Com. v. Harrison, P. ( 2018 )


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  • J-A08035-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                 :
    :
    v.                    :
    :
    PATRICK HARRISON,                         :
    :
    Appellant                : No. 2659 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 15, 2016
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010296-2013,
    CP-51-CR-0010297-2013, CP-51-CR-0010308-2013
    BEFORE:      PANELLA, LAZARUS, and STRASSBURGER*, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:                         FILED MAY 30, 2018
    Patrick Harrison (Appellant) appeals from the August 15, 2016 judgment
    of sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of several counts of simple
    assault, recklessly endangering another person, and firearms violations.
    Upon review, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand for a
    new trial.
    Appellant’s convictions arose from an incident that occurred on a street
    in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On July 23, 2013, at about 9:00 p.m., Edward
    Brown (Brown) was sitting in the driver’s seat of his parked vehicle, along with
    his wife in the passenger seat, talking to their 17-year old son through the
    passenger window. Brown heard a gunshot. Looking in his car’s mirrors and
    rear window, Brown saw someone pointing a gun in the direction of Brown’s
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A08035-18
    vehicle.   A second gunshot followed, which shattered the rear window of
    Brown’s vehicle. The gunshots did not strike any people. Brown later identified
    Appellant as the shooter, and he was arrested and charged with numerous
    offenses, including aggravated assault, simple assault, firearms violations,
    and criminal mischief.
    On April 29, 2016, a jury found Appellant guilty of three counts each of
    simple assault and recklessly endangering another person, and two firearms
    violations. Further, in a stipulated trial on the same day, the trial court found
    Appellant guilty of an additional firearms violation. On August 15, 2016, the
    trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of three and one-half to
    seven years of incarceration, followed by two years of probation. Appellant
    timely filed a notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court complied
    with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    On appeal, Appellant sets forth one issue for our review: “Did not the
    trial court err in allowing the prosecutor, over objection, to cross-examine
    [Appellant] about his religious beliefs and willingness to swear on the Bible?”
    Appellant’s Brief at 3 (answer omitted).
    We provide the following background. At trial, Appellant testified on his
    own behalf, first affirming he would testify truthfully. See Trial Court Opinion,
    4/26/2017, at 17 (“[Appellant] made an affirmation to testify truthfully by
    raising his right hand like every other witness during trial.”). Then, on cross-
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    examination, while the prosecutor questioned Appellant about whether he
    recognized Brown, the following exchange occurred:
    [PROSECUTOR:] What you’re saying is when you went to another
    hearing that’s when you recognized [Brown], right?
    [APPELLANT:] That’s when -- yea.
    [PROSECUTOR:] That’s when you realized, oh my God, that was
    that guy who I saw in the police district when I got arrested?
    [APPELLANT:] Well, I didn’t say because I don’t like to say, oh,
    my God, I don’t like to use God’s name because he’s the judge of
    us all. So I like to use a term more frequent like, oh, no, you
    know, like they’re really doing this to me. That’s how I felt,
    because like, you know, I got goals in my life. Like I just finished
    school. I’m trying air conditioning/refrigeration, so everything
    had to stop for me.
    ***
    [PROSECUTOR:] So you don’t like to use the Lord’s name in vain?
    [APPELLANT:] No, a God-fearing man.
    ***
    [PROSECUTOR:] But you don’t know [Brown] right, never met
    him before?
    [APPELLANT:] No.
    [PROSECUTOR:] No anger towards him or anything?
    [APPELLANT:] Anger rests in the bosom of fools.[1]
    N.T., 4/27/2016, at 160-62.
    ____________________________________________
    1According to the Commonwealth, this is a quote from “Ecclesiastes 7:9 (King
    James [v]ersion).” Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-11.
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    Subsequently, and after an unrelated and nonreligious line of
    questioning, the prosecutor raised the issue of whether Appellant swore or
    would be willing to swear on the Bible:
    [PROSECUTOR:] Sir, when you swore to tell the truth today, did
    you put your hand on that [B]ible?
    [APPELLANT:] I didn’t have to, did I?
    [PROSECUTOR:] I’m asking you, did you?
    [APPELLANT:] I didn’t have to, did I?
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Your Honor, I object [t]o the last question.
    He wasn’t asked to do that. He was just asked to simply raise his
    right hand, and swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing
    but the truth. He was not asked to put his hand on the [B]ible,
    and not a single witness who has testified in this trial has been
    asked to do that.
    [PROSECUTOR:] That may be, Your Honor, and I missed that,
    and if that’s the case, I’ll withdraw that. But I would ask if you’d
    have a problem swearing, on the [B]ible that you were telling the
    truth this entire time. Do you have a problem doing that?
    [APPELLANT:] This is probably why you have problems, because
    Jesus Christ said you’re not supposed to swear at all. Swearing is
    an omen only given to God.
    [PROSECTOR:] Very well said. Would you put your hand on that
    [B]ible and swear that everything you said today --
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Objection, you’re asking this person to do
    something different that every other person --
    [APPELLANT:] I don’t swear at all.
    THE COURT: I know counsel is asking him to do that. I suppose
    he’s asking hypothetically. Counsel?
    [PROSECUTOR:] Thank you.
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    [DEFENSE COUNSEL:]       He didn’t ask the other witnesses that
    hypothetically.
    THE COURT: Overruled, counsel.
    [PROSECUTOR:] You can answer the question. You don’t swear
    on the [B]ible, right?
    [APPELLANT:] No, sir.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] And I once again, I object. Everybody was
    asked to swear or affirm. No one comes in here --
    THE COURT: Counsel, nobody talked about religion like this
    witness either. So he opened the door to some of those questions.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL:]       Actually the person who started talking
    about this --
    THE COURT: Actually, we’re not going to go too far --
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Was the DA.
    THE COURT: I’m talking right now. And I know no one else is
    talking when I talk. Now we’re not going to go too far down that
    line.
    [PROSECUTOR:] I’m done with that line of questioning, Judge.
    N.T., 4/27/2016, at 163-65.
    On appeal, Appellant argues the trial court erred in overruling the
    objections to this line of questioning about swearing on the Bible. According
    to Appellant, this is banned explicitly by 42 Pa.C.S. § 5902(b) and the relevant
    case law. See Appellant’s Brief at 10-14. The Commonwealth responds that,
    by raising his religious beliefs, Appellant opened the door to this line of
    questioning, and thus it was permitted. Commonwealth’s Brief at 8-13.
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    We review this claim mindful of the following.         “The admission of
    evidence is a matter vested within the sound discretion of the trial court, and
    such a decision shall be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court
    abused its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 
    84 A.3d 736
    , 749 (Pa.
    Super. 2014). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but
    is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of
    judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-
    will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” 
    Id.
    In Pennsylvania, all testifying witnesses must either take an oath or
    affirm they will testify truthfully.2 Further, in Pennsylvania, witnesses cannot
    be questioned about their religious beliefs. Section 5902(b) provides:
    ____________________________________________
    2   42 Pa.C.S. § 5901 provides:
    (a) General rule.--Every witness, before giving any testimony
    shall take an oath in the usual or common form, by laying the
    hand upon an open copy of the Holy Bible, or by lifting up the right
    hand and pronouncing or assenting to the following words: “I, A.
    B., do swear by Almighty God, the searcher of all hearts, that I
    will [_____], and that as I shall answer to God at the last great
    day.” Which oath so taken by persons who conscientiously refuse
    to take an oath in the common form shall be deemed and taken
    in law to have the same effect as an oath taken in common form.
    (b) Right to affirm.--The affirmation may be administered in any
    judicial proceeding instead of the oath, and shall have the same
    effect and consequences, and any witness who desires to affirm
    shall be permitted to do so.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 5901; see also Pa.R.E. 603 (“Before testifying, a witness must
    give an oath or affirmation to testify truthfully. It must be in a form designed
    to impress that duty on the witness’s conscience.”).
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    (b) Religious belief may not be shown.—No witness shall be
    questioned, in any judicial proceeding, concerning his religious
    belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject, for the
    purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility.
    42 Pa.C.S. § 5902(b).
    This section “prohibits the use of a witness’[s] religious belief or
    affiliation to bolster or impeach his credibility.” Commonwealth v. Myer, 
    489 A.2d 900
    , 905-06 (Pa. Super. 1985).              “The prosecutor’s intentions
    notwithstanding, questions concerning [a witness’s] religious beliefs may not
    be asked[.] … This statute is firmly grounded in prohibitions against religious
    persecution found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
    and [] Art. I § 3 of the Pennsylvania Constitution[.]”      Commonwealth v.
    Eubanks, 
    512 A.2d 619
    , 622 (Pa. 1986). “Whether evidence [of religious
    beliefs], admitted in violation of a statute, actually deprives a defendant of his
    right to a fair trial must be viewed in light of the attendant circumstances.”
    Commonwealth v. Mimms, 
    385 A.2d 334
    , 336 n.8 (Pa. 1978).
    This Court addressed this issue in Commonwealth v. Fawcett, 
    443 A.2d 1172
     (Pa. Super. 1982). On direct examination of a prosecution witness,
    the following occurred:
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY: “Do you understand the meaning of the
    oath that you took when you took the stand?”
    WITNESS: “Yes, sir.”
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY: “Do you believe in a Supreme Being or a
    God?”
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    DEFENSE COUNSEL: “Your Honor, we object. I don’t see the
    relevancy of this at all-”
    THE COURT: “[Defense counsel], before the Supreme God strikes
    you down, you better-I’ll just say that I’ll overrule your objection
    and allow an exception on the record for you and allow her to state
    her belief.”
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY: “Do you believe in a Supreme Being or a
    God?”
    WITNESS: “Yes, I do.”
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY: “You’re aware that you swore or affirmed
    an oath to tell the truth at this time?”
    WITNESS: “Yes.”
    DISTRICT ATTORNEY: “Is the recollection of the incidents that
    took place October 31, 1976, as you have related to the jury, the
    truth?”
    WITNESS: “Yes.”
    Fawcett, A.2d at 1176 (internal citation omitted). Fawcett was convicted.
    On appeal, the Commonwealth conceded that this line of questioning was
    improper. Finding that “such questions are expressly prohibited” by section
    5902(b), this Court held that the trial court erred in overruling this objection.
    
    Id. at 1176-77
    . Accordingly, this Court vacated Fawcett’s judgment of
    sentence and remanded for a new trial. 
    Id. at 1177
    .
    In this case, the Commonwealth acknowledges that “[i]t is improper to
    question an accused about his religious beliefs and exploit those beliefs to
    impugn his credibility.”    Commonwealth’s Brief at 9.        Nevertheless, the
    Commonwealth maintains that its questioning was proper.           We disagree.
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    Appellant’s religious beliefs were irrelevant to any issue at trial and had not
    been elicited during the direct examination of Appellant. Appellant had been
    duly sworn in the same manner as all other witnesses at trial. Trial Court
    Opinion, 4/26/2017, at 17.     Nonetheless, the prosecutor, in an effort to
    impeach Appellant’s credibility, repeatedly asked whether he had or was
    willing to put his hand on the Bible and swear that he was telling the truth.
    N.T., 4/27/2016, at 163-65. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that this
    line of questioning during Appellant’s cross-examination plainly violated 42
    Pa.C.S. § 5902(b), and the trial court erred in not sustaining Appellant’s
    objections.
    Even assuming that Appellant opened the door with his reference to God
    and quote from the Bible (see Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-11, 13), Appellant
    would still be entitled to relief. In Commonwealth v. Greenwood, 
    413 A.2d 655
    , 657 n.3 (Pa. 1980), our Supreme Court held that the trial court
    committed reversible error by permitting testimony about religious beliefs that
    was “totally irrelevant and served no useful purpose.”          Rejecting the
    Commonwealth’s argument that Greenwood had opened the door to these
    questions on direct examination, our Supreme Court vacated Greenwood’s
    judgment of sentence and ordered a new trial. 
    Id.
     at 657 n.3. Thus, even if
    Appellant opened the door, the testimony at issue here was irrelevant and
    served no useful purpose. Accordingly, we do not find the Commonwealth’s
    argument persuasive.
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    Finally, we conclude that the admission of this testimony was not
    harmless error.    The prosecutor’s impeachment tactics, which expressly
    violated a statute and have no relevance to the issues in the case, are not
    harmless error. See Mimms, 385 A.2d. at 336 (footnote omitted) (“[T]he
    impeachment tactics that were employed by the prosecution in violation of an
    express act of legislature cannot, in the context of the present case, be
    considered harmless.”).
    Accordingly, we vacate Appellant’s judgment of sentence and remand
    for a new trial.
    Judgment of sentence vacated. Remanded for a new trial. Jurisdiction
    relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/30/18
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2659 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 5/30/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/30/2018