In Re: Long, J., Appeal of: Lorenz, C. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: JAMES M. LONG, AN ALLEGED : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
INCAPACITATED PERSON : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: CAROL LORENZ, PH.D. : No. 491 WDA 2016
Appeal from the Order March 8, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans' Court Division, No(s): 7272 of 2014
BEFORE: DUBOW, MOULTON and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 14, 2017
Carol Lorenz, Ph.D. (“Lorenz”), appeals from the Order dismissing her
Exceptions and approving the payment of fees and costs to Lazarus Support
Services, LLC (“Lazarus Support Services”), in the amount of $11,503.75,
and to Arnold H. Caplan, Esquire (“Caplan”), in the amount of $4,282.10.
We affirm.
James M. Long (“Long”) (d/o/b 8/4/30) and Lorenz were married in
June 2001. Long had two children, Debra Petitt (“Petitt”) and Marshall Long,
prior to his marriage to Lorenz. On February 8, 2011, Long suffered a
stroke, which diminished his cognitive skills and caused his right arm to be
paralyzed. As a result of the stroke, Long required 24-hour care and
assistance with daily living. Subsequent to the stroke, Petitt and Lorenz
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maintained a hostile relationship based upon, inter alia, who had power of
attorney over Long and Long’s care.1
On August 4, 2015, Petitt filed a Petition seeking, inter alia, the
appointment of Rhonda Lazarus (“Lazarus”), the owner of Lazarus Support
Services, as temporary guardian for Long. On August 13, 2015, the
Orphans’ Court appointed Lazarus as “the temporary, limited guardian” for
Long, and directed Lazarus to obtain skilled nursing care and supervision for
Long.2 The Orphans’ Court also ordered Lazarus to be paid directly from
Long’s assets “at a rate not to exceed $125 per hour plus travel expenses,
subject to review by the Guardianship Department.” Order, 8/13/15. The
relationship between Lazarus and Lorenz was acrimonious, as evidenced by
lawsuit threats, lengthy depositions, and requests for documents. As a
result, Lazarus retained Caplan’s services.
In November 2015, the Orphans’ Court held a hearing to determine,
inter alia, whether a permanent guardian for Long was required. On
November 17, 2015, the Orphans’ Court determined that Long was
incapacitated and appointed Santoriella as the limited guardian of Long.
Based upon the appointment of Santoriella as guardian, Lorenz’s
1
In 2009, Long executed a Power of Attorney (“2009 Power of Attorney”)
naming Lorenz as his agent. Under the 2009 Power of Attorney, Lorenz,
inter alia, managed Long’s financial affairs.
2
Previously, on February 25, 2015, the Orphans’ Court had appointed
Rachael Santoriella, Esquire (“Santoriella”), as Long’s guardian ad litem.
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appointment as temporary guardian concluded. Long subsequently died on
December 17, 2015.
On December 7, 2015, Lazarus Support Services filed a Petition
seeking fees and expenses incurred for Long’s care totaling $11,305.75. On
December 8, 2015, Caplan filed a Petition seeking counsel fees in the
amount of $4,282.10. Lorenz filed a Response in Opposition to each
Petition. On February 2, 2016, following the review and recommendation of
the Guardianship Department,3 the Orphans’ Court granted the Petitions and
ordered that the payments must be made from Long’s funds, whether in his
name or held jointly with Lorenz, or from funds transferred to Lorenz.
Lorenz filed Exceptions to the Orders granting the Petitions. The Orphans’
Court dismissed the Exceptions, and approved the payments to Lazarus
Support Services and Caplan. Lorenz filed a timely Notice of Appeal and a
court-ordered Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b) Concise
Statement.
On appeal, Lorenz raises the following questions for our review:
3
In Allegheny County, the Guardianship Department in the Orphans’ Court
“handles all cases involving the appointment of guardians for minors and
incapacitated individuals. Court investigators review guardianship petitions
before presenting them to the judges for hearing dates; review petitions for
allowance when there is a request to pay legal or guardianship fees or when
invading the principal of the incapacitated person’s estate.” Fifth Judicial
District of Pennsylvania, County of Allegheny,
http://www.alleghenycourts.us/orphans/guardianship.aspx (last visited Jan.
12, 2017).
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1. Whether the [Orphans’ Court] erred in approving and
ordering that the estate of [] Long pay costs and fees to
Lazarus Support Services [] and [Caplan]?
a. Whether [] Lazarus’[s] fees are supported or
supportable by competent evidence?
b. Whether [] Caplan’s fees are supported or supportable
by competent evidence?
2. Whether the [Orphans’ Court] erred in ordering that costs and
fees of Lazarus Support Services [] and [Caplan] be paid in
part out of the personal accounts of [Lorenz], thereby
ignoring, negating and/or overriding the 2009 Power of
Attorney which names [Lorenz] as [] Long’s Power of
Attorney?
3. Whether the [Orphans’ Court] erred by failing to apply the
American Rule in determining which party should pay
attorney’s fees[?]
Brief for Appellant at 5.
Our standard of review of an [O]rphans’ [C]ourt’s decision
is deferential. When reviewing an [O]rphans’ Court decree, this
Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error
and whether the [O]rphans’ [C]ourt’s findings are supported by
the record. Because the [O]rphans’ [C]ourt sits as the finder of
fact, it determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on
review, this Court will not reverse its credibility determinations
absent an abuse of discretion. However, this Court is not bound
to give the same deference to the [O]rphans’ [C]ourt conclusions
of law. Where the rules of law on which the [O]rphans’ [C]ourt
relied are palpably wrong or clearly inapplicable, we will reverse
the court’s decree. Moreover, we point out that an abuse of
discretion is not merely an error of judgment. However, if in
reaching a conclusion, the court overrides or misapplies the law,
or the judgment exercised is shown by the record to be
manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice,
bias, or ill will, discretion has been abused.
In re Estate of Zeevering, 78 A.3d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
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In her first claim, Lorenz contends that the Orphans’ Court erred in
approving the payment of fees to Lazarus Support Services and Caplan
without holding an evidentiary hearing. Brief for Appellant at 32. Lorenz
argues that the record did not support the fees requested by Lazarus
Support Services. Id. at 34-35, 37, 38. Lorenz claims that the submission
of invoices for work performed for Long was insufficient to sustain the claim
for payment of the fees. Id. at 38-39. Lorenz further asserts that the
Orphans’ Court’s findings that (1) Long’s estate should pay the fees of
Lazarus Support Services because Lazarus’s services furthered Long’s
interests; (2) Lorenz threatened to sue Lazarus; and (3) Lazarus was
subjected lengthy depositions were not supported by the evidence of record.
Id. at 36-37. Lorenz also claims that contrary to the Orphans’ Court’s
finding, Petitt was responsible for the extensive deposition and discovery in
this case. Id. at 37-38.
“The allocation of the fees of the guardian …, including the amount
thereof and the source of payment, is a matter largely within the discretion
of the Orphans’ Court, and unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion,
the determination will not be disturbed on appeal.” In re Trust Estate of
Pleet, 410 A.2d 1224, 1232 (Pa. 1980). When reviewing the award of fees
to determine whether they are reasonable, courts should consider, inter alia,
the amount of work performed, the problems involved, and the services
rendered, whether routine or complicated. See generally In re LaRocca’s
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Trust Estate, 246 A.2d 337, 339 (Pa. 1968); In re Thompson’s Estate,
232 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. 1967) (stating that “when it comes to the question
of the appropriate compensation to be paid to appellant-trustee, we must
not lose sight of the fact that he is to be paid only in an amount
commensurate with the services which he performed in connection with the
administration of the trust.”).
In its Order appointing Lazarus as temporary guardian, the Orphans’
Court stated the following:
[A]fter review of the Petition filed and a conference with
attorneys and parties present, an Emergency Temporary Limited
Guardian of the Person and Estate is appointed …. Due to safety
concerns, starting immediately, [] Lazarus, of Lazarus Support
Services[,] is hereby appointed to serve as the temporary,
limited guardian for [] Long and to obtain skilled nursing care
and supervision of [] Long, as discussed with the attorneys in
the conference.
[] Lazarus shall be paid directly from [] Long’s estate, at a
rate not to exceed $125 per hour plus travel expenses, subject
to review by Guardianship Department.
Order, 8/13/15.
Subsequently, the Orphans’ Court entered an Order granting the
Petition filed by Lazarus Support Services for payment of fees, which stated
the following:
[U]pon consideration of the foregoing Petition for
Allowance for Authorization of Fees and Costs to Temporary
Guardian, and upon review and recommendation of the
Guardianship Department, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND
DECREED that fees and costs to Lazarus Support Services [],
appointed as Temporary Guardian per Order dated August 13,
2015, in the amount of $11,503.75 … for services through
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November 13, 2015, and costs incurred, on behalf of [] Long, an
incapacitated person, are approved. Payment shall be made
from the funds of [] Long, whether such funds are held in the
sole name of [] Long or jointly with another party including his
wife, [] Lorenz, or from funds of [] Long transferred from his
name to another party’s name including his wife, [] Lorenz[,] to
be paid by the Permanent Guardian of the Estate and/or by []
Lorenz upon the presentation of this Order….
Order, 2/2/16.
Here, Lazarus Support Services attached to its Petition seeking fees for
Lazarus’s services, an itemized statement of the services performed and the
time needed to complete each service. See, e.g., Orphans’ Court Opinion,
6/1/16, at 2 (stating that “Lazarus monitored [Long’s] well-being, arranged
for needed hospitalizations, arranged placements in nursing homes, made
medical decisions, and monitored and organized his financial information.”).
The Guardianship Department reviewed these charges and found them to be
reasonable. We conclude that the Orphans’ Court’s acceptance of the review
and recommendation of the Guardianship Department did not constitute an
abuse of discretion. See id. (noting that the fees awarded were for services
that furthered the best interests of Long, as required under 20 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5521); see also In re Trust Estate of Pleet, 410 A.2d at 1232.4
Lorenz also contends that the record did not support the trial court’s
award of Caplan’s fees. Brief for Appellant at 39; see also id. at 36, 37.
4
Lorenz also argues that the Orphans’ Court erred in appointing Lazarus as
Long’s guardian. Brief for Appellant at 35. However, Lorenz did not raise
this claim in her Rule 1925(b) Concise Statement; thus, the claim is waived.
See Hess v. Fox Rothschild, LLP, 925 A.2d 798, 803 (Pa. Super. 2007).
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Lorenz argues that the trial court did not hold a hearing on Caplan’s fees,
and only based its award on Caplan’s invoices. Id. at 39. Lorenz further
asserts that Lazarus retained Caplan based upon her own conduct and the
conduct of Petitt, not Lorenz’s conduct; therefore, Long’s estate should not
have to pay the fees. Id.5
When reviewing an Orphans’ Court’s allowance of attorney fees from
an estate, this Court will not interfere with the court’s decision absent a clear
abuse of discretion. In re Estate of Rees, 625 A.2d 1203, 1206 (Pa.
Super. 1993). An attorney who seeks compensation for services from an
estate bears “the burden of establishing facts which show that he or she is
entitled to such compensation.” In re Estate of Sonovick, 541 A.2d 374,
376 (Pa. Super. 1988). The attorney must present evidence that the fees
charged to the estate are reasonable. Id.; see also In re Davidson’s
Estate, 150 A. 152, 152 (Pa. 1930) (stating that any charges against an
estate of an incapacitated person must be “manifestly just and moderate.”)
(citation omitted).
Here, the Orphans’ Court’s Order, which granted Caplan’s Petition for
payment of fees, stated the following:
5
Lorenz also baldly argues that Lazarus did not seek court approval before
retaining Caplan. Brief for Appellant at 36. However, Lorenz does not cite
to any case law demonstrating that this action constituted reversible error.
See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that the argument section must include
“such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”).
Thus, this argument is waived on appeal. See Lackner v. Glosser, 892
A.2d 21, 29 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that failure to cite pertinent authority
results in waiver).
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[U]pon consideration of the foregoing Petition For Approval
of Counsel Fees and Costs to Attorney for Temporary Guardian,
and upon review and recommendation of the Guardianship
Department, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND DECREED that fees
and costs to [Caplan] in the amount of $4,282.10 … for services
through November 27, 2015, and costs incurred, for
representation of the Temporary Guardian of [] Long, an
incapacitated person, are approved. Payments shall be made
from the funds of [] Long, whether such funds are held in the
sole name of [] Long or jointly with another party including his
wife, [] Lorenz, or from funds of [] Long transferred from his
name to another party’s name including his wife, [] Lorenz[,] to
be paid by the Permanent Guardian of the Estate and/or by []
Lorenz upon the presentation of this Order….
Order, 2/2/16.
With regard to Caplan’s request for fees from Long’s estate, the
Orphans’ Court stated that it was
aware of the allegations that Lazarus was threatened with
physical harm, lawsuits, and harm to her business and
reputation. Lazarus needed Caplan’s services due to the lawsuit
threats, lengthy depositions, and requests for production of
documents. The [Orphans’] Court will note that Lorenz and her
attorney greatly contributed to the fees and costs incurred in this
case. But for Lorenz and her counsel’s actions, much of the time
billed by Lazarus and Caplan would not have been necessary.
Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/1/16, at 2.
While Lorenz argued that Petitt’s and Lazarus’s actions necessitated
Caplan’s services, a review of the certified record reveals that “[t]his case
involved highly contentious proceedings,” wherein both parties made
numerous filings. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/1/16, at 2. However, the
Orphans’ Court observed firsthand the actions of Lorenz and her attorney
throughout the proceedings, and found that these specific actions caused
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Lazarus to retain Caplan as counsel. See id. Furthermore, the
Guardianship Department reviewed Caplan’s request for fees and found
them to be reasonable. See Order, 2/2/16. Thus, because the Orphans’
Court had firsthand observations of the conduct of Lorenz and her attorney,
and the Guardianship Department reviewed and accepted Caplan’s fees, we
conclude that the Orphans’ Court did not abuse its discretion. See ACE Am.
Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyds & Cos., 939 A.2d 935, 946 (Pa. Super.
2007) (stating that the trial court acted within its discretionary authority in
deciding a motion for sanctions without conducting an evidentiary hearing,
since the court observed counsel’s actions firsthand); see also Gilmore by
Gilmore v. Dondero, 582 A.2d 1106, 1108 (Pa. Super. 1990) (noting that
“the trial court that has the best opportunity to judge the attorney’s skills,
the effort that was required and actually put forth in the matter at hand, and
the value of that effort at the time and place involved.”) (citation omitted);
In re Estate of Sonovick, 541 A.2d at 376.
Finally, with regard to Lorenz’s claim that the fees should not be paid
from Long’s estate or any joint funds, the Orphans’ Court stated that it
“structured its Order in this fashion because the Court knew that Lorenz
transferred or restricted accounts belonging to Long. Because of the actions
Lorenz made regarding Long’s accounts, the payment of the fees from
accounts in Lorenz’s name is justified.” Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/1/16, at
2. Here, under the 2009 Power of Attorney, Lorenz acted as Long’s agent,
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and managed Long’s financial affairs. The Orphans’ Court did not find that
Lorenz mismanaged Long’s finances or that she committed any wrongdoing.
The Orphans’ Court merely acknowledged that Lorenz’s management of the
Long’s finances caused some of their assets to be comingled. Thus, the
Orphans’ Court did not abuse its discretion in directing from where the fees
in question were to be paid. Based upon the foregoing, Lorenz’s first claim
is without merit.
In her second claim, Lorenz contends that the Orphans’ Court erred in
ordering her to pay the fees to Lazarus Support Services and Caplan out of
her personal accounts. Brief for Appellant at 40. Lorenz argues that this
action by the Orphans’ Court overrode the 2009 Power of Attorney. Id. at
40, 48. Lorenz asserts that the trial court had no basis for the Order other
than its animosity toward Lorenz. Id. at 40; see also id. at 48 (wherein
Lorenz maintains that the Orphans’ Court improperly relied on ex parte
communications to reach its conclusion). Lorenz claims that Long properly
executed the 2009 Power of Attorney, and that Lorenz managed Long’s
physical and financial affairs in accordance with the 2009 Power of Attorney.
Id. at 43-44; see also id. at 45 (wherein Lorenz points out that the
Orphans’ Court found that all parties had the best interests of Long at
heart). Lorenz further argues that she acted in good faith with regard to
Long’s finances, and that she was permitted to use Long’s funds to protect
his interests. Id. at 46, 47. Lorenz also claims that section 5601.3(b) of
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the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code does not require that the
separation of funds of an agent and principal. Id. at 47.
Here, as noted above, the Orphans’ Court Orders do not indicate any
wrongdoing by Lorenz in her role as Long’s agent. There has been no
finding that Lorenz improperly administered Long’s funds or estate. Further,
the Orders do not overturn the 2009 Power of Attorney or require an
accounting of Lorenz’s actions. The Orphans’ Court’s Orders simply
acknowledge that Lorenz had power of attorney over Long, and had
commingled her personal funds with Long’s funds. The Orphans’ Court’s
Orders were based, not on any alleged wrongdoing, but on an effort to
ensure payment. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/1/16, at 2. Thus, Lorenz is
not entitled to relief on her second claim.
In her final claim, Lorenz contends that the Orphans’ Court failed to
apply the correct legal standard in determining that Caplan is entitled to
legal fees. Brief for Appellant at 49. Lorenz argues that generally, each
party pays their own counsel fees, and that such fees are only recoverable
under express statutory authorization. Id. Lorenz asserts that there was no
statutory authorization for Caplan to receive fees from Long’s estate. Id.
“The general rule within this Commonwealth is that each side is
responsible for the payment of its own costs and counsel fees absent bad
faith or vexatious conduct.” McMullen v. Kutz, 985 A.2d 769, 775 (Pa.
2009) (citation omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(9) (stating that
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“[t]he following participants shall be entitled to a reasonable counsel fee as
part of the taxable costs of the matter ... (9) [a]ny participant who is
awarded counsel fees because the conduct of another party in commencing
the matter or otherwise was arbitrary, vexatious or in bad faith.”); In re
Barnes Found., 74 A.3d 129, 136 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that an action
is vexatious if brought without legal or factual grounds, or its sole purpose is
to cause annoyance). “This so-called ‘American Rule’ holds true unless there
is express statutory authorization, a clear agreement of the parties or some
other established exception.” McMullen, 985 A.2d at 775 (citation and
quotation marks omitted).
Here, while Lorenz argues that there is no statutory authority to
support Caplan’s claim for counsel fees, she does not raise any claim with
regard to an award of counsel fees for vexatious conduct. As noted above,
the Orphans’ Court specifically found that but for the actions of Lorenz and
her counsel, including threatening Lazarus with physical harm, lawsuits and
harm to her business, Caplan’s representation and the subsequent fees
would have been unnecessary. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/1/16, at 2;
see also ACE Am. Ins. Co., 939 A.2d at 946. Further, the Guardianship
Department approved the fees, which furthered the best interests of Long.
See Order, 2/2/16; see also Orphans’ Court Opinion, 6/1/16, at 2. Thus,
under the facts of this case, the Orphans’ Court did not abuse its discretion
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in awarding fees to Caplan. See McMullen, 985 A.2d at 775. Accordingly,
Lorenz’s final claim is without merit.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/14/2017
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