Com. v. Ferguson, B. ( 2017 )

J-A23019-17
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
BALIL L. FERGUSON, :
:
Appellant : No. 1050 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 10, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No.: MC-51-CR-0005238-2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED DECEMBER 08, 2017
In the instant matter, Appellant appeals from the November 10, 2015
Judgment of Sentence.1 Appellant argues that the Philadelphia Court of
Common Pleas erroneously affirmed the Philadelphia Municipal Court’s denial
of Appellant’s Motion to Suppress. After careful review, we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this memorandum, including the entry of
findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Municipal Court in accordance
with Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I).
On February 19, 2015, the Commonwealth filed a Criminal Complaint
in the Philadelphia Municipal Court charging Appellant with, inter alia,
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1 On November 10, 2015, the Municipal Court denied Appellant’s Motion to
Suppress, conducted a bench trial, and imposed Judgment of Sentence. The
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas’ December 28, 2015 Order
denied Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Thus, Appellant’s Judgment
of Sentence constitutes an appealable final Order. Pa.R.A.P. 341.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) after he was stopped driving a car that
matched the description of a vehicle that had been involved in a “hit and
run.”2 On September 18, 2015, Appellant litigated a Motion to Suppress in
the Municipal Court, claiming that police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop
his vehicle. N.T. Suppression, 9/18/15, at 4-5, 26-35.
The Commonwealth presented testimony from Philadelphia Police
Officer David Mockus; Appellant presented testimony from Briana Murray,
Appellant’s passenger the night of the police stop and the owner of the
vehicle. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Municipal Court denied
Appellant’s Motion to Suppress without entering findings of fact or
conclusions of law. After discussing some of the issues and asking counsel
questions about the motion, the court simply announced: “Therefore,
Motions are denied.” N.T. Suppression, 9/18/15, at 26-35.
That same day, Appellant immediately proceeded to trial before the
same Municipal Court judge, who found Appellant guilty of one count of DUI.
On November 10, 2015, the Municipal Court imposed an aggregate term of
three to six days’ imprisonment, with a concurrent term of 174 days’
probation.3
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2 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(1).
3The Municipal Court stayed Appellant’s sentence until Appellant litigated his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas.
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On December 1, 2015, Appellant filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in
the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, arguing that the
Municipal Court erroneously denied his Motion to Suppress. The Court of
Common Pleas denied Appellant’s Petition on December 28, 2015,
concluding that reasonable suspicion supported the stop of Appellant’s
vehicle and the Municipal Court properly denied his Motion to Suppress.
On January 27, 2016, Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Both
Appellant and the Court of Common Pleas complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.4
Appellant presents one issue in this appeal:
Where police received an anonymous tip stating that a white or
silver car with front bumper damage was involved in a hit-and-
run on northbound I-95, and minutes later saw [Appellant]
driving a gray car with front bumper damage on a street five
blocks away from an I-95 exit ramp, was not reasonable
suspicion lacking to stop him under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
In pertinent part, Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 provides:
Rule 581. Suppression of Evidence
(A) The defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented,
may make a motion to the court to suppress any evidence
alleged to have been obtained in violation of the defendant’s
rights.
* * *
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4 The Municipal court did not file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion.
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(H) The Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward
with the evidence and of establishing that the challenged
evidence was not obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights.
The defendant may testify at such hearing, and if the defendant
does testify, the defendant does not thereby waive the right to
remain silent during trial.
(I) At the conclusion of the hearing, the judge shall enter on the
record a statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law as
to whether the evidence was obtained in violation of the
defendant’s rights, or in violation of these rules or any statute,
and shall make an order granting or denying the relief sought.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(A), (H)-(I).
When the Municipal Court (1) denies a motion to suppress, (2) finds
the defendant guilty of a crime, and (3) imposes sentence, the defendant
has the right either to request a trial de novo or to file a petition for writ of
certiorari in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Pa.R.Crim.P.
1006(1)(a); Commonwealth v. Neal, 151 A.3d 1068, 1070 (Pa. Super.
2016). If the defendant files a petition for writ of certiorari and challenges
the denial of a motion to suppress, “the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County sits as an appellate court and reviews the record of the
suppression hearing in the Municipal Court.” Neal, supra at 1070 (citations
omitted).
“Importantly, when performing this appellate review, the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County applies precisely the same standard
that the Superior Court applies in appeals from Common Pleas Court orders
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denying motions to suppress.” Id. This Court recently reiterated this
standard as follows:
[T]he [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported
by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed
before the suppression court, the [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas
may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so
much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record,
the [C]ourt of [C]ommon [P]leas is bound by those findings and
may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are erroneous.
Where ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression
court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court’s
legal conclusions are not binding on the [C]ourt of [C]ommon
[P]leas, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court
properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of
law of the court below are subject to plenary review.
Id. at 1070-71 (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa.
2010)). “The scope of review from a suppression ruling is limited to the
evidentiary record created at the suppression hearing.” Neal, supra at
1071 (citing In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013)).
In Neal, we concluded that the same remedy applies whether a Court
of Common Pleas has denied a suppression motion without entering findings
of fact and conclusions of law or whether the Municipal Court has denied a
suppression motion without entering findings of fact and conclusions of law:
the court performing appellate review must vacate the order denying
suppression and remand with instructions for the suppression court to enter
findings of fact and conclusions of law. Neal, supra at 1071. This Court
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reasoned that there is no meaningful difference between this Court’s
appellate review of a Court of Common Pleas order denying a suppression
motion when compared to the Court of Common Pleas reviewing a Municipal
Court’s denial of a suppression motion in the context of a Petition for Writ of
Certiorari. Id. at 1071.
Here, the Municipal Court failed to enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in accordance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(I). The failure to do
so poses a substantial impediment to our meaningful and effective appellate
review.5 Accordingly, we must vacate and remand for further proceedings.
Consistent with our opinion in Neal, because the Municipal Court failed
to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law into this record, we order the
following:
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5 We acknowledge that this Court may, in certain circumstances, conclude
that a remand is unnecessary and apply an alternative standard of review.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Astillero, 39 A.3d 353, 357 (Pa. Super.
2012); Commonwealth v. Millner, 888 A.2d 680, 685 (Pa. 2005) (holding
that “[w]hen the suppression court’s specific factual findings are
unannounced, or there is a gap in the findings, the appellate court should
consider only the evidence of the prevailing suppression party [] and the
evidence of the other party [] that, when read in the context of the entire
record, remains uncontradicted.”). In this case, such a conclusion is
unwarranted and unworkable given the issues presented on appeal and the
relevant and significant facts in dispute, including: (1) the location of the
accident on I-95; (2) the location of Appellant’s vehicle when stopped in
proximity to the accident; (3) the proximity of Appellant’s vehicle to the
nearest I-95 exit when stopped by police; (4) whether the initial tip was
made by a police officer, a citizen, or an anonymous person; and (5) the
description of the damage to the vehicle’s front-end bumper as simply
damage or whether there was a piece of the bumper missing.
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(1) The Court of Common Pleas’ Order denying Appellant’s Petition for
Writ of Certiorari is vacated;
(2) This case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County with instructions to remand the case to the Municipal
Court and direct that court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law
within 30 days; and
(3) Following the Municipal Court’s entry of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County shall
reconsider Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari by reviewing the
evidentiary record in accordance with the standards articulated in Jones and
L.J., and reiterated in Neal.
We relinquish jurisdiction. See Neal, supra at 1071-72 (citing
Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694, 704 n.10 (“given our disposition
of this appeal, we decline to retain jurisdiction for the purposes of the filing
of a statement of the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect to the suppression issue”)).
Order denying Appellant’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari vacated. Case
remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/8/2017
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