover, the eleven packets of drugs found in the bag recovered by police were
identical to packets found in the Tahoe Paris was seen entering. The bag containing the eleven
packets Appellant received from Paris most likely contained twelve individual packets of cocaine
when Paris gave it to Appellant, as did each of the seven bundles found inside the Tahoe. It
contained eleven packets when seized by police because Appellant sold a packet to Burgos. This
evidence was more than sufficient to establish that Paris and Appellant were acting pursuant to
an arrangement formed between the two. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to sustain Appellant's
PWID conviction and it is suggested that Appellant's claim with respect to this issue be denied.
See Commonwealth v. Perez, 931 A.2d 703 (Pa. Super. 2007) (evidence sufficient to prove
appellant's guilt for PWID and conspiracy, where appellant sold drugs supplied to him by his
cohort); Commonwealth v. McCall, 911 A.2d 992, 997 (Pa. Super. 2006) (evidence sufficient for
9
conspiracy to commit PWID where the appellant served as a lookout and held money for his
cohort, even where he did not hold drugs).
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully suggested that the judgment of sentence entered
in this matter against Appellant be affirmed.
BY THE COURT,
Date: fo / 1 7 / I ~ y:1~ Daniel D. Mccaffery, J.
10