Com. v. Glaab, J. ( 2018 )

J-A13001-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSEPH RYAN GLAAB :
:
Appellant : No. 588 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence March 20, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0012166-2016
BEFORE: OLSON, J., DUBOW, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 12, 2018
Appellant, Joseph Ryan Glaab, appeals his judgment of sentence
entered on March 20, 2017 in the Criminal Division of the Court of Common
Pleas of Allegheny County. We affirm.
This case proceeded to a non-jury trial based upon stipulated facts as
set forth in the affidavit of probable cause. The trial court summarized those
facts as follows:
Essentially, [Appellant] was a tenant [in] an apartment owned by
Paul Paulick. Due to various problems Mr. Paulick [had with
Appellant], Mr. Paulick [] evicted [Appellant from the dwelling].
After [Appellant] vacated the apartment, Mr. Paulick went to the
apartment to check [its] condition[.] Upon [entry,] he observed
substantial damage to the apartment including, but not limited to,
graffiti on the walls, holes in the walls, missing and destroyed
ceiling fixtures, spray-painted walls and light switches, destroyed
bathroom fixtures, broken screens, a destroyed counter top,
destroyed furniture, missing doors and syrup all over the carpets
and ceiling. Mr. Paulick telephoned [Appellant] on that same date
and [Appellant] stated to Mr. Paulick “How do you like the
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apartment”. The total monetary damage to the apartment
exceeded $7,000.[00.] Based on this evidence, th[e trial c]ourt
convicted [Appellant of one count of criminal mischief pursuant to
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(4) and sentenced him to three years’
probation. This timely appeal followed.]
Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/17, at 1-2.
On appeal, Appellant claims that the evidence was insufficient to sustain
his conviction for criminal mischief. Specifically, he contends that, although
the Commonwealth demonstrated his presence and access to the rental unit,
it failed to prove that he defaced the premises. We disagree.
Appellant’s claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence adduced by
the Commonwealth to prove his commission of an offense.1 Our standard of
review in considering sufficiency challenges is well settled.
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In
addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by
the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be
resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and
inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be
drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
____________________________________________
1 Because Appellant’s claim challenges the sufficiency of the evidence offered
to prove that he perpetrated the offense sub judice, we need not discuss the
precise elements of the crime. We simply note that § 3304(a)(4) defines
criminal mischief as “[intentional defacement or other damage] to tangible
public property or tangible property of another with graffiti by use of any
aerosol spray-paint can, broad-tipped indelible marker or similar marking
device[.]” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(4).
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beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
considered. Finally, the finder of fact while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
This standard is equally applicable to cases where the evidence is
circumstantial rather than direct so long as the combination of the
evidence links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. Although a conviction must be based on more than mere
suspicion or conjecture, the Commonwealth need not establish
guilt to a mathematical certainty.
Commonwealth v. Brockman, 167 A.3d 29, 38 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(quotation omitted), appeal denied, 176 A.3d 235 (Pa. 2017).
The trial court offered the following explanation for finding that
Appellant committed criminal mischief in the instant case.
The evidence set forth in the [a]ffidavit of [p]robable cause
established that [Appellant] was the tenant of the apartment that
[sustained] the extensive damage recited above. It was clear that
[Appellant] was involuntarily evicted from the apartment and after
being evicted, [Appellant] made a smug comment to Mr. Paulick
about the condition of the [rental unit. The trial court believed]
that this evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that [Appellant]
had control over the apartment at the time the damage occurred
and his comments about the damage to the apartment constituted
sufficient circumstantial evidence that [Appellant] knew of the
damage before he left the apartment and also caused the damage.
[Appellant’s] control of the apartment and his knowledge of the
damage to [it] render [Appellant’s] sufficiency claim baseless.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/17, at 4.
We concur in the trial court’s assessment. The thrust of Appellant’s
contention is that the Commonwealth’s proof, as stipulated in the affidavit of
probable cause, failed to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed
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criminal mischief in defacing Mr. Paulick’s rental unit. Specifically, he
maintains that the evidence did not exclude the possibility that any one or
more of the three apartment residents could have caused the damage. See
Appellant’s Brief at 13. Alternatively, Appellant asserts that the evidence did
not preclude the possibility that some unknown individual entered and
damaged the rental unit between the time of eviction and the time that Mr.
Paulick discovered the damage. See id. Contrary to Appellant’s contentions,
however, our standard of review does not require the Commonwealth to dispel
every possibility of innocence. Indeed, the fact-finder is entitled to resolve all
doubts about Appellant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive
that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. Here, the trial court relied upon Appellant’s remark to Mr.
Paulick to infer that Appellant had both access to the rental unit and
knowledge of its damaged condition. Appellant’s participation in causing the
damage was reasonably inferred from his early awareness of the condition of
the premises, which was his taunt conveyed to Mr. Paulick. In view of the
combined circumstances present in this case – i.e. Appellant’s access to the
apartment, his awareness of its damaged condition, and his motive to damage
the property in response to his recent eviction – we perceive no error in the
trial court’s decision to find Appellant guilty of criminal mischief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/12/2018
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