Com. v. Fairfield, M. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MICHAEL FAIRFIELD,
Appellant No. 1038 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence entered June 13, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County,
Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-07-CR-0001174-2016.
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J. and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED MARCH 19, 2018
Michael Fairchild appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after
a jury convicted him of aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another
person, and simple assault.1 Finding no merit to Fairchild’s claim that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the pertinent facts presented at Fairchild’s
jury trial as follows:
During the first day of trial, [the victim] testified. She
confirmed that she was in [a] relationship with [Fairchild]
for seven (7) years, that at one time she loved him and
that they lived together at 311 Howard Avenue, Altoona.
[The victim] broke up with [Fairchild] several weeks prior
to the subject incident date of May 20, 2016 and she
started dating another individual. She indicated that
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2705, and 2701(a)(1), respectively.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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[Fairchild] was jealous. [The victim] then described the
incident that occurred on May 20-21, 2016 after she and
[Fairchild] had attended a bonfire together at a neighbor’s
house. She described [Fairchild] as becoming angry;
throwing things; striking her in the head with a
lampshade; pushing her down on the mattress when she
asked him to leave and asking for sex; throwing cans of
beer across the room off the wall, etc., leading up to her
description that she “felt a big hit behind me.” [The
victim] testified that she felt pain on her left side around
her ribcage and described the pain as being a 10 on a 1 to
10 scale. She had trouble breathing and she advised
[Fairchild] that she needed help. [The victim] also
testified that [Fairchild] told her to tell the police that she
fell down the steps, which she refused to do. She was
taken to the hospital, underwent surgery and remained in
the hospital for several days.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/17, 6-7 (citations omitted).
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth presented a motion in limine, seeking
permission to admit evidence of prior acts of domestic violence between
Fairchild and the victim. In granting the motion, the trial court specifically
noted, “In so ruling, however, if [Fairchild] testifies, he will be permitted to
testify as to ‘his side’ of each and every such domestic incident. The trial
court will provide a cautionary instruction to the jury[.]” Trial Court Opinion,
3/27/17, at 4.
In addition to the victim’s testimony, the Commonwealth presented
testimony from a 911 dispatcher, the police officers involved in the
investigation of the case, and a medical doctor with regard to the extent of
the victim’s injuries. Fairchild did not testify, and presented no other
evidence. According to the trial court, Fairchild “opted not to testify, as
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confirmed after colloquy outside the presence of the jury. It was clear,
however, from the questions posed by [defense counsel] during cross-
examination of [the victim], and in both his opening statement and closing
argument, that the defense was that [Fairchild] lacked the requisite criminal
intent to support the most serious charge” of aggravated assault. Trial
Court Opinion, 8/10/17, at 9.
The jury convicted Fairchild of the above charges.2 On June 13, 2017,
the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of four to ten years of
incarceration. This timely appeal follows. Both Fairchild and the trial court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Fairfield raises the following issue on appeal:
I. Whether the [trial court] abused its discretion when
it admitted evidence of prior alleged domestic abuse
in this case.
Fairchild’s Brief at 4.
“Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court
and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused
its discretion.” Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 808 A.2d 893, 904 (Pa.
2002). “An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but is
rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of
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2The trial court also found Fairchild guilty of a summary harassment charge.
18 Pa.C.S.A. 2709(a)(1).
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judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-
will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v.
Harris, 884 A.2d 920, 924 (Pa. Super. 2005).
The admissibility of prior bad acts of a defendant is governed by
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 404(b), which reads as follows:
Rule 404. Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts
***
(b) Crimes, Wrongs, or Other Acts.
(1) Prohibited uses. Evidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character
in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.
(2) Permitted Uses. This evidence may be admissible
for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or lack of accident. In a
criminal case this evidence is admissible only if the
probative value of the evidence outweighs its potential
for unfair prejudice.
Pa.R.E. 404(b)(1)-(2). “[E]vidence of prior crimes is not admissible for the
sole purpose of demonstrating a criminal defendant’s propensity to commit
crimes.” Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1283
(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc). Nevertheless, “[e]vidence may be admissible
in certain circumstances where it is relevant for some other legitimate
purpose and not utilized solely to blacken the defendant’s character.” Id.
Specifically, evidence of other crimes or bad acts is admissible if offered for
a non-propensity purpose, such as proof of an actor’s knowledge, plan,
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motive, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Commonwealth v.
Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501 (Pa. 2005). When offered for a legitimate purpose,
evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is admissible if its probative value
outweighs its potential for unfair prejudice. Commonwealth v. Hairston,
84 A.2d 657 (Pa. 2014).
Here, the trial court recounted the manner in which Fairchild’s prior
bad acts were admitted at trial:
During the trial, we permitted the victim to testify about
prior incidents when she suffered physical and/or
emotional abuse at the hands of [Fairchild]. She indicated
that [Fairchild] has hurt her “a lot” and that he would lose
his temper, become angry, blame her and later apologize.
She said the first time abuse occurred was when she was
at a hotel and her ex-husband was helping her and
[Fairchild] believed that she was getting back together
with her ex. [The victim] claimed that [Fairchild] became
angry, took a phone and “. . . hit it on the bed but it come
up and split my lip”.
[The Commonwealth] asked whether there were other
times that [Fairchild] hurt her resulting in injuries, which
led to a sidebar discussion on the record with counsel. It
was at that time that [defense counsel] interposed an
objection to any testimony about these prior incidents of
domestic abuse.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/17, at 7-8 (citations omitted).
The trial court overruled defense counsel’s objection, but gave the
following cautionary instruction to the jury:
Members of the jury, [the Commonwealth] has started
asking [the victim] about prior incidents that allegedly
occurred between her and Mr. Fairchild. The general rule
is that evidence of prior criminal acts cannot be
considered, cannot be considered by a jury in determining
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whether [Fairchild] is guilty of the act for which he is
charged here. That’s the general rule. In this case,
however, this admission of evidence of prior domestic
incidents which allegedly occurred between [the victim]
and [Fairchild] are being admitted for the limited purpose,
the limited purpose, to prove motive and intent, absence
of mistake, or accident. As with all of the evidence that
may be presented to you during this trial you afford this
evidence whatever weight that you deem it appropriate.
Thank you.
N.T., 3/30/17, at 50-51.
The Commonwealth then continued its direct examination of the
victim, and elicited testimony about another prior incident that occurred
when Fairchild injured her collarbone while they were both living in Altoona.
The victim further testified that Fairchild would emotionally abuse her, and
that she tried to leave several times, but Fairchild would prevent her from
doing so. Defense counsel was given the opportunity to cross-examine the
victim about these prior incidents. During its closing charge to the jury, the
trial court repeated the above cautionary instruction. N.T., 3/31/17, at 55.
The trial court found no merit to Fairchild’s appellate claim:
[W]e respectfully submit that the evidence of the prior bad
acts of domestic violence between [Fairchild] and [the
victim] was highly relevant and probative and admissible
under Pa.R.E. 404(b)(2) as proving motive, opportunity,
intent, absence of mistake and/or lack of accident.
Further, we provided the jury the cautionary instruction as
set forth above so that the jurors would understand the
limited purpose for which this evidence was offered at the
time of trial.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/10/17, at 11. We agree.
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In support of his issue on appeal, Fairchild argues that the allegations
of prior abuse were “highly prejudicial.” Fairchild’s Brief at 6. In addition,
he states that the prior incidents were “remote, vague and unsubstantiated.”
Id. According to Fairchild, the evidence of prior incidents of domestic abuse
had “very little [probative] value,” and any probative value “was greatly
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.” Id.
Fairchild cites no relevant case law to support his argument. Indeed,
our precedent has consistently held that evidence of prior abuse between a
defendant and an abused victim is generally admissible to establish motive,
intent, malice, or ill-will. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241
(Pa. Super. 2016). Moreover, evidence of such prior bad acts may be
introduced to prove consciousness of guilt, i.e., that the defendant was
aware of his wrongdoing. Id. Such prior incidents are also admissible and
relevant to show the continual nature of abuse. See Drumheller, 808 A.2d
at 905 (affirming the admission of past PFA violations by the defendant
against the murdered spouse). In fact, as to intent in particular, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has reasoned that when attempting “to
discover the intent accompanying the act in question[,]” the “prior doing of
similar acts,” is “useful as reducing the possibility that the act in question
was done with innocent intent.” Commonwealth v. Donahue, 549 A.2d
121, 126 (Pa. 1988) (quoting II Wigmore on Evidence, § 302, at 241).
Stated differently, the fact that prior similar instances of abuse occurred
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lessens the chance that the act for which the defendant is on trial was
unintentional.
Fairchild’s claims to the contrary are without merit. “Although
evidence of prior occurrences which is too remote is not properly
admissible[,] it is generally true that remoteness of the prior instances of
hostility and strained relations affects the weight of the evidence and not its
admissibility.” Commonwealth v. Ulatoski, 371 A.2d 186, 191 (Pa. 1977)
(citation and footnote omitted). However, “no rigid rule, can be formulated
for determining when such evidence is no longer relevant.” Id. “What that
limit of time should be must depend largely on the circumstances of each
case, and ought always to be left to the discretion of the trial court.” Id. at
191-92. Here, although the prior incidents admitted at trial spanned the
entire course of the victim and Fairchild’s relationship, we cannot conclude
that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the prior incidents on
this basis. Drumheller, supra.
Moreover, our review of the victim’s testimony refutes Fairchild’s claim
that her description of the prior incidents of abuse was vague. We note
further that the prior incidents of abuse need not be substantiated in order
to be admissible. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Chandler, 721 A.2d 1040,
1044 n.7 (Pa. 1998) (explaining that “[i]f competent, evidence of prior
abusive conduct, whether charged or uncharged, constitutes relevant and
admissible evidence”). As with Fairchild’s remoteness claim, the fact that
there was no other evidence to corroborate the victim’s account of the prior
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abuse goes to the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility. Ulatoski,
supra.
Finally, we find no merit to Fairchild’s claim that the prior incidents of
abuse admitted at trial were unduly prejudicial. As our Supreme Court has
recently explained, “[T]he trial court is not required to sanitize the trial to
eliminate all unpleasant facts from the jury’s consideration where those facts
are relevant to the issues at hand, and form part of the history and natural
development of the events and offenses for which the defendant is charged.”
Commonwealth v. Hairston, 84 A.3d 657, 666 (Pa. 2014) (citation
omitted). Although, by their very nature, evidence of prior bad acts is
prejudicial to a criminal defendant, the acts at issue in this case were not
unduly prejudicial. This is especially true, when, as in this case, the trial
court twice gave a cautionary instruction as to how the jury was to limit its
consideration of this evidence. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Claypool,
495 A.2d 176, 179-80 (Pa. 1985) (concluding that the trial court’s giving of
a detailed cautionary instruction was sufficient to overcome prejudicial effect
of the introduction of prior bad acts evidence). A jury is presumed to follow
the trial court’s instructions. Commonwealth v. Faurelus, 147 A.3d 905,
915 (Pa. Super. 2016).
In sum, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
the evidence of prior incidents of abuse perpetrated by Fairchild against the
victim, we affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 3/19/2018
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