Com. v. Ruiz, M. ( 2017 )

J-S07033-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
MIGUEL ANGEL RUIZ, :
:
Appellant : No. 1276 MDA 2016
Appeal from the PCRA Order June 21, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division, No(s): CP-36-CR-0003468-1991
BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED APRIL 13, 2017
Miguel Angel Ruiz (“Ruiz”) appeals, pro se, from the Order dismissing
his fourth Petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
(“PCRA”). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
In September 1991, Ruiz killed a car dealer during a test drive. On
June 23, 1992, Ruiz entered into a negotiated guilty plea to one count each
of murder of the first degree, robbery, and criminal conspiracy in exchange
for the Commonwealth not seeking the death penalty. That same day, the
trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of life in prison. Ruiz did not file
a direct appeal.
Ruiz previously filed three PCRA Petitions, all of which were denied or
dismissed. On May 16, 2016, Ruiz filed the instant PCRA Petition. The PCRA
court issued a Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907 Notice. Ruiz
filed a pro se Response. Thereafter, the PCRA court dismissed Ruiz’s
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Petition. Ruiz filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a court-ordered
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise Statement.
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA
level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court
and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court’s
ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal
error.
Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted).
Initially, under the PCRA, any petition “including a second or
subsequent petition, shall be filled within one year of the date the judgment
becomes final[.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1) (emphasis added). A judgment
of sentence becomes final “at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the
expiration of time for seeking the review.” Id. § 9545(b)(3). The PCRA’s
timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature, and a court may not
address the merits of the issues raised if the PCRA petition was not timely
filed. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010).
Here, Ruiz’s Petition is facially untimely under the PCRA. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b). However, Pennsylvania courts may consider an
untimely petition if the appellant can explicitly plead and prove one of three
exceptions set forth at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)–(iii). Any PCRA petition
invoking one of these exceptions “shall be filed within 60 days of the date
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the claim could have been presented.” Id. § 9545(b); Albrecht, 994 A.2d
at 1094.
Here, Ruiz invokes the newly-recognized constitutional right exception
based on Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). See Brief for
Appellant at 4-18.1 In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that any fact that
increases the sentence for a given crime must be submitted to the jury and
found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2155. The
Supreme Court reasoned that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs where
these sentence-determinative facts are not submitted to a jury. Id. at
2156. Ruiz argues that because Alleyne renders his sentence illegal, there
is no need to determine whether Alleyne applies retroactively. See Brief for
Appellant at 5-6, 7, 13, 15-17, 18.
Initially, based upon our review of the written sentencing Order and
the sentencing hearing transcript, the trial court did not impose a mandatory
minimum sentence. However, even if the trial court had imposed a
mandatory minimum sentence, Ruiz’s May 16, 2016 PCRA Petition was filed
well over sixty days after June 17, 2013, the date that Alleyne was decided.
1
Ruiz cites to various cases from this Court and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania that held that mandatory minimum sentencing statutes to be
unconstitutional based upon the reasoning in Alleyne. See, e.g., Brief for
Appellant at 4-5, 6, 7-13, 18. However, the rulings in those cases are based
solely upon Alleyne, and the Courts did not state that those rulings apply
retroactively. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 102 A.3d 988, 995 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (recognizing that “a new rule of constitutional law is applied
retroactively to cases on collateral review only if the United States Supreme
Court or our Supreme Court specifically holds it to be retroactively applicable
to those cases.”).
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See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923
A.2d 513, 517 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that “[w]ith regard to [a newly]-
recognized constitutional right, this Court has held that the sixty-day period
begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.”).
Further, the rule established in Alleyne does not apply retroactively
where, as here, the judgment of sentence is final. See Commonwealth v.
Washington, 142 A.3d 810, 820 (Pa. 2016) (holding that “Alleyne does
not apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review.”); see also
Miller, 102 A.3d at 995 (stating that while Alleyne claims go to the legality
of the sentence, a court cannot review a legality claim where it does not
have jurisdiction). Ruiz failed to meet the requirements of the newly-
recognized constitutional right exception. Thus, the PCRA court properly
dismissed Ruiz’s fourth PCRA Petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/13/2017
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