Com. v. Hugaboom, T. ( 2017 )

J. A20034/17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
TODD A. HUGABOOM, : No. 1569 MDA 2016
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, June 29, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County
Criminal Division at No. CP-08-CR-0000129-2016
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED DECEMBER 08, 2017
Todd A. Hugaboom appeals from the June 29, 2016 judgment of
sentence of 12 to 60 months’ imprisonment imposed after he pled guilty to
one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) -- highest rate of alcohol.1
After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
On May 2, 2016, appellant pled guilty to DUI -- highest rate of alcohol, his
fourth lifetime DUI conviction and third offense in ten years. On June 27,
2016, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing, wherein it determined
that appellant was ineligible for county intermediate punishment (“CIP”)
under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9804(b)(5). (See notes of testimony, 9/27/16 at 6.)
1 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3802(c).
J. A20034/17
As noted, appellant was sentenced to 12 to 60 months’ imprisonment on
June 29, 2016. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence to modify his
sentence and a hearing was conducted on August 8, 2016. Following the
hearing, the trial court denied appellant’s motion on September 2, 2016.
This timely appeal followed on September 22, 2016. Although he was not
ordered to do so, appellant filed a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal, in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), on September 26, 2016.
The trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on January 18, 2017.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
Did the [trial] court err in interpreting
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9804(b)(5) to bar consideration
of a [CIP] sentence for an otherwise qualified
offender because the underlying conviction is a
fourth lifetime DUI conviction?
Appellant’s brief at 7. Appellant further averred at the sentencing hearing
that a CIP sentence was necessary because he needed treatment for alcohol.
(See notes of testimony, 9/27/16 at 2-3.)
Generally, our standard of review in assessing whether a trial court
has erred in fashioning a sentence is well settled.
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion
of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be
disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is
not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
[a]ppellant must establish, by reference to the
record, that the sentencing court ignored or
misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
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Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 117 A.3d 297 (Pa. 2015).
When an appellant’s claim implicates the discretionary aspects of his
sentence, as is the case here, the right to appellate review is not absolute.
See Commonwealth v. Allen, 24 A.3d 1058, 1064 (Pa.Super. 2011).
Rather, an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence
must invoke this court’s jurisdiction by satisfying the following four-part
test:
(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether
appellant preserved his issue; (3) whether
appellant’s brief includes a concise statement of the
reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal with
respect to the discretionary aspects of sentence; and
(4) whether the concise statement raises a
substantial question that the sentence is appropriate
under the sentencing code.
Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 64 A.3d 722, 725 (Pa.Super. 2013)
(citations omitted).
Here, the record reveals that appellant filed a timely notice of appeal
on September 22, 2016. The record further reflects that appellant preserved
his sentencing claim in a timely post-sentence motion and included a
statement in his brief that comports with the requirements of
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). (See appellant’s brief at 8-9.) Accordingly, we must
determine whether appellant has raised a substantial question.
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“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d
932, 935 (Pa.Super. 2013), appeal denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013)
(citation omitted). “At a minimum, the Rule 2119(f) statement must
articulate what particular provision of the code is violated, what fundamental
norms the sentence violates, and the manner in which it violates that norm.”
Zirkle, 107 A.3d at 132 (citation omitted).
Instantly, the crux of appellant’s claim concerns the trial court’s
application of the CIP eligibility statute in fashioning his sentence. This
statute provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(b) Eligibility.--
(5) A defendant subject to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3804
(relating to penalties) or 30 Pa.C.S.
§ 5502(c.1) may only be sentenced to
county intermediate punishment for a
first, second or third offense under
75 Pa.C.S. Ch. 38 (relating to driving
after imbibing alcohol or utilizing drugs)
or 30 Pa.C.S. § 5502.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9804(b)(5).
Appellant contends that “[t]he [trial] court’s interpretation of the
sentencing code regarding eligibility for CIP was inconsistent with the actual
[Section 9804(b)(5)],” and as a result, he was “denied a fair opportunity to
be eligible for a CIP sentence which he was otherwise qualified for.”
(Appellant’s brief at 8-9.) Appellant’s assertion that the trial court’s actions
were inconsistent with the sentencing code raises a substantial question for
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our review. See Commonwealth v. Glass, 50 A.3d 720, 727 (Pa.Super.
2012) (stating, “[a] substantial question exists only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were
either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or
(2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
process[]”), appeal denied, 63 A.3d 774 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, we proceed to consider the merits of appellant’s claim.
Appellant maintains that Section 9804(b)(5) applies to defendants that
are subject to the penalties set forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3804, and that under
Section 3804, DUI offenses are calculated pursuant to the ten-year
look-back provision set forth in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3806(b).2 (Appellant’s brief
2 Section 3806(b) provides as follows:
(b) Timing.--
(1) For purposes of sections 1553(d.2)
(relating to occupational limited license),
1556 (relating to ignition interlock
limited license), 3803 (relating to
grading), 3804 (relating to penalties)
and 3805 (relating to ignition interlock),
the prior offense must have occurred:
(i) within 10 years prior to the
date of the offense for which
the defendant is being
sentenced; or
(ii) on or after the date of the
offense for which the
defendant is being
sentenced.
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at 13-14.) Thus, appellant contends that because the first of his four
lifetime DUI convictions occurred more than ten years prior to the date of his
most recent DUI offense, the instant conviction should be classified as his
third offense under Section 9804(b)(5), thereby making him eligible for CIP.
(Id. at 14.) We disagree.
This court has long recognized that,
[i]n all matters involving statutory interpretation, we
apply the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1501 et seq., which provides that the object of
interpretation and construction of statutes is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General
Assembly.
Generally, a statute’s plain language provides
the best indication of legislative intent. We will only
look beyond the plain language of the statute when
words are unclear or ambiguous, or the plain
meaning would lead to a result that is absurd,
impossible of execution or unreasonable. Therefore,
when ascertaining the meaning of a statute, if the
language is clear, we give the words their plain and
ordinary meaning.
(2) The court shall calculate the number of
prior offenses, if any, at the time of
sentencing.
(3) If the defendant is sentenced for two or
more offenses in the same day, the
offenses shall be considered prior
offenses within the meaning of this
subsection.
75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3806(b).
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Commonwealth v. Popielarcheck, 151 A.3d 1088, 1091-1092 (Pa.Super.
2016) (internal quotation marks and some citations omitted), appeal
granted, 2017 WL 3712283 (Pa. 2017).
Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court in concluding that appellant was not eligible to receive a CIP sentence.
As discussed, appellant’s instant DUI offense was his fourth lifetime DUI
conviction. The unambiguous language of Section 9804(b)(5) clearly reveals
that a criminal defendant “may only be sentenced to [CIP] for a first,
second or third offense” under [the DUI statute.]” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9804(b)(5) (emphasis added). Contrary to appellant’s contention, it is
irrelevant under the plain language of Section 9804(b)(5) that not all of
appellant’s prior DUI convictions occurred within the past ten years. The
plain language of the statute does not contain any restrictive clause limiting
CIP eligibility to a ten-year look-back period.
Here, the trial court sentenced appellant to 12 to 60 months’
imprisonment, which was well within the standard-range of the Sentencing
Guidelines. In sentencing appellant, the trial court indicated that it reviewed
the pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report. (Notes of testimony, 9/27/16
at 1.) Where the trial court has the benefit of a PSI report, “we shall . . .
presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant information
regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d
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736, 761 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 95 A.3d 275(Pa. 2014). Based on the foregoing, we conclude that appellant’s challenge
to the discretionary aspects of his sentence must fail.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/10/2017
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